Logic and Ethics PDF
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LOGIC AND Enncs Nijhoff International Philosophy Series VOLUME 41 General Editor: JAN T. J. SRZEDNICKI Editor for volumes on Applying Philosophy: LYNNE M. BROUGHTON Editor for volumes on Logic and Applying Logic: STANISLAW J. SURMA Editor for volumes on Contributions to Philosophy: JAN T. J. SRZEDNICKI Assistant to the General Editor: DAVID WOOD Editorial Advisory Board: R.M. Chisholm (Brown University. Rhode Island); Mats Furberg (Goteborg Univer sity); D.A.T. Gasking (University of Melbourne); H.L.A. Hart (University College. Oxford); S. Komer (University of Bristol and Yale University); H.J. McCloskey (La Trobe University. Bundoora. Melbourne); J. Passmore (Australian National Univer sity. Canberra); A. Quinton (Trinity College. Oxford); Nathan Rotenstreich (The Hebrew University. Jerusalem); Franco Spisani (Centro Superiore di Logica e Scienze Comparate. Bologna); R. Ziedins (Waikato University. New Zealand) The titles published in this series are listed at the end of this volume. Logic and Ethics edited by PeterGeach with the editorial assistance of Jacek Holowka SPRINGER SCIENCE+BUSINESS MEDIA, B.V. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Logic and ethics / edited by Peter Geach, with the editorial asslstance of Jacek Holowka. p. cm. -- (Nijhoff international philosophy series ; v. 41> Includeslndex. ISBN 978-94-010-5481-2 ISBN 978-94-011-3352-4 (eBook) DOI 10.1007/978-94-011-3352-4 1. Logic. 2. Ethics. 1. Geach, F. T. (Peter Thomas), 1916- II. Ho{âwka, Jacek. III. Ser ies. BC55.L54 1990 160--dc20 90-20243 ISBN 978-94-010-5481-2 Printed on acid-free paper AII Rights Reserved © 1991 Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht Originally published by Kluwer Academic Publishers in 1991 Softcover reprint ofthe hardcover Ist edition 1991 No part of the material protected by this copyright notice may be reproduced or utilized in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, incJuding photocopying, recording or by any information storage and retrieval system, without written permission from the copyright owner. CONTENTS 1. Ethics and the Limits of Consistency 1 R. Bambrough 2. Negative Values 21 H. Elzenberg 3. Whatever Happened to Deontic Logic 33 P.T. Geach 4. The Ethical Root of Language 49 M. C. Gormally 5. The Principle of Transcendence and 71 the Foundation of Axiology A. Grzegorczyk 6. Deontic Logic and Imperative Logic 79 J. Harrison 7. Against Tolerating the Intolerable 131 J. Jackson 8. Winning Against and With the Opponent 145 J. Holowka 9. Meaning-Norms and Objectivity 167 J. Jack 10. On the Logic of Practical Evaluation 199 S. Korner vi 11. The Deductive Model in Ethics 225 1. Lazari-Pawlowska 12. Truth-Value of Ethical Statements: 241 Some Philosophical Implications of the Model-Theoretic Defintion of Truth M. Przelecki 13. On Subjective Appreciation of Objective 255 Moral Points J. Srzednicki 14. On Fair Distribution of Indivisible Goods 275 K. Szaniawski 15. Needs and Values 289 B. Wo lniewicz Index 303 NOTE FROM THE SERIES EDITOR This volume is to a large extent the result of the invitation for a term as visiting professor at the University of Warsaw that Geach accepted in the year 1985. During this period Geach initiated a number of discussions on the subject of Logic and Ethics, and it became apparent that a number of philosophers both in Poland and in the United Kingdom were working in this area. Thus the idea of a collective volume came into being. This became one of the highlights of his visit to Warsaw at that time, and implemented with further contributions from scholars invited by Geach resulted in the present book. I.S. 1 ETHICS AND THE LIMITS OF CONSISTENCY Renford Bambrough Walt Whitman contradicted himself, a critic said. Very well then, Whitman replied, I contradict myself. I am large, I contain multitudes. A philosopher faced with Whitman's plea will either take a tough censorious line or a charitable and pacific one. he may say that a contradiction is a contradiction and there's an end on't: no purpose can be served by deliberate contradiction, and the exposure of a hidden contradiction is a matter for regret and satisfaction; regret for the error and satisfaction at the oppor tunity to correct it by giving up one or other of the conflicting assertions or implications. But he may say instead that there is not really a contradiction at all. What Whitman meant was quite different from what Whitman said, both on the occasion of the initial complaint and in the brazen reply he now gives. When we answer 'Yes and no' to a plain question about the weather or the state of our health or of the stock market we do not mean to say that the weather or the health of the body or of the market is good and is also bad, wet and also dry, sick and also sound, bearish and bullish at the same time and in the same sense and in the same respect. If necessary - and it is not always P. Geach (ed.), Logic and Ethics, 1-20. © 1991 Kluwer Academic Publishers. 2 necessary - we explain. Gilt-edged are in demand, but equities are still sliding. The sunshine is welcome, but not the humidity. My heart is as strong as a horse, but my lumbago won't lie down. Heraclitus said that we are and are not, that we do and do not step into the same river twice. He or one of his commentators explained that what he meant was that over one who is in a river different and different waters flow. Some philosophers still need such explanations, even of the plainest paradoxes. The modes of expression in which we verbally contradict ourselves without contradicting ourselves are so widespread, and may operate so subtly, that it is much harder than we often think to be sure that we are faced with a contradiction. There are the plain cases, like those where my statement of my total debt is less or more than the sum of my statements of my particular debts. There are plain cases at the other end, like those where I say of a young man that he is an old woman, or of a widow that she was married to her husband only after he died. But in between there are all the debatable cases. If I say that a person is human, do I contradict myself when I add that he is also divine? Does Hume the backgammon player contradict Hume the sceptical philosopher? Suppose I conclude and declare that all human actions are in principle predictable and causally explicable, do I contradict myself when I add that some are voluntary and some are not, or when I praise Captain Oates and revile Corporal Hitler? Self~ontradictions are only one species of contradictions. We are more often concerned with conflicts between what you say and what I say, or between what they say and what we say. And again there are the plain cases but also the cases in which some 3 are sure that the two parties are fundamentally opposed while others are still saying that there is a misunderstanding and they are only at cross purposes. Some conflicts are about the nature and incidence of conflict. Wittgenstein speaks of the superstitious horror of a mathe matician in the face of a contradiction. There is a school of para consistent logicians. Can we preserve what they mean - even if not what they say - and still remain convinced that nothing is both true and false, that reason calls for the resolution of every contradiction by the rejection of one or more of its elements? In debating these issues, as in discussing most of the questions of philosophy and morals and religion, we shall often need to consider whether what I say is or is not in conflict with what you say. There is a story of a woman who kept two pug dogs, Caesar and Pompey, and said of them: 'Caesar and Pompey are so alike it's impossible to tell them apart - especially Pompey'. The story is told as a joke. If the dogs are virtually indistinguishable, how can it matter which of them is before us - matter, that is, to our chances of knowing which is which? But this joke is a good test of a person's attitude to more important and wider-ranging questions. In the first place, people divide more or less sharply into those whose reaction goes no further than to laugh at the joke, and those who go on to wonder what can have made the woman say what she said. The idea that the woman was being merely stupid or confused will appeal to one group more than to the other. The latter will look for a plausible or at least charitable interpretation of what she said. A first attempt might be this. Perhaps the only thing that
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