Plato And Aristotle On The Harmonia Theory

360 Pages·2006·2.42 MB·English

SOUL AS STRUCTURE:
PLATO AND ARISTOTLE ON THE HARMONIA THEORY
A Dissertation
Presented to the Faculty of the Graduate School
of Cornell University
in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of
Doctor of Philosophy
by
Douglas Justin Young
January 2007
© 2007 Douglas Justin Young
ALL RIGHTS RESERVED
SOUL AS STRUCTURE:
PLATO AND ARISTOTLE ON THE HARMONIA THEORY
Douglas Justin Young, Ph. D.
Cornell University 2007
We are conscious beings who think, understand, feel and perceive. We are also
material beings composed out of ordinary material stuff. Determining the pre-
cise connections between the psychological and the material remains problemat-
ic. The harmonia theory is one of the first attempts to frame this as a problem
about composite objects. The theory itself is simple: the soul is the harmonia
of the material parts of the body. But what a harmonia is and what the theory
amounts to are matters of much dispute. I argue that a harmonia is best un-
derstood as the structure of the body’s material parts.
Plato introduces the theory in the Phaedo, and Aristotle mentions it in On
the Soul. In both instances it is roundly criticized. Given that Plato thinks the
soul is independent of the body, it is not surprising that he rejects the harmonia
theory. However, he has been described as “extraordinarily obtuse” for arguing
against the view, since doing so seems to undermine his arguments for a tripar-
tite soul. Aristotle’s rejection has been thought equally perplexing, since his
own positive view (that the soul is the form of a living body) looks very much
like a version of the harmonia theory.
Looking closely at the harmonia theory helps clarify persistent misunder-
standings of the view and the reasons Plato and Aristotle reject it. This avenue
offers insight into Plato’s and Aristotle’s positive theories about the soul and its
relation to matter. In addition, their rejections of the theory shed light on how
they understand the relation between parts and wholes.
The problems lying behind the ancient debate about the harmonia theory
are not just historically significant, but also resonate with contemporary discus-
sions about material composition and the metaphysics of mind. Plato articu-
lates a version of the harmonia theory which is perhaps the first expression of a
supervenience thesis about the mental, but the precise sort of supervenience at
issue hasn’t been well understood. But most importantly, whether wholes and
souls are causally relevant and whether conscious beings are mereologically sim-
ple are issues at the heart of the debate, both ancient and modern.
BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH
Douglas Justin Young received his A.B. in Philosophy and Religious Studies
from Brown University in 1997. He earned an M.T.S. in Theological Studies
from Harvard Divinity School in 1999. He enrolled in the Sage School of Philos-
ophy at Cornell University in 2000, received his M.A. in Philosophy in 2004 and
his Ph.D. in Philosophy in 2007. He is currently a Visiting Assistant Professor
of Philosophy at Bowdoin College.
iii
For Jessie, Isaac and Angus
iv
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
I thank all those among the faculty and students of the Sage School at Cornell
University with whom I have had the distinct privilege of doing philosophy.
Particular thanks are due to my teachers Charles Brittian, Terry Irwin and
Scott MacDonald for their time, help and comments. I would also like to thank
Victor Caston whose class on Aristotle’s Philosophy of Mind at Brown Universi-
ty made me realize that the soul was a possible object of inquiry. But above all,
I offer my greatest appreciation to my advisor, Gail Fine, for her patience, preci-
sion, consideration and guidance. Without her encouragement and insight, this
dissertation would not have been possible.
My most important debt of gratitude is due my wife, Jessie, for her long-
suffering, love and support. I cannot imagine what it would have been like with-
out her. It is to her and to our two sons that I dedicate this work.
v
Table of Contents
Introduction 1

I Plato on the Harmonia Theory 9
1 The Soul’s Affinity to the Forms 10
1.1 The Philosophical Life & A Childish Fear of Death 12
1.2 The Soul is Simple 26
1.3 The Soul is Unchanging 36
1.4 The Soul is Invisible 45
1.5 The Soul is Divine 56
1.6 Two Conclusions and Two Puzzle Cases 61
1.7 Conclusion 68
2 The Harmonia Theory 70
2.1 Simmias’ Presentation 71
2.2 Four Ways to Understand ‘Harmonia’ 79
2.3 Two Ways to Think About Structure 88
2.4 Two Ways to Think About Harmonia 92
2.5 Harmonia and Supervenience 99
2.6 Conclusion 115
3 Plato’s Objections to the Harmonia Theory 117
3.1 The Priority Argument 119
3.2 The Argument from Degrees 138
3.3 The Opposition Argument 160
vi
3.4 Implications of Rejecting the Harmonia Theory 169
3.5 Conclusion 172
II Aristotle on the Harmonia Theory 174
4 A Ratio or a Composite 175
4.1 The Harmonia Theory Introduced 177
4.2 Chemistry 101: A Ratio of the Things Mixed 183
4.3 Physics 101: A Composite 192
4.4 Biology 101: A Hierarchical Model of Composition 197
4.5 Restating the Alternatives 203
4.6 More Positive Considerations 206
4.7 Conclusions 214
5 Aristotle’s Objections to the Harmonia Theory 215
5.1 Eudemus or On the Soul 219
5.2 The Soul is a Substance 230
5.3 The Soul is Effects Change 238
5.4 Harmonia and Health 243
5.5 The Actions and Affections of the Soul 247
5.6 The Soul is Not a Composite or a Ratio 252
5.7 Conclusion 262
6 Aristotle’s Alternative 264
6.1 The Soul is a Substance 268
6.2 The Soul is an Unmoved Mover 294
6.3 The Soul is Not a State of the Body 302
6.4 How the Soul Acts and is Acted On 317
6.5 The Soul is Not a Composite, the Body Is 322
6.6 Conclusion 335
Bibliography 337
vii
Introduction
Many wise people say either that the soul is a harmonia
or that the soul has a harmonia.
-Aristotle Politics 8.5.1340b18
We are conscious beings who think, understand, feel and perceive. We are also
material beings composed out of ordinary material stuff. Determining the pre-
cise connections between the psychological and the material remains problemat-
ic. The harmonia theory is one of the first attempts to frame this as a problem
about composite objects. According to the view, the soul is the harmonia of the
material parts of the body.
The view is introduced in Plato’s Phaedo and appears in Aristotle’s treatise
On the Soul and is resoundingly criticized by both. In the Phaedo, Plato de-
votes about ten Stephanus pages to articulating and refuting the harmonia the-
ory (85e3-95a3). In On the Soul 1.4, Aristotle piles up four or five arguments
against the view in rapid succession (407b27-408a34). My main aims in this the-
sis are the following:
(1) to determine precisely what a harmonia is and as a result to determine
what the harmonia theory amounts to;
1