Implications for India, By Vinod Anand and Neha Kumar

18 Pages·2014·0.14 MB·English

Development of Pakistan’s
Ballistic Missiles:
Implications for India
Vinod Anand and Neha Kumar
IInnttrroodduuccttiioonn
Missiles have emerged as an important weapon of deterrence since the use of V-1
and V-2 rockets by Germany. The invention of the missile was considered
revolutionary because it could travel from one country to other in the shortest
possible time and could inflict unbearable heavy damage on the enemy’s population
and economic centres. It was also realised that missiles have a great psychological
effect on the civilian population due to which a government may be forced to give
up war, and compromise according to the terms of the adversary’s government. The
importance of missiles increased during the nuclear age because, as effective means
of its delivery, missiles increased the utility of the nuclear weapon. Even if missiles do
not carry a warhead, they could inflict large scale damage on the civilian population
due to its debris. The absence of any effective defence against missile attacks makes
them more important to the various countries.
The possession of nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles by India and
Pakistan has been viewed with concern by the international community due to
many reasons, such as:
 Poor command and control structure.
 Missiles can travel in the short span of 4-5 minutes, thus, increasing the risk
of accidental attack.
 Historical conflicts between the two countries could escalate to a nuclear
war, as was evident from the Kargil War of 1999 and the December 2001
attack on the Indian Parliament. During these events, both sides put their
missiles on high alert; particularly Pakistan, due to its “first use policy”
against India created a major problem in the sub-region.
Brigadier Vinod Anand (Retd) is Senior Fellow, Centre for Strategic Studies and Simulation,
United Service Institution of India (USI); MsNeha Kumaris Research Associate, USI.
CLAWS JournalWinter 2008 105
VINODANANDANDNEHAKUMAR
Between India and Pakistan, the international community is more
concerned about Pakistan’s nuclear and missile programme. It has been
revealed from A Q Khan’s network of proliferation that Pakistan has a poor
command and control structure which could be dangerous for the international
non-proliferation regime. Pakistan is an unstable state and it figures very high
on the index of failed states; further, Pakistan’s military exercises control over its
nuclear weapons programme and, additionally, it is a growing hub of terrorists
of many varieties. The ever present danger of nuclear weapons and their
delivery means falling into the hands of radicals and extremists has alarmed the
international community. Pakistan’s missile-centric strategies pose a threat not
only to the region in particular but to the international community in general.
RReeaassoonnss BBeehhiinndd DDeevveellooppmmeenntt ooff PPaakkiissttaann’’ss MMiissssiillee PPrrooggrraammmmeess
Until the late 1980s, Pakistan focussed primarily on obtaining nuclear weapon
capability and not ballistic missiles. After India’s 1980 test of the long range
Agni missile, the Pakistan establishment started focussing on the need to
develop the means of delivering nuclear weapons with a high degree of
certainty. Pakistan realised its inferiority as it had the Hatf-I and Hatf-II
missiles at that time, and also lacked guidance and control functions.1With
the development of Indian missiles, Pakistan began to see its security being
more vulnerable than before. Pakistan missiles are India-centric and this was
the prime reason for the development of Pakistani missiles. The other reasons
are given below:
1. Pakistan was unable to build the aircraft needed to deter India because of
sanctions imposed on it by the US for slowing down its nuclear
development. The F-16 aircraft were Pakistan’s main delivery systems
against India. However, the US refused to supply additional F-16 aircraft and
imposed sanctions on the country. Particularly after the 1998 nuclear tests,
and instability in Pakistan, the United States was unwilling to supply nuclear
capable aircraft to it. Pakistan is unable to develop these aircraft due to its
economic compulsions and technical backwardness. On the other hand,
India was acquiring state-of-the-art aircraft from Russia and France. In order
to balance India’s growing superiority, Pakistan decided to acquire ballistic
missiles. Therefore, the missile programme along with nuclear programme
became the top priority of the Government of Pakistan.2
2. Pakistan began to regard investment in ballistic missiles as profitable
because it offered the maximum costs to benefit ratio when faced with the
Indian challenge. As compared with aircraft, missiles could deliver
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DEVELOPMENTOFPAKISTAN'SBALLISTICMISSILES: IMPLICATIONSFORINDIA
AAfftteerr IInnddiiaa’’ss 11998800
warheads a short period of time and with
tteesstt ooff tthhee lloonngg
improved capabilities, and by adoption of a
rraannggee AAggnnii
number of tactics, they could be in a
mmiissssiillee,, tthhee
position to even defeat sophisticated air
PPaakkiissttaann
defence systems. The missile programme
eessttaabblliisshhmmeenntt
of Pakistan is largely dependent on the help
ssttaarrtteedd ffooccuussssiinngg
of other nations. The missiles in the initial
oonn tthhee nneeeedd ttoo
stages were inaccurate and, therefore,
ddeevveelloopp tthhee
could have been said to be not suitable for
mmeeaannss ooff
military targets but increasingly Pakistan
ddeelliivveerriinngg nnuucclleeaarr
has been acquiring technical capabilities to
wweeaappoonnss wwiitthh aa
improve their circular error of probability
hhiigghh ddeeggrreeee ooff
(CEP). However, their use against counter
cceerrttaaiinnttyy..
value targets remains the first priority of
the Pakistan military planners, according
to what is generally known about their nuclear doctrine which has not
been spelt out officially in detail so far. Their use lies in inflicting damage
on civilian populations and producing terror in their mind. As Aron Crap
has observed:
The essence of warfare is not measured purely in terms of destruction but in
the ability to use force and threats to achieve political goals. Weapons that
intimidate or panic an adversary have a military role that is different but not
necessarily less than that of weapons more effective in killing and
destroying….Ballistic missiles lead ordinary people and their political leaders
to react with anxiety, even after they are certain that the missile will reach
them with conventional explosive.3
3. Several reports suggest that the Khan Research Laboratories (KRL) were in
fierce competition with the Samar Mukarak Mund National Defence
Complex (NDC) which has given a boost to the Pakistan missile programme.
This competitiveness resulted in two separate missile programmes with
similar range configurations. The end result was the development of the
KRL’s 2,300-km range of Ghauri-II and NDC’s 2,500-km range Shaheen-II
and later prospect of 3,000-km range Ghauri-III. According to one analyst,
“The rivalry came to the surface after the May 1998 nuclear explosion, with
both claiming credit for the nuclear tests. There is a clear rift between the
two. It became fairly embarrassing for the government and sources say that
CLAWS JournalWinter 2008 107
VINODANANDANDNEHAKUMAR
Nawab Sharif himself intervened between the feuding scientists to ask them
to not to make their differences apparent in public.”4Therefore, much of the
missile programme after 1998 was developed due to a fierce competition
between the two organisations.
PPaakkiissttaann’’ss MMiissssiillee DDeevveellooppmmeenntt
Pakistan’s ballistic missile infrastructure is now more advanced than that of
North Korea. It will support development of a missile of 2,500-km range,
which we believe Pakistan will seek in order to put all of India within range of
its missiles. Through foreign acquisitions and beginning without an extensive
domestic science and technology base, Pakistan has acquired these missile
capabilities quite rapidly. China and North Korea are Pakistan’s major sources
of ballistic missiles, production facilities and technology.
– Rumsfeld Commission Report 1999 (USA)5
The above statement of the Rumsfeld Commission underlines two
important things. First, the only aim of Pakistan is to bring all of India under its
missiles’ reach. Second, Pakistani missile development largely depends on the
assistance of China and North Korea. In order to discuss Pakistan’s missile
development, this section is divided into three main categories:
 Pakistan’s missile arsenal.
 External dependence.
 Implications for India.
Pakistan’s Missile Arsenal
The history of Pakistan’s missile development can be traced back to the Space
and Upper Atmosphere Research Commission (SUPARCO) in 1961. On February
5, 1989, after India’s first Agni test, Pakistan’s Chief of Army Staff Gen Aslam Beg
announced the testing of two types of Hatf missiles. This was the beginning of
Pakistan’s missile programme.6 The other details of Pakistan’s missile
programme, along with their operational status and strategy, are given in Table 1.
108 CLAWS JournalWinter 2008
DEVELOPMENTOFPAKISTAN'SBALLISTICMISSILES: IMPLICATIONSFORINDIA
Strategy The Hatf missile was developed to counter the Prithvi missile. It was basically designed as an offensive weapon to knock off Indian concentrations. In the defensive mode, it could be used in dual roles to destroy Indian bridgeheads in Pakistani territory. Its chief use could be said to be along Pakistan’s borders with India, both inside and outside. The Ghauri series could effectively reach virtually the whole of
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Missile Hatf-I Hatf-IA Hatf-II Hatf-III Ghauri-I Ghauri-II
CLAWS JournalWinter 2008 109
VINODANANDANDNEHAKUMAR
Strategy India but it seems that the strategic targeting of this missile would be more towards Mumbai and Peninsular India. The Ghauri is a mobile system and could be used for counter-value- strikes. Pakistan's answer to India's Agni-II. It has as all India coverage, but can be said to have Mumbai and Peninsular India as the main target. With its ground mobility and solid state propellant systems, it should logically form the backbone of the
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110 CLAWS JournalWinter 2008
DEVELOPMENTOFPAKISTAN'SBALLISTICMISSILES: IMPLICATIONSFORINDIA
Pakistani deterrent. It is also said that the Shaeen-II could give Pakistan second strike capability in the future, due to its features of survivability and mobility.
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CLAWS JournalWinter 2008 111
VINODANANDANDNEHAKUMAR
Besides these short range, medium range and long range missiles, Pakistan
is also busy in the development of a cruise missile — the Babur (Hatf-VIII) which
was tested in August 2005.7The Babur reportedly has a range of 500 km and can
carry a nuclear warhead. Pakistani officials described Babur as a “low flying,
terrain hugging missile with high maneuverability, pinpoint accuracy, and have
radar avoidance features.”8It resembles the Chinese DH-10 air launched missile
which is suspected to be a reverse engineered US Tomahawk cruise missile.
Some analysts believe that it is a modified version of the KH-55 cruise missile of
Ukrainian origin, with additional improvements in its guidance systems to
improve its accuracy. The missile’s exclusive characteristics were that it had the
ability to penetrate anti-ballistic systems such as the Aero, Patriot and others.
The development of this missile also indicated that Pakistani engineers have
been in the process of development of warhead miniaturisation. Added to the
above was a successful test of the Raad (Hatf-VIII) missile which is a nuclear
capable air launched cruise missile (ALCM) and has range of approximately 350
km. Pakistani officials said that the Raad has “low detection probability due to
stealth design and materials used in manufacturing.”9 The Raad (meaning
thunder in Arabic), Hatf-VIII, appears in some ways to be a scaled down Russian
KSR-2 / KS-11 / KSR-II AS-5 [North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) name is
“KELT”].10The JF-17 fighter aircraft being acquired from China are likely to be
equipped with the Raad. The accuracy of this missile is reported to be
comparable to Pakistan’s Babur cruise missile, which is labelled as having
“pinpoint accuracy” by official Pakistani sources.
Conduct of missile tests by Pakistan regularly, besides seeking to improve and
validate the design parameters of its systems, is also designed to exhibit its resolve
to use them as and when required. Demonstration of its missile capabilities is part
and parcel of its deterrence strategies. If one carefully observes the timing of the
testing of these missiles, it is clear they have been as a response to missile tests
carried out by India or as a response to some other major event occurring in the
subcontinent. For instance, the test-firing of the Raad on May 8, 2008, was in
response to the test of the Agni-III by India the previous day. Similarly, during the
Indo-Pak standoff in 2008, Pakistan had carried out a number missile tests for
demonstration purposes even when its limited inventory could have been best
preserved for eventual usage when required.
Pakistan carried out the Shaheen-I missile test in January 2008 which was
followed by the Ghauri missile tests in February 2008. It carried out a successful
test of the Shaheen-II missile in April 2008. Prime Minister Yousaf Raza Gilani
congratulated the engineers and scientists for achieving an “important
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DEVELOPMENTOFPAKISTAN'SBALLISTICMISSILES: IMPLICATIONSFORINDIA
CCoonndduucctt ooff
milestone in Pakistan’s quest for sustaining
mmiissssiillee tteessttss bbyy
strategic balance in South Asia.”11 After the test
PPaakkiissttaann
of the Raad missile this year, some analysts were
rreegguullaarrllyy,, bbeessiiddeess
of the view that the Raad has enabled Pakistan
sseeeekkiinngg ttoo
to achieve a greater strategic standoff capability
iimmpprroovvee aanndd
on land and at sea.12 Both nuclear deterrence
vvaalliiddaattee tthhee
and its delivery means are considered essential
ddeessiiggnn ppaarraammeetteerrss
by Pakistan to neutralise India’s larger
ooff iittss ssyysstteemmss,, iiss
conventional forces and India’s movement
aallssoo ddeessiiggnneedd ttoo
towards acquiring missile defence capabilities.
eexxhhiibbiitt iittss rreessoollvvee
This argument is also used by Pakistan to add to
ttoo uussee tthheemm aass
both its conventional and nuclear forces
aanndd wwhheenn
despite the economic constraints in order to
rreeqquuiirreedd..
satisfy its eternal quest for parity with India and
achieve the so-called “strategic balance” in
South Asia.
External Dependence
China and North Korea have been the most reliable partners in the development
of Pakistan’s missiles. China has been helping Pakistan in its missile programme
since the beginning. The then Army Chief of Pakistan, Gen Aslam Beg, had
stated that “China encouraged Pakistan in developing its own guidance systems
for the Hatf-II missile.” In 1990, there were reports that Pakistani scientists were
receiving training from Chinese scientists. Later, in 1991, it was found that China
has transferred components of the M-11 missiles to Pakistan. These
components included mobile launchers and dummy missile frames. As a result,
the US companies were not allowed to sell missile technology to China since the
China Machinery Import-Export Corporation (CPMIEC) and China Great Wall
Industry Corporation (CGWIC) were involved in the M-11 sale. However, it did
not have any effect on China’s supply programme to Pakistan as China
continued assisting Pakistan in the construction of a factory to build medium
range ballistic missiles (MRBMs) near Islamabad. China also provided Pakistan
with gyroscopes, assessor-meters, on-board computers and other missile
related equipment of the M-11 missiles. In 1994, the US intelligence community
found that Chinese technicians were going to Pakistan to activate transfer of M-
11 missiles. Again, in 1995, it was reported that China is sending missile parts to
Pakistan. Also, the Pakistani Shaheen missile has been based on China’s
missiles.13
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VINODANANDANDNEHAKUMAR
In April 1999, Pakistan carried out test of the Ghauri-II missile which signified
a major development in Pakistan’s missile arsenal. US intelligence found that the
technology for the Ghauri missile did not came from China, which was Pakistan’s
long-term missile partner, but from a new source— North Korea. This missile was
based on the North Korean No-Dong missile but has less range than the No-dong
missile. It was found that North Korean assistance has provided Pakistan the
option to acquire technology for long range missiles, including intercontinental
ballistic missiles (ICBMs).14 In June 1999, Indian customs officials detained a
North Korean freighter allegedly bound for Malta. According to Indian sources,
the ship was carrying precision machine tools which are used for the construction
of the missile production facility at Fatehjung, Pakistan.
The above facts indicate that Pakistan is highly dependent on foreign
assistance for development of missiles. It is quite evident that China’s
proliferation of missile technologies to Pakistan has been done with a view to
counter India’s growing power at both regional and global levels. While at the
international level, China pushes for a multipolar world, at the regional level, its
policies are designed for a unipolar Asia dominated by China. Without such
foreign assistance, it would not have been possible for Pakistan to develop its
missile programme at such a fast pace.
Implications of Pakistani Missile Capability for India
Pakistan’s Hatf-I and Hatf-IA missiles do not pose any strategic threat to India
due to their limited range. This range would be further reduced with a heavier
nuclear payload. However, these missiles could be used as tactical weapons
against India at a time of conflict. The Hatf-III missile, with a range of
approximately 600-800 km is capable of reaching three major Indian cities,
Srinagar, Chandigarh, Ahmedabad, and may even reach the outer perimeters of
the Delhi urban areas. 15
Pakistan has tested the Ghauri missile seven times since its first launch in
1998. In addition to the cities of Srinagar, Chandigarh, Delhi, Jaipur and
Ahmedabad, it could reach cities like Mumbai, Pune, Nagpur, Bhopal and
Lucknow. However, the problem is that the Ghauri is a liquid fuel missile carrying
nitric acid and kerosene as oxidizer and fuel. Therefore, its mobile launcher has to
be accompanied by separate tankers carrying nitric acid and kerosene. This
makes it difficult to handle. The fuelling operation could also take one to two
hours during which this missile could be vulnerable. Several reports also indicate
that its actual performance may be slightly lower than estimated. It has also been
reported that the Ghauri missile lacks a terminal guidance and reentry vehicle due
114 CLAWS JournalWinter 2008