Gambling with Truth: An Essay on Induction and the Aims of Science PDF
Preview Gambling with Truth: An Essay on Induction and the Aims of Science
BORZOI BOOKS in the Philosophy of Science ----~-·-- GENERAL EDITOR Sidney Mo rgenbesser COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY Isaac Levi GAMBLING WITH TRUTH An Essay on Induction and the Aims of Science Israel Scheffl,er THE ANATOMY OF INQUIRY Philosophical Studies in the Theory of Science Adolf Grilnbaum PHILOSOPHICAL PROBLEMS OF SPACE AND TIME FORTHCOMING Sidney Morgenbesser DETERMINISM AND HUMAN BEHAVIOR A Study of Social Scientific Theory Michael Scriven THE THEORY OF EXPLANATION : Patrick Suppes A SET-THEORETICAL PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE Hilary Putnam PHILOSOPHY OF PHYSICS AND MATHEMATICS ,,J GAMBLING with TRUTH An Essay on Induction and the Aims of Science GAMBLING with TRUTH An Essay on Induction and the Aims of Science ISAAC LEVI Wes tern Reserve University-Case Program ofP hilosophical Studies New York ~~ ALFRED A. KNOPF London ROUTLEDGE & KEGAN PAUL, LTD. First published in England by ROUTLEDGE & KEGAN PAUL LTD. Broadway House, 68-74 Carter Lane London E.C. 4 ---·~-·-·- - © Copyright, 1967, by Isaac Levi All rights reserved FIRST PRINTING Manufactured in the United States of America to SIDNEY MORGENBESSER PREFACE Scientific inquiry, like other forms of human deliberation, is goal directed activity. Consequently, an adequate conception of the goal or goals of scientific inquiry ought to shed light on the dif ference between valid and invalid inference; for valid inferences are good strategies designed to attain these objectives. However, knowing what one wants does not determine the best way to obtain it. Other items of information are required. What these items are is controlled in large measure by appropri ate criteria for rational deliberation. To be told, for example, that science looks for true, informative, and simple answers to ques tions is of little help to an understanding of legitimate inference if an account of how legitimate inferences aid in obtaining such answers is lacking. Contemporary work in decision theory provides one source from which the required account of rational decision-making might be fashioned. Unfortunately, those philosophers, statisti cians, and decision theorists who have appreciated the relevance of decision theory to induction have tended to use decision theory to foster a distorted conception of science. Some writers seem to hold that science has no aims of its own different from the moral, political, economic, or prudential objectives of other types of deliberation. Others are inclined to reduce the role of the scien tist to that of a statistician who organizes and analyses data in a manner helpful to the policy-maker without actually making policy recommendations. Both of these views are rejected in this book. Scientists are not mere guidance counselors. Nor are the aims which they attempt to realize always practical ones. But insistence on the distinctive "cognitive" character of the objectives of science is compatible Preface viii] . th . that the criteria for rational decision-making ap- 1 w1th e c alDl . l" ti' l . bl h the goals are "prachca are opera ve a so when lica e w ere P . t' are ''cognitive" In an attenuated but, nonetheless the ob 1ec ives . k ' • nse scientists do gamble. But the sta es are truth interesting se , . ' information, simplicity, explanatory power, and the hke. Conse- an analysis of the character of these stakes together with quen tl y, . . a theory of rational gambling ought t~ lead to 1nterestmg con- clusions about inductive inference. This book attempts to show that this is so. The dedication to Sidney Morgenbesser is but a small indi- cation of the profound debt I owe him. His encouragement and criticism, his readiness to share his ideas with me, and, above all, his friendship, have contributed to the development of the views presented here in a way that no number of scholarly footnotes could document. I have internalized so many of his suggestions and so much of his address to philosophical questions that it is often difficult for me to tell where his insight leaves off and my gloss begins. To have been a student of Ernest Nagel's has always been for me a source of pride and good fortune. He first awakened in me an interest in probability and induction and his constructive sug gestions and encourag~ment have been invaluable in writing this book. Chapters VIII and IX present a reconstruction of G. L. S. Shackle's theory of potential surprise. I hope that I can partially repay my considerable debt to Professor Shackle by introducing some of his original and profound ideas to students of philosophy. I owe the term "epistemic utility" to Carl Hempel. The account of ~pistemic utility offered here is largely the product of inter a~tion between his published discussions and my own earlier VIews on the subject. Henry Kyburg prompted me to worry about deductive closure. I have found close study of his work extremely helpful in writing this book. I regret that the recent important contributions of Ian Hacking, Jaakk 0 Hm' t ikk a, an d Ri·c hard Jeffrey came to my attention too Preface [ ix late for me to include a serious discussion of their work in this volume. Henry Kyburg, Sidney Morgenbesser, Ernest Nagel, Robert Nozick, Frederic Schick, and G. L. S. Shackle have all seen earlier drafts of this book. I am most grateful for their comments. Of course, no one but myself is to blame for its deficiencies. Some portions of Chapter I are reprinted from The Monist, Vol. 48, No. 2 ( 1964) by permission of the Open Court Publish ing Co., LaSalle, Illinois. The first two pages of "Corroboration and Rules of Acceptance" which appeared in the British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, Vol. 13, No. 52 ( 1963) are re printed by permission of the editors at the beginning of Chap ter VII. The National Science Foundation awarded me two summer grants which provided me with the leisure to write this book. My wife Judith and our boys, Jonathan and David, have sur rounded me with the love, warmth, and moral support without which the leisure time would have been useless. To them I owe the greatest debt of all. I. L.
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