Mental Symbols: A Defence of the Classical Theory of Mind

283 Pages·1997·6.909 MB·English

by  Peter Novak (auth.)

MENTAL SYMBOLS
STUDIES IN COGNITIVE SYSTEMS
VOLUME 19
EDITOR
James H. Fetzer, University ofM innesota, Duluth
ADVISORY EDITORIAL BOARD
Fred Dretske, Stanford University
Charles E.M. Dunlop, University ofM ichigan, Flint
Ellery Eells, University of Wisconsin, Madison
Alick Elithom, Royal Free Hospital, London
Jerry Fodor, Rutgers University
Alvin Goldman, University ofA rizona
Jaakko Hintikka, Boston University
Frank Keil, Cornell University
William Rapaport, State University ofN ew York at Buffalo
Barry Richards, Imperial College, London
Stephen Stich, Rutgers University
Lucia Vaina, Boston University
Terry Winograd, Stanford University
The titles published in this series are listed at the end of this volume.
MENTALSYMBOLS
A Defence of the Classical Theory of Mind
by
PETERNOVAK
SPRINGER SCIENCE+BUSINESS MEDIA, B.V.
A C.I.P. Catalogue record for this book is available from the Library of Congress.
ISBN 978-94-010-6374-6 ISBN 978-94-011-5632-5 (eBook)
DOI 10.1007/978-94-011-5632-5
Printed an acid-free paper
AII Rights Reserved
© 1997 Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht
Origina1ly published by Kluwer Academic Publishers in 1997
Softcover reprint ofthe hardcover Ist edition 1997
No part of the material protected by this copyright notice may be reproduced or
utilized in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical,
including photocopying, recording or by any information storage and
retrieval system, without written permis sion from the copyright owner.
SERIES PREFACE
This series will include monographs and collections of studies devoted
to the investigation and exploration of knowledge, information, and data-pro
cessing systems of all kinds, no matter whether human, (other) animal, or
machine. Its scope is intended to span the full range of interests from
classical problems in the philosophy of mind and philosophical psychology
through issues in cognitive psychology and sociobiology (regarding the
mental abilities of other species) to ideas related to artificial intelli-
gence and computer science. While primary emphasis will be placed upon
theoretical, conceptual, and epistemological aspects of these problems and
domains, empirical, experimental, and methodological studies will also
appear from time to time.
In this unusual volume, Peter Novak launches an unrelenting attack up-
on recent analytic approaches toward understanding the nature ofthe mind,
including the Conservative, the Radical, and the Middlebrow positions that
he identifies with Fodor, Quine, and Putnam, respectively. In their place,
Novak advocates (what he calls) The Classical Theory of Mind, which builds
upon an ontology of simple and complex concepts, generative mechanisms for
producing sentences and cognitive mechanisms that govern both cognitive and
emotional operations, combined with a Kantian epistemology that separates
what can and cannot be accessible to the mind. This study, which the author
intends as a critique of the Analytic Movement in philosophy, may infuriate
as many as it fascinates, but it will not be easy to ignore.
James H. Fetzer
Table of Contents
Introduction
A Fly in a Bottle ............................ xi
Chapter 1
Conservative Rationalism I ................... 1
1.1 Common-sense Psychology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 1
1.1.1 The language of thought .................... 2
1.1.2 The computer analogy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 3
1.1.3 The referential theory of meaning . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 5
1.2 The Supervenience Chain . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 8
1.2.1 Syntactically identical symbol-tokens
with different extensions .................... 9
1.2.1.1 N arrow and broad meaning ................. 10
1.2.2 Complex symbols under-determining extensions ..... 12
1.2.3 Syntactically distinct complex symbols
with identical extensions ................... 14
1.3 The Nomic Theory of Reference ........... 16
1.3.1 The four-phase nomic theory of reference . . . . . . . .. 17
1.3.1.1 The physical phase . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 18
1.3.1.2 The psychophysical phase . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 19
1.3.1.3 The psychological phase ................... 19
1.3.1.4 The sociological phase .................... 19
1.3.2 An error in an account of error? .............. 20
1.4 Casus Belli . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 21
1.5 Nomenclature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 22
Chapter 2
The Idea as World and Will
A Belief in a Contribution of Environment to Meaning
and a Division of Semantic Labour ...................... 25
2.1 The Ambiguous Meaning of "Meaning" .......... 25
2.1.1 Scientists as semantic experts ..... . 25
vi TABLE OF CONTENTS
2.1.2 A Middlebrow compromise between
extensionalism and mentalism .... 26
2.1.3 Pragmatic realism ............. 29
2.2 The Will to Linguistic Power ...... 32
2.2.1 Semantic oligarchy: scientists as unrepresentative leaders 32
2.2.2 A Westminster system? Extensions as Lords,
stereotypes as Commons ........... 35
2.2.3 Korrxo3 semantics, or meaning holism .. 35
2.2.4 Semantic tyranny: Merlin knows and rules
by meaning alone . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
Chapter 3
Sentence-based Semantics
Early Steps toward Semantic Holism. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 39
3.1 Motivation for Semantic Holism . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 39
3.2 Frege on Term-based Semantics. . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 41
3.2.1 Imagistic mentalism: variability in vorstellungen . . .. 43
3.2.2 Number-referring terms in axiomatic proofs .... 45
3.3 Russell on Term-based Semantics . . . . . . . . . . . 47
3.3.1 Meaningful terms referring to non-existent objects . 50
3.3.2 The sentence-based semantics of denoting phrases. 50
3.4 Carnap's Semantic Verificationism ....... 52
3.4.1 Sentences as fundamental bearers of meaning 55
3.4.2 Meaning as method of verification ... 55
3.4.3 Contingent verification as confirmation
of indefinitely many predictions . . . . . 56
Chapter 4
Radical Empiricism I ....................... 59
4.1 Meaning and Non-existent Entities ......... 59
4.2 The Separation of Meaning and Reference ... 60
4.2.1 The nominalistic extensional theory of meaning . 64
4.2.2 The realistic extensional theory of meaning . . . . . . .. 65
4.2.2.1 The conceptual-scheme relativity of what there is 65
4.2.2.2 The explanatory power and simplicity
of a conceptual scheme . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
4.2.2.3 The actual use of language,
and actual practices of positing universals . 68
TABLE OF CONTENTS vii
4.3 Mental and Mind-Independent Semantic Universals 69
4.3.1 The bad metaphysics charge . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 70
4.3.2 The virtus dormitiva charge ................. 72
4.3.3 The undefinability charge . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 73
Chapter 5
Radical Empiricism II.......................
77
5.1 Two Major Routes to Semantic Holism .......... 77
5.2 The Route from Verificationism to Holism ........ 77
5.2.1 Synthetic statements .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 79
5.2.1.1 Phenomenalism in natural science ............. 80
5.2.1.2 Universal epistemic revisability ............... 80
5.2.1.3 The inference from confirmation holism
to semantic holism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 83
5.2.2 Analytic statements ...................... 85
5.3 The Route from Behaviourism to Holism ......... 87
5.3.1 The argument from collateral information . . . . . . . ., 90
5.3.2 The argument from inscrutability of reference ...... 92
5.3.3 Four refutations of behavioural holism . . . . . . . . . .. 93
5.3.3.1 The language-learning argument. . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 94
5.3.3.2 The premiss that meaning is
what a sentence shares with its translation ........ 95
5.3.3.3 The argument from collateral information . . . . . . . .. 96
5.3.3.4 The argument from inscrutability of reference ...... 97
5.4 Remarks on Middlebrow Pragmatism ........... 100
5.4.1 Meaning holism ........................ 100
5.4.2 The coherence theory of truth ................ 101
5.4.3 The satisfaction theory of reference . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103
5.4.4 Holism's wake ......................... 105
Chapter 6
Conservative Rationalism II.................. 107
6.1 The Old Sorcerer's Supervenience Chain ......... 107
6.2 Misrepresentation and Asymmetric Dependence ..... 110
6.3 The Sociological Phase of Reference ............ 116
viii TABLE OF CONTENTS
Chapter 7
The Classical Theory of Mind I............... 125
7.1 Five Ways of Defining Logical Modality .......... 125
7.2 The Classical Theory of Mind . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 127
7.2.1 There is a finite basis of semantically simple ideas
(taken as types of symbol), or simple terms
of the mind's representational code ............. 127
7.2.2 There is a generative mechanism comprising operations
for the production of infinitely many complex ideas
from the empirical basis ................... 128
7.2.3 There is a generative mechanism comprising operations
for the production of infinitely many propositions
from the stock of simple and complex ideas ....... 129
7.2.4 There are finitely many basic psychological operations
on propositions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 130
7.2.5 There is a generative mechanism for the production
of complex psychological operations on propositions .. 131
7.3 The Classical Theory of Representation . . . . . . . . . . 132
7.3.1 Basic ideas ........................... 133
7.3.2 Complex ideas, and the a priori ideas generating them 133
7.3.2.1 The simple a priori ideas --, and A ...•.•...•.. 133
7.3.2.2 The complex a priori ideas v, ~,etc. .......... 134
7.3.2.3 The simple a priori predicate = . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 134
7.3.2.4 Complex empirical ideas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 134
7.3.3 Propositions, and the a priori ideas generating them .. 135
7.3.3.1 The simple a priori idea I . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 135
7.3.3.2 The complex a priori idea A . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 136
7.3.3.3 Propositions .......................... 136
7.3.3.3.1 Identity propositions ..................... 136
7.3.3.3.2 Quantified propositions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 136
7.3.3.3.3 Compound propositions ................... 136
7.4 Aspects of the Classical Theory of Knowledge . . . . . . 137
7.4.1 Locke on epistemic evaluation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 137
7.4.2 Locke's prevision of a new 'Logick and Critick' . . . . . 138
7.4.3 Metalogical principles and definitions ........... 141
7.5 Modal Properties in the Model Code ............ 143
7.5.1 Analytic evaluation in the model of CTM . . . . . . . . . 143
7.5.2 The trifling propositions a=a and (Ax)(Fx ~ Fx) .... 149
7.5.3 Comments on innate and a priori knowledge ....... 151
7.6 The Complex Ideas of Implication ............. 152
7.6.1 Assuming and implying in a true conditional . . . . . . . 152
7.6.1.1 Assuming a logical falsehood ................ 152
7.6.1.2 Implying a logical falsehood . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 153
TABLE OF CONTENTS ix
7.6.1.3 Assuming a logical truth ................... 153
7.6.1.4 Implying a logical truth . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 154
7.6.2 The complex ideas -+, ~, =*, and ~ ............ 155
7.6.2.1 The complex a priori ideas of necessary implication .. 155
7.6.2.2 The complex a posteriori ideas of contingent implication 158
7.6.3 Comments concerning the normativity of complex ideas 160
7.7 The Complex A Priori Idea
of Valid Deductive Inference . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 160
7.7.1 The complex a priori idea I- ................ 161
7.7.2 Some of Quine's objections against logical modality ... 162
7.8 Remarks on CTM and Analytic Philosophy ........ 163
Chapter 8
The Classical Theory of Mind II .............. 167
8.1 The Ontology and Architecture of CTM .......... 167
8.2 Learning, Memory, and Association in Aplysia . . . . . . 170
8.3 Learning, Memory, and Association in Vertebrates ... 175
8.4 The Genetic Code, the Mental Code . . . . . . . . . . . . 179
8.4.1 The Classical Theory of Mind . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 180
8.4.2 A conjecture on the nature of mental symbols ...... 181
8.4.3 Cognitive architecture ..................... 181
8.4.3.1 The vertical dimension .................... 183
8.4.3.2 The horizontal dimension . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 185
8.4.4 Concept-acquisition and memory .............. 187
8.4.5 Recall and simple associations ................ 187
8.4.6 Rational processes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 188
8.5 History, Histology,
and the Molecular Level of Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . 189
Chapter 9
The Classical Theory of Mind III ............. 195
9.1 Toward an Integrated Account of Mind . . . . . . . . . . . 195
9.2 The Symbolic System of a Deep-layer,
Long-term-store Psychic Cell ................ 195
9.2.1 Syntax .............................. 196
9.2.2 Semantics ............................ 199
9.2.3 Epistemology: cognitive processes in the psychic cell .. 201
9.2.3.1 A priori knowledge . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 202 .