Offshore Safety Management. Implementing a SEMS Program PDF
Preview Offshore Safety Management. Implementing a SEMS Program
Offshore Safety Management Implementing a SEMS Program Second Edition Offshore Safety Management Implementing a SEMS Program Second Edition Ian Sutton AMSTERDAM(cid:129)BOSTON(cid:129)HEIDELBERG(cid:129)LONDON NEWYORK(cid:129)OXFORD(cid:129)PARIS(cid:129)SANDIEGO SANFRANCISCO(cid:129)SINGAPORE(cid:129)SYDNEY(cid:129)TOKYO WilliamAndrewisanimprintofElsevier WilliamAndrewisanimprintofElsevier 225WymanStreet,Waltham,MA02451,USA TheBoulevard,LangfordLane,Kidlington,OxfordOX51GB,UK Copyrightr2014ElsevierInc.Allrightsreserved Nopartofthispublicationmaybereproducedortransmittedinanyformorbyanymeans, electronicormechanical,includingphotocopying,recording,oranyinformationstorageandretrieval system,withoutpermissioninwritingfromthepublisher.Detailsonhowtoseekpermission,further informationaboutthePublisher’spermissionspoliciesandarrangementswithorganizationssuchas theCopyrightClearanceCenterandtheCopyrightLicensingAgency,canbefoundatourwebsite: www.elsevier.com/permissions. Thisbookandtheindividualcontributionscontainedinitareprotectedundercopyrightbythe Publisher(otherthanasmaybenotedherein). Notice Knowledgeandbestpracticeinthisfieldareconstantlychanging.Asnewresearchandexperience broadenourunderstanding,changesinresearchmethodsorprofessionalpractices,ormedical treatmentmaybecomenecessary. Practitionersandresearchersmustalwaysrelyontheirownexperienceandknowledgeinevaluating andusinganyinformation,methods,compounds,orexperimentsdescribedherein.Inusingsuch informationormethodstheyshouldbemindfuloftheirownsafetyandthesafetyofothers,including partiesforwhomtheyhaveaprofessionalresponsibility. Tothefullestextentofthelaw,neitherthePublishernortheauthors,contributors,oreditors,assume anyliabilityforanyinjuryand/ordamagetopersonsorpropertyasamatterofproductsliability, negligenceorotherwise,orfromanyuseoroperationofanymethods,products,instructions,orideas containedinthematerialherein. LibraryofCongressCataloging-in-PublicationData AcataloguerecordforthisbookisavailablefromtheLibraryofCongress. BritishLibraryCataloguing-in-PublicationData AcataloguerecordforthisbookisavailablefromtheBritishLibrary. ISBN:978-0-323-26206-4 ForinformationonallElsevierpublications visitourwebsiteatelsevierdirect.com TypesetbyMPSLimited,Chennai,India www.adi-mps.com PrintedandboundedintheUnitedKingdom 14 15 16 17 18 5 4 3 2 1 Preface The Deepwater Horizon/Macondo tragedy (April 2010) changed everything. Before that event, in which 11 men died, record quantities of oil flowed into the ocean,andnearly$1billiondollarsworthofequipmentplungedtotheseabed,the safety record of the offshore oil and gas industry was good, and had been steadily improving.Whichwaswhythetragedywassuchashock—itwassounexpected. Ihavewrittenanumberofbookstodowithprocesssafetymanagement.Given thehighlevelofinterestinoffshoresafetyfollowingMacondoIwrotethefirstedi- tion of this book, Offshore Safety Management. At the time of publication— mid-2011—the regulatory environment to do with offshore safety in the United States was in flux; the federal agency responsible for offshore safety—the Minerals Management Service (MMS)—had just been replaced by the Bureau of Ocean Energy Management and Regulatory Enforcement (BOEMRE). And the voluntary standard API RP 75 was transformed into the Safety and Environmental ManagementSystems(SEMS)rule. Changes in the world of offshore safety have kept on coming so we have decided toissuea new edition of thisbook toaddresstopics such as: (cid:129) the second renaming of the agency, this time from BOEMRE tothe Bureau of Safety and Environmental Enforcement (BSEE); (cid:129) the new ruleinformally known asSEMS II; (cid:129) better ideason how to handle difficultmanagement issues such asworking with contractors,and how to conduct audits; (cid:129) the move toward an understanding of“safety culture” andwhatthat means offshore;and (cid:129) the incorporation ofthe findings ofthe many reports that were issued to do with the DeepwaterHorizon/Macondo event. But the impact of Deepwater Horizon/Macondo went beyond the United States; the accident caused oil companies all over the world to think through the effectiveness of their safety management programs. Moreover, events such as the Montara blowout in Australian waters in the year 2009 showed that these events are not confined to one place. The contents of this book therefore go beyond the United States regulatory environment. The book describes some of the major off- shore incidents that have occurred over the last 40 years or so, some of which occurred onshore, that led to the development of modern safety management sys- tems and regulations. So, for example, it contains a thorough discussion of the Safety Case approach—a system that was first used in the North Sea but that has now spread tomany international locations. Another book in this series is called Process Risk and Reliability Management. It describes the development and application of process safety man- agement systems in detail. Therefore, rather than repeat the contents of that book xv xvi Preface here, it makes much more sense to use PRMM for detailed information on topics such asthe writing of operating procedures. As always when I write, the most difficult challenge I face is knowing when to stop. When I first arrived in New York I was taught the phrase “Enough is enough already.” There is always a good time to stop writing, and that time is now. I would like to acknowledge the invaluable input from the editorial team at Elsevier and to express my usual thanks to my wife Val for her patience and support, particularly at those times when I was writing instead of helping around the house. Finally, in every publication that I have written so far I have concluded the Preface with the words Edmund Spenser used in the introduction to his poem Faerie Queene, ‘Goe little book: thy selfe present.’ So it is with this book—it is nowinyour hands gentle reader. I hopeyoufindit useful. Warning—Disclaimer This book provides information in regard to the subject matter covered. It is dis- tributed with the understanding that the publisher, the author, and any other advi- sors are not engaged inrendering legal, accounting, orother professional services. If legal or expert assistance is required the services of a competent professional shouldbe sought. It is not the purpose of this book to reprint all the information that is available to the author and/or publisher, but to complement, amplify, and supplement other texts. You are urged to read all the available material, learn as much as possible about the topics covered, and to tailor the information provided here to your needs. Forfurther information andothersources,see www.stb07.com Every effort has been made to make this book as complete and as accurate as possible. However, there may be mistakes, both typographical and in content. Therefore this text should be used only as a guide and not as an ultimate source of information and guidance on the topics covered. Furthermore, information on these topics may have changed since the release date ofthis book. The author and publisher of this book shall have neither liability nor responsi- bility to any person or entity with respect to any loss or damage caused or alleged to be caused, directly or indirectly by the information and/or guidance provided inthis book. xvii CHAPTER 1 Risk Management CHAPTER CONTENTS Introduction................................................................................................................2 ImpactofDeepwaterHorizon/Macondo........................................................................4 Processsafetytrends..................................................................................................5 Offshore........................................................................................................5 Thepipelineindustry......................................................................................7 Safetymanagementsystems........................................................................................8 Organizationofthisbook.............................................................................................8 Historicalbackground...............................................................................................10 Onshoredevelopments..............................................................................................12 Occupationalsafety,processsafety,andculture........................................................13 Occupationalsafety......................................................................................14 Processsafety..............................................................................................14 TheBakerReport...........................................................................................15 Theincidenttriangle.......................................................................................16 Riskmanagement......................................................................................................18 Perceptionoftheconsequenceterm..............................................................19 Performance-based/prescriptiveprograms.......................................................20 Nonprescriptive..............................................................................................21 Performance-based........................................................................................21 Fiberglasscompositepipeexample.................................................................21 Acceptablerisk............................................................................................22 Uncertainty....................................................................................................24 Cost-benefitanalysis.......................................................................................24 Riskreduction................................................................................................24 Aslowasreasonablypracticablerisk—ALARP................................................24 SettingALARP...............................................................................................24 DifficultieswithALARP...................................................................................25 ReverseALARP..............................................................................................26 Riskmatrices...............................................................................................26 Consequencematrix.......................................................................................26 Frequencymatrix...........................................................................................26 1 OffshoreSafetyManagement. ©2014ElsevierInc.Allrightsreserved. 2 CHAPTER 1 Risk Management Riskmatrix.....................................................................................................27 Safetymanagementsystems......................................................................................28 Fundamentals..............................................................................................28 Safelimits......................................................................................................29 Holistic..........................................................................................................31 Involvementandthoroughness.......................................................................33 Operators.....................................................................................................33 ElementsofanSMS.....................................................................................34 1.Facilitydescription.....................................................................................34 2.Technicalinformation.................................................................................35 3.Riskassessment........................................................................................35 4.Riskacceptance.........................................................................................35 5.Report.......................................................................................................35 6.Audit..........................................................................................................36 Economics...................................................................................................36 Benefits.........................................................................................................37 Costs.............................................................................................................38 BOEMREdata................................................................................................38 Measuringprogress..................................................................................................41 Laggingandleadingindicators......................................................................41 Laggingindicators........................................................................................42 Leadingindicators........................................................................................44 Keyperformanceindicators...........................................................................44 Tier1—Processsafetyevent...........................................................................46 Tier2—Processsafetyevent...........................................................................46 Tier3—Challengetosafetysystems................................................................47 Tier4—Operatingdisciplineandmanagementsystemperformance................47 Safetyasacausalfactor...........................................................................................47 Culture.....................................................................................................................48 References...............................................................................................................49 Introduction The offshore oil and gas business is hazardous. Some of the many issues to be concerned about include the following: (cid:129) Explosionsand fires. (cid:129) Weather conditionscan beharshand unforgiving. (cid:129) Toxic gases, particularly hydrogensulfide (H S), are afrequent by-product of 2 the oiland gas thatis produced. Introduction 3 (cid:129) Emergency response can bea challenge; platforms and rigs are small and congested. And the people onboard have to respond with the resources they have; outside help is notusuallyquickly available. Thus, from its very beginning this industry has had to pay particular attention to the safety of the workers and the prevention of catastrophic events. Generally these efforts have been successful, particularly with regard to occupational or per- sonal safety, as illustrated in Figure 1.1, which shows the progress that has been madeinrecentyears inthe United States (mostlythe Gulf ofMexico). Figure 1.1 was first published by the United States Mineral Management Service (MMS)—the government agency responsible, at the time, for offshore safety regulation and enforcement. These responsibilities for the MMS are now handled by the Bureau of Safety and Environmental Enforcement—BSEE. The chartprovidesdatatodowiththenumberofoffshoresafetyincidentsfortheperiod 1996 to 2011. The trend is impressive: in just 12 years the recordable injury rate declined from 3.39 to 0.75, a drop of around 80 percent. And the number of lost workdays dropped by a similar percentage. Moreover the trend is quite smooth and steady, showing that the results are not a fluke or one-time event. And these FIGURE1.1 Safetytrends—UnitedStatesOuterContinentalShelf. (Source:UnitedStatesMineralManagementService,2009) 4 CHAPTER 1 Risk Management 4,500,000 4,000,000 3,500,000 3,000,000 s n 2,500,000 o all 2,000,000 G 1,500,000 1,000,000 500,000 - 0 2 4 6 8 0 2 4 6 8 0 2 4 8 8 8 8 8 9 9 9 9 9 0 0 0 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 Facilities Pipelines FIGURE1.2 Environmentaltrends—OffshoreUnitedStates. advances were made as the industry has worked in ever-more challenging condi- tions—particularlyasithasmovedintoverydeepwateroperations. Figure 1.2 shows a similar positive trend with respect to the industry’s envi- ronmental record. The data, which are provided by the United States Coast Guard, include some land-based facilities, and also spills from inshore (state) waters. If the two bars for each of the years in Figure 1.2 are combined, it can be seen thatthe amountofoilspilledannuallyhas declinedfromjustunder 6million gallons inthe early 1980s toan almost negligibleamountby the year 2005. Impact of Deepwater Horizon/Macondo The trends shown in Figures 1.1 and 1.2 are largely attributable to improvement in occupational or personal safety. And prior to the year 2010, the trends to do with major events such as fires and blowouts also seemed to be favorable, although the level of improvement was not as great for personal safety and the quality ofthe data was not nearly as good. Then came the Deepwater Horizon explosion and fire followed by the spill of oil from the Macondo well. To say that this catastrophe was a shock to the industry would be a gross understatement. Not only was the initial impact of the loss of life, the destruction of the rig, and the massive spill dramatic enough, but the event showed that sys- tems were not in place to respond promptly to a catastrophe of this magnitude. In particular, it took 5 months before the well could be sealed; and during those 5 months, dramatic scenes were broadcast around the world showing oil pouring
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