Grace and Reason: A Study in the Theology of Luther PDF
Preview Grace and Reason: A Study in the Theology of Luther
GRACE AND REASON Oxford University Press, Amen House, London E.C.4 GLASGOW NEW YOUK TORONTO MELBOURNE WELLINGTON BOMBAY CALCUTTA MADRAS KARACHI LAHORE DACCA CAPE TOWN SALISBURY NAIROBI IBADAN ACCRA KUALA LUMPUR HONG KONG GRACE AND REASON A STUDY IN THE THEOLOGY OF LUTHER BY B. A. GERRISH OXFORD AT THE CLARENDON PRESS 1962 © Oxford University Press ig62 PRINTED IN GREAT BRITAIN AT THE UNIVERSITY PRESS, OXFORD BY VIVIAN RIDLER PRINTER TO THE UNIVERSITY OfiULP TO MY MOTHER In fulfilment of a promise 36274 PREFACE N ext to ‘antinomianism’, the charge most frequently brought against Luther by his critics is, perhaps, ‘irra¬ tionalism’. Many champions have come forward to defend the Reformer’s ethical principles, and the import of his assault upon ‘the law’ has been adequately explained. Fewer discussions have been made of his assault upon ‘reason’, and the need for drastically qualifying the charge of irrationalism is not sufficiently felt. In actual fact, the assaults on reason and on the law, properly understood, arise from the same basic motive and are expressions of the same fundamental theological stand¬ point. The opposition between Gospel and law in Luther’s theology could equally well be stated as an opposition between grace and reason. Luther’s ‘irrationalism’ is not to be inter¬ preted simply as a call for the theologian to abandon the demands of disciplined thought. Reason, as he understood it, constitutes a threat to the freedom of divine forgiveness, and his polemic is maintained chiefly in defence of the notion of God’s ‘grace’. How this is so, it is the purpose of the following chapters to make clear. The present essay is a shortened and revised version of an academic dissertation submitted in the spring of 1958 to the Joint Committee on Graduate Instruction of Columbia Uni¬ versity, New York. At that time the author had been unable to trace any monograph devoted wholly to Luther’s under¬ standing of reason, despite the many incidental allusions to the topic both in the ‘Luther-Literature’ and in other studies of Western thought. Wilhelm Link’s learned study, Das Ringen Luthers um die Freiheit der Theologie von der Philosophie, contains some valuable discussions of Luther’s attitudes towards the philosophical theology of the Schoolmen; and Bengt Hagglund, in his recent work, Theologie und Philosophie bei Luther und in der occamistischen Tradition, has offered an extremely useful essay on the difficult subject of Luther and the Nominalists. At several points Hagglund in particular addresses himself to the problem of reason in Luther, but, of course, neither of these two works viii PREFACE claims to be a comprehensive discussion of the place of reason in Luther’s theology. After the present writer had already completed his manu¬ script, he received a copy of Bernhard Lohse’s admirable work, Ratio und Fides. Eine Untersuchung iiber die ratio in der Theologie Luthers (Gottingen, 1958), the most comprehensive and satis¬ factory treatment of the problem that has yet appeared. Had this study been available to me during my own research, I would certainly have made extensive use of it: in revising my work for publication, however, I have contented myself with occasional references to Lohse’s essay, where his discussions parallel or supplement my own. As one would expect (despite the fact that the two studies were made independently), many of the same sources have been treated by each author and many similar conclusions have been reached. It is equally to be expected, in view of the vastness of the subject, that dissimi¬ larities of approach and of emphasis should appear. In parti¬ cular, it will be noticed that, whilst Lohse builds upon a developmental study of the ‘Young Luther’, the present essay adopts what Regin Prenter (in the prefatory remarks to his Spiritus Creator) calls a ‘systematic-exegetical’ method, proceed¬ ing by intensive analysis of a crucial text from the ‘Mature Luther’. And even though each of our essays has in addition a purely ‘systematic’ section, there also the reader will discern some variations of approach. Lohse, for instance, does not concern himself greatly with Luther’s historical relationships (with the Schoolmen, for instance); and it does, perhaps, constitute a real difference that our own topic is not ‘reason and faith’, but ‘grace and reason’. The aims and methods of the present study are more fully explained in the Introduction. It is the writer’s firm persuasion that the subject of ‘grace and reason’ in Luther’s theology will be of concern, not only to specialist scholars, but to all who have an interest in the Protestant Reformation, since our theme proves to be by no means peripheral, but brings us to the heart of the Protestant case against the medieval Church of Rome. It is to be hoped, therefore, that our essay will not only help to show the ground¬ lessness of many accusations of ‘irrationalism’ levelled against Luther, but may also do something towards clarifying the basic significance of Evangelical Protestantism. PREFACE IX With more general readers in mind, the writer has done his best to restrict technical scholarship (which the specialist will rightly demand) chiefly to the footnotes. Since it would be utopian to presuppose a knowledge of Luther’s own languages in every reader, English translations are offered from the Latin and German. The translations are our own, but where there are already-existing English versions, which the reader could consult for context, references are occasionally given to them also in the notes. Finally, one who stands in the Reformed, rather than the Lutheran, tradition may perhaps be pardoned if he suggests that the discussion of Luther’s views on reason be compared with the Institutes of Galvin, Book II, chapter ii. The chapter is misleadingly titled, since it seems to promise a discussion on the bondage of the will. In actual fact, Galvin here devotes more space to a succinct statement on the capabilities of the ‘intellect’ in fallen man. (The capabilities of the fallen will are taken up more fully in the following chapters.) Galvin’s pre¬ sentation in some respects amounts to a summing-up of Luther’s own, and yet it should be noted that Calvin’s conversation is, not with his fellow Reformers, but with Augustine and the Schoolmen. The writer wishes to record his indebtedness to Professor Wilhelm Pauck, of Union Theological Seminary, New York, his adviser during the writing of this essay, and to Professor Leonard J. Trinterud, his colleague in the Church History Department of McCormick Theological Seminary, Chicago: to both he owes valuable counsel on several points. B. A. GERRISH McCormick Theological Seminary January, ig6i
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