Making history: agency, structure, and change in social theory

333 Pages·2004·1.52 MB·English

by  Alex Callinicos

MAKINGHISTORY
HISTORICAL
MATERIALISM
BOOK SERIES
Editorial board
PAULBLACKLEDGE, London - SEBASTIANBUDGEN, London
JIMKINCAID, Leeds- STATHISKOUVELAKIS, Paris
MARCELVANDERLINDEN, Amsterdam - CHINAMIÉVILLE, London
WARRENMONTAG, Los Angeles -PAULREYNOLDS, Lancashire
TONYSMITH, Ames (IA)
MAKING HISTORY
Agency, Structure, and Change in
Social Theory
BY
ALEX CALLINICOS
BRILL
LEIDEN •BOSTON
2004
This book is printed on acid-free paper.
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Callinicos, Alex.
Making history : agency, structure, and change in social theory / Alex Callinicos –2nd ed.
p. cm. —(Historical materialism book series, ISSN 1570-1522 ; 3)
Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN 90-04-13627-4 (alk. paper)
1. Agent (Philosophy) 2. Act (Philosophy) 3. Structuralism. 4. Historical materialism. 5.
Revolutions—Philosophy. 6. Marx, Karl, 1818-1883. I. Title. II. Series.
BD450.C23 2004
128’.4—dc22
2004045143
second revised edition
ISSN 1570-1522
ISBN 90 0413827 4
©Copyright 2004 by Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, The Netherlands
All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, translated, stored in
a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic,
mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without prior written
permission from the publisher.
Authorization to photocopy items for internal or personal
use is granted by Koninklijke Brill provided that
the appropriate fees are paid directly to The Copyright
Clearance Center, 222 Rosewood Drive, Suite 910
Danvers, MA 01923, USA.
Fees are subject to change.
PRINTEDINTHENETHERLANDS
To John and Aelda Callinicos
This page intentionally left blank
Contents
Preface ............................................................................................................ ix
Introduction to the Second Edition ............................................................ xiii
Introduction .................................................................................................... xlv
Chapter 1 Subjects and Agents ................................................................ 1
1.1 Three concepts of agency ................................................................ 1
1.2 The orthodox conception of agents .............................................. 5
1.3 Human nature: the need for a philosophical
anthropology .................................................................................... 17
1.4 Human nature: morality, justice and virtue ................................ 25
1.5 Practical reason and social structures .......................................... 33
Chapter 2 Structure and Action .............................................................. 38
2.1 The concept of social structure ...................................................... 38
2.2 The basic concepts of historical materialism .............................. 40
2.3 Orthodox historical materialism .................................................... 54
2.4 Rational-choice marxism ................................................................ 69
2.5 Structural capacities and human action ...................................... 85
2.6 What’s left of historical materialism? .......................................... 102
Chapter 3 Reasons and Interests .............................................................. 107
3.1 Expressivism and the hermeneutic tradition .............................. 107
3.2 Interpretation and social theory .................................................... 111
3.3 Charity, truth and community ...................................................... 119
3.4 The utilitarian theory of action ...................................................... 129
3.5 Interests and powers ........................................................................ 139
viii • Contents
Chapter 4 Ideology and Power ................................................................ 152
4.1 Collective agents .............................................................................. 152
4.2 Falsehood and ideology, I .............................................................. 156
4.3 Falsehood and ideology, II .............................................................. 168
4.4 Nation, state and military power .................................................. 179
4.5 Anote on base and superstructure .............................................. 199
Chapter 5 Tradition and Revolution ...................................................... 206
5.1 Revolution as redemption: Benjamin and Sartre ........................ 206
5.2. Marxism and the proletariat .......................................................... 213
5.3 The rationality of revolution .......................................................... 225
5.4 Revolution and repetition .............................................................. 239
5.5 The tradition of the oppressed ...................................................... 254
Conclusion ...................................................................................................... 273
Index ................................................................................................................ 279
Preface (1987)
Individuals are dealt with here only in so far
as they are the personifications of economic
categories, the bearers of particular class-relations
and interests.
Karl Marx, Capital
Everyone has their own good reasons.
Jean Renoir, La Règle du jeu
The two sentences quoted above define the scope of
this book. The first is Marx at his most austerely
structural, concerned with analysing the objective
relationships in which human beings find themselves,
rigorously abstracting from individuals’ perspectives
and purposes. The second comes from a film, one of
whose triumphs lies in the sympathetic reconstruction
of the motives and interests of a diverse and conflicting
group of people. Although it sums up the approach
of one of the century’s supreme artists, Renoir’s
remark could also be taken to epitomise the tradition
in social theory most strongly opposed to Marx’s
(Max Weber was its greatest exponent) which set
itself the task, not of uncovering structures, but of
understanding persons. The book seeks to establish
the extent to which the two perspectives, of structural
explanation and intentional understanding, are
compatible with one another. My aim has not
been to blur real differences, setting in their place
a shallow syncretism, but it seems to me that no
worthwhile social theory can do without variants of