Handbook of Anticipation: Theoretical and Applied Aspects of the Use of Future in Decision Making

407 Pages·2016·5.33 MB·English

by  Roberto Poli (eds.)

Introducing Anticipation
Roberto Poli
Abstract
Anticipationoccurswhenthefutureisusedinaction.Theanticipatoryprocesses
thatallowthefuturetobecomepartofactionsinthepresentmaybeeitherinternal
or external. Watching a weather forecast and behaving accordingly is to use an
external model; actions taken on the basis of subjectively constructed psycho-
logical expectations are internal. It is our thesis that behavior isprimarily antic-
ipatory, while reactive behavior is only a secondary – albeit important –
componentofbehavior.Therefore,behaviorisalmostalwaysgoal-orientedrather
than being stimulus-driven. Anticipation comes in many different guises. The
simplest distinction is between explicit and implicit anticipation. Explicit antic-
ipations are those of which the system is aware. Implicit anticipations, by
contrast, work below the threshold of awareness. Anticipatory systems show
forms of impredicativity, that is the presence of self-referential cycles in their
constitution. The main distinction within self-referential systems is between
incompleteandcompleteformsofself-reference.Logicalformsofself-reference
are typically incomplete because they need an external interpreter. Complete
forms of self-reference do not require an external interpreter because all their
componentsare‘defined’–thatis‘produced’–withinthesystemitself.
Keywords
Anticipation(cid:129)Anticipatorysystem(cid:129)Forecast(cid:129)Foresight(cid:129)Latent(cid:129)Impredicative
system(cid:129)Self-reference(cid:129)RobertRosen
IthankAnthonyHodgson,Jan-HendrikHofmeyr,GonzaloIparraguirre,ScottJordan,Achilles
Kameas,AloisiusLouie,RielMiller,andThomasStaigerfortheircommentstoapreviousversion
ofthischapter.
R.Poli(*)
DepartmentofSociologyandSocialResearch,UniversityofTrento,Trento,Italy
e-mail:[email protected]
#SpringerInternationalPublishingAG2017 1
R.Poli(ed.),HandbookofAnticipation,
DOI10.1007/978-3-319-31737-3_1-1
2 R.Poli
Contents
Introduction....................................................................................... 2
TheThreeLevelsofFuturesStudy.............................................................. 5
ExplicitVersusImplicitAnticipations........................................................... 5
WhereDoModelsComeFrom?................................................................. 7
ApropostheImpredicativityofAnticipatorySystems........................................... 8
Summary.......................................................................................... 12
References........................................................................................ 13
Introduction
The aim of this handbook is to establish anticipation of the future as a legitimate
topicofresearch.
Anticipation comes in different guises. As a lay term it refers to all forward-
looking attitudes and activities. As a technical term, it takes on two different
meanings: as a distinct aspect of futures studies that goes beyond forecast and
foresight modeling, and as the qualifier “anticipatory” in the expression “anticipa-
torysystems.”Thesetwomeaningsof“anticipation”belongtotwodifferentframe-
works. As different as they are, we take care to identically define these two
acceptationsofanticipationinordertofacilitatetheirmutualtranslation(Poli2017).
Anticipation occurs when the future is used in action. From this perspective,
anticipation consists of two necessary but distinct components: a forward-looking
attitudeandtheuseoftheformer’sresultforaction.Aweatherforecastinitselfisnot
anticipatoryinoursense.Watchingaweatherforecastand,asaconsequencetaking
anumbrellabeforegoingtoworkisinsteadananticipatorybehavior.
Anticipation’stwocomponentsareconsistentwithRosen’sdefinition:“Anantic-
ipatory system is a system containing a predictive model of itself and/or its envi-
ronment, which allows the system to change state at an instant in accord with the
model’spredictionspertainingtoalaterinstant”(Rosen2012,pp.8,313,originally
publishedin1985).
With reference to the three-level framework presented in the next section, the
expression“predictivemodel”coversthelevelofforecastsonly.Itismycontention,
however,thatanticipationusesbothforecastsandforesights.
The anticipatory processes and models that allow the future to become part of
actionsinthepresentmaybeeitherinternalorexternal.Watchingaweatherforecast
andbehavingaccordinglyistouseanexternalmodel;actionstakenonthebasisof
subjectivelyconstructedpsychologicalexpectationsareinternal.
Internal anticipation is particularly important for understanding the anticipatory
behaviorofpeople,groups,organizations,andinstitutions.Amajorissueconcerning
internal anticipation is its origin: where does internal anticipation come from? We
willseethat thisapparentlyminorissueservesasadividing linethatdistinguishes
radicallydifferenttheoreticalperspectives.
IntroducingAnticipation 3
As relevant as anticipation may be for action, no anticipation is a guarantee of
success.Continuingwiththepreviousexample,takinganumbrellabeforegoingto
workdoesnotguaranteethatitwillrain.Whileanticipationhelpstodevelopmore
sophisticated courses of action, and is required for understanding much individual
andsocialbehavior,anticipationisnotalwayscorrect.Firstandforemost,anticipa-
tionisafeaturecharacterizingthebehaviorofsuitablydefinedcomplexsystems.
It isour thesis that behavioris primarily anticipatory,whilereactivebehavioris
onlyasecondary–albeitimportant–componentofbehavior.Asystembehavingin
an anticipatory way – an anticipatory system – makes decisions in the present
according to “anticipations” about something that may eventually happen in the
future. This handbook presents the theory and practices of anticipation and shows
thatanticipationisaserioustopicofresearch.Oneofthekeystartingpointsforthis
researchisthecontentionthatthecurrentlydominanttheoriesoftimeandcausation
areunabletoincorporateanticipationand,therefore,areinneedofseriousrevision.
Whenfirstconfrontedwiththepropositionthatanticipationisasubjectworthyof
research,mostpeopleseemtothinkthatanticipationisafeaturethathumanbeings
possessbecause we are such highly complexand wonderfully sophisticated cogni-
tive agents. That is not what the theory of anticipation claims. Indeed, the major
surprise embedded in the theory of anticipation isthat anticipationis a widespread
phenomenonpresentinandcharacterizingmosttypesofrealsystems.Lifeinallits
varieties is anticipatory; the brain works in an anticipatory way; the mind is
obviously anticipatory; society and some of its structures are anticipatory; even
nonliving or nonbiological systems can be anticipatory. All this often comes as a
surprise.
Ifallthatistrue,andprovidingthatthenecessarysupportingevidenceisoffered,
it follows that a proper understanding of anticipation necessitates the adoption of
newscientific(aswellasphilosophical)frameworks.
To date there have been few systematic attempts to pursue a thorough under-
standingofdifferenttypesandusesofanticipation.
Afteryearsofneglect,interestinthestudyofanticipationisgainingmomentum
(Poli 2014a, b, 2017). To quote a few recent developments, Martin Seligman’s
prospection theory deserves special mention (Seligman et al. 2013). Seligman,
formerPresidentoftheAmericanPsychologicalAssociation,hasrecentlyproposed
developinga“scienceofprospection”withtheaimofchangingpsychologyfroma
primarilypast-orientedfieldtoaprimarilyfuture-oriented one.Anotherexampleis
JensBeckert,DirectoroftheMaxPlanckInstitutefortheStudyofSocieties,whose
recentworkarguesforincludingfictionsinthearchitectureofeconomicsandcalls
attentiontotheneedtoreconsiderthewayinwhicheconomicslooksatthefuture.
According to textbook economics, activities are pursued or avoided according to
expectations of optimal outcomes. However, “under conditions of fundamental
uncertainty,expectationscannotbeunderstood asbeing determinedthroughcalcu-
lationofoptimalchoicestakingintoaccountallavailableinformation,butratherare
based on contingent interpretations of the situation in the context of prevailing
institutional structures, cultural templates, and social networks” (Beckert 2013,
p. 325). Here Beckert introduces the concept of fictional expectation – referring to
4 R.Poli
“presentimaginariesoffuturesituationsthatprovideorientationindecisionmaking
despitetheincalculabilityofoutcomes”(Beckert2013,p.325).
Inthefieldofanthropology,ArjunAppadurai,amostdistinguishedcontemporary
anthropologist,proposesreshapinganthropologyandbeginsbyaskinghowsocieties
–pastandrecent–construethefutureasaculturalfact(Appadurai2013).Whileitis
true that “the intellectual infrastructure of anthropology ... remains substantially
shapedbythelensofpastness,”Appadurainotesthat“thesubjectsofanthropology
have increasingly been those of the present and of the world we live in: ethnogra-
phies of science, technology, state, law, markets, and finance” (Appadurai 2013,
p.285).Inordertodevelop“ageneralpointofviewabouthumansasfuture-makers
and of futures as cultural facts” – continues Appadurai – “we need to construct an
understanding of the future by examining the interactions between three notable
human preoccupations that shape the future as a cultural fact, (namely) ... imagi-
nation,anticipationandaspiration”(Appadurai2013,p.286),evenif“wehavenot
yet found ways to articulate how anticipation, imagination, and aspiration come
togetherintheworkoffuture-making”(Appadurai2013,p.298).
As a final example, the social psychologist Kenneth Gergen asks whether the
practice itself of scientific research may generate futures (Gergen 2015). While
“traditional” research may inquire into “the causes of prejudice, aggression,
human happiness, aging, and so on because these are commonly shared terms for
understanding the world,” the questions supporting future-generating research are
muchmoredifficulttoraisebecausethelatterresearchis“aboutwhatdoesnotyet
exist,oraboutwaysoflifethatcouldbecreated”(Gergen2015,p.293).Ultimately,
future-generating research is about possible futures and how to realize them.
“The aim of research would not be to illuminate what is, but to create what is to
become.Hereinliestheessenceofafutureformingorientationtoresearch”(Gergen
2015, p. 294). The very idea of future-forming research runs counter to the meth-
odological divide between “social” and “sociological” problems and suggests that
the future is far from being something “there” – as something that is in some way
given–andagentswillsimplyhaveto“gothere.”Thealternativepossibilityisthat
futures themselvescanbegeneratedandconsumed,andthispossibilityopensnew
avenuesforresearchandaction(Poli2015).
Underdifferentdenominations,andoftenwithoutknowingofRosen’swork,all
theabovementionedscholarsrecognizetheimportanceofandneedforanticipatory
systemsandprocesses.OtherrecentdevelopmentsaremoreawareofRosen’sideas,
such as the collections of essays by Baianu (2006), Mikulecky (2007), and Nadin
(2015,2016),andthebooksbyLouie(2009)and(2013).Wemayalsomentionthe
UNESCO chair in Anticipatory Systems (http://projectanticipation.org) and the
endeavortoestablishafull-fledged“DisciplineofAnticipation”(Milleretal.2017).
IntroducingAnticipation 5
The Three Levels of Futures Study
Ishalldistinguishamongforecasting,foresight,andanticipation.Thesamedivision
into three main levels has been proposed by Tuomi (2013). Tuomi distinguishes
among “forecasting,” “foresight 1.0,” and “foresight 2.0.” This last is also called
“next-generation or design-based foresight” and fully includes the main ideas
underlying anticipation, such as futures literacy and complexity/impredicativity
(Milleretal.2017).
Thefirstlevel(forecasting)istheproperlypredictivecomponentoffuturesstudy.
Itsmodelstendtoadopteitheraveryshort–aswitheconometricmodels–oravery
long – as with climate change models – temporal window. It is often quantitative,
evenpoint-based,andstartsfromanunderlyingassumptionofcontinuity:thesystem
understudywillcontinuetoworkmoreorlessasithasbeenworkingsofarbecause
itsstructureremainsessentiallythesame,orthelawsgoverningitremainthesame.
The relevant futures are all past-based, as happen for time-series extrapolations or
projectionfromcross-sectionalsamples.
The second layer (foresight) includes most traditional futures studies. It is not
predictive, and for this reason the main output of most foresight exercises is the
productionofavarietyofpossiblefutures.Foresightisoftenqualitative;moreover,it
includesandevenfocusesondiscontinuities.Aspracticed,foresightusuallyshowsa
limitedacceptanceofcomplexity.Foresightexercisesareprimarilyusedtochallenge
themindsetofdecisionmakersbyexploringpossiblefutures.Alternatively,norma-
tivefuturescanbeused.Thedifferencebetweenexplorativescenariosandnormative
scenariosisthattheformerworkinaforwardattitudefromthepresenttothefuture
while thelatter workbackwardfrom thefuturetothepresent.Moreover,whilethe
methodofexploratoryscenariosproducesavarietyofdifferent,mutuallyincompat-
iblescenarios,themethodofnormativescenariosselectsagivenscenarioandworks
backwardtowardsitsnecessaryconditions.
The third level (anticipation, aka foresight 2.0 or design-based foresight) is
grounded on the outcomes resulting from forecast and foresight models and aims
atimplementingthemintodecisionsandactions.Byexploitingavarietyofmodels,
anticipationsharessomeofthefeaturesofforesight,namelythatitisnonpredictive,
qualitative,andfocusedondiscontinuity.Thedistinguishingfeaturesofanticipation
in futures study are those that are becoming known as “futures literacy” (Miller
2006, 2007; Miller et al. 2017), together with a full acceptation of impredicativity
(seebelowforfurtherdetails).
Explicit Versus Implicit Anticipations
Anticipation comes in many different guises. The simplest distinction is between
explicit and implicit anticipation. Explicit anticipations are those of which the
system is aware. Implicit anticipations, by contrast, work below the threshold of
awareness. They may be active within the system without the system itself being
aware of them. Implicit anticipations are properties of the system, intrinsic to its
6 R.Poli
functioning. Consider an organism’s schemata. By determining the ways in which
the organism looks at its environment, schemata are anticipatory. Schemata con-
struct anticipations of what to expect and thus enable the organism to actually
perceivetheexpectedinformation.
Most anticipations work as acquired habits either through evolution (as in bio-
logical anticipation) or learning (as in most cases of psychological and social
anticipation). Evolution-based anticipations are difficult to change, for obvious
reasons.However,asdifficultastheyaretochange,theymayevolve,andthisraises
thequestionastowhetherwecaneventuallycontributetobendevolution.
Accordingtothetheoryofanticipation,behaviorisalmostalwaysgoal-oriented
rather than being stimulus-driven. Anticipation runs contrary to the claim that
psychic processes in general are determined by stimuli (i.e., it is at odds with both
behaviorismandmostofcurrentcognitivepsychology).
If behavior is indeed goal-oriented, this implies that changes in behavior are
filteredbythesystem’sidentity.Anticipationwithinsystemsisbasedoncontrollers
detectingtheworkingconditionsofthesystemitself(i.e.,feed-forwardcontrollers).
Changes in the system’s working patterns are therefore projected by feed-forward
controllersintonewanticipations.
Anticipationshowsthatrealityincludesnotonlywhatisactuallygivenbutalso
dispositions,habits,tendencies,andtheforcesgeneratingthem.Thatistosay,reality
includeslatents(Poli2011,2017).Eveniflatentsmaynotbeactuallydetectablein
any given situation, they can nevertheless be there. Latents may become actual, if
proper triggering conditions are in place, or they may get lost in the process. The
simplest case of latents is given by dispositions, which can be described under the
label“whatwouldhappenif”(whatwouldhappenifsugarwereaddedtoaliquid).
Occasionally,latentscanbeperceivedevenwhentheyarenotexercised.Theyform
a kind of halo around persons and situations. Individual and group decisions are
often based on the perception of latents. The lack of a general theory of latents,
however, makes it difficult both to organize systematically the psychological data
already available and to guide research towards a better understanding of the less
known aspects of the perception of latents. Be that as it may, a major difference
between the behavior of people and the behavior of institutions is that the latter
seemsremarkablylessabletoperceiveandmakesenseoflatents.
As far as explicit anticipation is concerned, the reflexive side of explicit antici-
pationbecomesvisibleasthedifferencebetweenlookingintothefutureandtaking
account of the consequences of that looking, i.e., as the impact of anticipation on
current behavior. The types or aspects of behavior that can be modified through
anticipation are exemplifications of normative behavior. If the system evaluates its
ownevolutionaspositive(accordingtoitsowncriteria),itwillmaintainitsbehav-
ioral patterns; conversely, if the system evaluates its own evolution as negative, it
mayseektochangeitsbehavioralpatternsinordertopreventtheoccurrenceofthe
anticipatednegativeresults.Thisisonlyafirststep,however,becauseweallknow
howpoorly“understanding”scoresinchangingbehavior.Anyway,fromanevolu-
tionary pointofview,explicitanticipationisanadvantagebecause itenablesmore
rapidgoal-directedprocessing.
IntroducingAnticipation 7
Theothersideofthecoin,however,isthatfocusedgoal-orientedbehaviorusually
givesrisetoinattentionalblindness,i.e.,theincapacitytoperceivethingsthatarein
plain sight (Simons and Chabris 1999). Patterns constrain attention, govern the
boundary of relevance, and they direct attention to preestablished foci. The more
efficient the pattern, the more likely is the outcome of an overrestricted focus of
attention.Themoreefficientthebehavioralpatternsare,themorerigidtheybecome.
Anticipation exhibits a variety of temporal patterns, from microanticipations
embedded in perception to usually longer forms of social anticipation, ranging
fromsecondstoyearsanddecades.
Amajorquestioniswhetherexplicitanticipationsdepend–ortowhatextentthey
maydepend–onimplicitones(Riegler2003).Theapparentlyobviousanswerthat
explicitanticipationdepends–atleasttosomeextent–onimplicitanticipationmay
begthequestion.Foritmaywellturnoutthatthetwoformsofanticipationarebased
eitheronentirelydifferentenablingconditions,orondifferentsubsystems.
Where Do Models Come From?
Consider the capacity of an organism to navigate its environment, e.g., through its
perceptions. The organism’s percepts work as models of the environment. In this
regard,twomajoroptionscompete,whichmaybecalledthe“representational”and
the “presentational” perspective points. The former is the mainstream position
accepted by most practitioners of cognitive science and branches into many other
fields,includingcomputerscienceandthesocialsciences.Themainproblemforthe
representational position is the question about where the modeling capacity of the
representationalsystemcomesfrom.Apparently,mostthinkthatthesecapacitiesare
wired in the hosting system. All the efforts to understand perceptions as entirely
governedbyandreducedtobrainprocessespertaintothisposition.Thealternative
position – calledafter Albertazzi (2006)“presentational” –introduces twodivides:
fromoneside,thedistinctionismadebetweentheprocessespertainingtothemind
andtheprocessesofthebrainthatunderlie,makepossible,orbearmentalprocesses.
Thereisacategoricaldividebetweenthesetwolayers,asshownbythefactthattheir
observables are different. To provide but an exemplification concerning color per-
ception, the difference between warm and cold colors has no neurological corre-
spondence(AlbertazziandPoli2014).
The second divide is between first-level and higher-order cognitive processes.
From the point of view of the perceptor, the former are naturally endowed with
meaningsincetheirfirstappearances,whilethelatterarehigherorderrecodification
of the former’s outcomes. The difference between first-level and higher-order cog-
nitive processes depends upon processes unfolding in the “time of presentness,”
known also as “specious present” or “moment now” and processes unfolding in
widertemporalwindows.
Tothebestofmyknowledge,thepresentationalpositionhastwomaindefenders:
Albertazzi’sexperimentalphenomenology(Albertazzi,2006,2013)andBickhard’s
interactivism (Bickhard 2009, 2015a, b; Bickhard and Terveen 1995). For both of
8 R.Poli
them,themainproblemthattherepresentationalpositionisunabletoaddresscanbe
seenthroughtwodifferentyetdeeplyrelatedquestions,namely:wheredomeanings
comefrom?And,wheredomodelscomefrom?
Fromarepresentationalpointofview,meanings(orthefirstpersonperspective)
andmodelscomefromaninterpreter;thatisfromanexternalsystem.Assoonone
asks–wheredotheinterpreter’smeaningsandmodelscomefrom?–itisapparent
thataninfiniteregressbegins.Inthisregard,itisimmaterialwhethertheregressis
spatialortemporal(aswithevolutionaryexplanations).Inbothcasesanexplanation
based on some form of infinite regress is far from being satisfactory. To get rid of
infinite regresses, sooner or later a first meaning or model must be found. In this
regard,representationalperspectivesrunsintotroubles;theydonothaveaclueabout
thefirst,initialoriginofmeaningandthereforetherepresentationalperspectivesare
unable to explain how a natural system could have ever begun developing its
capacities to perceive and make sense of its environment. On the other hand, for
thepresentationalpointofview,processesinthefirstpersonperspectivearemean-
ingful,becausemeaningsaregeneratedfromtheprocessesthemselves.
If,atleastoccasionally,semanticsisinternal,theproblem oftheself-generation
ofmodelsbecomesacentralissueandcannotbeputaside.Notbychance,perhaps,
thisissueismorevisibleincognitivesciencethaninanyotherresearchfield.
Another way to describe the difference between the representational and the
presentationalstrategiesistoresorttothedifferencebetweensyntaxandsemantics.
Therepresentationalperspectivefocusesonthemanipulationofsymbolsandthere-
foreonsyntax.Itsproblemiswherethesemanticscomesfrom.Ontheotherhand,
the presentational perspective focuses on semantics, and it can allow itself ample
leewayaboutwhichsyntacticalconstraintstoadopt.Thelattercanopportunistically
exploit whatever “machinery” is available, without getting committed to any of
them.Fromabiologicalpointofview,thisphenomenonisoftencalled“plasticity.”
Assoonasthedistinctionbetweenpresentationandrepresentationismappedinto
thedifferencebetweensemanticsandsyntax,othercloseoppositionspopup,suchas
the difference between function and structure and the difference between subsystem
and element. While these oppositions are different, it is also patent that they closely
resembleoneanother.Towit,elementsgohandinhandwithstructureandcomposition
rules and therefore are focused on syntax, while subsystems are functionalin nature
andthereforemorecontext-dependentandarefocusedonsemantics(Poli2017).
Apropos the Impredicativity of Anticipatory Systems
Since the dawn of modern science, science has grown, dramatically improving its
methodsanddevelopingnewtheoreticalframes.Iseenoreasontobelieve thatthe
scienceoftwenty-firstcenturywillbelesscreativeandsurprisingthanthescienceof
thetwentiethcentury.
As far as the last decades are considered, the most pervasive development of
sciencegoesundercomplexitytheory–howeverdefined.Asafirstapproximation,a
complexsystemisasystemwithmanyinteractingpartsandcomplexityderivesfrom
IntroducingAnticipation 9
feedback cycles among the system’s parts as well as the subsequent collective
emergence of new properties and behaviors. Chaos theory adds a different strand
to this picture: the introduction of an unavoidable degree of uncertainty due to the
requiredandimpossibleconditionofmeasuringthesystem’sinitialconditionswith
infiniteprecision.
A bird’s eye glance at contemporary science may describe twentieth-century
science as characterized by the move from a science primarily based on linear
models to a science progressively based on nonlinear models. Both complexity
and chaos converge on showing the unavoidability of uncertainty – whether it is
embeddedintofeedback cyclesandemergenceorintheinfiniteprecisionofinitial
conditions.Thisfocusonmodelingtechniquessubsumesavarietyofsubtlerdiffer-
ences. Towit,linearmodelsassumethatevengrosslysimplifiedrepresentationsof
realphenomenaareneverthelesshelpfulproxiessupportingthedominant“command
and control” attitude. Complexity, on the other hand, shows that uncertainty is
unavoidableandthecommandandcontrolattitudeisanogo.
A subtler transformation is ongoing, however: a transformation working on a
deeperlevelthanthemovefromlineartononlinearmodelsandpatentlymuchless
visible thanit.Thispresently lessvisibletransformation,ifsuccessful,may impact
theveryideaofscienceinavastlymorerelevantwaythanthemovefromlinearto
nonlinearmodelingtechniques.
Asamatteroffact,bothlinearandnonlineartechniquesareformsofpredicative
modeling. The difference between predicative and impredicative systems (and
models and definitions) is pervasive and often considered of marginal interest. To
wit, the underlying unproven assumption is that the vast majority of systems is
predicativeandonlymarginal,borderlinesystemsareimpredicative.Asamatterof
fact,thetransformationIamalludingtocallsattentiontotheoppositepossibility:the
unquestionedbeliefinthepredicativityofmostsystemsmayprovetobeillusory–a
kind of self-inflicted form of groupthink. As a matter of fact, many disciplines,
including sociology, anthropology, and biology, exhibit varieties of self-reference,
theprimarysourceofimpredicativity(Bartlett1987,p.6).
Theveryideathatmostsystemsareindeedimpredicativeopensnewavenuesto
science. Moreover, it may help addressing some of the most egregious failures of
contemporary science. The possibility to deepen and extend science as well as the
possibility to address daunting obstructions of present science is serious enough
reasonsforadeepandthoroughinvestigationofthedifferencebetweenpredicative
andimpredicativescience.
In logic, the definition of an object is impredicative if it directly or indirectly
referstotheobjectitself.Thisself-referentialityofimpredicativityisthefeaturethat
has raised most doubts against impredicativity. Sometimes, impredicativity gives
risetoparadoxes(themostnotableofthemisRussell’sparadoxofthesetofallsets
that do not contain themselves as elements), although impredicativities are usually
harmlessandareregularlyusedinmathematics.Thereductionofmathematicstoits
predicativefraction(i.e.,torecursivefunctionsoralgorithms)correspondstoamajor
curtailmentofthecapacityofmathematics.WhileFeferman(1998,2005)hasshown
that a large part of classical mathematics can be reconstructed without using
10 R.Poli
impredicativedefinitions,thereisagreatdealofmathematicsthatgoesbeyondthe
limitsoftherote,mechanicalrepetitionofasetofrules.
Furthermore,manynaturalsystemsdoindeedshowformsofimpredicativity,that
isthepresenceofself-referentialcyclesintheirconstitution.Organismsgeneratethe
very parts they are made of; minds produce the psychological processes they are
basedon;societiesproducetherolesorpatternsofactionstheyaremadeof.Ifitis
truethatbiological,psychological,andsocialsystemsareindeedimpredicative,we
haveroomfordoingscienceandperhapsfindingcommongroundsamongotherwise
widelyisolateddisciplines.
One may note that the presence of the closure manifested by impredicativity is
alwaysflankedbytwinformsofopenness.Anorganismself-producesitsownparts
but needs food and usually other enabling (and constraining) environmental sup-
ports; a mind self-generates its psychological processes but needs a supporting
organism and usually a brain; a society self-produces its roles but needs people to
populatethem.Everysystemrequiresadmissibleenvironments(possiblyintheform
ofothermoreencompassingsystems).Butoncethesupportingorenabling(aswell
as constraining) capacity of the environment is provided, the impredicative cycle
characterizingthesystemproceedsinitsownway.
We shall say that impredicative systems are open to material causation (such as
foodfororganisms).Thenatureoftheclosuredefiningimpredicativesystemsraises
deep questions. For the time being, let us suppose that the impredicative cycle
includes efficient causes. For reasons that will become apparent in due time, we
shallcallhierarchicalacyclethatincludesefficientcauses.
The main distinctionwithin impredicative orself-referentialsystems isbetween
incomplete and complete forms of self-reference. Logical forms of self-reference
(suchasthewell-knownEpimenidesparadox)aretypicallyincompletebecausethey
needanexternalinterpreterabletomakesenseofexpressionslike“this,”“sentence,”
and“falsity.”Thesecasesofself-referencedonotrefertothemselvesonlybutalso
andnecessarilytosomethingelse,namelyanexternalinterpreter.Ontheotherhand,
complete self-reference pertains to systems whose terms are all defined within the
system. Complete forms of self-reference do not require an external interpreter
becausealltheircomponentsare“defined”–thatis“produced”–withinthesystem
itself (Lofgren 1968). Moreover, according to Lofgren (1968), complete self-
reference is independent from set theory and can therefore be added as a new
primitive.ApartfromthepioneeringeffortsofRosen,andusuallywithouthisidea
that impredicativity is the next paradigmatic frontier of science, the issue of
impredicativity has received some attention. See a. o. Aczel (1988), Barwise and
Etchemendy (1987), Kampis (1995), Varela (1974). If impredicativity is indeed of
suchgeneralrelevanceasweclaim,atleastsomesystemsshouldbeself-referentially
complete,i.e.,theyshouldbesuchthattheirsemanticsself-emergewithouttheneed
of an external interpreter. As a matter of fact, we claim that the vast majority of
systems work this way. Either one of the sources of meaning, i.e., semantics, is
internalorlife,mind,andsocietyarenotonlymeaninglessbutalsoimpossible.
Unsurprisingly,manypropertiesofimpredicativesystemsarestillunknownand
suitable research programs must be developed. Specifically, we know very little of