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Meaning, Truth, and the Limits of Analysis David Wiggins MEANING, TRUTH, AND THE LIMITS OF ANALYSIS MEANING, TRUTH, AND THE LIMITS OF ANALYSIS TEN STUDIES DAVID WIGGINS UNIVERSITY PRESS OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS Great Clarendon Street, Oxford, 0X2 6Dp, United Kingdom Oxford University Press is a department of the University of Oxford. It furthers the University’s objective of excellence in research, scholarship, and education by publishing worldwide. Oxford is a registered trade mark of Oxford University Press in the UK and in certain other countries © David Wiggins 2022 The moral rights of the author have been asserted First Edition published in 2022 Impression: 1 All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, without the prior permission in writing of Oxford University Press, or as expressly permitted by law, by licence or under terms agreed with the appropriate reprographics rights organization. Enquiries concerning reproduction outside the scope of the above should be sent to the Rights Department, Oxford University Press, at the address above You must not circulate this work in any other form and you must impose this same condition on any acquirer Published in the United States of America by Oxford University Press 198 Madison Avenue, New York, NY 10016, United States of America British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data Data available Library of Congress Control Number: 2021949449 ISBN 978—0—19—872617—3 DOI: 10.1093/0s0/9780198726173.001.0001 Printed and bound in Great Britain by Clays Ltd, Elcograf S.p.A. Links to third party websites are provided by Oxford in good faith and for information only. Oxford disclaims any responsibility for the materials contained in any third party website referenced in this work. Contents Sources Vil Introduction Meaning and Truth-Conditions: From Frege’s Grand Design to Davidson’s Concept and Copula . Donald Davidson’s Account of Semantic Interpretation. How Comprehensive is it? ‘All’, ‘Some’, and ‘Most’ Names, Existence, and Contingency Modes of Grammatical Combination, Adverbs, and the Case of Action-sentences Three Moments in the Theory of Definition or Analysis: Its Possibility, Its Aim or Aims, and Its Limit or Terminus Locke: ‘The Great Conduit’ . Languages as Things in their Own Right I18 Peirce: Reflections on Inquiry and Truth arising from his Method for the Fixation of Belief 129 An Indefinibilist-cum-Substantivist Account of Truth I10. and the Marks of Truth 164 Bibliography 177 Index 189 Sources Chapter 1 was first published in B. Hale and C. Wright eds Blackwell Companion to the Philosophy of Language, Oxford: Blackwell, 1994. Chapter 2 draws on ‘The Sense and Reference of Predicates: A Running Repair to Frege’s Doctrine and a Plea for the Copula’, Philosophical Quarterly 34 (1984), 311—28. Chapter 3 is based on ‘“Most” and “All”: Some Comments on a Familiar Programme, and on the Logical Form of Quantified Sentences’ in M. Platts ed. Reference, Truth and Reality, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1980. Chapter 4 draws upon material from ‘Contingency, Identity, and de re and de dicto Necessity’ in Jonathan Dancy ed. Papers on Language and Logic: Proceedings of the 1979 Keele Conference on Language and Logic (Keele: Keele University Library, 1980); ‘“The Sense and Reference of Predicates: A Running Repair to Frege’s Doctrine and a Plea for the Copula’, Philosophical Quarterly 34 (1984), 311—28; The Kant—Frege—RussellView of Existence: A Rehabilitation of the Second Level View’ in W. S. Armstrong, D. Raffman, and N. Asher eds Modality, Morality and Belief: Essays for Ruth Barcan Marcus, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994; and ‘Names, Fictional Names and “Really” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl.Vol. 73 (1999), 271-86. Chapter 6 draws upon material from ‘Three Moments in the Theory of Definition or Analysis: its Possibility, its Aim or Aims and its Limit or Terminus’, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 107 (2006/7), 73—109. Chapter 7 is based upon ‘Language: The Great Conduit’, Times Literary Supplement, 12 April 1996, 15. Chapter 8 is based upon ‘Languages as Social Objects’, Philosophy 72 (1997), 499—524. Chapter 9 1s based upon ‘Reflections on Enquiry and Truth arising from Peirce’s Method for the Fixation of Belief’ in Cheryl Misak ed. The Viii SOURCES Cambridge Companion to Peirce, Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004. Chapter 10 draws upon Chapter IV of Needs, Values, Truth (amended third edition Oxford University Press, 2002) and ‘An Indefinibilist-cum- Normative View of Truth and the Marks of Truth’in R. Schantz ed. What is Truth?, Berlin and New York: Walter de Gruyter, 2002. Permission from the original publishers to draw upon these publications is gratefully acknowledged.