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Kripke_Fm.qxd 12/3/03 6:45 AM Page iii Kripke Names, Necessity, and Identity Christopher Hughes CLARENDON PRESS • OXFORD Kripke_Fm.qxd 12/3/03 6:45 AM Page ii Kripke_Fm.qxd 12/3/03 6:45 AM Page i KRIPKE Kripke_Fm.qxd 5/12/05 08:18 AM Page iv 1 Great Clarendon Street,Oxford OX2 6DP Oxford University Press is a department ofthe University ofOxford. 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Well, Kripke is one of the most influential analytic philosophers ofthe twentieth century;his best-known work (Naming and Necessity) is arguably the single most important contribution to metaphysics and the philosophy of language in the last fifty years.And writing a book on a philosopher is an excellent way to get a finer-grained,broader,and deeper understanding ofhis (or her) thought. But why read this book on Kripke? I hope it will be useful.Although much has been written on Kripke,most of it has consisted of discussion and criti- cism of this or that particular view of Kripke (say, on reference, or on the intersubstitutability or otherwise of names in belief contexts,or on the identity of mental states with physical states).This book is an attempt to provide something of an overview of the central themes of Kripke’s metaphysics and philosophy oflanguage.As well as expounding Kripke,I juxtapose what I take to be the most important criticisms of Kripke’s views with those views. My aim is to put the reader in a better position to arrive at an overall judgement concerning how well those views stand up to the varied criticisms that have been made ofthem.In addition,the reader will see,I am not averse to putting in my own two cents’worth. As most readers of this book will be aware, different Kripkean ideas have differing degrees ofcontroversiality.Certain central Kripkean views—especially in the philosophy of language—are,if not uncontroversial,as close to uncontroversial as any interesting views in analytic philosophy.Most analytic philosophers think Kripke has shown that the descriptivist account ofthe reference of proper names targeted in Naming and Necessityis hopeless;that causal relations between a user’s use ofa proper name and an initial act ofreference-fixing typ- ically play a crucial role in explaining why,when a speaker uses this particular name, it refers to this particular thing; that proper names are rigid, and that identity statements involving only proper names are accordingly necessarily true or necessarily false; that we cannot simply assume that analyticity(cid:2) apriority(cid:2)necessity, and syntheticity(cid:2)aposteriority(cid:2)contingency; that the distinction between accidental and essential properties is not a distinction foisted upon us by Aristotle,but one that has what Kripke calls ‘intuitive content’. Other Kripkean views are somewhere between moderately controversial and highly controversial.A good many analytic philosophers don’t agree with Kripke that the identification ofmental states with physical states has severely counter- intuitive modal consequences.Not a few analytic philosophers think that,pace Kripke,we need a counterpart-theoretic account of modal predicationto solve Kripke_Fm.qxd 12/3/03 6:45 AM Page viii viii PREFACE certain logical difficulties. Few analytic philosophers find Kripke’s alleged examples ofthe contingent a priori convincing. Like most people,I find some Kripkean ideas,and some Kripkean arguments, more compelling than others. Sometimes I think that Kripke has made a thorough,exceptionally clear,and completely convincing case for a claim;sometimes I do not.So,when I wrote this book,I found that in some cases Kripke’s treatment of a question left me with almost nothing to object to,and almost nothing to add;in other cases,quite a lot. This left me with three options.I could have written a book whose aim was simply to expound some central themes in Kripke’s metaphysics and philosophy of language.The drawback of this option was that,as the reader of an earlier version ofthis book said,it is nearly impossible to improve on Kripke’s exposition.(And,as the reader said,I don’t.) I could instead have written a book in which I addressed only those themes in Kripke in which I thought there was much to object to, or much to clarify, or much to add to—a book I might have called something like Variations on Kripkean Themes, or Reflections on Kripke.But my hope is that some readers will find it useful to have a book that doesn’t limit itself to those bits of Kripke’s thought that are to some extent obscure,or incomplete,or controversial. I have accordingly ended up with a book that is less uniform than it might otherwise have been. Some sections—especially in the first two chapters— consist mainly of exposition,together with a bit of discussion of why certain objections that have been made to Kripke’s view are ineffectual,and of why certain extant interpretations of Kripke’s position are erroneous. In other sections—especially, but not exclusively, in the last two chapters—I spend much more time,not only discussing extant objections to Kripke’s arguments, but also developing objections of my own, or exploring possible lines of defence ofa view that Kripke seems to me to have left undefended. In one way, the non-uniformity of this book may give it a less pleasing shape than it would otherwise have had. In another way, though, its non- uniformity seems appropriate, given the structure of Naming and Necessity (and ‘Identity and Necessity’). As I have said, some of Kripke’s ideas (especially,though not exclusively,in metaphysics) are highly controversial;others (especially,though not exclusively,in the philosophy of language) are highly uncontroversial.Also, some of Kripke’s views (especially ones set out in the first two lectures of Naming and Necessity) are set out in great detail.Others (especially ones that appear in the third lecture of Naming and Necessity,and towards the end of ‘Identity and Necessity’) are presented in a much more compressed fashion.For example,Kripke’s discussion ofdescriptivist theories of reference is far more leisurely,and less compressed,than his discussion of various versions ofthe identity theory.(I take it that this reflects the fact that Naming and Necessityand ‘Identity and Necessity’were given as talks,and,as we all know, there is never enough time in a talk or series of talks for us to cover all the things we had intended to cover.) Given that Kripke treats Kripke_Fm.qxd 12/3/03 6:45 AM Page ix PREFACE ix some questions in a more leisurely and exhaustive fashion than he treats other questions,it seems natural that a commentator will sometimes have more to say,and sometimes have less to say,about what Kripke has to say on those questions.In some cases I will have less to say because Kripke has less to say.This happens,for example,when Kripke simply registers his view on a certain question,and says that he leaves the defence ofthat view to another time and place. In other cases I have more to say because Kripke has less to say.For example,if Kripke gives an argument for a conclusion that looks like anenthymeme,I may spend a good bit of time considering what sort of premisses (if any) that are both Kripkean and plausible will turn the enthymeme into a valid argument. If,as I hope,this book will be useful,to whom exactly might it be useful? Those who are new to philosophy would probably find it rather hard going. But undergraduates with a good bit ofphilosophy under their belt should find the book helpful,though they may sometimes wish for more forest and fewer trees. Graduate students would, I hope, find it instructive. (Depending on their background in logic,both undergraduates and graduates may find the section on Kripke’s modal logic challenging, although I tried to make it straightforward and to presuppose very little background in logic.) Because I have tried to write the book in such a way as not to exclude upper-level undergraduates or graduate students, professional philosophers—especially metaphysicians and philosophers oflanguage—may find some ofthe exposition surplus to requirements.I should like to think,though,that they too will find some food for thought here.My discussion of Kripke on,say,names of kinds, or the essentiality of origin, or trans-world identity, or the relation of persons to bodies,will,I hope,make a contribution to an ongoing debate started by Kripke. Many different people have helped me in many different ways with this book.Thanks are due to all my colleagues at King’s College London,especially to Keith Hossack,M.M.McCabe (a department head quo maior non cogitari possit),Mark Sainsbury,and Gabriel Segal.Thanks also go to Andrea Bottani, Massimiliano Carrara, Pierdaniele Giaretta, Carl Ginet, Michele Marsonet, Enrico Martini,Mario Mignucci,Ernesto Napoli,Carlo Penco,Achille Varzi, and Nicla Vassallo,as well as to Marta,Laura,and Amanda.Finally,I am grate- ful to two anonymous referees whose helpful and encouraging suggestions significantly changed (and,I hope,improved) this book. Kripke_Fm.qxd 12/3/03 6:45 AM Page x