Motives and Functions of Patenting in Public Basic Science

281 Pages·2021·6.2 MB·English

by  Michael Neumann

Michael Neumann
Motives and Functions
of Patenting in Public
Basic Science
Motives and Functions of Patenting
in Public Basic Science
Michael Neumann
Motives and Functions
of Patenting in Public
Basic Science
MichaelNeumann
Bremen,Germany
Dissertation,UniversitätBayreuth,2019
ISBN978-3-658-33121-4 ISBN978-3-658-33122-1 (eBook)
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-33122-1
©TheEditor(s)(ifapplicable)andTheAuthor(s),underexclusivelicensetoSpringer
FachmedienWiesbadenGmbH,partofSpringerNature2021
Thisworkissubjecttocopyright.AllrightsaresolelyandexclusivelylicensedbythePublis-
her,whetherthewholeorpartofthematerialisconcerned,specificallytherightsoftranslation,
reprinting,reuseofillustrations,recitation,broadcasting,reproductiononmicrofilmsorinanyother
physicalway,andtransmissionorinformationstorageandretrieval,electronicadaptation,computer
software,orbysimilarordissimilarmethodologynowknownorhereafterdeveloped.
Theuseofgeneraldescriptivenames,registerednames,trademarks,servicemarks,etc.inthis
publicationdoesnotimply,evenintheabsenceofaspecificstatement,thatsuchnamesareexempt
fromtherelevantprotectivelawsandregulationsandthereforefreeforgeneraluse.
Thepublisher,theauthorsandtheeditorsaresafetoassumethattheadviceandinformationinthis
bookarebelievedtobetrueandaccurateatthedateofpublication.Neitherthepublishernorthe
authorsortheeditorsgiveawarranty,expressedorimplied,withrespecttothematerialcontained
hereinorforanyerrorsoromissionsthatmayhavebeenmade.Thepublisherremainsneutralwith
regardtojurisdictionalclaimsinpublishedmapsandinstitutionalaffiliations.
ResponsibleEditor:CarinaReibold
This Springer Gabler imprint is published by the registered company Springer Fachmedien
WiesbadenGmbHpartofSpringerNature.
Theregisteredcompanyaddressis:Abraham-Lincoln-Str.46,65189Wiesbaden,Germany
Abstract
Innovationpolicypromotespatentingbybasicresearchers-Arepatentsprohibitiverights
thatcontradicttheidealofopenscience,ordoscientificcommunitiessucceedinadaptingthe
functionandeffectofpatentstotheirobjectives?Previoustestsoftheanticommonsthesis
didnotfindtheinitiallyassumedimpedimentsofanexpandingintellectualpropertyregime
foracademicresearch. Thisthesiscontinuesthisresearchbyreviewing(a)thetheoretical
underpinningofearlierconcernsand(b)theimplementationofknowledgeandtechnology
transferasthethirdmissionofthescientists,forwhichacademicpatentingissupportedand
evaluated.Qualitativeinterviewsareusedtoanalyzehowscientistscomplywithpatentlaw
andwhytheyapplyforpatents.Basedontheresults,itisarguedthatacademicscienceisa
norms-based,self-governingsystemthatcanrefunctionpatentstopreventharmandtoadapt
totheregulatoryenvironment.Potentiallyimpedingpatentrightssuchasexclusionmaybe
suspendedtopreventharmtothescientificendeavor.Giventhedependenceofscientistson
publicfunding,patentsbecomeameansofcommunicationwithstakeholdersandfunding
sourcestosignalthattheirexpectationsarebeingmet.Theseempiricalinsightsexplainthe
functionalchangeofpatentlawasbeingdrivenbycontextualfactorssuchasthestrategic
acceptanceofintellectualpropertyrightsandcompetingsourcesofregulation.
v
TableofContents
TableofContents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vii 2.4 UnitsofAnalysis. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
ListofFigures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xi 2.4.1 ScientistsinGermany. . . . . . . . . 32
2.4.2 Non-universityresearch . . . . . . . 32
ListofTables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xiii
2.4.3 Publicbasicscience . . . . . . . . . . 33
Acronyms. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xv 2.4.4 Technologicallyrelevantdisciplines 33
Preface . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xvii 2.5 DataCollectionandProcessing. . . . . . . . 34
Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xix 2.5.1 Interviewdesign . . . . . . . . . . . 34
2.5.2 Interviewselection . . . . . . . . . . 34
1 Introduction 1 2.5.3 Interviewprocess . . . . . . . . . . . 35
2.5.4 Transcription. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
1.1 PatentsinRegulatoryComplexity . . . . . . 3
2.5.5 Translation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
1.2 DefiningPublicBasicScience. . . . . . . . . 5
2.6 InterviewAnalysis. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
1.2.1 Thelinearmodel:Anoldbutsur-
2.6.1 Coding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
vivingapproach. . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2.6.2 Interpretation . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
1.2.2 Thequadrantmodel . . . . . . . . . 5
1.2.3 Thesocialsystemmodel . . . . . . . 7 2.7 QualityCriteria. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
1.2.4 Socialnormsinscience. . . . . . . . 8
3 Theory:CommunityGovernanceandPatent-
1.3 ShiftsinResearchPolicy-TheRiseofthe
inginScience 41
ThirdMission. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
3.1 CommonsGovernanceasaResearchPer-
1.4 APrimeronPatentsinScience . . . . . . . . 12
spective . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
1.4.1 Patentsasregulatoryinstruments. . 12
3.1.1 Defaultneutralitytowardsmarkets,
1.4.2 Patentablebasicscience?. . . . . . . 12 authority,andcommunitymanage-
1.4.3 Academicpatentsasserviceinven- ment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
tions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 3.1.2 Understanding institutional diver-
1.4.4 Disclosure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 sityandcomplexity. . . . . . . . . . 47
1.4.5 Exclusiverightsandtheirexemptions 13
3.2 AnalyticalToolsoftheCommonsPerspective 48
1.4.6 Summary. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
3.2.1 TheIADframework . . . . . . . . . 49
1.5 TheResultingFriction:PrivateOwnership 3.2.2 Multiplesourcesofrule-making . . 54
andBasicScience. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 3.2.3 Multiplelevelsofrule-making . . . 56
1.5.1 Theoreticalconcerns . . . . . . . . . 16 3.2.4 AGrammarofInstitutions. . . . . . 58
1.5.2 Evidence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 3.2.5 Dissecting Rules-in-Use of the
1.6 ResearchQuestion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 PatentSystem . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
3.2.6 Summary. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
1.7 MethodologicalConsiderations . . . . . . . 20
1.7.1 Contextanddata . . . . . . . . . . . 21 3.3 CommonsGovernanceasaResearchObject 64
1.7.2 Analysis of individual attitudes 3.3.1 Commons-Adisambiguation. . . . 65
andstrategiestowardpatenting. . . 22 3.3.2 Common-property regimes: Legal
variablesofcommunitygovernance 66
1.8 ThesisStructure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
3.3.3 Common-pool resources - Eco-
2 Methodology 25 nomicvariablesincommunitygov-
ernance. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
2.1 ResearchDesign . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
2.1.1 WhyaCaseStudy? . . . . . . . . . . 27 3.4 Cultural Variables in Community Gover-
nance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
2.1.2 Whatisthe“case?” . . . . . . . . . . 28
3.4.1 “Culture”asacategoryofinformal
2.1.3 Choiceofcasestudytype . . . . . . 29
institutions. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
2.2 ResearchQuestions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30 3.4.2 Interplayofinformalandformalin-
2.3 PriorInformationandTheoreticalProposi- stitutions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
tions:. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31 3.4.3 Summary. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
vii
TableofContents
3.5 CommunityGovernanceasSelf-Regulation 79 4.4.5 Regulatory indetermination of
3.5.1 Mainelementsofcommonsgover- polycentricenvironments . . . . . .132
nance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79 4.5 Summary:PatentsasaProxyforthe“Third
3.5.2 Opennessasanimportantproperty Mission”. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .133
ofcommonsgovernance . . . . . . . 81
4.5.1 Embeddedness of patents in the
3.5.3 Summary. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82
governanceofscience. . . . . . . . .134
3.6 PeculiaritiesofKnowledgeCommons. . . . 83 4.5.2 Exogenous Third-Mission regula-
3.6.1 Theinterdependencyofeconomic tionsintheIADframework . . . . .135
variablesandrules-in-use . . . . . . 83
3.6.2 Theneedforknowledgetobecreated 83
5 Empirics:PatentingMotivesinBasicScience 137
3.6.3 Specifictypesofgovernancefailures 85
3.6.4 Summary:Complexityinthegover- 5.1 BasicScienceDefinedbyBasicScientists . .139
nanceofknowledgecommons . . . 86 5.1.1 Institutional environment - Basic
scienceasamission. . . . . . . . . .139
3.7 UnderstandingScienceasaCommons . . . 88
3.7.1 Whatmakescommons“scientific”?. 89 5.1.2 Personal motives: Individual
3.7.2 Whatmakesscienceacommons? . . 91 questsforunderstanding. . . . . . .140
3.7.3 Nestednessofscientificcommons. . 95 5.1.3 Researchactivities. . . . . . . . . . . 141
3.7.4 Commonsgovernanceinscience . . 96 5.1.4 Researchresults . . . . . . . . . . . .142
3.7.5 Summary:Scienceasacommonsvs. 5.1.5 Sourcesofinnovation:Fourdimen-
scientificcommons . . . . . . . . . .100 sionsofbasicresearch . . . . . . . .144
3.8 Two Explanations for Overvaluations of 5.2 How are Scientists Affected by Existing
AnticommonsinScience . . . . . . . . . . . 101 Patents? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .146
3.8.1 InstrumentalismI: Patent instru- 5.2.1 Passiveignoranceofpatents. . . . .146
mentalismonresearchinstruments.102 5.2.2 Assessingpatentcontent. . . . . . . 147
3.8.2 InstrumentalismII: Exogenous 5.2.3 Activeignoranceofpatents . . . . .148
patents versus endogenous self- 5.2.4 Twosidesoftheignore-patentsnorm148
governance. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .104
5.3 MentalModelsofIntellectualPropertyand
3.8.3 Anticommons effects in institu-
theThirdMission . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .150
tionalcomplexity . . . . . . . . . . .106
5.3.1 ThetraditionalFirstMissionversus
3.9 ChapterSummary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107 thenewThirdMission . . . . . . . . 151
5.3.2 Mentalmodelsofpatentsandintel-
4 PolicyAnalysis:PatentingfortheThirdMission109
lectualproperty . . . . . . . . . . . .154
4.1 TheRiseoftheThirdMission. . . . . . . . .110 5.3.3 Mertoniannorms:Idealsandreality 158
4.1.1 Historicalperspective . . . . . . . .110 5.3.4 Summary:PragmatismaboutMer-
4.1.2 Conceptualperspective . . . . . . .112 toniannorms . . . . . . . . . . . . . 161
4.1.3 Theregulatoryperspective. . . . . .116
5.4 ResultingMotivesnottoPatent . . . . . . .162
4.1.4 RegulatoryOverlapsfortheThird
5.4.1 Academicculture . . . . . . . . . . .162
Mission. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .118
5.4.2 Improvingviasharing . . . . . . . .163
4.2 ExpectationsandMissionFormulation . . .119
5.4.3 Priorityforscienceandcost-benefit
4.2.1 Europeanlevel. . . . . . . . . . . . .119
considerations. . . . . . . . . . . . .163
4.2.2 Nationallevel . . . . . . . . . . . . .120
4.2.3 Organizationallevel . . . . . . . . . 121 5.5 MotivesforPatenting . . . . . . . . . . . . .164
5.5.1 Privateincome-ornot? . . . . . . .164
4.3 ThirdMission-DirectedResources . . . . . .122
5.5.2 Protectionfordiffusionintoappli-
4.3.1 Europeanlevel. . . . . . . . . . . . .123
cation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .166
4.3.2 Nationallevel . . . . . . . . . . . . .124
4.3.3 Organizationallevel . . . . . . . . .125 5.5.3 Accesstofunding. . . . . . . . . . .169
5.5.4 Patentsusedasacertificateandsignal170
4.4 Mission-DirectedEvaluation . . . . . . . . .126
5.5.5 Individualsignaling . . . . . . . . . 171
4.4.1 Europeanlevel. . . . . . . . . . . . .126
5.5.6 Organizationalsignaling. . . . . . .174
4.4.2 Nationallevel . . . . . . . . . . . . . 127
4.4.3 Organizationallevel . . . . . . . . .128 5.5.7 Patentingmotives:Conclusion . . . 177
4.4.4 Propertiesofpolycentrism. . . . . .130 5.6 ScientificFormsofStrategicPatenting. . . .179
viii
TableofContents
5.6.1 Patenting motives between exter- 6.4.6 Individualsignaling . . . . . . . . .224
nalincentivesandintrinsicmotiva- 6.4.7 Complexity:Emergingpatentfunc-
tion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .179 tionsaspatternsofinteraction. . . .226
5.6.2 Patenting motives and self- 6.4.8 Evaluatingnewpatentfunctions . . 227
determination theory in the IAD 6.4.9 Summary. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .229
framework. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .182 6.5 PatentsasSignals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .230
5.6.3 Patentingstrategiesinscienceand 6.5.1 Patent signals in legal and eco-
industry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .184 nomicresearch . . . . . . . . . . . .230
5.7 ChapterSummary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 187 6.5.2 PatentsignalsintheTripleHelix . .232
6.5.3 Summaryandimplications . . . . .234
6 Synthesis:ContextualPatentFunctions 189 6.6 ChapterSummary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .235
6.1 Disambiguating Legitimation, Purpose, 6.6.1 Contextual rules-in-use and func-
andFunctionofPatents . . . . . . . . . . . .190 tionsofpatenting . . . . . . . . . . .236
6.1.1 Aninstrumentalistviewonpatents.190 6.6.2 Symbolicpatentinginscience . . . . 237
6.1.2 Alookback . . . . . . . . . . . . . .192
7 Summary 239
6.1.3 Fencing a moving target: Dis-
tinguishing micro-functions and 7.1 RecapitulatingtheArgument. . . . . . . . .240
macro-purposes . . . . . . . . . . . .195 7.1.1 Initialconsiderations . . . . . . . . . 241
6.1.4 Summary. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .196 7.1.2 Theory:Commonsgovernanceand
theabsenceofanticommonseffects.242
6.2 Functions as Contextual Action-Outcome
7.1.3 Policyanalysis:Patentsinpolycen-
Links. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 197
tricregulation . . . . . . . . . . . . .243
6.2.1 Shortcomingsinthepreviousview. 197
7.1.4 Empirics: Strategic patenting mo-
6.2.2 Theanalyticalalternative:Contex-
tivesinscience. . . . . . . . . . . . .244
tualfunctionsofpatents . . . . . . . 201
7.1.5 Synthesis: From motives to func-
6.2.3 Summary. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 207
tions–Signalingasacontextually
6.3 ContextualEfficacyofPatentLaw . . . . . .208 emergingpatentfunction . . . . . .245
6.3.1 Disclosure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .209
7.2 The Big Picture: Understanding Institu-
6.3.2 Exclusivity. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .210
tionalComplexityofPatenting. . . . . . . .246
6.3.3 Licensing. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 211
7.3 ImplicationsforExistingDiscussions . . . .248
6.3.4 Summary. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .212
7.3.1 Incentives and motives for aca-
6.4 ContextuallyEmergingPatentFunctions . .213 demicpatenting. . . . . . . . . . . .248
6.4.1 Linking motives and contextual 7.3.2 Acceptanceandfunctionalchange
regulations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .214 ofpatentlaw. . . . . . . . . . . . . .248
6.4.2 “Traditional”functions. . . . . . . .216 7.3.3 Governingknowledgecommons . .249
6.4.3 Funding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .218 7.3.4 Exploringconceptualbridges . . . .249
6.4.4 Qualitativeorganizationalsignaling 220
6.4.5 Quantitativeorganizationalsignaling222 Bibliography 251
ix
MotivesandFunctionsofPatentinginPublicBasicScience
ListofFigures
0.1 KTT-pathsbetweenScienceandIndustry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xviii
1.1 OverlappingSourcesofRegulation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.2 Stokes’QuadrantModelofResearchOrientation . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
1.3 MertonianNormsinaRegulatoryOverlap . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
1.4 ResearchPolicyInstrumentalizingPatents. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
1.5 PatentsinPotentialConflictwithAcademicSelf-Regulation . . . . . . 14
1.6 ReflexiveRegulatoryRelationsinTheIAD-Framework . . . . . . . . . 22
2.1 IterativeResearchStrategy. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
2.2 BasicTypesofCaseStudyDesigns . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
2.3 ResearchquestionsintheIADframework . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
3.1 DefaultNormativeNeutrality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
3.2 ComplementaryUnderstandingofModesdifferentGovernanceModes 46
3.3 TheIADframeworkinitsadaptedformforknowledgeresources . . . 49
3.4 MultipleLevelsofRule-Making. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
3.5 ConnotationsoftheTerm“Commons” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
3.6 PropertyasaBundleofRights . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
3.7 Rules-in-useintheIADframework . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
3.8 EconomicResourceProperties. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
3.9 EconomicvariablesintheIADframework. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
3.10 CulturalVariablesintheIADframework . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78
3.11 CommonsastheInstitutionalArrangementofSharedResourceSystems 82
3.12 Economiccharacteristicsofknowledgeaffectedbylegalnorms . . . . 84
3.13 InterdependentLegalandEconomicVariables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
3.14 CommonsGovernanceembodyingMixturesofInstitutionalDevices . 87
3.15 MultiplelevelsofAcademicSelf-Governance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96
3.16 Changesinthemodesofgovernanceofuniversitiesbetweenthe1980s
and2000s,GermanyandGreatBritainincomparison. . . . . . . . . . . 97
3.17 Property-focusedandGovernance-focusedConceptionsof“Commons” 101
xi
ListofFigures
3.18 Legalrulesthatregulateeconomicresourcecharacteristics . . . . . . . 103
3.19 SocialNormsoverruleLegalRules . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105
4.1 RegulatoryoverlapsintheTriple-Helixmodel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115
4.2 PublicMissionsandExpectationsForScientists. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 119
4.3 PatentsinResearchResourceAllocation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 122
4.4 Patentsinresearchevaluation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 126
4.5 ResearchPolicyInstrumentalizingPatents. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 129
4.6 PatentsEmbeddedintotheGovernanceofScience . . . . . . . . . . . . 134
4.7 ExogenousThird-MissionRegulationsseenintheIADFramework . . 135
5.1 Fourdimensionsofbasicresearch . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 143
5.2 AcademicNormsinOppositiontoExternalRegulation . . . . . . . . . 150
5.3 PatentingmotivesintheIADframework . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 178
5.4 Self-determinationTheoryintheMetatheoreticalIADFramework. . . 183
6.1 Macro-,Meso-,andMicro-LevelofPatentRegulation . . . . . . . . . . 199
6.3 PatentFunctionsasAction-Outcome-Links . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 203
6.4 Patenting:MatchingOutcomeswithIntentions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 204
6.5 Rules-in-Useofthepatentsystemlinkingactionandoutcome. . . . . . 205
6.6 Rules-in-UseDefiningContextualPatentFunctions . . . . . . . . . . . 206
6.7 EfficacyofPatentDisclosure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 209
6.8 ContextualEfficiencyofPatentExclusivity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 210
6.9 ContextualRelevanceofPatentLicensing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 211
6.10 EmergingPatentFunction:PatentsusedforAllocatingFunding . . . . 219
6.11 Qualitativesymbolicpatenting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 221
6.12 Quantitativesymbolicpatenting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 223
6.13 IndividualSignalling . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 225
6.14 Patentfunctionsasemergingpatternsofinteraction . . . . . . . . . . . 226
6.15 Evaluatingpatentfunctions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 227
6.16 FormsofsignalingintheTripleHelix . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 233
6.17 ContextualRules-In-UseandPatentingFunctions . . . . . . . . . . . . 236
7.1 ResearchQuestionsintheIADFramework . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 241
7.2 ResearchStructureintheIAD-Framework. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 247
xii