Generic species and basic levels: Essence and appearance in folk biology

27 Pages·1997·15.9 MB·English

by  Scott Atran

Summer
Journal Ethnobiology 17(l):17-43 1997
of
AND
GENERIC
BASIC
SPECIES LEVELS:
AND
APPEARANCE FOLK BIOLOGY
ESSENCE
IN
ATRAN
SCOTT
Research
Institute for Social
Michigan
University
of
MI
Ann
48106-1248
Arbor,
PAUL
ESTIN
and Psychology
Cognition Perception
Michigan
University
of
MI
Ann
48106-1248
Arbor,
JOHN COLEY
DOUGLAS MEDIN
Department Psychology
of
Northwestern University
60208-2710
Evanston, IL
ABSTRACT.— same taxonomic rank cognitively privi-
Results indicate that the is
two populations: people raised in Michi-
leged for biological induction in diverse
—
and Maya This the generic species the level
gan, of the Peten rainforest. is
Itzaj
—
rank but with a
of oak and robin which coextensive with Berlin's folkgeneric
is
unaccounted
cannot
and
Rosch her
example, col-
For
measures
taneously of privilege.
yield different
—
—
and bird rather than
leagues suggest forms the level of tree
that
life
many Americans. Rosch, like Berlin,
folkgenerics comprise the "basic level" for
account for privileged cat-
advances such domain-general models of similarity to
best repre-
perceptual attributes that
egories as maximally informative clusters of
However, favors cross-cultural dif-
this
sent "objective discontinuities" in nature.
function of differences in famil-
ferences in the rank privileged in induction as a
some
relative
Although our data indicate
with environment.
iarity the natural
Americans
among
industrialized
rank
downgrading knowledge higher
a
of to
among Maya, these differences are
and upgrading lower rank silvicultural
to a
generic spe-
privilege of
absolute
To account for the
clearly a second-order
effect.
favors
offered.
view folkbiology It
of is
domain-specific
cies in diverse cultures, a
domains
ontological
of the
partitioning
the idea of the generic-species level as a
and
the bio-
The of essence,
attribution
of plant and animal into causal essences.
experience or
independent of actual
go with part
in
logical expectations that is
it,
This reflects a cogni-
kind question.
with in
degree the
of perceptual familiarity
and domain-
perceptual heuristics
between domain-general
tive division of labor
may design.
which be an evolutionary
mechanisms,
specific learning
ATRAN, COLEY MEDIN
ESTIN, and No.l
18 Vol. 17,
—
RESUMEN.
mismo
Nuestros resultados indican que rango taxonomico es
el
privilegiado cognoscitivamente en dos poblaciones gente que credo
diferentes:
en Michigan, en Estados Unidos de Norteamerica, Mayas de selva
los y Itzaj la
—
tropical del Peten en Guatemala. Este rango taxonomico es especie generica
la
—
el nivel del encino y el petirrojo que coincide con lo que Berlin llama el nivel
generico pero un Los modelos de formation
'folk' tiene sentido teorico distinto.
de categorias e induccion basados en similitud no pueden dar cuenta de estos
la
resultados porque tales modelos no pueden producir simultaneamente diferentes
medidas de privilegio. Por ejemplo, Rosch y sus colegas sugieren que son las formas
— —
de vida el nivel al que pertenecen arbol y pajaro mas que los genericos 'folk'
que comprenden muchos
las el "nivel basico" para norteamericanos. Rosch, al
igual que Berlin, propone tales modelos de similitud, generates a todo dominio,
para como maximamente
explicar las categorias privilegiadas conjuntos,
informativos, de atributos perceptuales que mejor representan
las
"discontinuidades objetivas" de la naturaleza. Esto, sin embargo, favorece las
como
diferencias entre culturas en rango privilegiado en induccion funcion
el la
de
las diferencias en familiaridad con medio ambiente. bien nuestros datos
el Si
indican disminucion
cierta relativa del conocimiento hacia rangos superiores en-
tre los norteamericanos industrializados, y un aumento del conocimiento hacia
rangos
inferiores entre los silvicultores mayas, estas diferencias son claramente
un
de segundo
efecto orden. Para responder privilegio absolute de especie
al la
generica en diversas culturas, ofrecemos una perspectiva de dominio
especifica
de
la biologia 'folk'. Esta perspectiva favorece idea del nivel de especie generica
la la
como
una
de
division los dominios ontologicos planta y animal en esencias
La
causales. atribucion de esencia, y las expectativas biologicas que conlleva, son
independientes en parte de la experiencia real o grado de familiaridad percep-
el
con
tual en
la clase cuestion. Esto una
refleja division cognoscitiva del trabajo
entre la heuristica perceptual de dominio general y los mecanismos de aprendizaje
de dominio
especifico, division que puede un diseno
ser evolutivo.
RESUME.—
Notre enquete indique que dans deux
populations ha-
distinctes, les
Hii-Antc r^rirriK^ii-ac- _-._» \/f;^U. t7j.~ ___ t t__ • _ _ . i _ _ *Mkaya »-__• i i_ e _ _ _•_« • j
gnitiv
connaissance des elements biologiques.
II
—
de
s'agit l'espece generique
gorge qui est
coextensive au niveau du
generique un
populaire de Berlin mais qui a sens
theorique Ces
different. resultats ne peuvent modeles de
s'expliquer par des la
formation
de
categorielle et l'induction fondes sur de modeles
la similarite, car tels
momo
DPUWnt
ne fnirmir on meme ___ J„
urnir en ttnetmvip^so u.,n-e .i_._i.___ _•<-<•' _.__ '-i__ii
mesure
de
predilection qui sont
a l'a?uvre. Par exemple, Rosch collegues
et ses
—
suggerent que pour de nombreux
Americains, formes de niveau d'arbre
les vie
— le
et d'oiseau
constituent le "niveau de base" au des generiques populaires.
lieu
Comme
Rosch
Berlin, propose de
tels modeles de domaines generaux de similarite
pour
rendre compte
des
categories
privilegiees en que groupes porteurs
tant
d'lnformation maximale
d'attributs perceptuels representant mieux
les
le
—
j^vx. ut
^ w> xa naiuic. luuieiuib, ceci iaisse croire a aes airrerenceb
culturelles
relatives a la selection inductive du rang de
qui seraient fonction
...
n
iffPriori .roc r\r\ f<*«>% «1 ««*«..: .t,x ^ i_ ___•!• *^-^. <
-
donnees
un
Michigan un
et
May
'
Summer JOURNAL OF ETHNOBIOLOGY
1997 19
evidemment un Une
forestiers, ces differences constituent effet secondaire. per-
spective specifique au domaine de biologie populaire peut rendre compte de
la la
predilection absolue pour niveau de l'espece generique dans diverses cultures.
le
Selon cette perspective, le niveau de Tespece generique serait le resultat d'un
morcellement des domains ontologiques de plante d animal en essences causales.
et
— —
L'attribution de l'essence attentes biologiques qui l'accompagnent est
et les
partiellement independante de l'experience concrete ou du degre de familiarite
du
perceptuelle avec sorte en question. Ceci reflete une division cognitive tra-
la
entre une heuristique perceptuelle orientee vers domaine general et des
vail, le
—
mecanismes d'apprentissage tourne vers domaine specifique ce qui pourrait
le
d'un schema
relever evolutif.
INTRODUCTION
i
psychology inducth
This paper uses a standard tool of cognitive
—
the
ence explore the cognitive validity of folkbiological ranks. In particular,
to
.~— Aft
. - * 1 maximizes - *
inferences
same The
across cultures. crucial
nomic
concerning
living kinds.
example, findin
up
category members as fairly similar to the life-form
industrialized society see
and
Boyes-
Mervis, Gray, Johnson,
that the level of tree or bird (Rosch,
el. is.
major breakpoint
Braem Zubin and Kopcke 1986 Germany). so, the
for If
1976; see
between
should appear the
or elbow in inductive confidence in such cultures life-
and
by colleagues
Berlin his
form and observations
level higher levels. In contrast, —
—
on oak and robin suggest that the
of
the salience of the folkgeneric the level
should be between the folkgeneric
breakpoint subsistence society
in a small-scale
following para-
and Raven the
and Breedlove, 1973). In
level higher
levels (Berlin,
we present experiment.
graphs develop these ideas to motivate the
ethnobiological
work and colleagues,
Ever pioneering of Berlin his
since the
human everywhere have similar
evidence has been accumulating that societies
Hays
and Raven Huron 1977; 1983;
1974;
Breedlove,
folkbiological structures (Berlin,
similarities
Brown These cross-cultural
striking
Atran Berlin 1992).
1984; 1990;
systems
define
universally
number organizing principles
suggest that a small of
are organized into
groups, or taxa,
of Folkbiological
folkbiological classification.
Most
folkbiological
ranks, which represent an embedding of distinct levels of reality.
same rank are mutually
and Taxa of the
systems have between ranks.
three six
similar linguistic
acteristics.
Ranks and whether
in
taxa,
them category mistake. Bioiogi
and confounding a
different logical orders, is
wh
kingdom)
family,
groups species,
ranks are second-order classes of e.g.,
(
ranks se
Folkbiological
animal).
elements are first-order groups (e.g., lion, feline,
systems
or belief
function of theories
vary cultures as a
to across
at
little, if all,
ATRAN, COLEY MEDIN
20 ESTIN, and No.l
Vol. 17,
other words, such ranks are universal but not the taxa they contain. Ranks are
2
intended to represent fundamentally different levels of not convenience.
reality,
The most general folkbiological rank the folk kingdom. Examples are plant
is
and animal Such taxa are not always explicitly named, and represent the most
.
fundamental
divisions of the biological world. These divisions correspond to the
notion of "ontological category" philosophy (Donnellan and psychology
in 1971)
From
an humans any
(Keil 1979). early age, appears, cannot help but conceive of
it
object they see in the world as either being or not being an animal and there
is
evidence for an early distinction between plants and nonliving things (Inagaki
and Hatano
in press). Conceiving of an object as a plant or animal seems to carry
with
assumptions
it certain that are not applied to objects thought of as belonging
to other ontological
categories, like the categories of substance or artifact (Keil
Mandler and McDonough
Most
form.
or another life form. Life-form taxa often have unanalyzable names (simple
lexically
primary
lexemes), such and some names
as "tree" "bird," although life-form are
analyzable, such "quadruped." members
as taxon are
Biologically, of a life-form
diverse. Psychologically, members number
of a life-form taxon share a small of
perceptual stem
diagnostics: and (Brown
aspect, skin covering, so forth 1984). Life-
may
form
taxa represent adaptations broad such
to sets of ecological conditions,
among
as competition
single-stem plants for sunlight and tetrapod adaptation to
(Hunn
life in the air 1982; Atran 1985). Classifying by form may occur early on:
life
two-year-olds
distinguish familiar kinds quadruped dog and from
of horse)
(e.g.,
sea versus
animals (Mandler
air
et 1991).
al.
The
any
core of folk taxonomy, according
to Berlin, the folkgeneric level.
is
Like
life-form named
taxa, folkgeneric taxa are often by simple lexemes, such as
"oak" and
"robin." Sometimes, compounds,
folkgenerics are labeled as binomial
On
"hummingbird."
like may
other
occasions, they be optionally labeled as bino-
mial
// oak makes
tree." In both cases the binomial
between
and
generic form.
t life
Folkgenerics
often correspond
to scientific genera or species, at least for the
most
phenomenally
salient organisms, such and flowering
as larger vertebrates
On
plants. occasion
generic species can correspond fragments
to local of biologi-
—
—
cal families
(e.g., vulture) oorrddeerrss aanndd
((ee..gg..,, bbaatt)) especially with invertebrates
,
,
may
gical taxa (Atran
1987a; Berlin Folkgenerics
1992).
also be the most
categories
easily recognized, most commonly named and most
easily learned by
children
in small-scale Indeed,
societies (Stross 1973).
who
ethnobiologists
otherwise
differ in their views of folktaxonomy tend to agree
one
that
level best captures
fundamen-
discontinuities in nature and provides the
tal constituents in systems
all of and use
folkbiological
categorization, reasoning
(Bulmer Hunn
1974;
1982; Ellen
1993).
what we
In
follows, use term
the "generic species," rather than "folk genera/
folk generic"
(Berlin 1972) or
"folk
species/folk specieme" (Bulmer three
for
1970),
reasons.
First, a principled
between
distinction biological genus and species is
not
pertinent
to local folk around The
the world. most Dhenomenallv spe-
salient
mans, mo
including
ms
and monos
belons
cacti to
Summer JOURNAL OF ETHNOBIOLOGY
1997
21
Hunn
genus hard hence no mor-
in a locale are often to distinguish, readily perceptible
phological or ecological "gap" can be discerned between them (Diver
1940).
second, the term // generi•c speci• es // reflects a more accurate sense or the corre-
spondence between groups and
psychologically privileged folkbiological
initial
wide "Age number
of Exploration/' the
order of magnitude. Foreign species were habitually joined to the most similar
European
species; that to the generic type in a "natural system." Historically,
is,
then, the distinction between genus and species did not appear until the influx of
newly discovered species from around the world compelled European naturalists
to mnemonically manage them within a worldwide system of genera built around
ma
As
Third, the term "generic species" reflects their dual character. privileged
mnemonic groups, they are akin to genera in being those groups most readily
apparent the naked eye (Cain As privileged causal groups, they are akin
to 1956).
to species in being the principal loci of evolutionary processes responsible for the
appearance (Mayr In Western science, the dual char-
of biological diversity 1969).
taxonomy //
eventually "fissioned
acter of this privileged level of folkbiological
and genera (Tournefort
into species (Cesalpino 1583) 1694).
PpodIp in rnlhirpQ snnntaneouslv partition the ontoloeical categories ani
^11
mal and exhaustive manner. "Virtually
plant into generic species in a virtually
exhaustive" means when an organism encountered that not readily iden-
that is
is
named expected belong
tifiable as beloneine to a generic species, it is still to to
named
organism often assimilated to one of the taxa it resembles
is
«
em rutiny
sometimes assiened an // i
is
it
"such-and-such a plant some [generic-species] kind of tree," cf. Berlin in
(e.g., is
and
seems be part parcel of
press). This partitioning of ontological categories to
belong uniquely
no animal can principle to
the categories themselves: plant or fail in
to a generic
species.
Moreover, from
data
presume kind have an "essence," or underlying
each living to
distincti re
(Gelman
kind
appearance of that
for the typical
isible
understanding
and Wellman At presumption involves only global
1991). this
first
produced but perhaps
that the readily outsides of living kinds are by, dif-
visible
Children lack concrete or specific
ferent from, their initially invisible insides. initially
Over they
(Simmons and time,
pieces of knowledge about each kind Keil 1995).
presumed essences as responsible for
try to flesh out the causal properties of these
and
and
growth and Gelman inheritance (Springer Keil 1989),
(Hickling 1995),
and
(Hatano
kind
complementary body parts in a living
functioning of distinct
presumed
which universally to
Inagaki Such causal essences, are
1994). intrinsic
and
substances)
be both mechanical causes affecting inert
teleological (unlike the
unique
appear be to
to
fashioned
internally directed (unlike externally artifacts),
domain kinds and primari
cognitive of living
cies.
These taxa are
may
be divided into folkspecifics.
further
species
c
Compound "white
names,
like
with secondary lexemes.
binomially,
ATRAN, COLEY MEDIN
22 ESTIN, and Vol. 17, No.l
make
oak" and "mountain
robin."
and have high
generic species folkspecifics. Folkspecifics that tradition of cul-
its
may
tural salience be labeled with primary lexemes, such as "winesap" kind of
(a
how
apple tree) and "tabby" (a kind of cat). In general, whether and a generic
cultural
lm
exam
with
trinomially,
make
lexemes
that transparent their taxonomic relationship with superordinat
n
example
"spotted white oak.
Thus, in addition to generic species, people everywhere tend to form groups
that are both subordinate and superordinate to the level of privileged groups. This
regular "groups under grouping
classification of groups... not arbitrary like the
is
of stars in constellations" arwin
anisms svstem
into a
designed embedded
to represent the structure of around with the generic-
us,
life
may
species level being most informative. In some but not people
cultures,
all,
develop
"theories" of life that are meant to cover living kinds, such as Western
all
theories of biology (Carey 1985; Atran 1995a). But the very possibility of such theo-
would
rizing not without provide
exist a universal construal of generic species to
the
transtheoretical basis for scientific speculation about the biological world. Dif-
— —
ferent biological theories including evolutionary theory arose to
initially
account "common
for the apparent constancy and the
of [generic] species" for
apparent similarities and differences between them Mayr
(Wallace 1969:37).
1889:1;
Given
these observations, or
results of psychological studies of privilege
periments
validity
taxonomic
measures
they found
that there indeed of
is a "basic level" in category hierarchies
"naturally
occurring
objects," such as "taxonomies" of as well as living
artifacts
kinds Brown,
(cf. Kolar, Torrey, Troung-Quang, and Volkman For
artifact
1976).
and
living kind hierarchies, the basic was where: many common features
level
(1)
are
listed for categories, consistent motor programs employed
(2) are for the inter-
action with
or manipulation
members have
of category
exemplars, category
(3)
enough
similar
shapes
so
that it is possible to recognize an average shape for ob-
jects of the category. For example, many
were more
subjects able features for
to
list
dog
chair or than mammal,
for furniture
or but few added kitchen
features for
chair or They
terrier. could
also readily construct an average image chair or
for
dog
but not
mammal.
for furniture
or Rosch
found
also that basic-level cat-
et
al.
egories
are preferred
in adult naming, and
the level learned by children, at
first
which
was
categorization
fastest.
work
Thus, by
and
Berlin Rosch
both
indicate a privileged level in cat-
egory
hierarchies. Moreover,
both
claim that this privileged take on naturally
occurring
objects
directly
is tied to objective discontinuities in the real world. These
objective
discontinuities
provide
the
information-rich bundles of perceptual at-
tributes that presumably
allow
a domain-general mechanism
perceptual processing
carve up
to nature
at fundamental
its
joints.
Summer JOURNAL OF ETHNOBIOLOGY
1997
23
But here's the rub that motivates the present study: The basic level that Rosch
was hammer, how-
hypothesized confirmed
et (1976) for artifacts guitar);
al. (e.g.,
ever, the hypothesized basic level for living kinds maple, trout), which Rosch
(e.g.,
presumed would was
initially accord with Berlin's generic rank, not. Instead of
maple and trout, Rosch found that tree and fish operated as basic-level cat-
et
al.
egories for American college students. Except for very familiar animals dog,
(e.g.,
chicken), Rosch's basic level for living kinds corresponds to Berlin's life-form level.
To explore the cognitive basis for this apparent discrepancy between Berlin
we
and Rosch, introduce the examination of inductive inference into our study.
knowledge beyond immediate
Inductive inference allows people extend their
to
experience and beyond the information they are given, and a crucial part of
is
category formation and use (Rips 1975; Smith and Medin 1981). Although neither
Berlin nor Rosch deal with inductive inference, such inferences are ar-
explicitly
what
guably central to understanding preference for certain categories. For is
mammal amount
informa-
privileged about or tabby that the of
cat relative to is
may
maximized
tion that can be inferred about the category be at the level of cat.
may
Thus, knowing that a tabby eats fish, be prima facie reasonable to infer that
it
mammals
all cats eat fish, but unreasonable to infer from this that all eat fish.
good an
Moreover, knowing that a short-haired tabby eats fish is likely as indica-
them
tion that all cats eat as it is that all tabbies do.
most information about the world, categories
a privileged level carries the
If
what
wide about
at that level should strongly support a range of inferences is
common among members. privileged category white oak to
Inferences to a (e.g.,
much superordinate
oak, tabby should be stronger than inferences to a
to cat)
subordinate
category oak mammal). Moreover, inferences to a
(e.g., to tree, cat to
should
tabby tabby)
category white oak white oak, short-haired to
spotted to
(e.g.,
not be much stronger or different than inferences to a privileged category.
taxonomic
The our experiment that the privileged
hypothesis motivating
is
remaining constant across
the sense of
level for biological induction absolute, in
is
Unlike
relative
culture, and not relative, in the sense of varying across cultures.
by general notions of per-
driven
not primarily
privilege, absolute privilege
is
the absolute inductive
Instead,
ceived experience, or cultural expertise.
similarity,
may assumptions
be anchored in cognitive
privilege of the generic-species level
everywhere
people
The
domain idea that
peculiar to a universal of folkbiology. is
govern
the
presume main causal processes that
kinds be the loci of
essential to
and underlying
apparent world, even the superficial
structure of the biological if
Medin and Ortony
known
(Atran 1987b;
properties of such kinds are at first little
Gelman, and
1989; Coley, Gottfried 1994).
show
ab-
we members widely divergent cultures to
Although expect of these
we may
also find
generic-species level,
solute psychological privilege at the
knowledge leading to sec-
evidence devolution of folkbiological
of the effects of
Dougherty
Specifically,
ondary induction patterns across cultures.
differences in
knowledge de-
world
leads to
with natural
the
(1978) argues that lack of contact
may show secondary privilege for
Americans
cay more thus
at specific levels;
with the bio-
dependence on intimate interaction
higher-order Likewise,
taxa. Itzaj
may secondary privilege
lead to
logical world, coupled with a silviculture tradition,
for lower-order
taxa.
ATRAN No.l
Vol. 17,
24
examining competing claims of absolute versus relative privi-
In addition to the
our experiment must also deal with claims for a more general sort of reasoning
lege,
What from most per-
we deem missing
which
progressive privilege.
is
heuristic,
accounts category formation in class-inclusion
ception-based or similarity-based of
how made taxonomy
across the
hierarchies an explanation of inferences are
is
understand the
from one category to another. Such an explanation is necessary to
any understand-
and
work do taxonomic reasoning, crucial to
that categories in is
most attempts to
one elegant
ing of underlying (biological) relationships. In of the
Osherson, Smith, Wilkie,
taxonomic
explain similarity-based inference to date,
pre-
argument
Lopez, and Shafir depict an inferential as categorical if its
(1990)
C
C where a
and form members have property P, is
mises conclusion take the All
of
ROBIN same premises
natural category or BIRD, and P remains the across
like
An mad cow
and conclusions. example Guernsey cows are susceptible to disease;
is
mad cow The argument psychologically
cows
therefore are susceptible to disease. is
all
conclusion.
strong to the extent that belief in its premises engenders belief in its
perceived or
Osherson model based exclusively on an evaluation of the
et al.'s is
presumed between premise and conclusion categories.
similarities
model
The from that
prediction of progressive privilege that follows this is
any given premise category held constant a particular taxonomic level, ar-
for at
gument conclusion category.
strength should decrease the higher the level of the
Thus, inductive strength should decrease incrementally from varietal to specific,
and kingdom. Also, for
varietal to generic species, varietal to form, varietal to
life
argument strength
any
given conclusion category held constant at a particular level,
the
should increase as one changes the premise category to one that is closer to
spe-
conclusion category. For example, inductive strength from varietal to generic
should be than from 5 By our hypothesis
cies less specific to generic species. contrast,
inference
entails that absolute rather than progressive privilege will account for
patterns across folkbiological ranks.
METHODS
— —
—
men women
Twelve and in the village
Itzaj participants. Itzaj six six living
San Guatemala 6 Maya Amerindians
of Peten,
lose, participated in the study. are
Itzaj
men
de-
living in the tropical forest region of Peten, Guatemala. Until recently,
women
voted time and whereas
their to shifting agriculture, hunting,
silviculture,
concentrated on the myriad tasks of household maintenance. The comprised
Itzaj
and
the last independent native polity to be conquered by Spaniards (in 1697),
Maya
have preserved knowledge Lowland
virtually ethnobiological recorded
all for
since the time of the initial Spanish conquest (Atran Despite the current
1993).
awesome
rate of deforestation and demise use language and culture, the
in of
Itzaj
Maya among
ethic of traditional silviculture very much evidence the
in
is still
who
generation of our informants range in age from 50 80 years old (Atran,
to
Medin,
Lynch, Ross, Vapnarsky, and Ucan spoke Span-
Ek' in press). Participants
ish as well as Itzaj, but testing was exclusively in They were acquainted with
Itzaj.
the author, and compensated
first at relative ease in the testing situation. All were
for their participation.
Summer JOURNAL OF ETHNOBIOLOGY
1997
25
—
Michigan The American were men and women
participants. 21 participants five 16
who
ranged in age from 17 to 25. They were self-identified as people raised
in
Michigan, and recruited through an advertisement campus newspaper.
in a local
were
All paid
for their participation.
—
we
Based on work
Itzaj materials. extensive field with the Itzaj, chose a set of Itzaj
kingdom
folkbiological categories of the life-form generic-species
(K), (L), (G),
We
and =
folkspecific varietal (V) ranks. selected three plant forms: che'
(S), life
We
7 = =
'tree ak' 'vine', pok~che' 'herb' /'underbrush'. also selected three animal
,
life forms: b'a'al~che' kuximal = 'walking animal', mammal, ch'iich' - 'birds
i.e.,
including kay = Three were chosen from each
generic-species taxa
bats',
'fish'. life
form
such that each generic species had a subordinate folkspecific, and each
had 7 Although some names com-
folkspecific a salient varietal. Itzaj life-form are
posites (e.g., b'a'al~ che' kuximal) while others are primary lexemes (e.g., ch'iich'),
previous experiments indicate that this linguistic difference has no impact on infer-
ence patterns within forms (Lopez in press; Atran in press). Categories
Itzaj life et al.
used and
their approximate English translations are presented in Table
1.
—
TABLE
Natural kind used
1. stimuli in Itzaj study.
Folk Kingdom Form Generic Species Folk Specific Varietal
Life
&
&
animal
kuximal kay)
(b'a'al~che' ch'iich'
mammal
(b'a'al~che')
agouti
(tzu')
green agouti (ya'ax tzu')
large green agouti (noj ya'ax tzu')
squirrel (ku'uk)
red squirrel (chak ku'uk)
(chak ku'uk uchupal)
female red squirrel
monkey
spider (tuuchaj)
monkey
black spider (b'ox tuuchaj)
monkey
tuuchaj
male black spider (b'ox
uxib'al)
h')
vulture (ch'om)
ch'om)
black vulture (b'ox
ch'om chak
red-headed black vulture (b'ox
upol)
hawk
(ch'uy)
hawk
water
(ch'uy-il ja')
hawk
black water (b'ox ch'uy-il ja*)
(kolonte')
kolonte')
woodpecker
black-backed red
upach)
(chak kolonte' b'ox
fish (kay)
catfish (lu
)
kaj)
village catfish (lu'-il
(noj kaj)
large village catfish lu'-il
MEDIN
COLEY
ATRAN, and No.l
ESTIN, Vol.
26 17,
—
TABLE
Continued.
1.
Kingdom Form
Folk Generic Species Folk Specific Varietal
Life
(b'ox)
yo'mojara
(yo' b'ox)
{mo'nok
small yo'mojara yo' b'ox)
sardine (chilam)
red-tailed sardine (chak~nej chilam)
male (chak-nej chilam
sardine
red-tailed
uxib'al)
fco
(che')
tree (p'ut)
papaya
village tree (p'ut-il kaj)
papaya
yellow put'-il
village tree (k'iin
kaj)
savanna
green joom savanna nance (ya'ax
tree
joom
chakan)
chi'
hogplum
tree (ab'al)
hogplu
forest
(job
k'aax)
(p
che')
male
cordoncillo (pu'uk che' uxib'al)
(p
chawak)
uxib'al
kits
ip'ak)
tomato
breast (chu'chu' p'ak)
p'ak)
sweet breast tomato (ch'uuk chu'chu'
pepper
chili
(ifc)
sweet pepper
(ch'uuk
chili ik)
red sweet pepper ch'uuk ik)
chili (chiik
JO
bean
(b'u'ul)
bean
red tzama bean tzama'
b'u'ul)
(chiik
squash
(k'uum)
chuyut squash (chuyut k'uum)
chuyut
spring chayut squash
(k'ik'i'ix
k'uum)