G. Abel/J. Conant (eds.)

44 Pages·2011·0.58 MB·English

by  Thomas Land

Thomas Land

KANTIAN CONCEPTUALISM

forthcoming in: G. Abel/J. Conant (eds.), Berlin Studies in Knowledge Research, vol. 1:
Rethinking Epistemology, Berlin/New York: de Gruyter.

Abstract: In the recent debate between conceptualists and nonconceptualists about
perceptual content, Kant’s notion of intuition has been invoked on both sides.
Conceptualists claim Kant as a forerunner of their position, arguing that Kantian
intuitions have the same kind of content as conceptual thought. On the other hand,
nonconceptualists claim Kant as a forerunner of their own position, contending that
Kantian intuitions have a distinctly nonconceptual kind of content. In this paper, I argue
first, that both sides are wrong about Kant, secondly, that neither side can properly
account for the epistemic function of intuition, and thirdly, that Kant’s own notion of
intuition contains the resources for a third alternative. The epistemic function of an
intuition for Kant is to furnish the sensory representation of an object of cognition.
Conceptualism cannot account for this function because it construes perception as a
species of thought. As a proper appreciation of Kant’s reasons for insisting upon the
heterogeneity of thought and perception puts one in a position to see, any view that does
this will fail to do justice to the distinctly sensory nature of intuition. Nonconceptualism,
on the other hand, cannot account for the epistemic function of intuition because it views
intuition as self-standing, and thus as completely independent from thought. As a
consequence, nonconceptualism is not entitled to claim that an intuition is itself a
cognitive state. I show that Kant’s actual view avoids both these extremes because it
involves a different way of conceiving how perception is informed by conceptual
thought. Building on this conception, Kant is able to preserve the distinctly sensory
nature of intuition, while also securing proper cognitive standing for it. As a result,
Kant’s notion of intuition provides the resources for an alternative account of how
thought relates to the senses – one that avoids the shortcomings of the positions staked
out in the contemporary debate.
1
2
3
Kantian Conceptualism
4
5
Thomas Land
6
7
8 Whetherornotperceptualcontentisconceptual,andwhatitmeansto
9 saythatitis,havebeenmuch-debatedquestionsinrecentphilosophyof
10 perception. A striking fact about this debate is that Kant has been in-
11 vokedontwoopposingsidesofit.Thus,someadvocatesofconceptu-
12 alism – the view that the content of a perceptual experience has the
13 structure of a proposition and must therefore involve the application
14 ofconcepts–havetracedtheirpositionbacktoKant’stheoryofintu-
15 ition.1Atthesametime,someproponentsofnonconceptualism–the
16 view that the content of perception is not propositional in structure
17 and does not involve the application of concepts – have argued that,
18 on the contrary, Kant’s theory of intuition is a forerunner of their
19 ownposition.2
20 Anaturalreactiontothisistothinkthatatleastonesideofthede-
21 bateismistakenaboutKantandthatcarefulexaminationofKant’stexts
22 willshowthis.Inthispaper,Iwanttocombineanexegeticalinquiryof
23 thissortwithanassessmentofthephilosophicalmeritsofthepositions
24
staked out in this debate. This project is motivated by the following
25
consideration:Assumingthatneithersidehasbeenrecklessinclaiming
26
that it incorporates a central insight of Kant’s theory of intuition, the
27
veryfactthatthistheorycanbeinvokedwithsomejustificationtosup-
28
portboththeseopposingpositionsshoulditselfbeacauseforphilosoph-
29
icalreflectionandleadustoaskwhatitisaboutthistheorythatmakes
30
31
1 ThemostprominentadvocateofthispositionhasbeenJohnMcDowell.See
32
McDowell(1996),aswellasthefirstthreeessaysinMcDowell(2009).
33 2 AprominentadvocateofthispositionisRobertHannawhowantstodefenda
34 “Kantiantheoryofthesemanticstructureandpsychologicalfunctionofnon-
35 conceptualcontent”(Hanna(2008),42)andwhoclaimsthatKantdidinfact
36 holdatheoryofthiskind:“[…]Kantismostaccuratelyregarded[…]asthe
founderofnon-conceptualism”(Hanna(2008),45);seealsoHanna(2005).–
37
Whatitisforthecontentofamentalstatetobenonconceptual(or,forthat
38 matter, conceptual) is itself a question on which there are various different
39 views; see Speaks (2005) for discussion. For the purposes of this paper, the
40 glossgiveninthetextwillbesufficient.
198 ThomasLand
1 such a situation possible. It is reasonable to expect that Kant’s theory
2 combines elements which bear some affinity to those that figure in
3 thecontemporarydebate.Eachside,wemaysuppose,emphasizesone
4 such element at the expense of the other. If this is right, it suggests
5 that a proper understanding of Kant’s theory might be able to show
6 howitispossiblethatthistheorycansomuchasseemtocombineel-
7 ementswhosecounterpartsinthecontemporarydebateappeartobein-
8 compatible.Andthis,inturn,shouldleadustoaskwhetherKant’sown
9 view,whenproperlyinterpreted,mightnotitselfyieldathirdalterna-
10 tive – a position that cuts a middle path between conceptualism and
11 nonconceptualism,revealingawayofintegratingcommitmentsthatat
12 firstblushappeartoexcludeoneanother,yet,whenproperlythought
13 through,canbeshowntobeinfactcompatible.
14 IshallarguethatKant’stheoryofintuitiondoesinfactcutsucha
15 middlepathbecauseitcombinesbothaconceptualistandanonconcep-
16 tualist element. As a consequence, a proper appreciation of its merits
17 willputusinapositiontoseethatthereisagenuineinsightonthecon-
18 ceptualistside,yetthereisalsoakerneloftruthinthenonconceptualist
19
position. The assumption that the forced alternative with which we
20
seemtobefaced(ofhavingtochoosebetweenconceptualismandnon-
21
conceptualismaboutperception)mustberejected.Itisbasedonanin-
22
accuraterepresentationoftheavailableoptions.Rather,athirdoptionis
23
available – one which combines the advantages of both positions, but
24
avoids their shortcomings. I shall be concerned to show that Kant’s
25
theoryofintuitionpointsthewaytowardsthisthirdoption.
26
Iproceedasfollows.IbeginbyarguingthatKant’sinterestinthe
27
structure of perceptual content is motivated by a different question
28
thanthecontemporarydebate(§1)andexplainwhatmakesthisquestion
29
urgentforKant(§§2and3).Ithenconsidertheanswerthatthosenon-
30
conceptualistswhoexplicitlydrawonKant–theKantianNonconcep-
31
tualists,asIcallthem–arecommittedtoascribingtohimandshowthat
32
thisanswerfails(§4).Next,Iturntoaversionofcontemporaryconcep-
33
tualismthatIcallPropositionalismandthatlikewisetakesitselftooffer
34
35 anupdatedversionofKant’stheoryofintuition.IarguethatProposi-
36 tionalismrunsintoequallyseriousproblems(§§5and6).Afterpausing
37 toreflectonwhatthefailureofPropositionalismshowsusaboutthena-
38 tureoftheproblemwithwhichKantisconcerned(§7),Igoontoout-
39 linemyownreadingofKantandshowhowhispositioncontainsthe
40 materials for a third alternative, which I call Kantian Conceptualism
KantianConceptualism 199
1 and which avoids the problems of Kantian Nonconceptualism and
2 Propositionalismrespectively(§8).
3
4
5 1. The Content Problem and the Question
6 of Objective Purport
7
8 MygoalinthispaperistoarguethatKantcanbeunderstoodasartic-
9 ulatingakindofconceptualismthatisinimportantwaysdifferentfrom
10 theconceptualistpositionthatfiguresinthecontemporarydebateabout
11 perceptualcontent.Kant’sbrandofconceptualismmakesitpossibleto
12 beaconceptualistwhilealsoappropriatingsomeoftheinsightsthatmo-
13 tivate contemporary nonconceptualism. This alternative construal of
14 conceptualism becomes available because Kant’s overriding concern
15 with regard to perception is distinct from the concern that is often
16 takentobeatthecenterofthecontemporarydebate.
17 ThecontemporarydebatecentersonwhatIcalltheContentProblem,
18 whileKant’soverridingconcerniswithwhatIcalltheQuestionofOb-
19 jectivePurport.3TheContentProblemconcernsthesimilaritiesanddis-
20 similaritiesinstructurebetweenthecontentofconceptualthought,on
21 theonehand,andthatofperceptualexperience,ontheother.4Bycon-
22 trast,theQuestionofObjectivePurportseekstoidentifytheconditions
23 thatmustbesatisfiedforperceptualexperiencetohaveacontentinthe
24 firstplace.
25
TwoconsiderationsservetoillustratethekindsofissuesIamgroup-
26
inghereundertheheadingoftheContentProblem.Oneofthesecon-
27
cernstherelativedeterminacyofperceptionandconceptualthoughtre-
28
spectively;theotherconcernsclassificatoryawareness.Thefirstservesas
29
thepointofdepartureforalineofargumentthathasledsomephilos-
30
opherstoadoptanonconceptualistviewofperceptualcontent.Thesec-
31
32
3 Thisclaimaboutthecontemporarydebateneedsqualification.McDowell,the
33 primaryadvocateofconceptualism,has,Ithink,fromthestartbeenconcerned
34 withtheQuestionofObjectivePurportaswell.Butsincehisworkhasbeen
35 read as being primarily addressed to the Content Problem, it is fair to say
36 thatthisiswherethefocusofthedebatehasbeen.SeeBoyle(2012)forhelpful
discussion.
37
4 Itshouldbenotedthatithasbeendisputedwhetherperceptualexperienceso
38 muchashasacontent;see,forinstance,Brewer(2006).Iwillnotaddressthis
39 questioninthispaper,butsimplyfollowthephilosopherswhoseviewsIam
40 discussinginassumingthatperceptualexperiencedoeshavecontent.
200 ThomasLand
1 ondhasledotherphilosopherstoconcludethatsomeformofconcep-
2 tualismmustbetrue.Letusconsidereachoftheseinturn.
3 Thefirstconsiderationbeginswiththeobservationthatperception
4 appears to be more determinate than conceptual thought in a sense
5 brought out by the following example: When I perceive something
6 as red, I do not perceive it as merely having some shade of red or
7 other,butashavingaparticularshadeofred.Amongthecolor-concepts
8 Ihave,thereareanumberofconceptsofdifferentshadesofred–such
9 as‘crimson,’‘maroon,’‘scarlet’,‘vermillion’–butreflectionshowsthat
10 eachofthesecanbefurtherdifferentiated.Eachoftheseconceptsofa
11 shade of red itself covers a whole range of more determinate shades.
12 ThismeansthatevenifIintroduceaconceptofashadeofred(forin-
13 stance,theconcept‘crimson’),thisconceptwillstillnotsufficetosingle
14 outtheparticularshadeofredthatIamperceivinghicetnunc.Thiscon-
15 cept,inasmuchasitistheconceptofa(furtherdeterminable)shade,will
16 stillnotbeabletoisolatethe(fullydeterminate)shadeofredIseehere
17 andnowfromanindefinitenumberofsimilaryetdistinctshades.Con-
18 cepts are, as this is often put, too coarse-grained to capture the fine-
19 grained content of our perceptual experience.5 From this one might
20
concludethat,sincethecontentofanycolorexperienceinvolvesasin-
21
glefullydeterminateshade,thatcontentcannotbeconceptualinnature.
22
Considerations of this sort lead some philosophers to attribute to per-
23
ceptionadistinctlynonconceptualkindofcontent.6
24
On the other hand, perception seems to involve sortal awareness;
25
for instance, awareness of things as red. And this might lead one to
26
think that perception involves classification and, therefore, concepts.
27
Thus, to perceive something as red involves (so the argument goes)
28
anapplicationoftheconcept‘__isred’.Itmayinvolveotherthingsbe-
29
sidesthis,butifmyperceptionisaperceptionofsomethingasred,then
30
theconcept‘__isred’ispartofitscontent.Considerationssuchasthis
31
32
33 5 See,forinstance,Peacocke(1998).TheformulationseemstogobacktoEvans
34 (1982),229.
35 6 Althoughthisconsiderationisanimportantmotivationfornonconceptualism,
36 itisnottheonlyonethatfiguresinthedebate.Argumentsinfavorofnoncon-
ceptualismaboutperceptionalsoappealto,amongotherthings,thedistinctive
37
situation-dependenceofperception;theabilityofperceptiontoprovideinfor-
38 mationtomemoryinadistinctiveway;andthefactthatperceptionissome-
39 thingthathumanssharewithanimals.Foranoverview,seeSpeaks(2005)as
40 wellastheessayscollectedinGunther(2003).
KantianConceptualism 201
1 motivateconceptualiststoattributetoperceptionacontentthatisofthe
2 samesortasthecontentofpropositionally-structuredthought.
3 Aconcernwithissuesofthissort–thedeterminacyofperceptual
4 experience as well as its classificatory character – lies at the heart of
5 whatIcalltheContentProblem.AsIsaid,thecontemporarydebatebe-
6 tweenconceptualistsandnonconceptualistsinthephilosophyofpercep-
7 tionistoalargeextentfocusedonthisproblem.Bycontrast,Kant’sdis-
8 cussionofperceptionintheFirstCritiqueisprimarilymotivatedbyadif-
9 ferentkindofproblem,whatIcalltheQuestionofObjectivePurport.
10 TheQuestionofObjectivePurportconcernstheconditionsthatmust
11 be satisfied for perception to be about objects – or, as we might also
12 say,tohaverepresentationalcontent–inthefirstplace.Thisquestion
13 asks for a specification of what must be the case for perception to
14 haveanyrepresentationalcontentatall,whetheritisconceptualornon-
15 conceptualinnature.Inadifferentidiom,thisisthefamiliarquestionof
16 intentionalityor“aboutness,”appliedtothespecificcaseofperception.
17 Inastraightforwardsense,theQuestionofObjectivePurportislog-
18 icallypriortotheContentProblem.Forthelattercanonlyariseifitis
19 presupposedthattheformercanbeanswered.Toargueaboutthenature
20 of perceptual content is to presuppose that perception has a content.
21 TheQuestionofObjectivePurportconcernstheconditionsthatmust
22 beinplaceforthistobethecase.Putdifferently,forperceptiontoso
23 much as have a content (about whose nature one might then argue),
24 we must ascribe to perception whatever characteristics are necessary
25 toitsbeingacontentfulstate.Inseekingtoidentifythesecharacteristics,
26 theQuestionofObjectivePurportisthusconcernedwithwhatmustbe
27 thecasefortheContentProblemtoariseinthefirstplace.
28 SincetheQuestionofObjectivePurportisinthissensepriortothe
29 ContentProblem,considerationoftheformermayhaveconsequences
30 forhowwemustapproachthelatter.Thus,itmayturnoutthatascrib-
31 ingobjectivepurporttoperceptualexperienceforcesustoconceiveof
32 itscontentinaparticularway.Inotherwords,ouranswertotheQues-
33 tion of Objective Purport may already constrain the range of options
34 available for addressing the Content Problem. I shall argue that this is
35 indeed so. More precisely, I shall argue that a full appreciation of the
36 QuestionofObjectivePurportwillforceustorecognizeanewsense
37 of‘conceptualcontent,’onethatisdifferentfromthesensecommonly
38 attached to this phrase in the contemporary debate. Specifically, the
39 claimisthatweareentitledtoattributeobjectivepurporttoperceptual
40 experience onlyif weascribe to ita contentthat isconceptual inthis
202 ThomasLand
1 newsense.Recognizingthiswillallowustoseethattheprevailingal-
2 ternative between conceptualism and nonconceptualism does not ex-
3 haust the space of available options for solving the Content Problem.
4
5
6 2. The Heterogeneity of Thought and Perception
7
8 Kant notes that there are certain fundamental differences between
9 thinkingandperceiving.Wecanbringtheseoutbycontrastingthought
10 andperceptionwithregardtothreedifferentaspects.
11 Thought is essentially conceptual;it is what Kant calls discursive.7
12 Thismeansthat(1)conceptsaregeneral(asopposedtosingular)repre-
13 sentations;(2)conceptsareclassificatory:employingaconceptinthought
14 (orasKantwillsay,injudgment)involvessortingthings–thatis,itin-
15 volves thinking of something as being an instance of a general kind,
16 which can, in principle, have other instances; (3) conceptual thought
17 is logically articulated, where this means that it has a kind of structure
18 thatenablesathoughttofigureininferences.8
19 Bycontrast,perception(whatKantcallsintuition)accordingtohim
20 hasthefollowingthreefeatures:(1)Perceptionissingular:itisofindi-
21 vidualobjects,ratherthanofgeneralkinds.9(2)Perceptionisfullydeter-
22 minate:itpresentsobjectstouswhosepropertiesaredeterminate,rather
23
thandeterminable,inthesensebroughtoutabovebytheexampleabout
24
color. (3) Perception is spatio-temporally structured: the objects we per-
25
ceivehavealocationinspaceandtime.
26
To register these three fundamental (and interrelated) differences
27
between thinking and perceiving, I will speak of their heterogeneity.
28
Thoughts and perceptions, or, in Kant’s terms, judgments and intu-
29
itions, are heterogeneous to one another. Kant aims to do justice to
30
their heterogeneity by attributing them to different capacities of the
31
mind,whichhecallsunderstandingandsensibilityrespectively.Theun-
32
33
34 7 SeeKant(1998),A68/B93.Henceforth,allreferencestoKant(1998)willgive
35 onlythepaginationofthefirst(A)andsecond(B)editions.Ihavetacitlymodi-
36 fiedGuyer/Wood’stranslationwhereappropriate.
8 SeeKant(1998),A320/B376f,aswellasKant(1992),§1.
37
9 Anappreciationofthispointiscompatiblewiththeclaim,whichiswidely
38 held,thatperceptioninvolvesclassificatoryawareness,henceconcepts.Ascon-
39 ceptualistswillagree,acknowledgingthesingularityofperceptioninnoway
40 decidestheissueinfavorofnonconceptualism.
KantianConceptualism 203
1 derstandingisthecapacityforthought.Sensibilityisthecapacityforin-
2 tuition.10
3
4 3. Intuitions Have Objective Unity
5
6
ConceptualistsandNonconceptualistsaboutperception–atleastthose
7
whoregardthemselvesasKantian–agreethatperceptionisnotmerely
8
amatterofhavingsense-impressions.Perceptionpurportstobeofob-
9
jects.Ifbyanimpressionwemeansomethingmomentaryandperspec-
10
tival,theagreeduponclaimisthatperceptualrepresentationsofobjects
11
cannotbejustamatterofthemomentaryandperspectivalaffectionsof
12
sensoryconsciousnessthatareaffordedbyimpressions.Rather,theidea
13
ofanobjectistheideaofsomethingthatessentiallyoutstripssuchper-
14
spectivalrepresentations.Anobjectissomethingthat,forinstance,can
15
be perceived from a variety of different spatial and temporal vantage
16
points, which are, moreover, systematically related to one another.
17
We can express this point by saying that an object exhibits a certain
18
kindofspatio-temporal unity.Ifperceptionistobeofobjects,sothe
19
Kantian thought runs, it must contain a consciousness of this unity.
20
Thatis,itmustinsome(perhapsimplicit)waybepartofthecontent
21
ofperceptionthatwhatitrepresentsareenduringthree-dimensionalob-
22
jects.Forinstance,whenIseeatomatoinfrontofme,thereisasensein
23
whichmysensoryimpressionisconfinedtothesideofthetomatothat
24
isfacingme.IfwhatIperceiveisindeedatomato,however,thecontent
25
ofmyperceptionisnotjustasurface.Itisasolid,three-dimensionalob-
26
ject,which(inthenormalcourseofthings)existedpriortomyperceiv-
27
ingitandwillcontinuetoexistafterwards.Andthisis,atleastimplicitly,
28
part of my perceptual consciousness. In perceiving the tomato, we
29
mightsay,Iamawareofperceivingathree-dimensionalobjectwitha
30 temporalhistory.Idonottakemyselftobeperceivingameresurface.11
31
32
10 Seee.g.Kant(1998),A19/B33andA50f/B74f.ItisworthnotingthatKant
33 takesittobeamonghisdeepestinsightstohaveproperlyappreciatedthehet-
34 erogeneityofperceptionandthought,asisindicatedbyhisquipthatLeibniz’s
35 chiefmistakewasto“intellectualize”thesenses,whileLocke’smistakewasto
36 “sensualize”conceptualthought.Cf.Kant(1998),A271/B327.
11 WemightputthepointbysayingthatIperceivethetomatoinvirtueofhav-
37
ing,amongotherthings,impressionsofitsfacingsurface.Toexplainhowthisis
38 possible,thatis,howtheperceptionof,forinstance,afacingsurfaceenablesthe
39 perceptionoftheobjectwhosesurfaceitis,ranksamongthecentraltasksofthe
40 philosophyofperception.
204 ThomasLand
1 WhenKantcharacterizesanintuitionasthesingularrepresentationofan
2 objectanddistinguishesintuitionsfrommeresensations,thispoint,suit-
3 ablyelaborated,iswhathehasinmind.12
4 Wecancapturethecentralpointherebysayingthatintuitionschar-
5 acteristicallyexhibitacertainkindofunity.Letuscallthistheobjective
6 unityofintuitions.Thistermismeanttocapturethefactthatintuitions
7 musthavethekindofunity,whateveritis,whichenablesthemtobe
8 perceptualrepresentationsofobjects.Thethoughtthenisthattheob-
9 jectiveunityofanintuitionisnotsimplyafunctionoftheimpressions
10 themindreceives.Theremustbeanotherelement,overandabovethe
11 impressions.Andbecauseimpressionsarewhatresultsfromthemind’s
12 being affected, this other element cannot in turn be a product of the
13 mind’sbeingaffected.Itmusthaveadifferentsource.
14 Forthe purposes of orienting ourselves in thediscussion that isto
15 follow, it will be helpful to have a concise overview of these Kantian
16 commitments.Thiswillenableustorevisitthesecommitmentsatcru-
17 cialjuncturesofthispaperandassesshowourunderstandingofthemhas
18 evolved.LetussummarizeKant’sviewofperception,totheextentthat
19 it has come into view so far, by means of the following three theses:
20 (1) TheSensibilityThesis:Intuitionsaretherepresentationsofsensi-
21 bility.
22 (2) TheObjectiveUnityThesis:Intuitionshaveobjectiveunity.
23 (3) TheAnti-EmpiricistThesis:Objectiveunityisnotgiven.
24
The Sensibility Thesis registers the fact that the ability to enjoy intu-
25
itions–thatis,perceptions–requiresasensiblecapacity.Asensibleca-
26
pacityisacapacitytohaverepresentationsofanobjectinvirtueofhav-
27
ingone’ssensesaffectedbyit.ItisthuswhatKantcallsareceptiveca-
28 pacity.13Sayingthatasensiblecapacityisrequiredimpliesthattheca-
29
pacityforintuitionsisspecificallydistinctfromthecapacityforthought
30
and judgment, which Kant characterizes as intellectual and thereby as
31 non-sensible.14 Second, the Objective Unity Thesis expresses the
32
point that intuitions, as perceptions of objects, are distinct from mere
33
impressions in that they exhibit a kind of unity that mere impressions
34
do not have. Finally, the third thesis makes the point that this unity,
35
which accounts for the objective purport of intuitions, does not itself
36
37
12 ForKant’sinsistencethatintuitionsaredistinctfrommeresensations,seeKant
38 (1998),A320/B376f.
39 13 Cf.Kant(1998),A19/B33andA50f/B74f.
40 14 Cf.ibid.
KantianConceptualism 205
1 resultfromaffectionsofthesenses.Insomeyettobedeterminedsense,
2 ithasitssourceintheminditself,“prior”tothesenses’beingaffected.I
3 callittheAnti-EmpiricistThesissimplytoregisterthatitsetsKant’spo-
4 sitionapartfromatraditionalEmpiricismthatseekstoaccountforper-
5 ceptionwhollybyreferencetotheaffectionsofsensibility.
6 Theobviousquestionthatmustbeansweredbyanytheoryofper-
7 ceptionthatiscommittedtothesethreethesesisthis:whatisthesource
8 oftheobjectiveunitythatintuitionsexhibit?Thisisacceptedonboth
9 sidesofthedebatebetweenthosecontemporaryconceptualistsandnon-
10 conceptualistswhoseektotracetheirpositionsbacktoKant.Disagree-
11 mentarisesoverwhat thecorrectanswertothisquestionis.Anditis
12 preciselyonthispointthat,asIshallargue,thesetwogroupsofcontem-
13 poraryKantiansarenotonlyequallymistakenaboutKant,butalsoeach
14 facetheirownphilosophicalproblems.Inthefollowing,Ishallconsider
15 in turn these attempts to inherit Kant and identify the problems that
16 eachofthemraises.
17
18
19 4. Kantian Nonconceptualism
20
21 Adistinctivefeature ofKant’spositionistheviewthatsensibility,the
22 capacity for intuition, has a pure form, which is constituted by what
23 Kant calls the pure intuitions of space and time.15 This view contains
24
a claim about the metaphysical nature of space and time, but I shall
25
notbeconcernedwiththataspectofit.Rather,Iwillfocusontheac-
26
countofourperceptualcapacitiesthatisimplicitinit.
27
Itsufficesforourpresentpurposestoemphasizethefollowingthree
28
characteristicsofKant’sposition:First,byspeakingofaformofsensi-
29
bility,Kanthasinmindcertainfeaturesthatareconstitutiveofallexer-
30
cisesofthiscapacity.Thatis,heistalkingaboutfeaturesthatarechar-
31
acteristic of intuitions as such:all possible intuitions exhibit these fea-
32
tures.Second,tosaythatthisformofsensibilityispure,orapriori,is
33
tosaythatitdoesnotderivefromexperienceandisthusindependent
34
of any particular perceptions.16 It is, therefore, something that does
35
36
15 ThisviewisfamouslyelaboratedinthepartoftheFirstCritiquecalledtheTran-
37
scendentalAesthetic.
38 16 Kantdoesnotusetheterms‘pure’and‘apriori’synonymously,butforourpur-
39 poseswecanabstractfromtheirdifference.SeeKant(1998),B2f.forastate-
40 mentofthisdifference.