Plurality and Continuity: An Essay in G.F. Stout’s Theory of Universals

161 Pages·1985·3.471 MB·English

by  David A. J. Seargent (auth.)

PLURALITY AND CONTINUITY
NIJHOFF INTERNATIONAL PHILOSOPHY SERIES
VOLUME 21
General Editor: JAN T.J. SRZEDNICKI (Contributions to Philosophy)
Editor: LYNNE M. BROUGHTON (Applying Philosophy)
Editorial Advisory Board:
R.M. Chisholm, Brown University, Rhode Island. Mats Furberg, G6teborg
University, D.A.T. Gasking, University of Melbourne, H.L.A. Hart, University
College, Oxford. S. Korner, University of Bristol and Yale University.
H.J. McCloskey, La Trobe University, Bundoora, Melbourne. J. Passmore,
Australian National University, Canberra. A. Quinton, Trinity College, Oxford.
Nathan Rotenstreich, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem. Franco Spisani,
Centro Superiore di Logica e, Scienze Comparate, Bologna. S.J. Surma,
Auckland University, New Zealand. R. Ziedins, Waikato University, New
Zealand.
For a list of other volumes in this series see final page of the volume.
David A.l. Seargent
Plurality and Continuity
An Essay in G.F. Stout's
Theory of Universals
1985 MARTIN US NIJHOFF PUBLISHERS
a member of the KLUWER ACADEMIC PUBLISHERS GROUP
DORDRECHT ! BOSTON ! LANCASTER
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Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data
Seargent, David A.
Plurality and continuity.
(Nijhoff international philosophy series; v. 21)
Bibliography' p.
Includes index.
1. Stout, George Frederick, 1860-1944--Contributions
in theory of universals. 2. Universals (Philosophy)-
History--20th century. I. Title. II. Series.
B1667.S374S42 1985 111'.2 85-10621
ISBN-13: 978-94-010-8769-8 e-ISBN-13: 978-94-009-5131-0
DOl: 10.1 007/978-94-009-5131-0
Copyright
© 1985 by Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Dordrecht.
Softcover reprint of the hardcover 1s t edition 1985
All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a
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The Netherlands.
For Bill Daniela
VII
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
The following persons have helped me greatly by their guidance and criticism
during the preparation of this work: Drs. R. Robinson, J. Lee, Dr. Dockrill and
Professor W.V. Doniela of the University of Newcastle (New South Wales) and
Professors D.M. Armstrong and K. Campbell of Sydney. I would also like to
thank the latter for making available unpublished work and for extending
permission for the free use of passages from this material. I am also indebted to
Professor D.W. Hamlyn, who, as editor of Mind, granted me permission to
quote freely from that journal. and to Mrs. Owen, widow of Professor G.E.L.
Owen, for permission to quote from her late husband's paper 'Inherence'.
Due to the nature of this volumne, rather extensive use has been made of
quotations from a variety of monographs and journals, and this would not have
been possible without the kind permission of the following publishers:
Wadsworth, Indiana University Press, The British Academy, Cambridge
University Press, University of Chicago Press, Oxford University Press, Van
Gorcum, Routledge and Kegan Paul. The Catholic University of America, The
Aristotelian Society, The Australasian Journal of Philosophy and the Journal of
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
DAJS
October 1984
IX
ABBREVIATIONS OF MAJOR WORKS CITED
APP Armstrong and Properties as Particulars (K. Campbell).
AR Appearance and Reality (F.H. Bradley).
ASR Alleged Self-contradictions in the Concept of Relation (G.F. Stout).
CM The Concept of Mind (G. Ryle).
CPT Are the Characteristics of Particular Things Universal or Particular?
(G.E. Moore, G.F. Stout & G. Dawes Hicks).
DUC Distributive Unity as a 'Category' (G.F. Stout).
E Error (G.F. Stout).
EGL The Early Growth of Logic in the Child (B. Inhelder & J. Piaget).
GN God and Nature (G.F. Stout).
HY One Hundred Years of Philosophy (J. Passmore).
I Inherence (G.E.L. Owen).
LPV From a Logical Point of View (W.V.O. Quine).
M Metaphysics (R. Taylor).
MAP The Metaphysics of Abstract Particulars (K. Campbell).
MI Metaphysics: An Introduction (K. Campbell).
NE The Nature of Existence (J. McTaggart).
NU The Nature of Universals (N. Kemp Smith).
NUP The Nature of Universals and Propositions (G.F. Stout).
OM The One and the Many (G.B. Matthews & S.M. Cohen).
OP On Properties (H. Putnam).
OTB The Object of Thought and Real Being (G.F. Stout).
OU On Universals (N. Wolterstorff).
PA The Particularisation of Attributes (J. Levinson).
PL The Principles of Logic (F.H. Bradley).
PP The Problems of Philosophy (B. Russell).
PRE Properties and Related Entities (J. Levinson).
RI Resemblance and Identity (P. Butchvarov).
RTJ Mr. Russell's Theory of Judgment (G.F. Stout).
SPP Studies in Philosophy and Phychology (G.F. Stout).
STU Stout's Theory of Universals (D.J. O'Connor).
TF Truth and Falsity (G.F. Stout).
TPR Things, Predicates and Relations (G.F. Stout).
UA Universals Again (G.F. Stout).
UMA Universals and the 'Method of Analysis' (F.P. Ramsay, W.H.B.
Joseph & R.B. Braithwaite).
USR Universals and Scientific Realism (D. Armstrong).
(I & II)
XI
CONTENTS
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS .................................................. VII
ABBREVIATIONS OF MAJOR WORKS CITED ... " ....... " .............. IX
FOREWORD by D.M. Armstrong .......................................... XII
GEORGE FREDERICK STOUT (1860 - 1944) ............................ XIV
1. SOME RELEVANT PRE-STOUTIAN THEORIES ....................... 1
1. Early Greek Philosophers. ............................................. 2
2. Medieval and Later Philosophers ...................................... 7
3. Stout's Older Contemporaries ........................................ 13
2. STOUT'S THEORY OF UNIVERSALS (1):
SOME KEY TERMS .................................................... 26
1. General Statement of Stout's Position ............................... 26
2. Distributive Unity ..................................................... 29
3. Resemblance ......................................................... 36
4. Classes and Kinds in Stout's Philosophy ............................. 46
5. Possiblities in Stout's Philosophy .................................... 63
3. STOUT'S THEORY OF UNIVERSALS (2):
STOUT'S ABSTRACT PARTICULARISM ............................... 74
1. Stoutian Particulars as Predicates. ................................... 77
2. General Criticisms of Stout's Abstract Particularism ................ 79
a. Abstract Particulars as Simples ................................... 79
b. Second-Order Properties .......................................... 81
c. 'Obviously' Particular Qualities .................................... 83
d. Stout's Argument from Local Separation ......................... 87
e. Ordinary Language as Evidence for Abstract Particularism ...... 88
f. Possible Failure of the UniversaVParticular Distinction .......... 91
g. Difficulties Encountered by Stout's Abstract Particularist Theory
of Substance ....................................................... 92
h. Two Armstrongian Arguments Against Abstract Particularism ... 106
4. ASUGGESTEDAPPROACHTOTHE PROBLEM OF UNIVERSALS .... 110
1. Jerrold Levinson's Theory of Attributes ............................. 117
BIBLIOGRAPHY. .......................................................... 133
GENERAL INDEX ......................................................... 136
XII
FOREWORD
by D.M. Armstrong
In the history of the discussion of the problem of universals, G.F. Stout has an
honoured, and special. place. For the Nominalist, meaning by that term a
philosopher who holds that existence of repeatables - kinds, sorts, types -
and the indubitable existence of general terms, is a problem. The Nominalist's
opponent, the Realist, escapes the Nominalist's difficulty by postulating
universals. He then faces difficulties of his own. Is he to place these universals
in a special realm? Or is he to bring them down to earth: perhaps turning them
into repeatable properties of particulars (universalia in res), and repeatable
relations between universals (universalia inter res)? Whichever solution he
opts for, there are well-known difficulties about how particulars stand to these
universals.
Under these circumstances the Nominalist may make an important con
cession to the Realist, a concession which he can make without abandoning his
Nominalism. He may concede that metaphysics ought to recognize that
particulars have properties (qualities, perhaps) and are related by relations.
But, he can maintain, these properties and relations are particulars, not
universals. Nor, indeed, is such a position entirely closed to the Realist. A
Realist about universals may, and some Realists do, accept particularized
properties and relations in addition to universals.
As Dr. Seargent shows at the beginning of his book. a doctrine of part
icularized properties and relations has led at least a submerged existence from
Plato onwards. The special, classical. importance of Stout's work is that with
him the doctrine becomes completely explicit and self-conscious. He says
roundly that the shape and colour of a certain billiard-ball, and its relation to
another particular billiard-ball, is as particular as the billiard-balls them
selves. After Stout, there is really no proper excuse for philosophers having
painfully to rediscover the particularist view of properties and relations for
themselves. An important intellectual option within the tradition lies fully
exposed.
Stout is a Nominalist. So, having postulated his classes of particularized
properties and relations, his problem is the problem of explaining the unity of
such classes. As Dr. Seargent indicates, those who have followed Stout in his
particularism, such as D.C. Williams and, more recently, Keith Campbell, have
sought to solve the problem in a traditional Nominalist fashion. They appeal to
objective resemblances between the members of the classes. These resembl
ances, they argue, are not based upon something that is common to the
resembling things, and so involve no covert backsliding into Realism. This
approach has certain technical advantages over a traditional Resemblance
Nominalism, where the terms ofthe resemblance relation are not qualities and
relations but full-blooded particulars. (With the latter there are problems
about too many resemblances.)
XIII
Stout, however, rejects a solution to his problem in terms of resemblance and
appeals instead to what he calls the 'distributive unity' of the class. (In
contemporary philosophy, its nearest analogue appears to be Anthony
Quinton's 'natural classes'. The members of Quinton's classes are, however,
ordinary particulars.) It is a special merit of Dr. Seargent's book that he
explores the Stoutian notion of distributive unity very fully, sympathetically yet
critically. In doing so, he shows what is the place and the force of the notion
within Stout's system as a whole. That is something which has been neglected
by other workers on the problem of universals, even where they have
specifically concerned themselves with Stout's view.
After a full discussion of Stout's position, together with notice of con
temporary work which he judges relevant to these views, the author devotes a
final chapter to his own position on the question of universals. Against Stout,
he leans more towards the Realistic side. But he urges that we must not reify
properties and relations as, he thinks, both Stout and the Realists tend to do.
We must think of properties as ways that a particular may stand to further
particulars. If we do this, he argues, certain traditional problems for Realism
will evaporate, or at least be eased.
Stout is in no way a forgotten man among philosophers. But Dr. Seargent's
book should ensure a fuller appreciation of what he had to contribute to one
central problem of metaphysics, and to metaphysics in general.
Department of Traditional
and Modem Philosophy
University of Sydney
September, 1984.