General Theory of Knowledge

432 Pages·1974·12.588 MB·English

by  Moritz Schlick (auth.)

Library of
Exact Philosophy
Editor:
Mario Bunge, Montreal
Co-editors:
Sir Alfred Jules Ayer, Oxford
Herbert Feigl, Minneapolis, Minn.
Victor Kraft, Wien
Sir Karl Popper, Penn
Springer-Verlag NewYork Wien
Library oE Exact Philosophy 11
Moritz Schlick
General Theory
of Knowledge
Translated by Albert E. Blumberg
With an Introduction by
A. E. Blumberg and H. Feigl
Springer-Verlag NewYork Wien 1974
Translated from the 2nd German Edition of
Allgemeine Erkenntnislehre
(Naturwissenschaftliche Monographien und Lehrbücher, Band 1)
Berlin: Verlag von Julius Springer, 1925
Copyright 1925 by Julius Springer in Berlin
Printing type: Sabon Roman
Composed and printed by Herbert Hiessberger, Pottenstein
Binding work: Karl Scheibe, Wien
Design: Hans Joachim Böning, Wien
ISBN 978-3-7091-3101-5 ISBN 978-3-7091-3099-5 (eBook)
DOI 10.1 007/978-3-7091-3099-5
This work is subject to copyright.
All rights are reserved,
whether the whole or part of the material is concerned,
specifically those of translation, reprinting, re-use of illustrations,
broadcasting, reproduction by photocopying machine or similar means,
and storage in data banks.
© 1974 by Springer-Verlag/Wien
Softcover reprint ofthe hardcover 1st edition 1974
Library of Congress Card Number 73 -80988
General Preface to the LEP
Exact philosophy can be described as the field of philosophy tilled
with exact tools, i. e. logic and mathematics. Exactness concerns the
methods or tools, not the subject. Regardless of its subject, a piece
of philosophical investigation qualifies as exact as long as it involves
a precise statement of the problems, a careful analysis of the key
concepts and principles, and an attempt at systematization. If the
outcome is a full fledged theory with adefinite mathematical struc
ture, and moreover a theory that solves some important philosoph
ical problems, so much the better.
It is worth while, nay exciting and urgent, to try the exact
method in every branch of philosophy - in semantics, epistemology,
philosophy of science, value theory, ethics, legal philosophy, the
history of philosophy, and perhaps even in aesthetics. The more
exactly we proceed in handling genuine philosophical problems, the
narrower should become the gap between the humanities on the
one hand, and mathematics and science on the other. And the
better we bridge this gap the lesser will be the chances that the
anti-intellectualist trends will destroy contemporary culture.
Some great philosophers have worked in exact philosophy: not
only Carnap and Russell but also Bolzano, Leibniz, and Aristotle.
A whole school, the Vienna Circle, was devoted to the enterprise
of reconstructing philosophy in an exact manner and in the light
of the sciences. The Library of Exact Philosophy is a new link in
this long thin chain. It was established in 1970 in order to stimulate
the production and circulation of significant additions to philos
ophia more geometrico. The LEP has already made a contribution
VIII General Preface
to that goal, and it is hoped that it will incorporate further works
dealing in an exact way with interesting philosophical issues.
Zürich, April 1973
Mario Bunge
From the Preface to the First Edition
It may seem odd that aseries of works devoted to the natural
sciences should indude - indeed begin with - a volume on phi
losophy. Today, of course, it is generally agreed that philosophy
and natural science are perfectly compatible. But to grant the theory
of knowledge such a prominent position implies not only that these
two fields are compatible, but that there is a natural connection
between them. Thus the indusion of this book in the series can
be justified only if such an intimate relation of mutual dependence
and interpenetration really does exist.
Without anticipating what is to come, the author would like
first to explain his point of view on the relationship between
epistemology and the sciences, and in so doing make dear at the
outset the method to be followed in this book.
It is my view - which I have already expressed elsewhere and
which I never tire of repeating - that philosophy is not aseparate
science to be placed alongside of or above the individual disciplines.
Rather, the philosophical element is present in all of the scienccs;
it is their true soul, and only by virtue of it are they sciences at all.
Knowledge in any particular field presupposes a body of quite
general principles into which it fits and without which it would not
be knowledge. Philosophy is nothing other than the system of these
principles, a system which branches out and penetrates the entire
system of knowledge and thereby gives it stability. Hence philos
ophy has its horne in all the sciences; and I am convinced that the
only way one can reach philosophy is to seek it out in its homeland.
While philosophy has its residence deep within all the sciences,
it does not reveal itself with the same readiness in every one of them.
On the contrary, first principles will of necessity be found most
easily in those disciplincs that have already attained the highest
x
From the Preface to the First Edition
level of generality. Clearly, the propositions that possess the most
general validity for the real world are those of the natural sciences,
in particular the exact sciences. It is only from their diggings that
the philosopher can unearth the treasures he seeks. History is
concerned with the destiny of a single species on a single planet,
philology with the laws governing a quite specific activity of that
species. In contrast, the validity of the laws discovered through the
methods of the natural sciences is not confined to any individual
domain of reality; it extends, .in principle, to the entire universe,
however distant in time and space. Therefore general epistemology
is bound to take the scientific knowledge of nature as its point of
departure.
This is not to say, however, that knowledge of nature is some
special kind of knowledge. Knowledge everywhere is one; the most
general principles are always the same, even in the humanities. The
only difference is that in the humanities these principles, although
just as operative there, appear as applied to much more specific
and complicated matters and hence are much more difficult to per
ceive. Consider, for instance, how much easier it is to trace the
workings of causality in a physical process than in an historical
event.
It is pretty much in this fashion that the relationship between
philosophic thought and the thinking characteristic of the individual
sciences presents itself. Clearly the philosopher is called upon to
address his full energies to the knowledge of nature. Conversely, the
natural scientist finds that his most important problems strongly
impel hirn toward the theory of knowledge; for these problems are
of such extreme generality that his science, in dealing with them,
continually impinges on the domain of the purely philosophical. He
must indeed step over into that realm; otherwise he will not be able
to understand fully the meaning of his own activity. The truly great
scientist is always at the same time a philosopher. This dose inter
relationship of goals between epistemology and the natural sciences
both permits and requires a dose external association as weIl. It
would be good if this were more dearly evident in the academies
and universities, where it is still the custom to counterpose the philo
sophical and historical disciplines to the mathematical and scientific
ones. Meanwhile, the interrelationship may find a modest expression
in the way the present work is being published.
Preface to the Second Edition XI
For these reasons, I was delighted to accept the publisher's
proposal that this book appear in aseries devoted to the "natural
sciences".
I have constandy sought the simplest possible mode of presen
tation, one that builds slowly, so that the discussion can be under
stood without a special knowledge of philosophy. In a few places,
it was necessary to include a detailed criticism of particular philo
sophical doctrines so that the author could characterize his own
position more completely for the benefit of his colleagues. But these
passages are easy to recognize, and they may be omitted without
loss by the reader who is interested only in the general argument.
The pages that follow have been entitled General Theory 01
Knowledge because the inquiry is directed wholly to ultimate prin
ciples. If philosophical curiosity does not carry us to these most
general principles, but comes to a halt, as it were, at the level
before the last, then we shall find ourselves - if our point of
departure has been natural science - in the province of the theory
of natural knowledge, or the philosophy of science. Similarly, the
road that leads flOm the science of history to general epistemology
passes through the theory of historical knowledge, or the philosophy
of history, that from mathematics through the philosophy of mathe
matics, and so on. We shall not be able, in what follows, to tarry
at the level of these special epistemologies, although admittedly the
substantiation of our results may seem incomplete at some points.
But it would be quite impossible, if only for practical reasons, to
go into the voluminous special studies in these areas. Thus the
definitive completion of our argument as a whole must await a
treatment of the special problems. This I hope to present later.
Preface to the Second Edition
This book has been out of print for more than two and a half
years. The author feels that he should account to the reader for
such a long delay in the appearance of a new edition, the more
so since there has been a lively demand for the book in the mean
time.
First of all, outside circumstances have kept the author occupied
with tasks of an altogether different nature. But other factors, stem-
XII Preface to the Second Edition
ming from an awareness of certain deficiencies in the first edition,
also have held back the start and progress of the revision. To over
come these deficiencies fuHy would have required a major develop
ment and expansion with regard to the logic of knowledge, and this
would have meant reconstructing the entire work. So sweeping
a change, however, could not be considered; for the book, thus
transformed, would have lost its original character. It would no
longer have been able to serve those needs the satisfaction of which
has eamed for it the particular place it holds in the philosophical
literature. For the book to continue to occupy this place, it was
necessary to retain the general design; for it to fulfill its role better
than before, it was necessary to revise many details.
As a consequence, the revisions in the second edition had to be
confined to corrections, smaH additions and deletions. And the
important task of rounding out 10gicaHy the epistemological ideas
developed in the book had to be put over to a later comprehensive
exposition of the principles of logic.
Convinced that correct ideas make their way best by virtue of
the truth inherent in them, without their having to wage a long
drawn out battle against error, I have eliminated aH non-essential
polemical excursions. The development of my own position has been
tied in with a critique of opposing views only where the latter form
a natural point of departure for positive considerations. Accordingly,
the critical comments on the basic ideas of Kant and his school have
had to be retained in the new edition. Indeed, it was necessary
even to enlarge the important chapter on the "Critique of the Idea
of Immanence", for although this chapter, in particular, had received
widespread favorable attention, it seemed to rqe to be in need of
some not insignificant supplementation and improvement.
I have devoted much care to reworking the chapters that deal
with the psychophysical problem. It seems that the discussion of
this topic, to which I attach a quite special systematic importance,
has for the most part not been correctly understood. The experi
ences I have had in lectures and conversations permit me to hope
that by means of the new formulations I have succeeded in avoiding
the shortcomings of the earlier account.
Among other changes, I should like to mention the observations
newly added as § 11, which make for a greater simplicity and com
pactness in the basic systematic outlook. Also, the exposition in the
final section of the book is given in a still briefer outline than in