Game Theory and Animal Behavior PDF
Preview Game Theory and Animal Behavior
Game Theory and Animal Behavior This page intentionally left blank GAME THEORY & ANIMAL BEHAVIOR Edited by LEE ALAN DUGATKIN and HUDSON KERN REEVE OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS New York Oxford Oxford University Press Oxford New York Athens Auckland Bangkok Bogota Bombay Buenos Aires Calcutta Cape Town Dar es Salaam Delhi Florence Hong Kong Istanbul Karachi Kuala Lumpur Madras Madrid Melbourne Mexico City Nairobi Paris Singapore Taipei Tokyo Toronto Warsaw and associated companies in Berlin Ibadan Copyright © 1998 by Oxford University Press, Inc. First published in 1998 by Oxford University Press, Inc. 198 Madison Avenue, New York, New York 10016 First issued as an Oxford University Press paperback, 2000 Oxford is a registered trademark of Oxford University Press All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise, without the prior permission of Oxford University Press. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Game theory and animal behavior / edited by Lee Alan Dugatkin and Hudson Kern Reeve. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 0-19-509692-4 ISBN 0-19-513790-6 (Pbk.) 1. Animal behavior—Mathematical models. 2. Game theory. I. Dugatkin, Lee Alan, 1962- . II. Reeve, Hudson Kern. QL751.65.M3G25 1997 591.5'015'193—dc21 96-29891 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 21 Printed in the United Slates of America on acid-free paper To Dana, (an, Alex, and Aaron. They are all too wonderful for words. This page intentionally left blank Preface It is always notoriously difficult to identify precisely what constitutes a revolutionary change within a scientific discipline (Kuhn 1962). In the fields of animal behavior (ethology) and behavioral ecology, the introduction of inclusive fitness models (Ham- ilton 1963, 1964) may qualify as such a change in that they reshaped the manner in which behavioral ecologists and ethologists think about nearly every question they address. The subject of this book, game theory, may rank second to inclusive fitness in terms of its effect on the way animal behaviorists currently approach issues sur- rounding the evolution of social behavior. However, evolutionary game theory's fun- damental principle—that actions taken by one individual have effects on the fitness of others and that all such effects must be accounted for when examining the evolu- tion of a trait—has had a large enough impact that phrases like "payoff matrix" and "evolutionarily stable strategies" are used by virtually all pundits of behavioral ecol- ogy and animal behavior and are among the first concepts taught in graduate classes. Furthermore, the idea of an evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) has surpassed the boundaries of ethology and behavioral ecology and can often be heard being uttered by the likes of political scientists, mathematicians, and psychologists. It is certainly rare for mathematical terminology created by behavioral ecologists to be adopted outside the field, and this stands as a testament to the influence of ethological game theory. Hardly an issue of such journals as Animal Behaviour, Behavioral Ecology, Be- havioral Ecology and Sociobiology (to name a few of the top journals in the field), or for that matter The Journal of Theoretical Biology is published in which at least one, and usually more, articles cite some reference to evolutionary game theory (most often Maynard Smith's 1982 book, Evolution and the Theory of Games). Yet, to date, there is no place where one can turn for a large-scale picture which not only reviews the impact of games on behavioral ecology and ethology, but suggests directions for future research. This volume (and the 1995 National Animal Behavior Society sympo- sium on "Game Theory and Animal Behavior" that it is loosely based on) is an attempt to remedy this problem by gathering some of the leading researchers in the field and having them review (and sometimes extend) work in their area in a manner viii Preface that is accessible to those interested in games and animal behavior, but not necessar- ily trained in the sometimes tedious mathematics of game theory. This book is in- tended for all advanced undergraduates, graduate students, and professional biologists interested in the evolutionary analysis of animal behavior. A basic mathematical back- ground in algebra (and some elementary calculus) will be sufficient to allow access to even the most complex models discussed in this volume. However, even in the absence of such training, the vast majority of material will be accessible to the inter- ested reader. After an opening chapter that provides a lucid attempt to answer the question "What is evolutionary game theory?" (Hammerstein), the following topics are re- viewed: the impact of game theory and ESS thinking on the study of social foraging (Giraldeau and Livoreil), cooperation (Dugatkin), animal contests (Riechert), commu- nication (Johnstone), reproductive skew and nepotism within groups (Reeve), sibling rivalry and parent-offspring conflict (Mock et al.), alternative life histories (Gross and Repka), habitat selection (Brown), trophic-level interactions (Sih), learning (Ste- phens and Clements), and human behavior (Wilson). Gomulkiewicz then reviews the relations among game theory, optimality, and quantitative genetics. In a final chapter, we briefly assess the utility of game-theoretic reasoning in the study of social behav- ior (Reeve and Dugatkin). We believe that evolutionary game theory is one of the most powerful analytical tools available to behavioral ecologists and ethologists today and sincerely hope that this volume opens the door to those readers who were tantalized by game theory, but until reading this book believed it to be the domain solely of theoreticians. References Hamilton, W. D. 1963. The evolution of altruistic behavior. Am. Nat., 97, 354-356. Hamilton, W. D. 1964. The genetical evolution of social behaviour. I and II. J. Theor. Biol, 7, 1-52. Kuhn, T. 1962. The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Maynard Smith, J. 1982. Evolution and the Theory of Games. Cambridge: Cambridge Univer- sity Press. Spring 1997 L. A. Dugatkin University of Louisville H. K. Reeve Cornell University Acknowledgments First and foremost, we would like to thank the contributors to this volume for provid- ing outstanding chapters in a timely fashion. We had very high expectations for this book; and thanks to their talents and effort, even our expectations were surpassed. In addition to our own comments and suggestions, each chapter in this volume was reviewed by at least two external referees. Reviewing for an edited book is thankless work, and we are indeed indebted to the following individuals for their efforts on this front: Robert Boyd, Phil Crowley, Larry Dill, Jim Gilliam, Peter Ham- merstein, David Haskell, Geoff Hill, Don Hugie, Laurent Keller, Steve Lima, Jeff Lucas, Peter Nonacs, David Pfennig, David Queller, Peter Richerson, Jan Shellman- Reeve, David Stephens, and George Uetz. We thank Dana Dugatkin for proofreading and indexing this entire book. Dana now knows more about behavioral ecology and game theory than any sane person outside the field should. Finally, we are indebted to Kirk Jensen at Oxford University Press for all his time, effort, and encouragement. We are honored to have this volume published by the oldest and most respected academic press in the world.
Description:The list of books you might like
