God and Phenomenal Consciousness: A Novel Approach to Knowledge Arguments

179 Pages·2008·0.81 MB·English

by  Yujin Nagasawa

GodandPhenomenalConsciousness
ANovelApproachtoKnowledgeArguments
In God and Phenomenal Consciousness, Yujin Nagasawa bridges
debatesinthephilosophyofmindandthephilosophyofreligion.He
proposes novel objections to Thomas Nagel’s and Frank Jackson’s
well-known‘knowledgearguments’againstthephysicalistapproach
to phenomenal consciousness by utilising his own objections to
arguments against the existence of God. From the failure of these
arguments,Nagasawaderivesauniquemetaphysicalthesis,‘nontheo-
reticalphysicalism’,accordingtowhichalthoughthisworldisentirely
physical, there are physical facts that cannot be captured even by
completetheoriesofthephysicalsciences.
ThisbookreceivedaJohnTempletonAwardforTheologicalProm-
isein2007.
YujinNagasawaisLecturerintheDepartmentofPhilosophyatthe
University of Birmingham and Honorary Research Fellow at the
Centre for Applied Philosophy and Public Ethics at the Australian
National University. He is the author of numerous journal articles
andco-editorofThere’sSomethingAboutMary:EssaysonPhenom-
enal Consciousness and Frank Jackson’s Knowledge Argument and
NewWavesinPhilosophyofReligion.

God and Phenomenal Consciousness
A Novel Approach to Knowledge Arguments
YUJIN NAGASAWA
UniversityofBirmingham
CAMBRIDGEUNIVERSITYPRESS
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Cambridge University Press
The Edinburgh Building, Cambridge CB28RU, UK
Published in the United States of America by Cambridge University Press, New York
www.cambridge.org
Information on this title: www.cambridge.org/9780521879668
© Yujin Nagasawa 2008
This publication is in copyright. Subject to statutory exception and to the provision of
relevant collective licensing agreements, no reproduction of any part may take place
without the written permission of Cambridge University Press.
First published in print format 2008
ISBN-13 978-0-511-38616-9 eBook (EBL)
ISBN-13 978-0-521-87966-8 hardback
Cambridge University Press has no responsibility for the persistence or accuracy of urls
for external or third-party internet websites referred to in this publication, and does not
guarantee that any content on such websites is, or will remain, accurate or appropriate.
Thisbookisdedicatedwithlove
toAsjaPo¨rtsch,mywifeandmyfriend.

Contents
Preface page xi
part i the structure of knowledge arguments
1 TheStructureofKnowledgeArguments 3
1.1 Introduction 3
1.2 Jackson’sMaryArgument 3
1.3 Nagel’sBatArgument 5
1.4 DefiningaKnowledgeArgument 5
1.5 TheArgumentfromConceptPossession 9
1.6 Grim’sArgumentfromKnowledgeDeSe 10
1.7 WhyTheyAreKnowledgeArguments 10
1.8 NontheoreticalPhysicalism 12
part ii knowledge arguments in the
philosophy of religion
2 Grim’sArgumentfromKnowledgeDeSe 17
2.1 Introduction 17
2.2 Castan˜eda’sandAbbruzzese’sObjectionstotheArgument
fromKnowledgeDeSe 19
2.3 FirstPrinciple:DivineOmniscienceandEpistemicPowers 21
2.4 SecondPrinciple:DivineOmnipotenceandNecessary
Impossibilities 23
2.5 ApplyingthePrinciples 24
2.6 PossibleObjections 25
2.7 ApplicationofMyStrategy 30
2.8 Conclusion 35
3 TheArgumentfromConceptPossession(1) 36
3.1 Introduction 36
3.2 HistoricalBackground 37
vii
viii Contents
3.3 TheStructureoftheArgumentfromConceptPossession 43
3.4 Objectionsto(1) 45
3.5 Objectionsto(2) 48
3.6 Objectionsto(3) 50
3.7 Objectionsto(4) 52
3.8 Conclusion 56
4 TheArgumentfromConceptPossession(2) 58
4.1 Introduction 58
4.2 ANewObjectionto(4) 59
4.3 Amending(4) 64
4.4 ObjectionstotheNewArgument 65
4.5 Conclusion 72
part iii knowledge arguments in the
philosophy of mind
5 Nagel’sBatArgument 77
5.1 Introduction 77
5.2 Argument1 78
5.3 ObjectionstoArgument1 79
5.4 Argument2 81
5.5 TheThomisticPrinciple 84
5.6 TheRevisedThomisticPrinciple 85
5.7 Thomasvs.Thomas:ApplyingtheRevisedThomistic
Principle 86
5.8 PossibleObjections 89
5.9 Conclusion 98
6 Jackson’sMaryArgument(1) 99
6.1 Introduction 99
6.2 TheMaryArgumentAgainstPhysicalism 100
6.3 TheParityofReasonsObjection 102
6.4 TheMaryArgumentAgainstDualism 103
6.5 RepliesfromDualists 104
6.6 ReductiveDualismandNonreductiveDualism 106
6.7 ApplicationoftheParityofReasonsObjection:Chalmers’
Panprotopsychism 108
6.8 Conclusion 112
7 Jackson’sMaryArgument(2) 115
7.1 Introduction 115
7.2 TheMaryArgumentAgain 117
7.3 TheArgumentfromConceptPossessionAgain 118
7.4 TheStructuralSimilarityBetweentheMaryArgument
andtheArgumentfromConceptPossession 120
Contents ix
7.5 TheCrucialDissimilarityBetweentheMaryArgument
andtheArgumentfromConceptPossession 123
7.6 Mary’sIgnorance 125
7.7 KnowingtheFundamentalFeaturesofPhysicalEntities
andProperties 129
7.8 Conclusion 131
part iv knowledge arguments and nontheoretical
physicalism
8 KnowledgeArgumentsandNontheoreticalPhysicalism 135
8.1 Introduction 135
8.2 Plausibilityof(i) 136
8.3 Plausibilityof(ii) 137
8.4 Plausibilityof(iii) 140
8.5 NontheoreticalPhysicalismandtheMysteryofPhenomenal
Consciousness 141
8.6 NontheoreticalPhysicalismandtheExistenceofGod 142
8.7 KnowledgeArgumentsandMeasuringtheSize
ofOmniscience 144
8.8 FinalRemarks 144
References 147
Index 159