Nuclear Weapons . Scientists and the Post–Cold War Challenge Selected Papers on Arms Control TThhiiss ppaaggee iinntteennttiioonnaallllyy lleefftt bbllaannkk Nuclear Weapons . Scientists andthe Post–Cold War Challenge Selected Papers on Arms Control Sidney D. Drell Stanford University, USA World Scientific NEih. JERSEY * LONDCIR; SINGAPORE EEiJING SEIAbGHAl e HONG KONG 0 TAlPEl * CHENNAI Published by World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd. 5 Toh Tuck Link, Singapore 596224 USA ofice: 27 Warren Street, Suite 401-402, Hackensack, NJ 07601 UK ofice: 57 Shelton Street, Covent Garden, London WC2H 9HE British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library. The author and publisher would like to thank the following publishers of the various journals and books for their assistance and permission to include selected reprints found in this volume: Stanford Linear Accelerator Center (Beam Line);N ational Reconnaissance Office and American Society for Photogrammetry and Remote Sensing (Beyond Expectations -B uilding an American National Reconnaissance Capability); American Physical Society (Reviews of Modern Physics); Springer Science and Business Media (In the Shadow of the Bomb: Physics and Arms Control); Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists (Bulletin ofthe Atomic Scientists); National Academy of Sciences, Washington, DC (Issues in Science and Technology); Foreign Affairs, NY (Foreign Affairs); Palgrave Macmillan (Adlai Stevenson’s Lasting Legacy); Blackwell Publishing (New Perspective Quarterly); New York Times (New York Times Op-Ed); The Washington Post (The Washington Post Op-Ed); Annual Reviews, CA (Annual Review of Nuclear and Particle Science); American Institute of Physics (Physics Today);A rms Control Association, Washington, DC (Arms Control Association Report). NUCLEAR WEAPONS, SCIENTISTS, AND THE POST-COLD WAR CHALLENGE Selected Papers on Arms Control Copyright 0 2007 by World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd. All rights reserved. This book, orparts thereoJ may not be reproduced in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording or any information storage and retrieval system now known or to be invented, without written permission from the Publisher. For photocopying of material in this volume, please pay a copying fee through the Copyright Clearance Center, Inc., 222 Rosewood Drive, Danvers, MA 01923, USA. In this case permission to photocopy is not required from the publisher. ISBN 98 1-256-896-4 ISBN 981-256-897-2 (pbk) Printed in Singapore by Mainland Press V Contents INTRODUCTION 1 CHAPTER I My Involvement as a Scientist Working on Issues of National Security and 5 Views on Scientists’ Responsibilities and Ethical Dilemmas - Reflections 7 - Physics and U.S. National Security 17 - The Moral Obligation of Scientists and a Rekindling of Hope 28 - Response on Behalf of Degree Recipients at the University of Tel Aviv 34 Ceremony Granting Honorary Doctors Degrees - Response at the Ceremony Awarding the William Oliver Baker Award 36 - Beyond Expectations - Building an American National Reconnaissance 38 Capability: Recollections of the Pioneers and Founders of National Reconnaissance - The Impact of a Public Constituency 45 - Science and Society: The Troubled Frontier 51 - To Act or Not To Act 65 CHAPTER I1 Issues Coming to the Fore Immediately Following the Collapse of the 67 Soviet Union and the End of the Cold War - Science and National Security 68 - Testimony on the Future of Arms Control 76 - Abolishing Long-range Nuclear Missiles 89 - Reducing Nuclear Danger 91 CHAPTER I11 At the End of the 20th Century: The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and 107 the Emergence of the New Terror of Biological and Chemical Weapons - Adlai Stevenson and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty of Today 109 - On Stockpile Stewardship and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty 113 - Putting the Nuclear Genie Back in the Bottle 118 - Reasons To Ratify, Not To Stall 124 - This Treaty Must Be Ratified 125 - Technical Issues of a Nuclear Test Ban 126 vi - Merits and Risks of More Underground Tests 169 - Safety in High Consequence Operations 171 - The Route to the CTBT 189 - The Present Threat 197 CHAPTER IV New Challenges in the 21st Century: Escaping the Nuclear Deterrence 205 Trap and Facing Terrorism - The Gravest Danger 207 - Nuclear Weapons and Their Proliferation: The Gravest Danger 213 - Tough Challenges 231 - What Are Nuclear Weapons For - Recommendations for Restructuring 235 U.S. Strategic Nuclear Forces? - In the Shadow of the Bomb 270 CHAPTER V Memorials to Four Colleagues who were Great Scientists and Citizens 277 - Amos deShalit: Statesman of Science 278 - Viki: A Passionate Leader for International Cooperation in Science and 286 in the Pursuit of Peace - Hans Bethe: Shaping Public Policy 294 - Report on the Progress in Reducing Nuclear Danger, Presented at an 303 International Conference in Honor of Andrei Sakharov - Andrei Sakharov and the Nuclear Danger 317 AFTERWORD What Are Nuclear Weapons For? 323 1 Introduction This volume includes a representative selection of my recent writings and speeches (circa 1992 to the present) on public policy issues that have substantial scientific compo- nents. Most deal with national security, nuclear weapons and arms control, reflecting my personal involvement in such issues, dating back to 1960. These essays are a sequel to the collection in my book ”In the Shadow of the Bomb: Physics and Arms Control” published by the American Institute of Physics in 1993 in its series ”Masters of Modern Physics.” My preface to that book started with the following paragraph: “As a physicist, I have tried to understand nature’s mysteries. As a citizen, I have worked to decrease the dangers posed by the nuclear weapons of mass destruction that are one of the consequences of scientific progress. Since 1960, my life has been divided between pursuing the dream of discovery and working to avoid the nightmare of a nuclear holocaust. The essays, speeches, and Congressional testimony in this collection touch on both endeavors.” The essays in ”The Shadow of the Bomb’’ reflected the fact that in 1993 we were just emerging from the Cold War, during which efforts had been focused primarily on avoid- ing a nuclear holocaust. The success that the United States and the Soviet Union achieved in that effort was based on their recognition that the enormous destructive potential of nuclear weapons meant, simply, that any nation that initiated nuclear war would, most likely, be committing suicide. This fact reflects the technical reality that there is no effec- tive defense of one’s society against nuclear retaliation. The two superpowers managed their confrontational relationship by establishing a balance of terror in the form of nuclear deterrence based on mutual assured destruction. The 1986 summit at Reykjavik, Iceland, between President Ronald Reagan and General Secretary, Mikhail Gorbachev marked the beginning of a major change in the U.S./Soviet confrontation, starting with the call for sizable reductions in their arsenals of nuclear weapons. The two leaders even went so far as to consider removing all nuclear-armed ballistic missiles that were poised on hair-trigger alert to deliver devastating destruction on an unparalleled scale in less than 30 minutes. Gorbachev and Reagan also presented a vision of escaping from the nuclear deterrence trap based on mutual assured destruction, and flirted with the revolutionary idea of removing all nuclear weapons. In the end, that bold idea was judged to be premature for 1986. However they lit a glimmer of hope that still flickers. Today, 20 years later, and 15 years after the demise of the Soviet Union, the gravest danger presented by nuclear weapons comes in a new form. It is no longer a superpower conflict resulting in a radioactive holocaust. It is the danger that the spread of advanced technology may result in the proliferation of nuclear weapons to a growing number of na- tions, and hostile governments, including terrorists and suicidal fanatics not constrained 2 by accepted norms of civilized behavior. Our challenge now is to prevent this from happening. At the same time, now that the Soviet Union no longer exists, we should aggressively pursue the opportunity to escape from the nuclear deterrence trap. These themes - sustaining and strengthening a nonproliferation regime against severe chal- lenges, preventing the world's most devastating weapons from falling into the most dan- gerous hands, and escaping the deterrence trap - are the main focus of the essays in this book. I have divided this book into five chapters. Each starts with a short commentary on the individual articles it includes. Chapter I describes how I originally got involved in techni- cal issues of national security as a complement to my academic career in physics research and teaching. In addition to giving a broad account of my activities on specific problems as a government advisor, these articles also address my views on the responsibilities of scientists and the importance that I attach to the scientific community helping society to benefit from the technical advances resulting from scientific progress. I also discuss ethical dilemmas that we may face in working on technical issues of national security. The next three chapters proceed chronologically in pace with the evolving strategic context for U.S. national security policy and nuclear weapons through the post-Cold War years into the 21st century. Chapter I1 focuses on issues that came to the fore immediately following in the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War. Chapter I11 addresses the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and its strategic im- portance for maintaining and strengthening a nonproliferation regime that is under in- creasing pressure as we enter into the 21st century. I discuss technical issues that have to be evaluated and understood for the United States to conclude that a CTBT is consistent with our national security needs. I also include an essay summarizing a study on the what I call the New Terror, that is the growing threat of biological and chemical weapons that we must now face due to the proliferation of the technology to make and use them. Chapter IV addresses the new challenges of the 21st century. Can the nuclear nonpro- liferation regime be maintained? What strengthening of the restrictions of the NonProlif- eration Treaty will be required to prevent the spread of nuclear technology and weapons into the most dangerous hands? Can we now, 15 years after the demise of the Soviet Union, escape from the trap of nuclear deterrence based upon mutual assured destruc- tion that guided us through the most dangerous period of the Cold War? And indeed, "What are nuclear weapons for?" in the post-Cold War era with our former adversary, the Soviet Union, now relegated to the dustbin of history, and our new partner, Russia, accepted formally as an ally in the war against terrorism. Chapter V is devoted to memorials to four great human beings who were admired both as scientists and leaders in the endeavor for a better world, with peace and human justice: Amos de Shalit, Viki Weisskopf, Hans Bethe, and Andrei Sakharov. It is inevitable that there is a significant amount of overlap in the essays included in this book since, in one way or another, they are all addressing the challenge we face to 3 reduce the nuclear danger, to walk away from the brink of nuclear holocaust, to extend the nonproliferation regime, and to negotiate a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. But one can also see a changing emphasis in the discussion as it tracks the changing strategic con- text since the historic Reykjavik Summit of 1986. There and then, 20 years ago, President Ronald Reagan and General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev flirted with such far out and vi- sionary ideas as getting rid of all nuclear armed ballistic missiles, or "fast fliers," and even contemplated a world ultimately free of nuclear weapons. These ideas are surfacing once again with the question "What Are Nuclear Weapons For?"
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