Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction

305 Pages·2008·6.45 MB·English

by  David Shoemaker

“I predict that this book will become the defnitive guide to the relation between
personal identity and our practical concerns, both self-regarding and other-regarding.
The book provides an excellent discussion of all the major theories of personal
identity as well as how they relate to ethical theory, moral responsibility, and numerous
applied ethical issues. The writing is clear and crisp and interlaced with intriguing
examples, making it accessible to introductory philosophy students. But, at the same
time, the philosophical treatment of the issues is highly sophisticated, making it
essential reading for graduate students and professional philosophers interested
in these issues.”
DouglaS W. PortmorE, arIzona StatE unIvErSIty
“David Shoemaker’s Personal Identity and Ethics provides a very fne introduction to
personal identity theory and its relationship to questions of value. It is accessible even
when technical, lucid, fair-minded, and conversant with both classic and cutting-edge
discussions. Undergraduates, graduate students, and experts will beneft from this book.”
DavID DEgrazIa, gEorgE WaShIngton unIvErSIty
“This is a crystal clear and remarkably complete introduction to the philosophy of
personal identity and its relation to ethics. In lively and compelling prose Shoemaker
provides a detailed description of the main positions in the feld and offers compelling
original insights. Personal Identity and Ethics will be an extremely valuable resource
for beginners and experts alike.”
marya SchEchtman, unIvErSIty of IllInoIS at chIcago
The relationship between personal identity and ethics remains one of the most
intriguing yet vexing issues in philosophy. It is a commonplace to hold that
moral responsibility for past actions requires that the responsible agent is in
some relevant respect identical to the agent who performed the action. Is
this true? On the other hand, can ethics constrain our account of personal
identity? Do the practical requirements of moral theory commit us to the view
that persons do remain identical over time? For example, does the moral status
of abortion or stem cell research depend on whether personal identity is based on
psychological or biological properties? Or is it the case that personal identity is not,
in fact, relevant to ethics?
Personal Identity and Ethics provides the frst comprehensive examination of these
issues. Topics include personal identity and prudential rationality; personal identity’s
signifcance for moral responsibility and ethical theory; and the practical consequences
of accounts of personal identity for issues such as abortion, stem
cell research, cloning, advance directives, population ethics,
multiple personality disorder, and the defnition of death. 0:)5!
0:)5!
DavID ShoEmakEr is Department Chair in the Philosophy Personal Identity and Ethics
Department at Bowling Green State University. He has
published in many of the leading philosophy journals such
as Ethics, Mind, and Philosophy and Public Afairs and is A Brief Introduction
the author of the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy’s
entry for “Personal Identity and Ethics.”
David Shoemaker
Cover design: Aldo Fierro
broadview press Cover photo: Madartists/
www.broadviewpress.com Dreamstime.com broadview
Personal Identity CVR.indd 1 9/8/08 7:06:29 PM
Personal Identity and Ethics
David Shoemaker
A Brief Introduction
Personal Identity and Ethics
Personal Identity INT.indd 1 8/28/08 8:38:10 PM
eR iv e w oC yp
To Marie, my better self.
Personal Identity INT.indd 2 8/28/08 8:38:10 PM
eR iv e w oC yp
Personal Identity and Ethics
A Brief Introduction
David Shoemaker

Personal Identity INT.indd 3 8/28/08 8:38:11 PM
eR iv e w oC yp
© 2009 David Shoemaker
All rights reserved. The use of any part of this publication reproduced, transmitted in any form
or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise, or stored in a
retrieval system, without prior written consent of the publisher—or in the case of photocopying,
a licence from Access Copyright (Canadian Copyright Licensing Agency), One Yonge Street,
Suite 1900, Toronto, Ontario M5E 1E5—is an infringement of the copyright law.
Library and Archives Canada Cataloguing in Publication
Shoemaker, David, 1964-
Personal identity and ethics : a brief introduction / David Shoemaker.
Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN 978-1-55111-882-6
1. Self (Philosophy). 2. Identity (Philosophical concept). 3. Ethics.
I. Title.
BD450.S45 2008 126 C2008-904149-6
Broadview Press is an independent, international publishing house, incorporated in 1985.
Broadview believes in shared ownership, both with its employees and with the general public;
since the year 2000 Broadview shares have traded publicly on the Toronto Venture Exchange
under the symbol BDP.
We welcome comments and suggestions regarding any aspect of our publications—please feel
free to contact us at the addresses below or at
Contents
Acknowledgments vii
Introduction 1
Part A: Personal Identity and Self-Regarding Ethics 21
Chapter One: Personal Identity and Immortality 23
Chapter Two: Personal Identity, Rational Anticipation, and Self-
Concern 59
Chapter Three: Alternative Approaches 87
Part B: Personal Identity and Other-Regarding Ethics 117
Chapter Four: Moral Issues at the Beginning of Life, Part I:
Killing 119
Chapter Five: Moral Issues at the Beginning of Life, Part II:
Creation 143
Chapter Six: Moral Issues at the End of Life 175
Chapter Seven: Personal Identity and Moral Responsibility 205
Chapter Eight: Personal Identity and Ethical Theory 241
Conclusion: Notes on Method 277
Index 287
Personal Identity INT.indd 5 8/28/08 8:38:12 PM
eR iv e w oC yp
Personal Identity INT.indd 6 8/28/08 8:38:12 PM
eR iv e w oC yp
Acknowledgments
Despite the many lonely hours I have spent working on it, the overall
production of a book like this is far from a solitary task. Many others have
contributed to it in one way or the other and they deserve mention. For
her original suggestion that I put together such a project, I’m grateful to
Broadview’s Tania Therien. For his early encouragement and helpful edi-
torial guidance, I thank Ryan Chynces. For his later encouragement and
helpful editorial guidance, I thank Alex Sager. I also wish to thank the
rest of the wonderful team at or associated with Broadview Press, includ-
ing especially Bob Martin, Piper-Lee Bradford, and the delightful Don
LePan. I am also deeply grateful to an anonymous reviewer, who helped
me make the manuscript immeasurably better. I did all of my revisions
while on a research fellowship during the academic year 2007-2008 at the
Center for Ethics and Public Affairs, part of the Murphy Institute at Tu-
lane University. Thanks, then, both to the Murphy Institute for fnancial
support, and to my home institution, Bowling Green State University, for
supporting my academic leave during that period. Finally, my thanks to
the late great Greg Kavka for starting my earlier self down the personal
identity path way back when.
vii
Personal Identity INT.indd 7 8/28/08 8:38:12 PM
eR iv e w oC yp
Personal Identity INT.indd 8 8/28/08 8:38:12 PM
eR iv e w oC yp
Introduction
Motivation
Consider the following six cases.
Case 1: Gretchen has been in a terrible motorcycle accident, which has caused such
internal damage that she will die in just a few days. A lifelong atheist and advocate
of the view that “once you’re dead, you’re dead,” Gretchen now begins to wonder if
she’d been wrong all along. She would, after all, very much like to be able to antici-
pate some kind of continued survival after the death of her body, but such anticipa-
tion will be rational only if it’s possible for her to survive the death of her body. But is
it? Her body and brain will in fact cease to exist in a few days (she has requested cre-
mation after she dies), so how could it even be remotely possible that she, Gretchen,
will survive if her body and brain won’t?
Case 2: Carlos and Tanya are having a discussion about abortion. Carlos says, “Abor-
tion is wrong. It would be wrong to kill me, wouldn’t it? Well, that fetus from which I
developed was also me, so it would have been wrong to kill it as well.” “I disagree,” says
Tanya. “While you certainly developed from a fetus, that fetus wasn’t you, just like an
acorn isn’t an oak tree. What you are is a person, after all, a being with the capacity for
not only consciousness but also self-consciousness, whereas an early-stage fetus, say,
has neither capacity. Thus, insofar as you aren’t the same sort of things, it could be
wrong to kill you without being wrong to kill the fetus from which you grew.”
Case 3: When Meredith is 55 she is diagnosed with early-stage Alzheimer’s. She
knows exactly what the disease does to one’s mind, since she watched her mother
1
Personal Identity INT.indd 1 8/28/08 8:38:13 PM
eR iv e w oC yp