Game Theory in Communication Networks: Cooperative Resolution of Interactive Networking Scenarios

150 Pages·2012·4.258 MB·English

by  Josephina Antoniou, Andreas Pitsillides

Electrical Engineering / Communications / Digital & Wireless Communications A Game Theory in
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A mathematical tool for scientists and researchers who work with computer n
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and communication networks, Game Theory in Communication Networks: u
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Cooperative Resolution of Interactive Networking Scenarios addresses P Communication
the question of how to promote cooperative behavior in interactive situations it
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between heterogeneous entities in communication networking scenarios. It ll
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explores network design and management from a theoretical perspective, using e
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game theory and graph theory to analyze strategic situations and demonstrate Networks
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profitable behaviors of the cooperative entities.
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The book promotes the use of game theory to address important resource
management and security issues found in next generation communications e

networks, particularly heterogeneous networks, for cases where cooperative T
Cooperative
interactive networking scenarios can be formulated. It provides solutions for h
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representative mechanisms that need improvement by presenting a theoretical
o Resolution of
step-by-step approach. The text begins with a presentation of theory that can be
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used to promote cooperation for the entities in a particular interactive situation. y
Interactive
Next, it examines two-player interaction as well as interactions between multiple i
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players. The final chapter presents and examines a performance evaluation
framework based on MATLAB®. C Networking
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Each chapter begins by introducing basic theory for dealing with a particular
interactive situation and illustrating how particular aspects of game theory can be m
used to formulate and solve interactive situations that appear in communication
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networks regularly. The second part of each chapter presents example scenarios n
that demonstrate the applicability and power of the theory—illustrating a number i
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of cooperative interactions and discussing how they could be addressed within a
the theoretical framework presented in the first part of the chapter. t
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The book also includes access to simulation code that can be downloaded, so n

you can use some or all of the proposed models to improve your own network N
designs. Specific topics covered include network selection, user-network e
interaction, network synthesis, and context-aware security provisioning. t
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K12143
Josephina Antoniou and Andreas Pitsillides
ISBN: 978-1-4398-4808-1
90000
www.crcpress.com
9 781439 848081
w w w. c r c p r e s s . c o m
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Game Theory in
Communication
Networks
Cooperative Resolution of
Interactive Networking Scenarios
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Systems Evaluation: Methods, Models,
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“Book” — 2012/7/11 — 9:10 —
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Game Theory in
Communication
Networks
Cooperative Resolution of
Interactive Networking Scenarios
Josephina Antoniou and Andreas Pitsillides
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CRC Press
Taylor & Francis Group
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Boca Raton, FL 33487-2742
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Contents
Preface vii
1 Introduction: Game theory as an analytical tool 1
1.1 Book structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
2 Cooperation for two: Prisoner’s Dilemma type of games 15
2.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
2.2 Prisoner’s Dilemma and similar two-player games . . . . . . . . 16
2.3 Focusing on Prisoner’s Dilemma . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
2.3.1 Motivating cooperation from repetition . . . . . . . . . 21
2.3.2 Present value . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
2.4 Threats and punishments: The user as an active participant in
the network . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
2.4.1 An illustrative scenario . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
2.4.2 Incentives, assumptions and requirements . . . . . . . . 26
2.4.3 No past or future consideration: One-shot user-network
interaction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
2.4.4 Consideringpastandfuture:Repeateduser-networkin-
teraction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
2.4.5 The user as an adaptive entity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
2.4.6 Evaluating the game . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
3 Cooperation for two: Dealing with different types of player
behavior 53
3.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
3.2 Cooperative behavior through bargaining . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
3.3 Bayesian type of games . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
3.3.1 An example of a Bayesian type of game . . . . . . . . . 56
3.4 When payoffs need to be partitioned: Player truthfulness. . . . 58
3.4.1 Scenario overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
3.4.2 Cooperative bargaining model. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
3.4.3 A Bayesian form of the payment-partition game . . . . 65
3.4.4 Evaluating the game . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
v
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vi Contents
4 Cooperationformany:SpatialPrisoner’sDilemmaandgames
in neighborhoods 77
4.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
4.2 Spatial version of the Prisoner’s Dilemma game . . . . . . . . . 78
4.3 Group strategies for the Prisoner’s Dilemma game . . . . . . . 79
4.4 Spatial games and group strategies: Reducing interference in
dense deployments of home wireless networks . . . . . . . . . . 83
4.4.1 Scenario overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
4.4.2 Wireless deployments in urban environments . . . . . . 85
4.4.3 Cooperative neighborhoods . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86
4.4.4 A protocol for cooperative neighborhoods . . . . . . . . 93
4.5 Conclusions on neighborhood games . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95
5 Cooperation for many: Payoffs to coalitions 97
5.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97
5.2 Games of coalitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98
5.3 The Voting Game. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99
5.4 Players’ power to affect decisions in a coalition game . . . . . . 102
5.5 The Coordination Game . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104
5.6 Cooperationbetweenmultiplenetworks:Coalitionstowardnet-
work synthesis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106
5.6.1 Scenario overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107
5.6.2 Network Synthesis Game . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107
5.6.3 A new power index . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111
5.6.4 Evaluating the game . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 117
5.7 Conclusions on coalitional games . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121
6 MATLAB implementation: Strategies for Iterated Prisoner’s
Dilemma type of games 123
6.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123
6.2 Initializing the execution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 124
6.3 Fixed iterations number . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 124
6.4 Randomized iteration number . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 126
6.5 Strategies and payoffs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 127
6.6 Collecting cumulative payoffs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 127
6.7 A single round of the game . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 129
6.8 Implementing strategies with non-cooperative nature . . . . . . 132
6.9 Implementing a simple modification of the Grim
Trigger strategy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 132
6.10 Implementing adaptive strategies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 134
Index 139
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Preface
Communication Networks is an area in which multiple interactive situations
arise among networking entities. Such interactive situations may be hard to
resolve satisfactorily because of the conflicting goals of the participating en-
tities. It is often the case that cooperation in such interactive situations may
be beneficial to all entities involved; however, cooperation is normally hard
to enforce, unless specific conditions can be applied. An example of such a
network is a converged communication network, a paradigm found in Fourth
Generation Telecommunication Networks, where heterogeneous access tech-
nologies may coexist. Among other features, this new network model enables
a user (or a set of users) to be served by any (one or many) of the multiple,
available access networks. These access networks carry differing characteris-
tics and capabilities encouraging the decoupling of carriage and content, i.e.,
the infrastucture operators and the service or content providers can be differ-
ent entities in this new system. As part of the same network, these entities
mayneedtocooperateinordertoservetheusersofthenetworkswhilemain-
tainingtheirowngoalsasself-managedentities.Forthisspecificnetwork,the
common thread that links all this heterogeneity is the support for a user-
centric paradigm of communication, converging all activities to the system’s
key function, i.e., to satisfy its customers. Cooperation in Fourth Generation
CommunicationNetworkscantakeadvantageofthesevaryingcharacteristics,
and exploit them in complementary manners in order to surpass any limits
imposed by any one of these networks on their own, through appropriate
network synergies.
Synergies, i.e., cooperation between participating entities in communica-
tion networks, promote the useful coexistence of the participating entities,
aiming at enhancing the overall network, since the support of demanding
services, as for example interactive and multiparty multimedia services, can
become a challenging task due to the heterogeneity of the entities involved,
the user(s), and the access network(s). This heterogeneity results in different
and often conflicting interests for these entities. Since cooperation between
theseentities,ifachieved,isexpectedtobebeneficial,weexploreexamplesof
interactive situations arising in such communication networks, and show how
cooperation is beneficial for the interacting entities, i.e., how the proposed
cooperative modes of behavior allow the interacting entities to achieve their
vii
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viii Preface
own satisfaction, despite their conflicting interests, and how this cooperation
can be encouraged.
In fact, there exist multiple interactive situations in communication net-
works among the entities participating in such networks where cooperation
of the entities might be a beneficial or even a necessary way to achieve cer-
tain goals of the participating entities. A rich theory behind cooperation,
often referred to as cooperation theory, may be used to analyze and resolve
such situations in a cooperative manner. Our aim in this book is to make
use of cooperation theory, focusing on game theoretic tools, and targeting
specific examples from communication networks to demonstrate how cooper-
ationthroughtheuseofsuchtheoreticaltoolscanprovebeneficialinresolving
situations of interaction.
Interactions between entities with conflicting interests follow action plans
designed, by each entity, in such a way as to achieve a particular selfish goal;
such interactions are known as strategic interactions. Strategic interactions
are studied by Game Theory, a field which develops models that prescribe
actions for entities interacting in a strategic manner, such that they achieve
satisfactorygainsfromthesituation.Totargetthequestionofhowtopromote
cooperativebehaviorininteractivesituationsbetweenheterogeneousentitiesin
communicationnetworkingscenarios,thebookutilizesgametheoreticalmodels
to analyze a set of illustrative strategic situations and demonstrates profitable
behaviors of the participating entities.
In the course of this book, it is shown how cooperation can be motivated
in each of the selected interactive situations and, furthermore, that such co-
operative behavior is beneficial for the interacting entities. Cooperation is
motivatedbycharacteristicsoftheselectedsituationssuchasrepeatabilityof
interaction, need for sharing between entities, and need for participation in
groups.
Our objective is not to offer a comprehensive book on cooperation theory,
where a rich bibliography already exists; instead we want to illustrate the
natureandpowerofthetheoryanditsapplicabilityandbenefitsininteractive
situations selected within the area of communication networks by targeting
specific examples of such interactive scenarios. The richness of the theory on
cooperation may be further explored by the interested reader who wants to
expand on specific scenarios of interest not covered in the book, by following
on the given bibliography, and beyond.
The structure of the book considers first the presentation of theory that
canbeusedtopromotecooperationfortheentitiesinaparticularinteractive
situation. Then, for each chapter, the first part introduces basic theory for
dealing with a particular interactive situation in an attempt to show how
particular aspects of game theory can be usefully employed to formulate and
solveinteractivesituationscommonlyappearinginthefieldofcommunication
networks, and the second part of each chapter presents example scenarios,
showing the applicability and power of the theory, from the scenario’s view,
inordertodemonstrateanumberofcooperativeinteractionsanddiscusshow
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Preface ix
these could be addressed within the theoretical framework presented in the
first part of the chapter. In particular, four specific situations are covered
in the book. Chapter 2 and chapter 3 deal with two-player interaction, while
thenexttwochaptersdealwithinteractionsbetweenmultipleplayers.Finally,
chapter6dealswithaperformanceevaluationframeworkbasedonMATLAB.
Beyond the great pioneers of game theory, who contributed to the general
theory of Games (with several Nobel prizes awarded for contributions in this
field), several colleagues contributed in realizing the scientific contents pre-
sented in this book (including the anonymous reviewers of several published
articles by the authors in this area), to whom the authors are very grateful
for their cooperation.
Primarily, the authors acknowledge Dr. Vicky Papadopoulou (European
University Cyprus) for her valuable guidance in the theoretical resolutions
presented in the book as well as for her beneficial revisions of a large part of
the book content.
Furthermore,theauthorswishtoacknowledgeDr.VasosVassiliouandDr.
Chris Christodoulou (University of Cyprus), who provided the motivation for
the idea of adaptivity as an enhancement to the game theoretical framework
presentedintheuser-networkinteractionscenarioanalyzedinChapter2.For
thesamechapter,Dr.LoizosMichael(OpenUniversityofCyprus)hasoffered
very useful comments and suggestions as well.
Moreover,thespecificsandunfoldingofthescenariopresentedinChapter
4 are largely contributed by Dr. Lavy Libman (University of Sydney), whom
the authors wish to thank for his valuable input.
Finally, the study of cooperation between multiple networks in Chapter 5
wouldnothavebeenpossiblewithoutthehelpandcooperationofProf.Ioannis
Stavrakakis, Dr. Ioannis Koukoutsidis and Dr. Eva Jaho, having contributed
extensively in the theoretical analysis of coalition formation possibilities.
SpecialthanksalsogotothestaffofCRCPress,especiallyRichO’Hanley
andStephanieMorkert,fortheirpatienceandprofessionalismfromtheincep-
tion of the book until its publication.
Lastbutnotleast,wewouldliketothankourfamiliesandfriendsfortheir
unwavering encouragement and support throughout writing this book.
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