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Personal IdentIty and BuddhIst PhIlosoPhy since the publication of Mark siderits’ important book in 2003, much has changed in the field of Buddhist philosophy. There has been unprecedented growth in analytic metaphysics, and a considerable amount of new work on Indian theories of the self and personal identity has emerged. Fully revised and updated, and drawing on these changes as well as on developments in the author’s own thinking, Personal Identity and Buddhist Philosophy, 2nd edition explores the conversation between Buddhist and Western Philosophy showing how concepts and tools drawn from one philosophical tradition can help solve problems arising in another. Siderits discusses afresh areas involved in the philosophical investigation of persons, including vagueness and its implications for personal identity, recent attempts by scholars of Buddhist philosophy to defend the attribution of an emergentist account of personhood to at least some Buddhists, and whether a distinctively Buddhist antirealism can avoid problems that beset other forms of ontological anti-foundationalism. Siderits’s fusion philosophy replaces comparative philosophy, but this book transcends even his fusion philosophy. Chang-Seong Hong, Minnesota State University Moorhead, USA Mark Siderits is one of the few philosophers in the world today who is equally expert in Buddhist philosophy and contemporary analytic philosophy; who is as lucid and penetrating on ethical matters as on metaphysical ones; and who, as a scholar of Buddhist thought, can charitably discuss Abhidharma discourse with as much ease and insight as he can handle the themes of Mahayana philosophy. This book is especially valuable for its balanced treatment of these two major streams of Buddhist philosophy, the first half exploring – and extending – an Abhidharma approach to personhood and psychological reality, and the second half illuminating Mahayana approaches with a rare analytic clarity. Though balanced in its scholarship, the book is also stirringly provocative in its philosophical argumentation. Despite divergences between the two Buddhist traditions, Siderits highlights points of convergence, ones that he supports ingeniously with additional philosophical argument of his own. Already seminal in its first appearance, this second edition significantly refines the arguments and conceptual apparatus that Siderits uses to support his ecumenically Buddhist understanding of life, value and experience. Gordon Davis, Carleton University, Canada Ashgate World Philosophies Series the Ashgate World Philosophies Series responds to the remarkable growth of interest among English-language readers in recent years in philosophical traditions outside those of ‘the West’. The traditions of Indian, Chinese, and Japanese thought, as well as those of the Islamic world, Latin America, Africa, Aboriginal Australian, Pacific and American Indian peoples, are all attracting lively attention from professional philosophers and students alike, and this Ashgate series provides introductions to these traditions as well as in-depth research into central issues and themes within those traditions. The series is particularly designed for readers whose interests are not adequately addressed by general surveys of ‘World Philosophy’, and it includes accessible, yet research-led, texts for wider readership and upper- level student use, as well as research monographs. The series embraces a wide variety of titles ranging from introductions on particular world philosophies and informed surveys of the philosophical contributions of geographical regions, to in-depth discussion of a theme, topic, problem or movement and critical appraisals of individual thinkers or schools of thinkers. Series Editors: Professor David E. Cooper, University of Durham, UK Professor Robert C. Solomon, University of Texas, Austin, USA Professor Kathleen M. Higgins, University of Texas, Austin, USA Professor Purushottama Bilimoria, University of Melbourne, Australia Other titles in this series: Buddhism as Philosophy an Introduction Mark Siderits Wisdom in Early Confucian and Israelite Traditions Xinzhong Yao learning from Chinese Philosophies ethics of Interdependent and Contextualised self Karyn Lai Mulla Sadra’s Transcendent Philosophy Muhammad Kamal The Philosophy of Rabindranath Tagore Kalyan Sen Gupta Personal Identity and Buddhist Philosophy Empty Persons MARK SIDERITS Seoul National University, Korea First published 2015 by Ashgate Publishing Published 2016 by Routledge 2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN 711 Third Avenue, New York, NY 10017, USA Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business Copyright © 2015 Mark siderits Mark Siderits has asserted his right under the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act, 1988, to be identified as the author of this work. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. Notice: Product or corporate names may be trademarks or registered trademarks, and are used only for identification and explanation without intent to infringe. British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library The Library of Congress has cataloged the printed edition as follows: Siderits, Mark, 1946– author. Personal identity and Buddhist philosophy : empty persons / By Mark Siderits. – Second edition. pages cm. – (Ashgate world philosophies series) Previously published: 2003. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 978–1–4724–6610–5 (hardcover : alk. paper) – ISBN 978–1–4724–4645–9 (pbk. : alk. paper) 1. Self (Philosophy) 2. Identity (Psychology) 3. Buddhism – Philosophy. 4 . Analysis (Philosophy) I. Title. BD438.5.S53 2015 126–dc23 2015010977 ISBN 9781472466105 (hbk) ISBN 9781472446459 (pbk) Contents Preface to the First Edition vii Preface to the Second Edition ix Introduction 1 1 Situating Reductionism 9 2 Refuting the Self 29 3 Getting Impersonal 53 4 Wholes, Parts, and Emergence 97 5 Ironic Engagement 127 6 Establishing Emptiness 143 7 Empty Knowledge 167 8 The Turn of the True 187 9 Empty Persons 207 Bibliography 219 Index 229 Preface to the First Edition Analytic philosophy and Buddhist philosophy share a fundamental commitment to trying to attain complete clarity about the matters they investigate. One such matter is what it means to be a person. Both traditions contain long and complex debates over questions concerning their mode of existence and the properties that attach to them. In this work I have tried to bring the two traditions into dialogue with one another over some key issues in the philosophical investigation of persons. While I know that the results fall far short of complete clarity, I hope I have made some progress toward that goal. If so, there are many people I must thank. David Anderson and Kenton Machina have proven invaluable conversational partners over the years. I consider myself truly fortunate in having had two such colleagues – analytic philosophers who are willing (sometimes even eager) to discover how a non-Western philosophical tradition might contribute to a current debate. Not only did I learn much from my interactions with them, but without their examples I might have despaired of the possibility of finding an audience for ‘fusion’ philosophy. I have gained much from my many long philosophical conversations with Arindam Chakrabarti over the years, and I hope he will not be chagrined by the fruit these have born here. Roy Perrett provided many valuable comments on earlier drafts of the first part of this book, as well as a great deal of extremely helpful bibliographic information. Chakravarthi Ram-Prasad had useful things to say about some of the material in the second half. And special thanks must go to Amita Chatterji, who introduced me to some of the exciting work being done at Jadavpur University. As this work developed, portions of it were presented to a number of philosophy departments, and I must thank them all for useful comments and general encouragement. Portions of Chapter 3 were the basis of talks at Otago University (Dunedin), Massey University (Palmerston North), and Rabindra Bharati University (Calcutta). Parts of Chapter 4 were presented at Canterbury University (Christchurch), Jadavpur University (Calcutta), and to the Philosophy of Religions programme at the University of Chicago. Parts of Chapter 5 were presented to the Friday Seminar, Calcutta, where Kalipada Bakshi, Tara Chatterjea and Shefali Moitra all raised important points. Finally, my colleagues and friends in the joint philosophy colloquium series of Illinois State University and Illinois Wesleyan University heard earlier versions of some of the material in Chapters 1, 3, and 7; I especially wish to thank Carl Gillett and Michael Gorr for useful discussion and feedback. viii Personal Identity and Buddhist Philosophy I should also like to take this opportunity to express my gratitude to my many students who over the years have demanded clarity in the presentation of philosophical ideas. If persons are ultimately empty, then there is no person who is ultimately to blame for any mistakes in these pages. Mistakes were made nonetheless – despite all the helpful advice, comments and criticism made by those mentioned here and by others. The ultimate responsibility for those mistakes must rest with me alone. Preface to the Second Edition When Sarah Lloyd told me that Ashgate was interested in issuing Personal Identity and Buddhist Philosophy in paperback, she and I agreed that, given how much has changed in the intervening 12 years since the work first came out, a new edition would be appropriate. Among the things that have changed is that there is now far more scholarly literature on Indian Buddhist philosophy that needs to be taken into account. And so each chapter of this second edition includes some discussion of works that appeared after 2003. But two other changes necessitated more dramatic revisions. Chapter 4 and Chapters 8 and 9 have been almost completely rewritten, for two slightly different reasons. Chapter 4 concerns the defence of the view that there are no mereological sums. In the first edition this view was called ‘mereological reductionism’, but here I call it ‘mereological nihilism’. The reason for the name change is simple: there is now a growing literature in analytic metaphysics concerning this view, and in that literature it is known as mereological nihilism. This is a reflection of a larger change in the environment in which the new edition appears. The sorts of issues that classical Indian philosophers discussed in connection with their debates over the self and personal identity have recently been taken up in analytic metaphysics. As a result, there is now much more room for a real conversation between classical Indian Buddhist philosophy and current work in the analytic tradition. Chapter 4 has been rewritten to try to take full advantage of this new opportunity. But there is also one substantive revision in the contents of this chapter that is the result of second thoughts on my part. I earlier wrote that a Buddhist version of Reductionism should adopt an account of vague terms that is committed to acceptance of a deviant logic. I am now convinced that Indian Buddhist philosophy as a whole is logically conservative. Consequently, I now say that Buddhist Reductionists should adopt a different approach to vague terms (namely the epistemic approach), one that is compatible with their commitment to classical logic. The rewriting of Chapters 8 and 9 has less to do with enhanced opportunities for dialogue, and more to do with what I hope is a deeper understanding of relevant parts of the Indian Buddhist tradition. In the second half of this book I take up the school of Indian Buddhist philosophy that challenged key parts of the Buddhist defence of Reductionism discussed in the first half. I continue to describe this school as antirealist, in part to bring out their core differences from Buddhist Reductionists. But as more of the school’s literature becomes available, it becomes apparent that despite these differences there is far greater continuity between this school and its Buddhist Reductionist rivals than one might suspect (particularly