George Kennan and the Dilemmas of US Foreign Policy

417 Pages·1988·32.29 MB·English

by  David Allan Mayers

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George Kennan and the Dilemmas
of US Foreign Policy
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GEORGE KENNAN
and the Dilemmas
of US Foreign Policy
DAVID MAYERS
OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS
New York Oxford
Oxford University Press
Oxford New York Toronto
Delhi Bombay Calcutta Madras Karachi
Petaling Jaya Singapore Hong Kong Tokyo
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and associated companies in
Berlin Ibadan
Copyright © 1988 by Oxford University Press, Inc.
First published in 1988 by Oxford University Press, Inc.,
200 Madison Avenue, New York, New York 10016
First issued as an Oxford University Press paperback, 1990
Oxford is a registered trademark of Oxford University Press
All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced,
stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means,
electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise,
without the prior permission of Oxford University Press, Inc.
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Mayers, David Allan, 1951-
p. cm.
Bibliography: p. Includes index.
ISBN 0-19-505139-4
ISBN 0-19-506318-X (pbk.)
1. Kennan, George Frost, 1904- . 2. Ambassadors—United States—
Biography. 3. Historians—United States—Biography.
4. United States—Foreign relations—20th century. I. Title.
E748.K374M39 1989 88-1418
327.2'092'4—dc19 CIP
The following journals have kindly granted permission to include in this book articles that were first published in their
pages in somewhat different form:
Copyright 1985 by the Biographical Research Center. "Young Kennan's Criticisms and Recommendations" originally
appeared in Biography: an Interdisciplinary Quarterly. Summer, 1985.
Journal of Contemporary History. "Soviet War Aims and the Grand Alliance: Goerge Kennan's Views, 1944-1946,"
Vol. 21 (January, 1986); 57-79.
The International History Review. "Nazi Germany and the Future of Europe," Vol. 8 (November 1986): 550-572;
"George Kennan and the Soviet Union," Vol. 5 (November 1983): 525-549.
International Security (Massachusetts Institute of Technology Press Journals). "Containment and the Primacy of
Diplomacy: George Kennan's Views, 1947-1948," Vol. 11, No. 1 (Summer 1986): 124-162.
10 9 8 7 6 5 4 32
Printed in the United States of America
To Elizabeth
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PREFACE
By practically any standard of evaluation, the diplomatic and intellectual career of
George Frost Kennan has been as important as it has been fascinating. Virtually
every student of twentieth century US foreign policy tries to come to grips with
Kennan's position and role in policymaking, especially during the early Cold War,
and with his scholarly assessment of contemporary and historical American diplo-
macy. During the late 1920s and 1930s, he was one of a select group of Foreign
Service officers who received specialized training about the Soviet Union and was
called upon in World War II and soon thereafter to provide the American govern-
ment with advice and guidance as it sought to order its relations with the USSR.
Throughout the critical years of 1946-1950, when the Soviet Union and United
States moved from being uneasy allies to major rivals, Kennan helped to define the
problems and direction of US foreign policy. Henry Kissinger has recorded appre-
ciatively that "George Kennan came as close to authoring the diplomatic doctrine of
his era as any diplomat in our history."1 He also served in 1952 as ambassador to
Stalin's Russia and during John Kennedy's administration was accredited as Ameri-
can envoy to Belgrade. As a critic of US foreign policy, Kennan has always been
lucid, often incisive, and widely followed, even though his views have never met
with anything approaching universal agreement. Still, in the words of one young
scholar, Barton Gellman: "Kennan would appear on any short list of influential
thinkers on American foreign policy."2 Whether in his capacity as participant in
policymaking or as observer, he has been intellectually engaged for decades with
the major international dilemmas confronting the United States.
Despite attention from a number of fine analysts, nobody has yet written a
comprehensive, critical review of Kennan's service in government and subsequent
political counsel. His own memoirs in two volumes are certainly useful; but they,
like any such work, are partial and subjective and suggest that important material is
still to be ferreted out. Studies to date by the distinguished historian John Gaddis
and by Gellman are very good as far as they go, but neither has yet produced the sort
viii PREFACE
of study undertaken herein. Gellman's excellent Contending with Kennan: Toward
a Philosophy of American Power amounts to a distillation of Kennan's underlying
assumptions and intellectual categories, but does not connect Kennan's ideas
closely either to his more than twenty-five years in government service or to other
critics of foreign policy and international relations. Kennan's thought is ably por-
trayed, but it is presented in an intellectual and historical vacuum. Gaddis's work
thus far, especially his masterful Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of
Postwar American National Security Policy, has concentrated almost exclusively on
Kennan's career in the late 1940s, leaving more or less untouched both his earlier
development and post-1940s career. In contrast to the existing published literature,
exemplified by Gellman and Gaddis, I aim here to present a political and intellectual
biography; and, although 1 have deep respect for my subject, this book does not
constitute an apologia for Kennan.3
My study of him is not a full-scale biography, as that would necessarily draw
upon all of his private papers, some of which still remain inaccessible. Instead,
three sources, all of them in the public domain, have provided the basis of this
book. First, scattered about in journals, various written reminiscences, and schol-
arly books on post-World War II US diplomacy, there exists—in addition to the
contributions of Gellman and Gaddis—a useful literature dealing both with Ken-
nan's ideas about international politics and his career in the Foreign Service. These
works, especially those written by him, have been evaluated and incorporated.
Second, the National Archives, the Mudd Manuscripts Library at Princeton Univer-
sity, the Truman Presidential Library, the Library of Congress, and the George
Marshall Library in Lexington, Virginia have yielded a rich lode of oral histories,
personal letters, memoranda, and various government documents. Minutes from
meetings of the Policy Planning Staff, position papers, and official correspondence
have proved especially helpful. Equally valuable have been the Foreign Relations of
the United States (FRUS) series and The State Department Policy Planning Staff
Papers 1947-1949 (SDPPSP), edited by Anna Kasten Nelson. Finally, some of
Kennan's associates from the State Department and more recent colleagues have
kindly answered various inquiries from the author, ventured opinions, and volun-
teered information.
The book, then, is not based on all the extant materials pertaining to George
Kennan, nor does it attempt to examine him in his role as esteemed academic
historian of European international relations and of Russian and Soviet affairs.
Rather, the participation of Kennan in foreign policy—from fledgling diplomat in
Moscow in 1933 to respected critic on the sidelines—and his commentary on US
diplomacy form the core of this work.
In writing this book I have benefited from the assistance of a number of friends,
colleagues, and institutions. Before making these acknowledgments, however, I
want to express gratitude to Kennan for having patiently read and commented on
most chapters. His careful reading and his correspondence with me have been of
immeasurable help in my writing. In addition, Gaddis, who has been commissioned
by Kennan to write his authorized biography, has been generous to me within the
limits allowed by his project and privileged relationship with Kennan. Without
PREFACE ix
Gaddis's encouragement, I would not have gone forward in my research and writ-
ing. In some areas, our books will undoubtedly overlap, but, as their goals are
differently defined and our critical opinions often at variance, I expect the results of
our respective labors will represent two contrasting voices in a much larger discus-
sion about George Kennan and US foreign policy.
Three institutions generously supported me in the course of writing this book. The
Institute for the Study of World Politics, the Institute on Global Conflict and Coop-
eration, and the University of California at Santa Cruz provided several grants that
enabled me to take academic leaves, travel to archives, and hire student assistants.
In addition to my two intelligent, hard-working student researchers, Gina Soos
and Karen Johnson, I benefited greatly from the skilled typing of Judith Burton. She
made sense out of an illegible hand and worked minor miracles with her trusty word
processor.
It has been a pleasure to work with the first-rate staff at Oxford University Press.
In particular I would like to mention three of its distinguished editors, Valerie
Aubry and Susan Rabiner, and associate editor Catherine Clements.
Each of the following has provided me with some combination of constructive
criticism, practical advice, or moral support. I am deeply grateful to: Susan Abel,
Dane Archer, Jeremy Azrael, Deidre Bannon, Philip Bayer, Donald Brand, Vladimir
Brovkin, L. Carl Brown, Charles Burdick, Richard Challener, John Dizikes, Anne
and Dale Easley, Norman Graebner, Gregg Herken, Daniel Hirsch, Stephen Jones,
Penelope Kenez, Jeffery Levi, Peter Loewenberg, Dean McHenry, Dennis McElrath,
David S. McLellan, Eugene Mayers, Peter M. Mayers, Robert Meister, Richard
Melanson, Charles Neider, Lucian Pye, Richard Sakwa, Paul Seabury, Joseph
Silverman, Michael Joseph Smith, Page Smith, Karol Soltan, Kenneth Thompson,
Richard Ullman, Stephen Van Evera, Laurence Veysey, Richard Wasserstrom, and
Glenn Willson.
My very good friend and colleague Peter Kenez, who read all of this book with
great care, saved me from factual errors and misinterpretations. No more than any
of the aforementioned people is he responsible for the book's flaws, but whatever
merit it possesses is in large part due to his constant assistance and wise advice.
Despite the heavy demands of her own professional career, my wife Elizabeth
provided the most valuable assistance of anyone. She read every chapter and brought
to it her keen editor's mind for organization, logic, and clear prose. And while our
son Peter did not contribute directly to the writing of this book, his antics provided a
happy diversion from it.
Santa Cruz, Calif. D. M.
August 1987