obstacles to Army Special Operations Forces' employment in support to resistance operations

180 Pages·2008·1.78 MB·English

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2017-12
Unconventional restraint: obstacles to Army
Special Operations Forces' employment in
support to resistance operations
Hoelscher, Eric A.; Staab, Charles A., II
Monterey, California: Naval Postgraduate School
http://hdl.handle.net/10945/56939
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NAVAL
POSTGRADUATE
SCHOOL

MONTEREY, CALIFORNIA

THESIS

UNCONVENTIONAL RESTRAINT: OBSTACLES TO
ARMY SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES’
EMPLOYMENT IN SUPPORT TO RESISTANCE
OPERATIONS

by

Eric A. Hoelscher
Charles A. Staab II

December 2017

Thesis Advisor: Kalev Sepp
Second Reader: John Tullius
Approved for public release. Distribution is unlimited.
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(Leave blank) December 2017 Master’s thesis
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UNCONVENTIONAL RESTRAINT: OBSTACLES TO ARMY SPECIAL
OPERATIONS FORCES’ EMPLOYMENT IN SUPPORT TO RESISTANCE
OPERATIONS
6. AUTHOR(S) Eric A. Hoelscher and Charles A. Staab II
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Monterey, CA 93943-5000 NUMBER
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13. ABSTRACT (maximum 200 words)
st
Despite ever-increasing political support to U.S. Army Special Operations Forces (ARSOF) in the 21
century, enduring obstacles continue to limit the execution of support to resistance movements as a viable
strategic policy option for the United States. When both diplomatic and conventional military options prove
too costly and/or reach an impasse, the National Command Authority is left with two options: do nothing or
force a change by supporting elements of the indigenous opposition.
Recent history provides several examples of presidential decisions to leverage U.S. military support to
resistance movements (STR) to, as outlined in Joint Publication 3-05, Special Operations (2014), “coerce,
disrupt or overthrow a government or occupying power” in Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, and most recently,
Syria. Yet the efficacy of this core activity remains constrained by legal, political, and organizational
challenges. This thesis explores both the causes and depths of these obstacles to the employment of
ARSOF elements in support to indigenous resistance activities and identifies feasible means to overcome
these hurdles. Ultimately, recognition and alleviation of these obstacles will optimize ARSOF’s activities
and arm national policymakers with the ways and means to achieve long-lasting policy ends.

14. SUBJECT TERMS 15. NUMBER OF
Army special operations forces (ARSOF), unconventional warfare (UW), support to resistance PAGES
(STR), special forces (SF) 179
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Approved for public release. Distribution is unlimited.

UNCONVENTIONAL RESTRAINT: OBSTACLES TO ARMY SPECIAL
OPERATIONS FORCES’ EMPLOYMENT IN SUPPORT TO RESISTANCE
OPERATIONS

Eric A. Hoelscher
Major, United States Army
B.A., University of Wisconsin at La Crosse, 2006

Charles A. Staab II
Major, United States Army
B.S., United States Military Academy, 2006

Submitted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of

MASTER OF SCIENCE IN DEFENSE ANALYSIS

from the

NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL
December 2017

Approved by: Kalev Sepp, Ph.D.
Thesis Advisor

John Tullius, Ph.D.
Second Reader

John Arquilla, Ph.D.
Chair, Department of Defense Analysis

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ABSTRACT
Despite ever-increasing political support to U.S. Army Special Operations Forces
st
(ARSOF) in the 21 century, enduring obstacles continue to limit the execution of support
to resistance movements as a viable strategic policy option for the United States. When
both diplomatic and conventional military options prove too costly and/or reach an
impasse, the National Command Authority is left with two options: do nothing or force a
change by supporting elements of the indigenous opposition.
Recent history provides several examples of presidential decisions to leverage U.S.
military support to resistance movements (STR) to, as outlined in Joint Publication 3-05,
Special Operations (2014), “coerce, disrupt or overthrow a government or occupying
power” in Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, and most recently, Syria. Yet the efficacy of this core
activity remains constrained by legal, political, and organizational challenges. This thesis
explores both the causes and depths of these obstacles to the employment of ARSOF
elements in support to indigenous resistance activities and identifies feasible means to
overcome these hurdles. Ultimately, recognition and alleviation of these obstacles will
optimize ARSOF’s activities and arm national policymakers with the ways and means to
achieve long-lasting policy ends.
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND ..........................................................1
II. LITERATURE REVIEW .....................................................................................3
A. VIABILITY OF STR AS A STRATEGY ................................................3
B. MODERN CONFLICT PARADIGM ......................................................4
C. POLITICAL AND LEGAL CHALLENGES TO STR ..........................5
D. ORGANIZATIONAL CHALLENGES TO STR ...................................6
E. TRAINING AND EDUCATIONAL CHALLENGES TO STR ............7
III. APPROACH/METHODOLOGY .........................................................................9
A. SUPPORT TO RESISTANCE MOVEMENTS VERSUS
UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE .........................................................9
B. TRADITIONAL WARFARE VERSUS IRREGULAR
WARFARE ...............................................................................................10
C. INDIRECT APPROACH VERSUS DIRECT APPROACH ...............11
D. SPECIAL WARFARE VERSUS SURGICAL STRIKE .....................11
E. COMBATING TERRORISM VERSUS
COUNTERTERRORISM .......................................................................12
IV. PREMISE 1: STR IS A VIABLE OPTION ......................................................13
A. A HISTORY OF FAILURE? ..................................................................14
B. THE “MAGIC BULLET” FALLACY ..................................................16
C. SHORT-TERM SUCCESS, LONG-TERM FAILURE, AND
WINNING THE “DAY AFTER” ...........................................................21
D. CONCLUSION ........................................................................................25
V. PREMISE 2: MODERN CONFLICT PARADIGM CHANGE ......................27
A. CHINA ......................................................................................................28
B. RUSSIA .....................................................................................................30
C. IRAN .........................................................................................................33
D. SIMILAR REFLECTIONS WITHIN U.S. DOCTRINE .....................37
E. CONCLUSION ........................................................................................38
VI. LEGAL OBSTACLES ........................................................................................41
A. INTERNATIONAL LEGAL CONSIDERATIONS .............................41
B. DOMESTIC LEGAL CONSIDERATIONS .........................................46
C. SUMMARY ..............................................................................................54
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