Isolationism & Appeasement in Australia EM Andrews

245 Pages·2016·12.98 MB·English

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Isolationism & Appeasement
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C/3 Reactions to the European Grises, 1935-1939
‘They tell me things are not too good in Europe, Dave.’
‘What’s wrong? Drought?’
‘Unk’ White, Bulletin, 26 July 1939
E. M. Andrews
Australian foreign policy in the late
1930s has till now been a neglected topic
in historical writing.
In this book the author examines
Australian reactions to the aggressions
which led to World War II —
Abyssinia, Spain, Austria, Czecho­
slovakia, and Poland. He describes the
early support in Britain and Australia
for the League of Nations, and goes
on to discuss the causes of the change
to a policy of appeasement, culminating
in the Munich crisis of 1938, and
Australian reactions to that crisis.
Additionally, he compares Australian
foreign policy at that time and in
the sixties, when Australia again
supports a powerful ally, this time
in Vietnam.
To those who lived through the
crises of the thirties and now wish
to see those years in perspective,
as well as to readers of a younger
generation, who seek the causes for
the development of present-day
attitudes to Australian foreign policy,
this book will make absorbing reading.
For teachers and students of the
history of the period it will provide
a welcome insight into the reactions
of Australian politicians and people
to the European crises and to
Britain’s part in them.
Price in Australia
$6.95
This book was published by ANU Press between 1965–1991.
This republication is part of the digitisation project being carried
out by Scholarly Information Services/Library and ANU Press.
This project aims to make past scholarly works published
by The Australian National University available to
a global audience under its open-access policy.
‘They tell me things are not too good in Europe, Dave.
‘What's wrong? Drought?’
‘Unk’ White, Bulletin, 26 July 1939
ISOLATIONISM
AND APPEASEMENT
IN AUSTRALIA
Reactions to the European Crises, 1935-1939
E. M. ANDREWS
1970
AUSTRALIAN NATIONAL UNIVERSITY PRESS
CANBERRA
© Eric Montgomery Andrews 1970
This book is copyright. Apart from any fair dealing
for the purposes of private study, research, criticism, or
review, as permitted under the Copyright Act, no part may
be reproduced by any process without written
permission. Inquiries should be made to the publisher.
Printed and manufactured in Australia
Registered in Australia for transmission by post as a book
sbn 7081 0029 5
Library of Congress Catalog Card no. 78-82888
National Library of Australia reg. no. aus 69-942
To Jack, Alice, and Shirley
PREFACE
This work is a study of Australian governmental and public opinion
on the Abyssinian crisis, the Spanish civil war, and Hitler’s aggres­
sions till the outbreak of World War II in 1939. The inclusion of the
government widens the scope of the inquiry beyond the bounds of
what is generally regarded as ‘public opinion’, since the government
was open to arguments and pressures outside Australia, in particular
from the flow of information from Britain and contacts with the
British government. It was also influenced, to a certain extent, by
professional advisers, both the British Foreign Office and the Aus­
tralian Department of External Affairs. On the other hand, the
wider Australian public, too, was influenced by Britain, if not
directly, then because British policy formed the framework within
which the Australian public discussed foreign affairs, and provided
the points upon which it argued.
A study of public opinion in the 1930s has certain pitfalls, how­
ever. The term ‘public opinion’ has become common usage in the
democracies of the twentieth century: hardly a day passes without a
claim to public support by a political party, a newspaper, or a group
advocating a specific policy, so that sociologists have been led to
attempt, by means of controlled sampling, to discover the elusive
‘public opinion’ on a wide range of subjects. It is only natural, there­
fore, that historians should cast a speculative eye on the new tech­
niques that have developed. But whereas the historian of the future
may be able to attain to a degree of certainty on public opinion
today, present-day historians, looking at the past, are not so for­
tunate. The evidence on which generalisation could be based is too
fragmentary to permit a detailed analysis to be made with any
confidence. For example, Gallup polls did not begin in Australia
until 1941, after the period covered in this book had ended.
Fragmentary evidence is, however, the occupational hazard of an
historian. To wait on scientific certainty is to wait for ever. More­
over, for the student of Australia in the thirties, much evidence, of
vii
Viii PREFACE
varying worth, does remain. To begin with, there are numerous
contemporary estimates of public opinion. These may or may not be
the result of sound observation and judgment; all too often they con­
tradict one another. However, their accuracy can be verified to a
certain extent by studying incidents and statements reported in the
press, letters to the newspapers, opinions expressed in newspaper
editorials themselves, speeches made by personalities in the public
eye, books and magazines produced at the time, and meetings and
official statements of different organisations.
Indeed, policies adopted or supported by organisations are of
particular interest because, as Almond suggests,1 foreign policy is a
complicated subject, not usually the concern of the average citizen.
The issues need to be simplified for him to make judgments, a task
that is often performed by various ‘leadership’ or ‘interest’ groups
within the community. In other words, in foreign policy matters,
which are difficult and remote from their experience, people tend to
adopt the attitudes of the groups to which they belong — clubs,
political parties, churches, etc. Later work has suggested that
Almond’s theory is over-simplified, and is more applicable to the
system of government in the United States than to the parliamentary
system in Australia, which is not organised to be so open to pressure
groups. But his general point, that group thinking is evident on
foreign policy, is valid. This book, therefore, does not pretend to use
modern sociological methods; it looks instead at the various sections
of the Australian population to see what policies they were advocat­
ing.
Foremost among the organised groups in Australia in the 1930s
was the government, together with its professional advisers and its
supporters in Parliament. Governmental policy affected the course
and scope of debate on foreign affairs within the community.
Organised opposition to the government and its supporters came
from the Australian Labor Party and labour movement, within the
ranks of which were a minority of communists and a substantial
minority of Catholics. (Neither the Catholic Church nor the Com­
munist Party was primarily concerned with foreign policy, but in
the 1930s each held strong views, both on the European crises and
on each other, and tried to influence the Labor Parties and trade
unions to adopt their interpretation of events.) Also in the Austra-
1 G. Almond, The American People and Foreign Policy, pp. 5-6.
PREFACE ix
lian community were a variety of other organisations. Some, like the
Returned Servicemen’s League, were only intermittently concerned
with foreign affairs, while others, such as the League of Nations
Union, made foreign matters their main interest. All these groups,
therefore, receive attention. They held public discussions on
foreign affairs, and at times made statements on the policy they
wished to see adopted: their activities received notice in the press.
The material examined, however, also includes a number of original
submissions, which have survived in the official records, made by
interested parties to the Prime Minister.
The contemporary record has been supplemented by interviews
with surviving actors in the original drama. Such interviews have
pitfalls, for, with the best will in the world, men forget events after
thirty years, and have their views tinged by subsequent history.
Moreover, courage is needed to admit mistakes. Accordingly,
wherever possible, the contemporary record has been followed,
except where an interview appears to throw a reasonable light on a
confused situation.
At this stage it may be as well to point out that the parts of this
study which give brief accounts of the European crises are intended
not as substitutes for more adequate histories, but as a background
to events mentioned in the Australian public debate.
Two warnings need to be kept in mind. Fear of Japan, and interest
in her policy, which influenced Australian attitudes to European
events and to world affairs in general, has been largely ignored in
this work. To a certain extent the picture is thus falsified. For
example, the Australian Institute of International Affairs in Vic­
toria was orientated more towards the Pacific than to Europe. The
government, too, was very concerned with the possible threat from
Japan. This influenced its attitude to Britain’s Abyssinian policy,
concerned some of its members in 1936, and led to Australian sug­
gestions for regional pacts in the Imperial Conference of 1937.
However, Australian reactions to Japan have been considered in
several books,2 and it seemed better to concentrate on attitudes to
the European dictators, in order to delve in greater detail into the
material available. Fear of Japan will be mentioned at various
2 J. Shepherd, Australia’s Interests and Policies in the Far East, New
York, 1939; W. Macmahon Ball, Japan, Enemy or Ally?, Melbourne, 1948;
R. N. Rosecrance, Australian Diplomacy and Japan, 1945-51, Melbourne,
1962.