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alias ffiffiilffi #=m&.re Srr,arfrm Recollectiorus of the guerrilla leader who waged a -ye&r anti-colonial 72 , war against British and Commoruu)ealth forces in, jungles 'w the of Malaya. F-* '-ja,. About this book 'Looking back over the years, I have always been careful not to fall into the trap of romanticising the past. There has, after all, been very litde in my life that would inspire the mendacity of nostalgia.' Chin Peng, My Sid.e of History ,{" The Chin Peng story bears no comparison, whatever, to autobiographical accounts by contemporary celebrities recording for posterity the brillian.e of iheir careers. It has nothing to do with the honing of incredible talent or demonstrations of serendipity. My Sid.e of History stands as a unique fr, and extraordinary historical document from the man who, along with fellow believers, challenged militarily the might of bothJapanese and British Empires. Following rWorld'War 11, the returning _tu colonial masters, on instructions from London, bestowed on Chin Peng rwo campaign medals 0€ and an Order of the British Empire (OBE). These honours were for services to the Crown in Japanese-occupied Malaya. But the enticements failed. To extinguish the revolutionary flames thereafter ignited by the Chin Peng-led Communist Party of Malaya (CPM), Britain would embark on a ll-year military campaign which, for insurance purposes, she labelled an f -rli '( :rfs; C' 'Emergenry' rather than the war that it was. The =L- proclaimed war hero, would be re-packaged as TOre: a a 'terrorist leader' and huge rewards would be offered for his capture - dead or alive. More than half a century latet Chin Peng maintains: 'I could not make an OBE the core of my life.'His generation, he sayn, 'dreamed of doing away with British colonialism in Malaya. I'm proud of this fact.' This amazing saga could only be recalled by someone who has lived - consistently and for so long- a truly baffling existence. Intensely controversial, it is a story of unrelenting commitment, undeniable courage, hardship and the fewest of compromises. It is also the chronicle of a fretfi.rl age that posed monumental challenges and how different political persuasions within that generation rose to meet them. 'Vhen the war came, I had to be with the guerrilla forces ftghting theJapanese. As a young man, I saw no other route that would have sat well with me for the rest of my life. Just as I was appalled by the British colonial days before the war, I was outraged by the Japanese invasion. I had to help actively undermine the invaders. Tlo compromise would have been more harrowing than the formidable hills and jungles we had to trudge through. I had to be a liberation ftghter., These senrimenrs came with a fearfirl price. Chin Peng chose to pay it. His book is the srory of that choice. About the co-authors Ian'Ward was South East Asian correspondent for Tlte DailyTelqraplt, London, from tgGZ- 87 . He spenr a large part of these 25 years as a war correspondent covering regional conflicts including the 'second Emer gency' years in Malaysia. At various points of his career, he lived - apart from Singapore - in Manila and Saigon. Norma Miraflor was founding Editor-in- Chief of MPH Magazines, Singapore, from 1974-1985. She remained the Groupt Editorial Consultant undl L990. The husband and wife writing team is based in Singapore and travels extensively. Nearly half a century on, old comrades Chin Peng (righ) Gua Musang police station todayfeaturing remnants and Rashid Maidin review declassffied British documents of the Emergency years. It was from this central on the 1955 Baling peace talks. Kelantan compound that the communist guerrillas declared their struggle s sole 'liberated zone.' 5 Having lived as long as I have, I am now able to enioy urhat I can only describe ' as a levitated riew of history. I wa$ instrumental in playing out one side ot the Emergency story. AGGess to declassified documents today giues me the ability to look back and dorun 0n the other side and see the broad picture.9 Chin Peng joined the Communist Party of Malaya (CPM) inJanuary, 1940, as a 15 yeavold schoolboy, His commitment to the communist cause, the pre-war anti-colonial struggle against Britain and, eventuafly, guerrilla warfare against the Japanese invaders saw him propelled rapidly to senior positions within the CPM pafiy structure. By the age of 18 he had become the key link,beuareen the communists' Malayan Peoples Anti-Japanese Army (MPAJA) and Britaint clandestine Force 136, then endeavouring to set up intelligence-gathering operations behind enemy lines. \While still a teenager he was promoted to head the communist movement's activities in his home state of Perak. Immediately following the Japanese surrender, Chin Peng was appointed to the Central Committee and, ultimatelp his parryt policy-making Politburo. He was barely 21. At 23, hewas formally named the CPM's Secretary General, its highest- ranking figure. ByJune, l948,the Malayan Emergency erupted and Chin Peng, four months shy of his Z4rhyex, became the British Empiret most wanted man. Thern T.,PMnegot ing team at Baling ISBN 18I,-B|r-4E13-E (left to right): Maidin, Chin Peng ililtl[ltJilLtit]U[ll NIY SIDE OF HISTORY By Chin Peng Mirallor as told to lan'Vard and Nortna My Side of History Copyright @ 2003 by Media Masters Pte Ltd Published by Media Masters Pte Ltd, Newton Road PO Box 272, Singapore 912210 Email: [email protected] tWebsite: www. mediamasters. com.sg Far (65) 5484-2559 'Wendy Design: \7ong Colour photographs, front and back covers: Demetrio Miraflor Printed by Mui Kee Press & Co. Singapore First published Septemb er 2003 No part of this publication may be reproduced in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without the prior consenr of the publishers. ISBN: 981-04-8 693-6 Foreuord I went on my first and only visit to the United Kingdom in the summer of 1998.I spent some of that time reading Malayan Emergency documents ar the Public Record Office, Kew, and subsequently at Rhodes House Library, Universiry of Oxford. It was part of my personal quest to get a broader picture of the war in which between four and five thousand of my comrades were killed. Discovering what officials in the late I 940s and 1950s London were hatching to further the cause of their anti-insurgency campaign against the Communist Party of Malaya (CPM) was, to say the least, an affirming exercise. Finally, after so many years, I was able to evaluate the propaganda that was fed the world as my men and I trekked through the forbidding jungles of our country. I have, since those reading sessions at Kew and Oxford, gathered a large collection of relevant declassified reports, not just from the Public Record Office, but also from the Imperial \War Museum in London and the Australian \Var Memorial in Canberra. These have become part of my personal archives. I now see the wisdom in not having rushed to tell my story as I was coaxed to do by several quarters immediately upon signing the peace accords in Haadyai, southernThailand, on December 2,l9B9.I had two reasons. At the time, I volunteered only the patently obvious one. I said I needed time. I had to adjust first to the new schedules and disciplines brought on by the accords. After a lifetime in the wilderness, I had to make sure that the new concept of peace we had worked out with Thailand and Malaysia would work for everyone. The second reason was not an easy one to explain. I agreed that our side of the Emergency story had to be told. But, not so soon. From where I had been directing our armed struggle, only vague reports reached me ofwhar was being said, decided and ordered in London and Kuala Lumpur corridors of power. I required documented proof to accompany my re-examination of that war. \Without it, intrepid detractors would, quickly and conveniently, dismiss my analysis as a summary of unsubstantiated resentments and bits of fiction or, to borrow GeraldTempler's derisive phrase, 'typical of all communist muck'. It was important that I remain as dispassionate as any human being could be in the predicament I had been placed. Reams of propaganda material had succeeded in categorising me as a 'terrorist leader'. The Emergency was a conflict spurred by the continual onslaught of propaganda. I dont in any way excuse our side and claim we did not indulge in campaigns of persuasion. \7e certainly tried. But the documents at Kew attest to the paltriness of the CPM propaganda arsenal. This can easily be explained by the fact that we were not shackled to desks housed in grand buildings. My army was constandy moving and reorganising and facing food shortages. You could say idealism was the biggest weapon in our stockpile. \We had neither the skill nor the sophistication to phrase columns upon columns of elegant prose meant to mislead.'We were raw, hot-tempered and inexperienced. Our pronouncements were largely unadorned and straightforward. What you read was what you got. In early 2000, Ian 'Ward, whose name I recalled from his bylin e in The Daily Telegraph, London, contacted me. He was by this stage into the l2'h year of his retirement and had become an historian. I knew he had been a war correspondent. I remembered his reports from Vietnam and the 'second Emergen.y . H. didnt have to tell me that our politics differed. He had, for a quarter of a century, represented a staunchly conservative British newspaper. 'Ward said the Emergency had long interested him and he had, as a matter of fact, been researching it, on and ofl for the past many years. By the .very nature of it being a guerrilla war, there were aspects of the Emergenry that had yet to be revealed and I held the key to this unexplored territory. He wanted to listen to my story. He added that his politics had not changed. That started a complex and, at times, fi.ry collaboration. 'We were, from the very outset, determined that each would not be a 'stooge' of the other. For instance, it took some painstaking effort on my part to explain to \7ard why a comrade would not consider setbacks in the movement as being'wasted dme'. \7ard, on the other hand, was adamant that the book should not read like a manifesto. The presence of the writer and editor Norma Miraflor proved more than beneficial to the project that took much longer than anticipated. It was Miraflor - a 'recalcitrant bourgeois' (her words) married to'Ward - who kept her cool caonndt rbibyu dtieofnasu ltt ob ethcea minev akerieapbelyr oirfr rtohelr .pde ace. But she was more than that. Her insights that were worthy of t.irg "rJ Iengthy discussrioitn.s led to further she knew how to listen ,h. "r"ffi "rrJr..ord.J. her husband, \ward "nd "rk.d t'he ,ight questions. and Miraflor -"1t-it plain *."*.re of the communist Parry of Mi"y"- fi:, nor interested in the history human element of the Eme were more concerned with the b o th s i d es o r a m o n u -.r, o,".ffi iJ:ffi :" ILr'fr ::r":: T ;*:l: :? hparoveP aregaacnhdead' \tVhat rmd tpdaiar tiwcuhlialer lyih .w rorr-k.edd;; ra"t gr.g..r.e,i rrg out episodes that could not taon dc herxoanmicinlee da' nSyotmhien ghe b aacc..ejp otend ;h.oetahrse rasy r ro. rr J1pu.-ro.rdau,g .rem.d a woin.ert.a Tcinohinn.rcgeu irwtr eewdrae.s dpisocinutslessesd You may ask, is this book ,lr. *Lpi.,. atNohlboeovn rEig odm uaoes d rIgr iefecfaelnascroiemynn' Itttth h riaaosatt' sdiitit m ,iorspe ipnpyru,oe rtstr heuthn.e ter se a hca odinsrrtyedowae rdhrn ye-j or'hoeue ir nrnhtee.apa ydirc. roaf,oorf rcr"-eo -h-,m ri"stp.h, rr .eeoinw*hr?re hr rnoI,ptsr yaoivi.rspce ty ne aodocf t ct,Mo of aoutrrnraa tyvt haoee.lf Other fears t.rrorc "rd monsrerswereshapedby,h;#::#.:L,:ffi iJ:-..'*H**ff H ,H::ff TTehceh wnoolroldg ichaasl , of .ourr., changed vastry "#o- the one i r.a to chalenge. dimensions' Bupt rIo glioreldss t hrraatn tshpeo srmtsa trrheesr aorft toofd, a-.y"tr .',s mktaii"rlft; ' i."top ofr*i ghtening find it impossible to eliminate the human desire for justic. wilr sti, bbeoloiekfs Ii sfao rneue gfiothhrtme irne a dt wbaoona dsw tha nrosow ra .anondn affolpir.o rlr,o "gIr"y.y., I,i; r;ir, * " r,t hinev jiutantgioren wtoas "u rmnrady e drhisgotnaminreyd.. Thohwis an insight into how peace can be achieved. and run ,r.rrb",.d. Equaly, it is " -'/ e{r*fo-* r4+ Chin Peng I July, 2003 Contents Chapter I The unlikely alliance ....... ...........9 Chapter 2 A Chinese boyhood in colonial Malaya .....29 Chapter 3 My personal passage ro communism ....... .............41 Chaprcr 4 From underground activist to anti-Japanese guerrilla fighter ............57 Chapter 5 A succession of betrayals ..........73 Chapter 6 Face to face with Lai Te ....85 Chapter 7 \Working with Force 136 .. . launching our mobile squads .....95 Chapter B To fight or not to fight the returning colonials . I 15 Chapter 9 A cauldron of simmering discontenr .. ..135 Chapter l0 Awards, a letter of apology and accelerating political confrontation ............149 Chapter I I Plotting the betrayer's overthrow ..........lG7 Chapter 12 Eliminating Britain's spy . . . then an OBE! ....... l8l Chapter 13 Committing to armed revolution ........... ............ 195 Chapter 14 Sungei Siput, the Emergency declaration and 20 seconds that saved me ........ .............209 Chapter 15 The Batang Kali massacre and British propaganda ...........223 Chapter 16 Second thoughts about Australian involvemenr ....245 Chapter 17 The Briggs plan bites ..263 Chapter 18 Assassination on the Gap road. . . enter the hectoringGmpler.....287