Petroleum and Progress in Iran: Oil, Development, and the Cold War

294 Pages·2022·5.766 MB·English

by  Gregory Brew

Petroleum and Progress in Iran
Fromthe1940sto1960s,Irandevelopedintotheworld’sfirst“petro-
state,”whereoilrepresentedthebulkofstaterevenueandsupportedan
industrializingeconomy,expandingmiddleclass,andpowerfuladmin-
istrativeandmilitaryapparatus.DrawingonbothAmericanandIranian
sources, Gregory Brew explores how the Pahlavi petro-state emerged
froma confluence of forces – some global, some local. He shows how
the shah’s particular form of oil-based authoritarianism evolved from
interactionswithAmericandevelopmentalists,Pahlavitechnocrats,and
major oil companies, all against the looming backdrop of the United
States’ColdWarpolicyandthecoupd’étatofAugust1953.Byplacing
oil at thecenter of theCold War narrative, Brew contextualizes Iran’s
slide into petrolic authoritarianism within its relationship to inter-
national oil, the global development movement, and the United
States.Synthesizingawiderangeofsourcesandresearchmethods,this
bookdemonstratesthatthePahlavipetro-statewasnotbornbutmade,
andnotsolelybythePahlavishah.
GregoryBrewisaKissingerVisitingFellowattheJacksonSchoolof
GlobalAffairsatYaleUniversity.HeisahistorianofmodernIran,the
ColdWar,andinternationaloil.Hehaswrittenextensivelyoncontem-
porary issues of energy and geopolitics, and his work has appeared in
IranianStudies,theInternationalHistoryReview,andtheTexasNational
SecurityReview.

Petroleum and Progress in Iran
Oil, Development, and the Cold War
Gregory Brew
YaleUniversity
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www.cambridge.org
Informationonthistitle:www.cambridge.org/9781009206341
DOI:10.1017/9781009206327
©GregoryBrew2022
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To Megan and Margot

Contents
Listof Figures page ix
Acknowledgments x
Noteon Transliteration xii
Listof Abbreviations xiii
Introduction 1
0.1 “AModernMajorGeneral” 1
0.2 TheDualIntegrationofOil 5
0.3 ThemesandStructure 10
Part I
1 Iran,GlobalOil, and the United States, 1901–1947 21
1.1 OilImperialismandPetro-Nationalism 23
1.2 “ABirdThatLostItsFeathers”:OilandPahlavi
Iran,1921–1941 29
1.3 Occupation,“Incapacity,”andExpertise:AmericanAdvisorsinIran,
1941–1945 33
1.4 Oil,Iran,andtheColdWar 41
1.5 TheDualIntegrationofIranianOil 48
1.6 Conclusion 51
2 “We Have Done Nothing”:TheSeven-YearPlanand
the Failure of Dual Integration in Iran, 1947–1951 53
2.1 DevelopmentinIran 55
2.2 “Know-How”:TheWorldBank,MaxThornburg,andthePlan,
1947–1949 61
2.3 PayingforthePlan:AIOCandIran,1946–1949 68
2.4 TheCollapseofDualIntegration,July1949–March1951 77
2.5 Conclusion 82
3 TheMosaddeq Challenge: Nationalization and the Isolation of
Iranian Oil, 1951–1952 86
3.1 Mosaddeqand“Nationalization” 88
3.2 DefiningNationalization:Negotiations,June1951–March1952 97
vii
viii Contents
3.3 Embargo:Iran’sDe-integrationandtheMythof
IranianIncapacity 107
3.4 Conclusion 116
4 The Collapse Narrative: The Coup and the Reintegration
ofIranianOil,1952–1954 118
4.1 “Oil-Less”Economics 120
4.2 JudgingCollapse:AnalyzingtheOil-LessEconomy 128
4.3 MakingtheCoupDecision,August1952–March1953 135
4.4 SettlingAccounts 141
4.5 Conclusion 147
PartII
5 The Petrochemical Paradise:Oil-Driven Development
and the SecondPlan, 1954–1963 151
5.1 AfterAJAX:PahlaviPowerPost-coup 153
5.2 ModernizationTheory,Ebtehaj,andtheSecondPlan 157
5.3 “APioneeringKindofPattern”:Lilienthal,Clapp,andtheKDS 162
5.4 Scapegoat:TheShahTurnsontheSecondPlan,1958–1962 172
5.5 Conclusion 178
6 The Golden Goose: Iran, the Consortium, and the
First OPECCrisis, 1954–1965 182
6.1 TheGoldenAge:TheMechanicsoftheOligopoly,1954–1960 184
6.2 Iran,theConsortium,andPerformativePetro-Nationalism,
1954–1960 191
6.3 TheScholarandthe“WildMen” 197
6.4 ConciliationorConflict:OilNegotiations,1962–1963 200
6.5 Sabotage:Fallah’sIntervention 206
6.6 Conclusion 211
7 ControlledRevolution:Expertise,Economics,
and the American View ofIran,1960–1965 214
7.1 “TheHarvardBoys”:TheEconomicBureauandthe
FinancialCrisisof1960 216
7.2 TheKennedyAdministrationandtheAminiExperiment 222
7.3 “ARevolutionaryMonarch” 232
7.4 TheEndofDevelopment? 240
Epilogue 246
E.1 Unthinkable 246
E.2 Tragedy 249
Bibliography 253
Index 270