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432 Pages·1974·12.588 MB·English
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Library of Exact Philosophy Editor: Mario Bunge, Montreal Co-editors: Sir Alfred Jules Ayer, Oxford Herbert Feigl, Minneapolis, Minn. Victor Kraft, Wien Sir Karl Popper, Penn Springer-Verlag NewYork Wien Library oE Exact Philosophy 11 Moritz Schlick General Theory of Knowledge Translated by Albert E. Blumberg With an Introduction by A. E. Blumberg and H. Feigl Springer-Verlag NewYork Wien 1974 Translated from the 2nd German Edition of Allgemeine Erkenntnislehre (Naturwissenschaftliche Monographien und Lehrbücher, Band 1) Berlin: Verlag von Julius Springer, 1925 Copyright 1925 by Julius Springer in Berlin Printing type: Sabon Roman Composed and printed by Herbert Hiessberger, Pottenstein Binding work: Karl Scheibe, Wien Design: Hans Joachim Böning, Wien ISBN 978-3-7091-3101-5 ISBN 978-3-7091-3099-5 (eBook) DOI 10.1 007/978-3-7091-3099-5 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are reserved, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically those of translation, reprinting, re-use of illustrations, broadcasting, reproduction by photocopying machine or similar means, and storage in data banks. © 1974 by Springer-Verlag/Wien Softcover reprint ofthe hardcover 1st edition 1974 Library of Congress Card Number 73 -80988 General Preface to the LEP Exact philosophy can be described as the field of philosophy tilled with exact tools, i. e. logic and mathematics. Exactness concerns the methods or tools, not the subject. Regardless of its subject, a piece of philosophical investigation qualifies as exact as long as it involves a precise statement of the problems, a careful analysis of the key concepts and principles, and an attempt at systematization. If the outcome is a full fledged theory with adefinite mathematical struc ture, and moreover a theory that solves some important philosoph ical problems, so much the better. It is worth while, nay exciting and urgent, to try the exact method in every branch of philosophy - in semantics, epistemology, philosophy of science, value theory, ethics, legal philosophy, the history of philosophy, and perhaps even in aesthetics. The more exactly we proceed in handling genuine philosophical problems, the narrower should become the gap between the humanities on the one hand, and mathematics and science on the other. And the better we bridge this gap the lesser will be the chances that the anti-intellectualist trends will destroy contemporary culture. Some great philosophers have worked in exact philosophy: not only Carnap and Russell but also Bolzano, Leibniz, and Aristotle. A whole school, the Vienna Circle, was devoted to the enterprise of reconstructing philosophy in an exact manner and in the light of the sciences. The Library of Exact Philosophy is a new link in this long thin chain. It was established in 1970 in order to stimulate the production and circulation of significant additions to philos ophia more geometrico. The LEP has already made a contribution VIII General Preface to that goal, and it is hoped that it will incorporate further works dealing in an exact way with interesting philosophical issues. Zürich, April 1973 Mario Bunge From the Preface to the First Edition It may seem odd that aseries of works devoted to the natural sciences should indude - indeed begin with - a volume on phi losophy. Today, of course, it is generally agreed that philosophy and natural science are perfectly compatible. But to grant the theory of knowledge such a prominent position implies not only that these two fields are compatible, but that there is a natural connection between them. Thus the indusion of this book in the series can be justified only if such an intimate relation of mutual dependence and interpenetration really does exist. Without anticipating what is to come, the author would like first to explain his point of view on the relationship between epistemology and the sciences, and in so doing make dear at the outset the method to be followed in this book. It is my view - which I have already expressed elsewhere and which I never tire of repeating - that philosophy is not aseparate science to be placed alongside of or above the individual disciplines. Rather, the philosophical element is present in all of the scienccs; it is their true soul, and only by virtue of it are they sciences at all. Knowledge in any particular field presupposes a body of quite general principles into which it fits and without which it would not be knowledge. Philosophy is nothing other than the system of these principles, a system which branches out and penetrates the entire system of knowledge and thereby gives it stability. Hence philos ophy has its horne in all the sciences; and I am convinced that the only way one can reach philosophy is to seek it out in its homeland. While philosophy has its residence deep within all the sciences, it does not reveal itself with the same readiness in every one of them. On the contrary, first principles will of necessity be found most easily in those disciplincs that have already attained the highest x From the Preface to the First Edition level of generality. Clearly, the propositions that possess the most general validity for the real world are those of the natural sciences, in particular the exact sciences. It is only from their diggings that the philosopher can unearth the treasures he seeks. History is concerned with the destiny of a single species on a single planet, philology with the laws governing a quite specific activity of that species. In contrast, the validity of the laws discovered through the methods of the natural sciences is not confined to any individual domain of reality; it extends, .in principle, to the entire universe, however distant in time and space. Therefore general epistemology is bound to take the scientific knowledge of nature as its point of departure. This is not to say, however, that knowledge of nature is some special kind of knowledge. Knowledge everywhere is one; the most general principles are always the same, even in the humanities. The only difference is that in the humanities these principles, although just as operative there, appear as applied to much more specific and complicated matters and hence are much more difficult to per ceive. Consider, for instance, how much easier it is to trace the workings of causality in a physical process than in an historical event. It is pretty much in this fashion that the relationship between philosophic thought and the thinking characteristic of the individual sciences presents itself. Clearly the philosopher is called upon to address his full energies to the knowledge of nature. Conversely, the natural scientist finds that his most important problems strongly impel hirn toward the theory of knowledge; for these problems are of such extreme generality that his science, in dealing with them, continually impinges on the domain of the purely philosophical. He must indeed step over into that realm; otherwise he will not be able to understand fully the meaning of his own activity. The truly great scientist is always at the same time a philosopher. This dose inter relationship of goals between epistemology and the natural sciences both permits and requires a dose external association as weIl. It would be good if this were more dearly evident in the academies and universities, where it is still the custom to counterpose the philo sophical and historical disciplines to the mathematical and scientific ones. Meanwhile, the interrelationship may find a modest expression in the way the present work is being published. Preface to the Second Edition XI For these reasons, I was delighted to accept the publisher's proposal that this book appear in aseries devoted to the "natural sciences". I have constandy sought the simplest possible mode of presen tation, one that builds slowly, so that the discussion can be under stood without a special knowledge of philosophy. In a few places, it was necessary to include a detailed criticism of particular philo sophical doctrines so that the author could characterize his own position more completely for the benefit of his colleagues. But these passages are easy to recognize, and they may be omitted without loss by the reader who is interested only in the general argument. The pages that follow have been entitled General Theory 01 Knowledge because the inquiry is directed wholly to ultimate prin ciples. If philosophical curiosity does not carry us to these most general principles, but comes to a halt, as it were, at the level before the last, then we shall find ourselves - if our point of departure has been natural science - in the province of the theory of natural knowledge, or the philosophy of science. Similarly, the road that leads flOm the science of history to general epistemology passes through the theory of historical knowledge, or the philosophy of history, that from mathematics through the philosophy of mathe matics, and so on. We shall not be able, in what follows, to tarry at the level of these special epistemologies, although admittedly the substantiation of our results may seem incomplete at some points. But it would be quite impossible, if only for practical reasons, to go into the voluminous special studies in these areas. Thus the definitive completion of our argument as a whole must await a treatment of the special problems. This I hope to present later. Preface to the Second Edition This book has been out of print for more than two and a half years. The author feels that he should account to the reader for such a long delay in the appearance of a new edition, the more so since there has been a lively demand for the book in the mean time. First of all, outside circumstances have kept the author occupied with tasks of an altogether different nature. But other factors, stem- XII Preface to the Second Edition ming from an awareness of certain deficiencies in the first edition, also have held back the start and progress of the revision. To over come these deficiencies fuHy would have required a major develop ment and expansion with regard to the logic of knowledge, and this would have meant reconstructing the entire work. So sweeping a change, however, could not be considered; for the book, thus transformed, would have lost its original character. It would no longer have been able to serve those needs the satisfaction of which has eamed for it the particular place it holds in the philosophical literature. For the book to continue to occupy this place, it was necessary to retain the general design; for it to fulfill its role better than before, it was necessary to revise many details. As a consequence, the revisions in the second edition had to be confined to corrections, smaH additions and deletions. And the important task of rounding out 10gicaHy the epistemological ideas developed in the book had to be put over to a later comprehensive exposition of the principles of logic. Convinced that correct ideas make their way best by virtue of the truth inherent in them, without their having to wage a long drawn out battle against error, I have eliminated aH non-essential polemical excursions. The development of my own position has been tied in with a critique of opposing views only where the latter form a natural point of departure for positive considerations. Accordingly, the critical comments on the basic ideas of Kant and his school have had to be retained in the new edition. Indeed, it was necessary even to enlarge the important chapter on the "Critique of the Idea of Immanence", for although this chapter, in particular, had received widespread favorable attention, it seemed to rqe to be in need of some not insignificant supplementation and improvement. I have devoted much care to reworking the chapters that deal with the psychophysical problem. It seems that the discussion of this topic, to which I attach a quite special systematic importance, has for the most part not been correctly understood. The experi ences I have had in lectures and conversations permit me to hope that by means of the new formulations I have succeeded in avoiding the shortcomings of the earlier account. Among other changes, I should like to mention the observations newly added as § 11, which make for a greater simplicity and com pactness in the basic systematic outlook. Also, the exposition in the final section of the book is given in a still briefer outline than in

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