Locke’s science of knowledge

249 Pages·2017·2.95 MB·English

by  Matthew Priselac

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Locke’s Science of Knowledge
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6 John Locke’s An Essay Concerning Human Understanding begins with a
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2 clear statement of an epistemological goal: to explain the limits of human
1 knowledge, opinion, and ignorance. The actual text of the Essay, in stark
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2 contrast, takes a long and seemingly meandering path before returning to
at that goal at the Essay’s end—one with many detours through questions in

o] philosophy of mind, metaphysics, and philosophy of language. Over time,
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e Locke scholarship has come to focus on Locke’s contributions to these parts
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D of philosophy. In Locke’s Science of Knowledge, Priselac refocuses on the
n Essay’s epistemological thread, arguing that the Essay is unified from begin-
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S ning to end around its compositional theory of ideas and the active role
a, Locke gives the mind in constructing its thoughts. To support the plau-
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r sibility and demonstrate the value of this interpretation, Priselac argues
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f that—contrary to its reputation as being at best sloppy and at worst out-
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a right inconsistent—Locke’s discussion of skepticism and account of knowl-
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f edge of the external world fits neatly within the Essay’s epistemology.
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it Matthew Priselac is Assistant Professor of Philosophy at the University of
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er Oklahoma, USA
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Routledge Studies in Seventeenth-Century Philosophy
For a full list of titles in this series, please visit www.routledge.com
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6 6 Descartes
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2 Belief, Scepticism and Virtue
1 Richard Davies
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t 7 The Philosophy of John Locke
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] New Perspectives
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g Edited by Peter R. Anstey
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n 8 Receptions of Descartes
a Cartesianism and Anti-Cartesianism in Early Modern Europe
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a, Edited by Tad M. Schmaltz
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or 9 Material Falsity and Error in Descartes’ Meditations
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i Cecilia Wee
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f 10 Leibniz’s Final System
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y Monads, Matter, and Animals
it Glenn A. Hartz
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v 11 Pierre Bayle’s Cartesian Metaphysics
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U Rediscovering Early Modern Philosophy
y [ Todd Ryan
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d 12 Insiders and Outsiders in Seventeenth-Century Philosophy
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d Edited by G.A.J. Rogers, Tom Sorell and Jill Kraye
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n 13 Vanishing Matter and the Laws of Nature
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o Descartes and Beyond
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Edited by Dana Jalobeanu and Peter R. Anstey
14 Locke and Leibniz on Substance
Edited by Paul Lodge and Tom Stoneham
15 Locke’s Science of Knowledge
Matthew Priselac
Locke’s Science of Knowledge
Matthew Priselac

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First published 2017
by Routledge
711 Third Avenue, New York, NY 10017
and by Routledge
2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN
Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business
© 2017 Taylor & Francis
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0 The right of Matthew Priselac to be identified as author of this work
2 has been asserted by him in accordance with sections 77 and 78 of the
h Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988.
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a All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced
M or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other
6 means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and
1 recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without
2 permission in writing from the publishers.
1
3: Trademark notice: Product or corporate names may be trademarks
2 or registered trademarks, and are used only for identification and
at explanation without intent to infringe.
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o Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
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e Names: Priselac, Matthew, author.
Di Title: Locke’s science of knowledge / by Matthew Priselac.
n Description: 1 [edition]. | New York : Taylor & Francis, 2016. | Series:
a Routledge studies in seventeenth-century philosophy ; 15 | Includes
S bibliographical references and index.
a, Identifiers: LCCN 2016024613 | ISBN 9781138918832 (hardback)
ni Subjects: LCSH: Locke, John, 1632–1704. Essay concerning human
or understanding. | Knowledge, Theory of.
f Classification: LCC B1294 .P75 2016 | DDC 121.092—dc23
i
al LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2016024613
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f ISBN: 978-1-138-91883-2 (hbk)
o ISBN: 978-1-315-68747-6 (ebk)
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Contents

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h Acknowledgments vi
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Introduction to Locke’s Science of Knowledge 1
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2 1 Simple Ideas, Ideas of Qualities, and the Simple Idea of Power 15
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2 2 The Genetic Structure of Ideas of Substances 51
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] 3 Locke’s Account of Knowledge 83
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e 4 Locke’s Account of Knowledge of the External World 111
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n 5 Locke’s Response to Skepticism 155
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a, 6 Locke and Idealism 194
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f Works Cited 231
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C Index 237
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Acknowledgments

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6 Too many people have been involved in too many ways in the production
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2 of this manuscript for me to adequately acknowledge their contributions.
1 I will do my best here. First, I must thank Alan Nelson. Not just an advi-
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2 sor but a philosophical inspiration and role model. Without his support,
at challenge, and guidance, this project simply would not to be. My conver-
] sations with Bob Adams were also invaluable—not only philosophically
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g but in encouraging me to pursue this as a full length manuscript proj-
e
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D ect. Several chapters in this project, especially chapters three and four,
n are evolutions of a dissertation written at UNC-Chapel Hill. I thank the
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S members of that committee—Simon Blackburn, Geoff Sayre-McCord,
a, and Ram Neta—for their insight, criticism, and encouragement. I would
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r also like to thank Patrick Connolly, Cathay Liu, and Ken Brown for their
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f deep conversations on these topics.
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a Moving beyond the beginnings of this manuscript at UNC, it has also been
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f shaped by my colleagues and graduate students over the last few years. I
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y would also like to thank my colleagues at the University of Oklahoma and
it Virginia Tech for their generous conversation and engagement. My students
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er in graduate seminars in the Spring of 2103 at Virginia Tech and Fall of 2013
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i at the University of Oklahoma are due much thanks for listening to differ-
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U ent parts of this manuscript and always pushing me to express these ideas as
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y clearly as possible. I also thank the University of Oklahoma, College of Arts
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d & Sciences for supporting this project with a Junior Faculty Fellowship in the
e Summer of 2014.
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a I’ve benefitted substantially from more and less formal conversations
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nl with the community of Locke scholars I’ve encountered at conferences
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over the last few years. The Locke Workshop has been an especially
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D valuable resource for me. I would like to thank the attendees at several
of these Locke conferences, in 2012 at the University of St. Andrews,
2013 at Washington and Lee, and 2014 at Lehman College. In particular,
whether they remember how helpful they’ve been to me or not, I would
like to thank Martha Bolton, Jessica Gordon-Roth, Benjamin Hill, Ed
McCann, and Shelley Weinberg.
Acknowledgments vii
Thanks are due as well to the Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy for
granting permission to reprint some material from ‘Locke: Knowledge of
the external world’ in chapters four and five of the manuscript.
Finally, I offer my deepest gratitude to my family—Caroline, Gigi, Finn,
as well as my parents—for not merely tolerating but enthusiastically sup-
port my career. My life in academia, let alone this manuscript, would not be
possible without you.
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Introduction to Locke’s Science
of Knowledge
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6 How can we know that there are perceptible objects external to our minds?
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2 It has seemed obvious to many philosophers, including John Locke, that
1 we know such objects to exist by sensory experience.1 On the other hand,
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2 it has also seemed to many philosophers that skeptical doubts pose a seri-
at ous challenge to such knowledge. The canon of early modern philosophers
o] is laden with figures such as Descartes, Berkeley, and Hume who have left
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e substantial legacies regarding our knowledge of the external world. In stark
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D contrast to the legacies of these early modern figures, John Locke is com-
n monly taken to have offered among the worst accounts of knowledge of the
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S existence of the external world in the whole history of philosophy.
a, This monograph takes the problems presented by Locke’s long-alleged
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r failure regarding knowledge of the external world as an opportunity to
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f develop and defend a radical reorientation towards Locke’s An Essay Con-
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a cerning Human Understanding (henceforth, “Essay”). It is not the first to
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f do so, of course. Yolton’s direct realist interpretation in Yolton (1970), for
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y example, seems tailor-made to avoid painting Locke’s epistemology of the
it external world as incongruous with the rest of his philosophical thought.
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er That is not to suggest, however, that the interpretation developed below fol-
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i lows Yolton’s direct realist interpretation. To further set the stage, let’s con-
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U sider two other puzzles whose interest reaches far beyond Locke scholarship.
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d Thoughts and their parts
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a Understanding the parts of, say, the table I’m seated at is not especially
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nl difficult. We can carve the table into functional parts: a table is com-
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posed of a top, legs, the fasteners which hold the top to the legs. Alter-
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D natively, we could distinguish the table into parts defined by the kinds
of materials it’s made of. It’s made of pressed wood, metal, natural
wood, and glass. Of course, we could further refine those descriptions
into descriptions of the chemical compounds which compose the table.
Or we could cut really deep and distinguish the physical atoms which
compose the table. The roadmap for carving my thoughts about the
table into parts is not nearly so clear. What, for example, might be the