Political Theory in the Welfare State

248 Pages·1990·11.294 MB·English

by  Niklas Luhmann

Niklas Luhmann
Political Theory in the Welfare State
Copyright © 1981 by Günter Olzog Verlag GmbH, München,
from Niklas Luhmann, Politische Theorie im Wohlfahrtsstaat.
Copyright © 1987 by Westdeutscher Verlag, Opladen,
from Soziologische Aufklärung IV. Beiträge zur funktionalen Differenzierung
der Gesellschaft, pp. 74-103, 117-125, 126-132, 152-160.
Chapter I: The Representation of Society within Society was first published in:
Current Sociology, Vol. 35, No. 2, Summer 1987, pp. 101 —108,
SAGE Publications.
Niklas Luhmann
Political Theory
in the Welfare State
Translated and introduced by John Bednarz Jr.
W
Walter de Gruyter
DE
G Berlin · New York 1990
Dr. sc. pol. Niklas Luhmann
Professor of Sociology at the Faculty of Sociology,
Universität Bielefeld, Federal Republic of Germany
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Luhmann, Niklas
[Politische Theorie im Wohlfahrtsstaat. English]
Political theory in the welfare state / Niklas Luhmann ;
translated by John Bednarz, Jr.
Rev. translation of: Politische Theorie im Wohlfahrtsstaat.
1981.
ISBN 0-89925-554-X (U. S.)
1. Welfare state. I. Title.
JC263.L8313 1990 89-23804
361,6'5-dc20 CIP
Deutsche Bibliothek Cataloging in Publication Data
Luhmann, Niklas:
Political theory in the welfare state / Niklas Luhmann. Transi,
by John Bednarz Jr. — Berlin ; New York : de Gruyter, 1990
Einheitssacht.: Politische Theorie im Wohlfahrtsstaat
<engl.>
ISBN 3-11-011932-3
® Printed on acid free paper
© Copyright 1990 by Walter de Gruyter & Co., D-1000 Berlin 30.
All rights reserved, including those of translation into foreign languages. No
part of this book may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any
means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopy, recording, or any infor-
mation storage and retrieval system, without permission in writing from the
publisher.
Printed in Germany
Typesetting: Arthur Collignon GmbH, Berlin. — Printing: Gerike GmbH, Berlin.
— Binding: Dieter Mikolai, Berlin. —Cover Design: Johannes Rother, Berlin.
Contents
0 Translator's Introduction 1
1 The Representation of Society Within Society 11
II Political Theory in the Welfare State 21
III State and Politics: Towards a Semantics of the
Self-Description of Political Systems 117
IV Societal Foundations of Power: Increase and Distribution . 155
V The Theory of Political Opposition 167
VI Two Sides of the State Founded on Law 187
VII Societal Complexity and Public Opinion 203
VIII Participation and Legitimation: The Ideas and the
Experiences 219
IX The Future of Democracy 231

0. Translator's Introduction
Political Theory in the Welfare State [Politische Theorie im Wohl-
fahrtsstaat] was originally published (Olzog, Munich) in 1981. The
present English translation, which is an enlarged version of this text,
differs from the original in that it contains material that has been
written and published subsequently, in addition to material that appears
here for the first time. In a way this should come as no surprise to
those familiar with the work of its author. But for someone who is
coming to Luhmann for the first time I would like to explain that
throughout a very productive career the author has continually devel-
oped and refined his position. This is readily apparent to anyone who
reads works of Luhmann's that are separated by even as few as five
years.
In large part, this is the situation with the present work. Although
not written, as a single piece, but arranged as a compilation of works
of varying length from relatively different periods, it is unified by its
theme in a way that allows the reader to follow the more recent
developments of its author's thinking that would not have been possible
even for the reader of the original work. This, of course, should not
be read as a rejection in any way of the contents of the original — on
the contrary, all but the original's concluding chapter is included
unchanged here in the English translation — but as an explanation of
the fact that the author has continued to pursue this theme and wishes
to present the results of his more recent efforts here.
Political Theory in the Welfare State is, as its title indicates, a
theoretical work. But it is also more than this. It brings together a
general theoretical model — in this case, systems-theory - with a
specific empirical content — the political system — both in order to
locate what Luhmann believes is the central problem in the latter as it
has developed to the present and to suggest the direction theory must
take in order to deal with it more satisfactorily. In this way Political
Theory in the Welfare State tries to accomplish for the political system
what other works by Luhmann — Die Funktion der Religion, Refle-
2 Translator's Introduction
xionsprobleme im Erziehungssystem, Rechtssoziologie, Liebe als Pas-
sion and Die Wirtschaft der Gesellschaft — have done for other social
systems — for the systems of religion, education, law, the family and
the economy respectively. This also indicates the key to understanding
the work. The disclosure of this key is, I believe, at the very least
extremely helpful, if not downright indispensable, not only because it
reveals the uniqueness and originality of Luhmann's approach (which
might serve to cause problems in the comprehension of a thematic
content — viz. politics — with such a long and established conceptual
tradition of its own) but also, and perhaps more importantly, because
it focuses attention on the central problem and the way in which
Luhmann approaches its solution. The key of which I speak here is
the idea of the functional differentiation of society. This idea provides
the context within which the themes of Political Theory in the Welfare
State become clear.
The functional differentiation of society is at the very core of
Luhmann's general theory of society. It signifies the distinct way in
which modern society has evolved. It is an historical achievement of
society itself that is preceded by other modes of differentiation.
Initially, society (archaic, pre-civilized societies) was differentiated
by means of segmentation. Here a defining feature of society is the
essential equality of its differentiation. Society is differentiated into
subsystems whose principles of self-selective system formation are
either descent, settlement or a combination of both. Inequality, of
course, may occur here, but only as an effect of environmental condi-
tions. It does not possess a systematic function itself.
Inequality acquires a systematic function, i. e. it becomes a principle
of self-selective system formation, only with the advent of stratified
(traditional) societies. In this case society is differentiated in terms of
strata (subsystems) that are essentially unequal due to differences of
wealth and power. Equality occurs in this case only within a stratum.
And because of its hierarchical structure the whole of traditional society
could be — and indeed was — represented by one part (stratum,
subsystem): the top of the hierarchy, the highest stratum.
By the end of the eighteenth century this situation had changed.
Modern society was no longer differentiated by means of stratification,
but by means of function. Functional differentiation means that the
subsystems of society are assigned their own separate functions. They
Translator's Introduction 3
become, in Luhmann's terminology, "function systems." And while the
principle of self-selective system formation in preceding forms of dif-
ferentiation had been based either on equality (segmentation) or ine-
quality (stratification), functional differentiation includes both of these.
It is unequal because no function system can ever substitute for (perform
the function of) another. But at the same time functional differentiation
is equal because there must be "equal" access for everyone to all
function systems. In other words, the respective environments of the
different function systems are viewed (by each function system) as an
environment of equals.
An important consequence of the functional differentiation of mod-
ern society is the resulting autonomy of the separate function systems.
Autonomy corresponds to the above mentioned inequality of function
systems, and, in Luhmann's terminology, it signifies that function
systems constitute themselves "self-referentially" (reflexively). Through
the development of their own codes and programs the separate function
systems are specialized to different functions and operate exclusively
on the basis of these codes and programs. In this way their specific
modes of operation are closed to other systems and operate only on
themselves. Of course, this closure in no way precludes the capacity
of one function system to react to ("to observe" in Luhmann's termi-
nology) other function systems, quite the contrary. But it does mean
that any function system reacts to changes in its environment (to
changes in other function systems) only in accordance with its own
specific mode of operation (its own codes and programs).
Self-referentiality (reflexivity) is infected with a particularly insidious
theoretical flaw. Its direct or immediate operation is tautologous,
empty. This "symmetry" of direct self-reference has to be interrupted,
refracted, "asymmetricized," in Luhmann's terminology. One way
asymmetry can (indeed must) be introduced into the self-referential
operations of function systems (in order for them to operate non-
tautologously, non-emptily) is through the use of time. Another is
structurally through the introduction of internal differentiation, i. e. a
system/environment difference within a system.
Self-referentiality can be "interrupted," "refracted" [unterbrochen],
only be choosing system-external reference points that specify to what
in the environment of a system the system will react and to what it
will be indifferent. These are not external points of contact or exchange
4 Translator's Introduction
between the system and its environment but rather aspects of the
system's environment that it can observe from within and use to guide
its own operation. Time, for instance, according to Luhmann, provides
such system-external reference points.
In contrast to an understanding of time as (the experience of) motion
or its measurement, Luhmann defines it as, "the interpretation of reality
with regard to the difference (emphasis added) between past and
future." An extremely important consequence of this interpretation is
the pre-eminence accorded the present as the ultimate integrator of
time and reality. Everything must start from, take its point of departure
in, the present — any present — because this is what distinguishes
(differentiates) the two temporal horizons: the present past (the past
for this present) and the present future (the future for the same present).
These two horizons — especially the future — provide the system-
external reference points that "interrupt," "refract," the self-referen-
tiality of system operations. A system, then, is able to base the selection
of its operations on the prospect of future (external) states; either in
the sense of trying to achieve such states or trying to avoid them. It
goes outside itself to "recruit," as Luhmann says, the "additional
meaning" [Zusatzsinn] (system-external reference points) necessary to
"fill" the emptiness, tautology, that results from the direct operation
self-reference — e. g. "legal is what is legal." In this sense self-reference
is at the same time other-reference. It can operate non-tautologously,
non emptily, only if it is "refracted," "interrupted," by passing through
external reference points; even if these external reference points are
merely possible future states of the system.
This general theoretical context is a direct consequence of the func-
tional differentiation of society. It holds for all differentiated function
systems; of course, in different ways depending on the way they have
separately evolved. The political system is one of these.
Traditional (pre-modern) society had been differentiated by means
of stratification. Politically this meant a hierarchical order of domi-
nation [Herrschaft] whose top, highest level could plausibly claim to
represent the whole of society ("l'état c'est moi"). With the transition
to modern society this was changed by the new mode of differentiation.
No function sytem could claim to perform the function of (to replace)
any other. Society was deprived of any "privileged place" (top, center)
from which it could be represented as such. This effect, of course, was