ebook img

Kant's Will at the Crossroads: An Essay on the Failings of Practical Rationality PDF

187 Pages·2022·1.617 MB·English
Save to my drive
Quick download
Download
Most books are stored in the elastic cloud where traffic is expensive. For this reason, we have a limit on daily download.

Preview Kant's Will at the Crossroads: An Essay on the Failings of Practical Rationality

OUPCORRECTEDPROOF–FINAL,22/6/2022,SPi ’ Kant s Will at the Crossroads OUPCORRECTEDPROOF–FINAL,22/6/2022,SPi OUPCORRECTEDPROOF–FINAL,22/6/2022,SPi ’ Kant s Will at the Crossroads An Essay on the Failings of Practical Rationality JENS TIMMERMANN OUPCORRECTEDPROOF–FINAL,22/6/2022,SPi GreatClarendonStreet,Oxford,OX26DP, UnitedKingdom OxfordUniversityPressisadepartmentoftheUniversityofOxford. ItfurtherstheUniversity’sobjectiveofexcellenceinresearch,scholarship, andeducationbypublishingworldwide.Oxfordisaregisteredtrademarkof OxfordUniversityPressintheUKandincertainothercountries ©JensTimmermann2022 Themoralrightsoftheauthorhavebeenasserted FirstEditionpublishedin2022 Impression:1 Allrightsreserved.Nopartofthispublicationmaybereproduced,storedin aretrievalsystem,ortransmitted,inanyformorbyanymeans,withoutthe priorpermissioninwritingofOxfordUniversityPress,orasexpresslypermitted bylaw,bylicenceorundertermsagreedwiththeappropriatereprographics rightsorganization.Enquiriesconcerningreproductionoutsidethescopeofthe aboveshouldbesenttotheRightsDepartment,OxfordUniversityPress,atthe addressabove Youmustnotcirculatethisworkinanyotherform andyoumustimposethissameconditiononanyacquirer PublishedintheUnitedStatesofAmericabyOxfordUniversityPress 198MadisonAvenue,NewYork,NY10016,UnitedStatesofAmerica BritishLibraryCataloguinginPublicationData Dataavailable LibraryofCongressControlNumber:2022933571 ISBN978–0–19–289603–2 DOI:10.1093/oso/9780192896032.001.0001 Printedandboundby CPIGroup(UK)Ltd,Croydon,CR04YY LinkstothirdpartywebsitesareprovidedbyOxfordingoodfaithand forinformationonly.Oxforddisclaimsanyresponsibilityforthematerials containedinanythirdpartywebsitereferencedinthiswork. OUPCORRECTEDPROOF–FINAL,22/6/2022,SPi Inmemoryof SarahJeanBroadie(1941–2021) OUPCORRECTEDPROOF–FINAL,22/6/2022,SPi OUPCORRECTEDPROOF–FINAL,22/6/2022,SPi Table of Contents Preface ix ANoteonTextsandTranslations xiii AbbreviationsUsedforKant’sWorks,HandwrittenNotes,andLectures xv 1. Introduction 1 }1. Twomodelsofpracticalfailure 1 }2. Kant’sgallowscases 3 }3. Sourcesofpracticalinterest 5 }4. Ahybridtheory? 6 2. Happiness 10 }5. Thenatureofhumanhappiness 10 }6. Statevsconception:Happinessasanideal 15 }7. Theproblemofuncertainty 17 }8. The‘nominal’or‘titular’desiretobehappy 21 }9. Thestochasticnatureofprudence:Settingfelicificends 23 }10. Kant’srejectionofqualitativedistinctions:Thegoldanalogy 25 3. The Law and the Good 30 }11. Pistorius’challenge 30 }12. The‘paradoxofmethod’ 32 }13. Themeaningof‘good’and‘evil’ 33 }14. Theobjectofthewill 35 }15. Kant’sreductio:Settingthestage 36 }16. Kant’sreductio:Theargumentagainsthedonism 40 }17. Kant’sreductio:Theargumentagainstinstrumentalism 41 4. Instrumental Imperatives 46 }18. Instrumentalreasonastheservantofinclination 46 }19. Thepluralityofhypotheticalimperatives 51 }20. Is‘true’means–endsirrationalitypossible? 56 }21. Practicalanalyticity:Covertcontainmentandexplication 59 }22. Practicalanalyticity:Identityandnon-contradiction 64 }23. Thelimitationsofinstrumentalreason 66 }24. Scepticismaboutpracticalreason(s) 67 }25. Instrumentalreasonastheservantofmorality 71 OUPCORRECTEDPROOF–FINAL,22/6/2022,SPi viii   5. The Emergence of Practical Reason 75 }26. Theoriginalpracticalassignmentofreason 75 }27. Fromprudentialdeliberationtomoralchoice 80 }28. Two‘perfectlylegalconstitutionaltransitions’ 84 }29. Thenecessitiesofhappinessandduty 86 }30. Thewillonitswaytothecrossroads 88 6. Incentives, Maxims, and Freedom 91 }31. Intellectualistinterpretations 91 }32. The‘incorporationthesis’ 94 }33. Freedom,sensibility,andthecontributionofreason 99 }34. Non-prudentialintellectualismrejected 102 }35. Legislationandchoice:WilleandWillkür 106 7. Two Types of Practical Failure 109 }36. Prudentialfailure 109 }37. Moralfailure 116 }38. Doweeverchoosethelessergood? 121 }39. Theguiseofthegood 124 8. Conclusions and Implications 130 }40. Silencingasnon-enabling:Kant’s‘dualisticmonism’of practicalreason 130 }41. Tradinghappinessforhope 134 }42. Moralprogressandhumanfrailty 137 }43. Thelanguageof‘reasons’ 143 }44. Anewconstitutivism? 146 Kant’s Practical Dualisms: A Fifteen-point Summary 153 Bibliography 161 Index 167 OUPCORRECTEDPROOF–FINAL,22/6/2022,SPi Preface If to do were as easy as to know what were good to do, chapels had beenchurches,andpoormen’scottagesprinces’palaces.Itisagood divine that follows his own instructions: I can easier teach twenty whatweregoodtobedone,thanbeoneofthetwentytofollowmine own teaching. The brain may devise laws for the blood, but a hot temperleapso’eracolddecree.... PortiainTheMerchantofVeniceAct1Sc.2 Whathappenswhenhumanbeingsfailtodoasreasonbids?Thisbookisan attempt to address this age-old question within Kant’s mature practical phil- osophy,i.e.thepracticalphilosophythatemergedwiththewatersheddiscov- ery of autonomy in the mid-1780s. As always, Kant is good for a surprise. There is, I shall argue, not one answer but two: He advocates Socratic intellectualismintherealmofprudencewhiledefendingananti-intellectualist or volitional account of immoral action. This ‘hybrid’ theory of practical failure is more than a philosophical curiosity. There are ramifications for Kant’stheoryofpracticalreasonasawhole.Inparticular,thehybridaccount emphasizesthedividebetweenpureandempiricalpracticalrationalitytothe extent that the latter, while containing practically relevant propositions, no longercountsasabranchofpracticalreasonatall.Hypotheticalandcategor- ical imperatives exemplify two entirely distinct kinds of normativity. In fact, the dichotomy between pure and empirical determining grounds of the will goes hand in hand with many other dualisms and dichotomies that, whether welikethemornot,continuetodefineKant’smatureethicalthought. TheprojectprovidedawelcomeopportunitytoreturntoissuesIhavebeen thinking about since my student days at Göttingen and Oxford. In an early publication, I argue that Aristotle’s two types of akrasia, impetuosity and weakness, can be explained in terms of how desire affects the ‘final premise’ of the practical syllogism of reason (Timmermann, 2000). Since then, the differencebetweentheSocraticdenialofakrasiaandAristotelianself-control has been a recurring theme in my lectures at St Andrews. The idea that Kant might espouse a hybrid theory that explains imprudent and immoral action differently first occurred to me over a decade ago, when Carolyn

See more

The list of books you might like

Most books are stored in the elastic cloud where traffic is expensive. For this reason, we have a limit on daily download.