Idealistic Logic - A Study of Its Aim, Method and Achievement

348 Pages·1933·18.22 MB·English

by  C. R. Morris

IDEALISTIC LOGIC
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IDEALISTIC LOGIC
A STUDY OF ITS
AIM, METHOD AND ACHIEVEMENT
BY
FELLOW, TUTOR A'1DowrOWETT LF.CTURFR IN PHILOSOPIIY
BALLIOL COLLEGE. OXFORD
MACMILLAN AND CO., LIMITED
ST. MARTIN'S STREET, LONDON
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PRINTED IN GREAT BRITAIN
PREFACE
THIS study has been developed out of lectures de
livered in the course of the last five years under the
terms of my appointment as Jowett Lecturer in Philo
sophy at Ballio!. It does not attempt to provide an in
troduction to the logic of the Idealists, in the sense of
giving an easily intelligible exposition of the doctrines
of that logic as they are propounded by the Idealistic
writers themselves. From the outset I have approached
the matter from a critical standpoint, seeking to dis
cover for myself what is in the last resort the essential
logical position of modern Idealism, to estimate how
far the implications of that position have been fully
worked out, and finally to judge of the philosophical
value of the Idealistic logic generally. I have through
out been influenced by the conviction that the broad
issues in this enquiry are best seen in proportion by
reflecting on the debt which any Idealistic Logic must
owe to Kant. He, though his arguments are too sweep
ing in character and his conclusions, for all his native
caution, too unreservedly stated and too easily arrived
at, was in a position-and his Crz"t£que of Pure Reason
forces the reader into a position-to see the issues
broadly and as a whole. The Idealists, while they have
rarely, if at all, in my view, passed outside the terms
of reference set for logic by Kant, or added sub
stantially to the germinal ideas given by him, have
not unnaturally shown a tendency to lose sight of the
wood in giving necessary attention to the trees.
v
vi PREFACE
In working out my argument I have concentrated
attention primarily on an attempt to make the several
logical positions which I have set against one another
as clear and well-defined as possible. To that end I
have thought it better quite frankly to take a high line
in dealing with the philosophies concerned. I have not
scrupled to use the terms 'the Traditional logic' and
'the Idealistic logic' quite freely, without necessarily
having in mind at the given moment any particular
utterance or even, sometimes, any particular thinker;
and no attempt has been made by quotation and refer
ence to give an appearance of a kind of scholarship
which it is no part of the purpose of this study to
claim. The exposition of the essentials of a philo
sophical position, while it requires a knowledge of the
relevant writings, also demands judgment in the ex
pounder, especially when those doctrines are being
exhibited from a special and independent point of
view; and no wealth of documentation can obviate
that need, though it may conceal it. No doubt it is a
weakness, but if in this study I had turned aside to
justify every attribution of doctrine, I could not have
kept my line of argument clear. The main theses about
the essential principles of the Traditional and Ideal
istic logics, though they may appear unorthodox at
first sight, tend, I hope, to justify themselves as their
implications become clearer in the course of the argu
ment.
My conclusions about the Idealistic logic are
based primarily on reflection on the writings of Brad
ley and of Professor Joachim. As regards Kant, experi
ence certainly does not suggest that quotation is of
much value in itself as a support for a particular inter
pretation of his thought. I n the case of Cook Wilson,
I have been forced to ask the reader to pay close atten-
PREFACE
Vll
tion here and there to particular statements; but this
is because it is essential to his position to criticise other
views by pressing their particular statements in his
own way, and because he wrote his own pages in full
anticipation that this method of interpretation, which
he thought the only sound one, would be applied to
his own writings.
My chief obligation is to Professor Prichard, without
whose teaching I could never have achieved any under
standing of the logic of Cook Wilson, in the study
of whose doctrines I was brought up. My respect and
admiration for Bradley, and for the logic of Idealism
generally, is due chieH y to the lectures of Professor H. H.
Joachim, which I heard more than twelve years ago;
my recollection of these has been the main force driv
ing me to the attempt to learn more about the philo
sophy of Kant. lowe much more than I can estimate
in detail to the privilege of being able frequently to
hear Professor J. A. Smith defending Idealism in
private conversation, usually against an essentially
Cook Wilsonian attack. I am also especially indebted
to the Master of Balliol and to Mr. T. D. Weldon,
who have read the MS. of this study and have made
valuable suggestions; and to Mr. O. de Selincourt
and to my wife for reading the proofs.

CONTENTS
CHAPTER PAGE
PREFACE - v
I. THE AIM OF LOGIC
II. THE METHOD OF LOGIC I7
III. THE TRADITIONAL LOGIC 32
IV. THE DOWNFALL OF THE TRADITIONAL LOGIC 64
V. THE IMAGINATION: HUME AND KANT - 87
VI. KANT'S THEORY OF JUDGMENT II3
VII. THE TRANSCENDENTAL UNITY OF ApPERCEPTION 127
VIII. THE JUDGMENT IN THE IDEALISTIC LOGIC 144
IX. INFERENCE IN THE IDEALISTIC LOGIC 160
X. THE COHERENCE THEORY OF TRUTH - 182
XI. COHERENCE AND STATEMENT OF FACT - 200
XII. REACTIONARY CRITICISM: COOK WILSON 222
XIII. REACTIONARY CRITICISM: COOK WILSON (con-
tinued) 249
XIV. CONCLUDING REMARKS:
I. INTRODUCTORY 274
2. THE IDEALISTIC LOGIC AND PHYSICS 282
3. THE IDEALISTIC LOGIC AND MATHE-
MATICS 292
4. THE JUDGMENT OF PERCEPTION 302
5. THE IDEALISTIC LOGIC AND PsYCHOLOGY 315
6. THE AUTHORITY OF LOGIC - 326
INDEX 337
ix