Knowledge and Social Imagery

209 Pages·1991·7.55 MB·English

by  David Bloor

Knowledge and Social Imagery
Knowledge
and
Social Imagery
Second Edition
David Bloor
~
~
The University of Chicago Press
Chicago and London
DAVID BLOOR, one of the founders of the "strong
programme" at the University of Edinburgh Science
Studies Unit, is the author of Wittgrnstei?l and Social
Scirnce.
The University of Chicago Press, Chicago 60637
The University of Chicago Press, Ltd., London
© 1976, 1991 by David Bloor
All rights reserved Published 1991
Printed in the United States of America
999897969594939291 654321
ISBN 0-226-06096-9 (cloth)
ISBN 0-226-06097-7 (pbk.)
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Bloor, David
Knowledge and social imagery I David Bloor. -
2nd ed.
p. em.
Includes bibliographical references and index.
1. Knowledge, Sociology of. 2. Science
Philosophy 3. Mathematics-Philosophy.
I. Title.
BD175.B57 1991 91-9141
306. 4'2-dclO CIP
@The paper used in this publication meets the
minimum requirements of the American National
Standard for Information Sciences-Permanence of
Paper for Printed Library Materials, ANSI
Z39.48-1984
For Max Bloor
Contents
Preface to the Second Edition ( 19 91) ix
Acknowledgments xi
The Strong Programme in the Sociology of Knowledge 3
The Strong Programme 5
The Autonomy of Knowledge 8
The Argument from Empiricism 13
The Argument from Self-Refutation 17
The Argument from Future Knowledge 18
2 Sense Experience, Materialism and Truth 24
The Reliability of Sense Experience 25
Experience and Belief 31
Materialism and Sociological Explanation 33
Truth, Correspondence and Convention 37
3 Sources of Resistance to the Strong Programme 46
A Durkheimean Approach to Science 47
Society and Knowledge 50
4 Knowledge and Sociallmagery: A Case Study 55
The Popper-Kuhn Debate 55
Enlightenment Versus Romantic Ideologies 62
The Historical Location of the Ideologies 65
The Link between Epistemological and
Ideological Debates 75
vii
viii Contents
Another Variable, Knowledge under Threat 76
The Lesson to Be Learned 79
5 A Naturalistic Approach to Mathematics 84
The Standard Experience of Mathematics 85
]. S. Mill's Theory of Mathematics 87
Frege's Criticisms of Mill 92
Frege's Definition of Objectivity Accepted, But
What Satisfies This Definition? 97
Mill's Theory Modified by Sociological Factors 99
Summary and Conclusion 10 4
6 Can There Be an Alternative Mathematics? 107
What Would an Alternative Mathematics
Look Like? 10 8
Is 'One' a Number? 110
Pythagorean and Platonic Number 118
The Metaphysics of Root Two 122
lnfinitesimals 125
Conclusion 129
7 Negotiation in Logical and Mathematical Thought 131
Lord Mansfield's Advice 132
Paradoxes of the Infinite 135
Azande Logic and Western Science 138
The Negotiation of a Proof in Mathematics 146
8 Conclusion: Where Do We Stand? 157
Afterword: Attacks on the Strong Programme 163
How Not to Attack the Strong Programme 163
Covariance, Causality and Cognitive Science 165
The Ultimate Refutation of Interest Explanations 170
The Charge of Idealism 173
Symmetry Lost and Symmetry Regained 175
Mathematics and the Realm of Necessity 179
Conclusion: Science and Heresy 183
Bibliography 187
Index 197
Preface to the Second
Edition ( 1991)
The second edition of 'Knowledge and Social Imagery'
has two parts: the text of the first edition plus a new and substantial
Afterword in which I reply to critics. I have resisted the temptation to
alter the original presentation of the case for the sociology of knowl
edge, though I have taken the opportunity to correct minor mistakes
such as spelling errors. I have also made a few stylistic alterations
where the language of the book has become dated. Otherwise the
first part is unchanged. As for the second part: attacks by critics have
not convinced me of the need to give ground on any matter of sub
stance. Indeed, their failure to make inroads has reinforced my belief
in the value of a naturalistic understanding of knowledge in which.
sociology plays a central role. I hope that the arguments I offer in the
Afterword show this to be a reasoned and justified response. Because
of the volume of the criticism I could not allow myself to follow every
twist and turn in the argument. I have therefore restricted the discus
sion to essentials, and avoided repeating replies that I have given
elsewhere. Nevertheless, the topics covered in the Afterword repre
sent the main areas of dispute in the field. The only exception is that I
have left aside the standard objection that a relativist sociology of
knowledge is self-refuting. This is discussed in the main body of the
text, and the further points that need making seem to me to be
cogently expressed in Hesse ( 1980).
If I were beginning the book today, I would be able to call on a
substantially larger body of empirical work in the historical sociology
of knowledge. The main proof of the possibility of the sociology of
knowledge is its actuality Shapin's admirable bibliographical essay,
History of Science and Its Sociological Reconstructions ( 1982), has
ix
Preface
X
established itself as a vital resource and guide for marshalling the em
pirical basis of the subject. Since that publication the field has be
come even richer. We now have such impressive scholarly achieve
ments as Desmond's 'The Politics of Evolution' ( 1989); Rudwick's The
Great Devonian Controversy' ( 1985); and Shapin & Schaffer's 'Levia
than and the Air-Pump' ( 1985). Added to these there have been impor
tant empirical contributions from sociologists of science themselves,
such as: Collins's work on the replication of gravity wave detections
( 1985); Pickering's sociological analysis of elementary particle physics
( 1984); and Pinch's account of the measurement of solar-neutrino flux
( 1986). In the intriguing field of the sociology of mathematics I could
now call on Kitcher's powerful historico-philosophical analysis The
Nature of Mathematical Knowledge' ( 1984 ); MacKenzie's 'Statistics in
Britain, 1865-1930' ( 1981 ); and Richards's 'Mathematical Visions'
( 1988).
The cumulative effect of these, and many similar works, has been
to alter the terms of the debate. It has tipped it in favour of the strong
programme. This is despite inevitable and healthy differences of
opinion as well as many unsolved problems. Of course, historical and
empirical data alone will never win the day. The complete argument
must be developed both empirically and theoretically. This is fully
acknowledged by the above authors and is, in various ways, built into
their work. I draw attention to this fact in order to justify the treat
ment offered here. I cannot pretend to offer new case studies, only a
determined advocacy of some important theoretical arguments. That
there is still the need to do a job of this kind will be apparent to any
one who studies the philosophical criticisms addressed in the After
word.
Not all independent philosophical assessments of the sociology of
knowledge reach negative conclusions. Just occasionally, and in vary
ing degrees, the opposite is the case, e. g. Gellatly ( 1980); Hesse
(1980); Jennings (1984); and Manicas and Rosenberg (1985). Al
though I am sensible of a debt to all the critics whose attacks have
helped draw attention to this work, I am of course particularly grate
ful to these allies. I must also thank the staff of the University of
Chicago Press and their referees for supporting the idea of a second
edition, and for their help in preparing it.
David Bloor
Science Studies Unit
Edinburgh
Acknowledgments
I am anxious to express my gratitude to a number of
people who kindly read drafts and parts of the book while it was in
preparation. These are Barry Barnes, Celia Bloor, David Edge, Don
ald MacKenzie, Martin Rudwick and Steven Shapin. In all cases I
have greatly benefited from their comments and criticisms. My help
ful critics have not always agreed with what I have said and so I must
stress that they are in no way responsible for the final outcome. Per
haps I would have been wise to make more extensive alterations in the
light of their comments than I sometimes did.
It is only right that I single out of this list one of my colleagues at
the Science Studies Unit, Barry Barnes. This is in order to express the
very special debt that I owe to his thinking and work. This is too per
vasive to be conveyed in footnotes, but is nevertheless keenly felt.
Similarly, rather than make repeated references to his book 'Scientific
Knowledge and Sociological Theory' ( 1974 ) I hope that a general ac
knowledgment wifl suffice. Certainly, anyone interested in the
standpoint to be developed in the present book will find its discus
sions of first-rate importance. Nevertheless, although our two books
share a number of important premises they develop quite different
themes and press the argument into quite different areas.
· I am grateful to the Hutchinson Publishing Group Ltd for permis
sion to use a diagram from p. 13 of Z. P Dienes's The Power of
Mathematics' ( 1964). I must also record my appreciation to the histo
rians of science whose scholarship I have pillaged to provide myself
with examples and illustrations. Frequently I must be using th~ir work
in a manner of which they would not approve.
xi