Peter of Ailly: Concepts and Insolubles: An Annotated Translation

208 Pages·1980·7.62 MB·English

by  Paul Vincent Spade (auth.)

PETER OF AILLY:
CONCEPTS AND INSOLUBLES
SYNTHESE HISTORICAL LIBRARY
TEXTS AND STUDIES IN THE HISTORY OF
LOGIC AND PHILOSOPHY
Editors:
N. KRETZMANN, Cornell University
G. NUCHELMANS, University 0/ Leyden
L. M. DE RIJK, University o/Leyden
Editorial Board:
J. BERG, Munich Institute o/Technology
F. DEL PUNTA, Linacre College, Oxford
D. P. HENR Y, University ofM anchester
J. HINTIKKA
B. MATES, University o/California, Berkeley
J. E. MURDOCH, Harvard University
G. PATZIG, University ofG6ttingen
VOLUME 19
PETER OF AILLY:
CONCEPTS AND
INSOLUBLES
An Annotated Translation
by
PAUL VINCENT SPADE
India1U/ University, Dept. of Philosophy,
Bloomington, Indiana, U.S.A.
D. REIDEL PUBLISHING COMPANY
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Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data
Miller, Mitchell H
The philosopher in Plato's Statesman.
(Martinus Nijhoff classical philosophy library; v.2)
Includes bibliographical references and index.
1. Plato. Politicus. I. Title. II. Series.
JC71.P314M54 321 .07 79-12659
ISBN-13: 978-94-009-8995-5 e-ISBN-13:978-94-009-8993-1
001: 10.1007/978-94-009-8993-1
Copyright © 1980 by Martinus NijhoffPublishers by The Hague
Softcover reprint oft he hardcover 1st edition 1980
All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in 'Q retrieval
system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, mechanical, photocopying, recording,
or otherwise, without the prior written permission of the publisher, Martinus Nijhoff Pub
lishers bv, P. O. Box 566, 2501 CN The Hague, The Netherlands.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS xiii
INTRODUCTION 1
TRANSLA TION 16
Concepts 16
I. Introductory considerations (pars. 1-9). 16
A. Division of terms into mental, spoken and written (par. 1). 16
B. General definition of 'term' (pars. 1-3). 16
C. Analysis of the phrase 'vital change' (pars. 4-7). 16
D. Two senses of 'to be a sign of some thing' (pars. 8-9). 17
II. Mental terms (pars. 10-54). 18
A. Complex and incomplex mental terms (par. 10). 18
B. Categorematic and syncategorematic mental terms, in signification
and in function (pars. 11-15). 18
C. Mental terms properly and improperly so called (pars. 16-20). 19
D. First and second intentions (pars. 21-30). 21
E. Mental terms properly so called signify naturally only (par. 31). 22
F. Two senses of 'to signify naturally' (pars. 32-33). 22
G. Mental terms syncategorematic in signification (par. 34) 23
H. Against the modigtae (pars. 35-40). 23
I. Absolute and connotative mental terms properly so called (pars.
41-54). 24
a. The connotation of the term 'concept' (pars. 51-54). 26
III. Spoken terms (pars. 55-88). 27
A. Analysis of the phrase 'utterance that signifi~. by convention' (pars.
55-62). 27
B. Ultimate and non-ultimate conventional signification (pars. 63-68). 28
a. Supposition of spoken terms and mental terms properly so called
(pars. 67 -68). 29
C. Categorematic and syncategorematic spoken terms (pars. 69-73). 29
D. Spoken terms of frrst and second imposition or intention (pars. 74-
80). 31
vi T ABLE OF CONTENTS
E. Absolute and connotative spoken terms (par. 81). 32
F. Against the modistae (pars. 82-88). 32
IV. Written terms and mental terms improperly so called (par. 89). 34
Insolubles 35
I. Introduction (pars. 90-91). 35
A. Program of the treatise (par. 91). 35
II. Chapter One: What a sentence is (pars. 92-137). 36
A. Program of Ch. 1 (par. 92). 36
B. Subordination among spoken, written and mental sentences (par. 93). 36
C. Mental sentences properly and improperly so called (pars. 94-96). 36
D. Descriptions of various senses of 'sentence' (pars. 97 -98). 37
E. Are mental sentences properly so called composed of parts? (pars.
99-137). 37
1. Introductory remarks (par. 99). 37
2. Gregory of Rimini's view: They are never composites (pars.
100-111). 38
3. Peter's own view (pars. 112-137). 40
a. Introductory remarks (par. 112). 40
b. The composition or non-composition of mental sentences
properly so called (pars. 113-128). 40
i. Conclusion 1: Mental hypotheticals are composites (pars.
113-118). 40
ii. Conclusion 2: Mental categoricals are not composites
(pars. 119-124}. 41
iii. Conclusion 3: Mental expressions ought not be called
'complex' because they are really composites (pars. 125-
128). 42
c. Why a mental expression should be called complex (pars.
129-136). 43
i. Conclusion 4: Not because it is equivalent in signifying
to the several utterances or inscriptions that make up a
spoken or written expression (pars. 129-130). 43
ii. Conclusion 5: Not-because it signifies a composition or
division among beings (pars. 131-134). 43
iii. Conclusion 6: Rather because it is equivalent in signifying
to several acts of knowing (pars. 135-136). 44
d. Closing remarks (par. 137). 44
III. Chapter Two: Truth and falsehood in general (pars. 138-238). 44
A. Introductory remarks (pars. 138-139). 44
B. Bad reasons for calling sentences true or false (pars. 140-147). 45
1. Conclusion 1: Because they signify what is true or false exter-
nally (pars. 140-143). 45
TABLE OF CONTENTS vii
2. Conclusion 2: Because of the supposition of their subjects and
predicates (pars. 144-147). 45
C. Why sentences signifying by convention should be called true or
false, possible or impossible (pars. 148-157). 46
1. Conclusion 3: Their truth or falsehood is based on the truth or
falsehood of a corresponding mental sentence properly so called
(pars. 148-152). 46
a. Corollary 1: A conventionally signifying sentence can be true
and false at the same time (par. 150). 46
b. Corollary 2: Such a sentence is distinct from its own truth or
falsehood (par. 151). 46
c. Objection to Corollary I, with reply (par. 152). 47
2. Conclusion 4: The possibility or impossibility of such sentences
is based on the possibility or impossibility of a corresponding
mental sentence properly so called (pars. 153-157). 47
a. Corollary 1: The spoken sentence 'No spoken sentence is
true' is possible (par. 155). 47
b. Corollary 2: But it cannot be true (par. 156). 47
c. Problem and reply (par. 157). 48
D. Why mental sentences properly so called are true or false, possible
or impossible (pars. 158-178). 48
1. Introduction to Conclusions 5 and 6 (par. 158). 48
2. Conclusion 5: Rule for truth and falsehood of mental sentences
properly so called (pars. 159-164). 48
a. Corollary 1: The cause of the truth of an afilImative is not
the same as the cause of the falsehood of the corresponding
negative (par. 161). 49
b. Corollary 2: No mental sentence properly so called can be
true and false at the same time (par. 162). 50
c. Corollary 3: Mental sentences properly so called are identical
with their truth or falsehood (par. 163). 50
d. Corollary 4: The cause of the truth or falsehood of such
sentences is the same as the cause of their modal quality
(par. 164). 50
3. Conclusion 6: Rule for possibility and impossibility of mental
sentences properly so called (pars. 165-166). 50
4. Further clarification of Conclusions 5 and 6 (pars. 167 -170). 51
5. Corollaries from Conclusions 4 and 6 (pars. 171-178). 51
a. Corollary 1 (par. 171). 51
b. Corollary 2 (pars. 172-174). 52
i. Objection to Corollary 2, with reply (pars. 173-174). 52
c. Corollary 3 (par. 175). 53
d. Corollary 4 (pars. 176-178). 53
i. Objection to Corollary 4, with reply (par. 178). 54
E. Three doubts about the total significate of a sentence (pars. 179-238). 54
1. First doubt: What is the total or adequate significate of 'Every
man is an animal'? (par. 179). 54
viii TABLE OF CONTENTS
2. Second doubt: It seems that there is something true or false
besides true or false sentences (pars. 180-182). 54
a. First argument: E.g., God and God's knowledge (par. 180). 54
b. Second argument: Before the creation, it was true that the
world was going to exist (par. 181). 54
c. Third argument: If no sentence existed, it would be true that
no sentence existed (par. 182). 55
3. Third doubt: Something impossible must be the significate of an
impossible sentence (par. 183). 55
4. Program for the rest of Chapter two (par. 184). 55
5. Gregory of Rimini's theory of 'complexly significables' (pars.
185-189). 55
6. Refutation of Gregory's view (pars. 190-209). 56
a. Conclusion 1 : There are no complexly significables in
Gregory's sense (pars. 191-195). 56
b. Conclusion 2: Everything is, in a sense, complexly significable
(pars. 196-197). 57
c. Conclusion 3: Nothing is the adequate or total significate of
a mental sentence properly so called (pars. 198-199). 57
d. Conclusion 4: A mental sentence properly so called signifies
exactly what its parts signify, or the parts of the correspond
ing spoken sentence. Yet the sentence as a whole signifies in
some way that is not signified by any part (pars. 200-201). 57
e. Conclusion 5: Contradictory sentences signify exactly the
same things, but in different ways (pars. 202-203). 58
f. Conclusion 6: No dictum of a mental sentence properly so
called supposits for anything if taken significatively (pars.
204-209). 58
7. Reply to doubts (pars. 210-238). 59
a. To the fust doubt, in par. 179: Nothing is the total significate
(pars. 210-221). 59
i. How to treat infmitives (pars. 213-221). 59
Conclusion 1 (pars. 213-215). 59
Q.
(J. Conclusion 2 (pars. 216-218). 60
'Y. Conclusion 3 (par. 219). 60
6. Conclusion 4: Infinitives should be used only where
'that'-clauses can be used (pars. 220-221). 61
b. To the second doubt, in pars. 180-182 (pars. 222-234). 61
i. Created and uncreated truths (pars. 222-228). 61
Conclusion 1: There is a truth outside the soul in addi-
Q.
tion to created sentences (pars. 222-223). 61
(J. Conclusion 2: There is no truth outside the soul
besides created and uncreated sentences (pars. 224-
2~~ 61
'Y. Conclusion 3: God is a true sentence (pars. 226-228). 61
ii. Reply to fust argument, in par. 180: God is an uncreated
sentence (par. 229). 62
TABLE OF CONTENTS ix
iii. Reply to second argument, in par. 181: That truth was
then God (pars. 230-231). 62
iv. Reply to third argument, in par. 182: The antecedent is
impossible (pars. 232-234). 62
c<. Objection and reply: What about eternal falsehoods?
(pars. 233-234). 62
c. To the third doubt, in par. 183 (pars. 235-238). 63
i. One reply: The inference is invalid (par. 235). 63
ii. An alternative reply: To concede the inference and to
deny that it requires the existence of impossibles (pars.
236-237). 63
iii. Comparison of the two replies: The first is preferable
(par. 238). 63
IV. Chapter Three: Sentences having reflection on themselves (pars.
239-336). 63
A. Introductory remarks (par. 239). 63
B. Descriptions (pars. 240-252). 64
1. Description 1: Signification (par. 240). 64
2. Description 2: Sentence having reflection on itself (par. 241). 64
3. Description 3: Insoluble sentence (par. 242). 64
4. Corollaries from descriptions (pars. 243-252). 65
a. Corollary 1: Self-reference requires a term signifying a sen-
tence (par. 243). 65
b. Refutation of earlier views (pars. 244-252). 65
i. Corollary 2: Not every sentence signifies itself to be true
(pars. 244-246). 65
ii. Corollary 3: Against Marsilius of Inghen (pars. 247-
248). 66
iii. Corollary 4: Not every sentence has two significations,
one material and one formal, against Marsilius (pars. 249-
250). 66
iv. Corollary 5: Against Marsilius (par. 251). 66
v. Corollary 6: Many sentences thought to be insolubles are
not, against Marsilius and others (par. 252). 67
C. Distinctions: Various kinds of self-reference (pars. 253-261). 67
1. Distinction 1: Some self-referential sentences signify themselves
to be false, others do not (pars. 253-254). 67
2. Distinction 2: Some of the former do so independently of every
situation, others do not (pars. 255-256). 68
3. Distinction 3: Some of the former do so directly, others in-
directly (par. 257). 68
4. Distinction 4: Some of the latter do so immediately, others by
means of others sentences (par. 258). 68
5. Distinction 5: Some of the latter do so by means of sentences
they themselves signify, others rather by means of sentence by
which they are signified to exist (par. 259). 68
x T ABLE OF CONTENTS
6. Distinction 6: Some of the former do so by means of sentences
of which they are parts, others do not (par. 260). 69
7. Summary (par. 261). 69
D. Corollaries from distinctions (pars. 262-271). 69
1. Corollary 1 (par. 262). 69
2. Corollary 2 (pars. 263-270). 69
a. Objection and reply (pars. 264-270). 70
3. Corollary 3 (par. 271). 71
E. Which kinds of sentences can have reflection on themselves? (pars.
272-336). 71
1. Introductory remarks (par. 272). 71
2. Assumptions about formal and objective signification (pars.
273-280). 71
a. Assumption 1: Two kinds of signification: objective and
formal (par. 273). 71
b. Assumption 2: Dermition of each kind (par. 274). 72
c. Assumption 3: Anything can signify itself objectively (par.
275). 72
d. Assumption 4: Nothing can distinctly signify itself formally
(pars. 276-277). 72
e. Assumption 5: Spoken and written sentences signify only
objectively (par. 278). 72
f. Assumption 6: Spoken and written sentences signify them-
selves rllst of all (pars. 279-280). 73
3. The impossibility of self-reference among mental sentences
properly so called (pars. 281-336). 73
a. Introductory remarks (par. 281). 73
b. Conclusion 1: No mental sentence properly so called can
signify itself to be false (pars. 282-301). 73
i. First proof (pars. 283-284). 73
n. Second proof (pars. 285-286). 74
iii. Third proof (pars. 287 -289). 74
Refutation of other views, including Marsilius of
Q.
Inghen's (pars. 288-289). 75
iv. Fourth proof (pars. 290-296). 75
Refutation of Marsilius' view (pars. 292-296). 76
Q.
v. Corollaries (pars. 297-301). 77
Corollary 1 (par. 297). 77
Q.
p. Corollary 2 (pars. 298-299). 77
'Y. Corollary 3 (par. 300). 78
6. Corollary 4 (par. 301). 78
c. Conclusion 2: No mental sentence properly so called can
signify itself to be true (pars. 302-306). 78
d. Conclusion 3: There are no self-referential mental sentences
properly so called (pars. 307-310). 79
e. Objection to Conclusion 1 (pars. 311-326). 79
i. Statement of the objection (pars. 311-312). 79