From Aristotle to Cognitive Neuroscience PDF
Preview From Aristotle to Cognitive Neuroscience
FROM ARISTOTLE TO COGNITIVE NEUROSCIENCE Grant Gillett From Aristotle to Cognitive Neuroscience Grant Gillett From Aristotle to Cognitive Neuroscience Grant Gillett Dunedin School of Medicine University of Otago Dunedin, New Zealand ISBN 978-3-319-93634-5 ISBN 978-3-319-93635-2 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-93635-2 Library of Congress Control Number: 2018948151 © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s) 2018 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the pub- lisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, express or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institu- tional affiliations. Cover illustration: Pattern adapted from an Indian cotton print produced in the 19th century This Palgrave Pivot imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Switzerland AG The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland P reface This book examines the nature of the human soul from an Aristotelian perspective by accepting that human beings have souls as part of their nature (which includes second nature or social and ontogenetic proper- ties). I was persuaded to a form of Aristotelianism by my D.Phil supervisor at Oxford University—Cathy Wilkes and have found it a convincing framework within which to approach ethical and philosophical issues focused on human cognition and ethics. It is no accident that forms of Aristotelianism provide a philosophical foundation for developed biologi- cal, psychological, and medical science and also for certain strands of the- ology, and this book seeks to unpack why that is so. Many people have helped me to develop the manuscript as colleagues and mentors: Rom Harre, Derek Bolton, Carl Elliot, Hilde Lindemann, Jamie Nelson, John McMillan, Carl Mika, Charlotte Paul, David Green, Dirk De Ridder, Elana Brief, Alan Torrance, Giles Newton-Howes, the philosophy depart- ment at Otago University, colleagues in the Bioethics centre at Otago Medical School and elsewhere, and the many excellent students with whom I have had the privilege to work; some of whom have become notable scholars in their own right: Drew Donnelly, Lynne Bowyer, Claire Amos, Brent Hyslop, Deborah Lambie, Deb Stephens, Katherine Hall, Kati Taghavi, Simon Walker, and Jeanette Wikaira. Scholarship is a joint endeavour, and like any human enterprise, it has its tensions, rivalries, friendships, collaborations, and collegiality, but a book such as this enables one to honour the many who have impinged on one’s life path in a way that makes the academy what it is. It is they whom v vi PREFACE this preface seeks to acknowledge along with those notable forebears with- out which any scholarly endeavour can have no substance. … Dunedin, New Zealand Grant Gillett c ontents 1 I ntroduction: Second Nature and Naturalism 1 2 From Aristotle to Consciousness and Intentionality 11 3 Evolutionary Neurology and the Human Soul 45 4 Diverse Dissolutions of Consciousness 73 5 Consciousness, Value, and Human Nature 107 6 Second Nature, the Will, and Human Neuroscience 123 7 Consciousness: Metaphysical Speculations and Supposed Distinctions 135 References and Bibliography 151 Index 165 vii L f ist of igures Fig. 3.1 The connectivity of brain neurones. Source: http:// neurosciencenews.com/files/2014/10/neuron-diagram.jpg 47 Fig. 3.2 The connectivity of motor neurones. Source: http:// brainmind.com/images/PyramidalNeurons.jpg 63 Fig. 3.3 Weighted mutual symbolic information (wSMI) increases with consciousness, primarily over centroposterior regions. (A) The median wSMI that each EEG channel shares with all other channels is depicted for each state of consciousness. (B) 120 pairs formed by 16 clusters of EEG channels are depicted as 3D arcs whose height is proportional to the Euclidian distance separating the two clusters. Line colour and thickness are proportional to the mean wSMI shared by the corresponding cluster pair 63 ix CHAPTER 1 Introduction: Second Nature and Naturalism Abstract Aristotle’s account of the soul differs from Cartesianism; while it holds that the soul denotes a conception of a human being as not merely a physical or material thing, the division is conceptual and not in terms of a different metaphysical substance and it concerns the form of human life as self-organised, rational, and moral beings in a shared world using shared cognitive tools. The human soul animates and gives coherence to our lives and it develops, in part, through education to create a second nature developed out of the (first) nature human beings are born with. The account is extended by Kant and the phenomenologists who examine how human beings train their children as cognitive apprentices. Keywords The human soul • soul and psyche • Neural adaptation • Human uniqueness Then he stood before the fire, and looked me over in his singular, introspective fashion. “Wedlock suits you,” he remarked. “I think Watson that you have put on seven and a half pounds since I saw you.” “Seven,” I answered. “Indeed, I should have thought a little more. Just a trifle more, I fancy, Watson. And in practice again, I observe. You did not tell me that you intended to go into harness.” “Then how do you know?” © The Author(s) 2018 1 G. Gillett, From Aristotle to Cognitive Neuroscience, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-93635-2_1 2 G. GILLETT “I see it, I deduce it. How do I know that you have been getting yourself very wet lately, and that you have a most clumsy and careless servant girl?” “My dear Holmes,” said I, “this is too much. You would certainly have been burned, had you lived a few centuries ago.” The human soul, a concept that indicates the uniqueness and moral sig- nificance of each human being, is a topic that philosophy has struggled with since Descartes. The Cartesian solution was radical: to posit two metaphysical types of substance, one of which was extended, mechanistic, and causal in its workings and one of which was immaterial, and the source of distinctly human nature. But there was always an alternative which located human beings squarely in the natural world but gave them a unique role as co-constructors of that world. That added complexity to their natural adaptation because, in part they were world-makers and self- makers unable to be studied like other objective phenomena. As self- organising and self-making systems, human beings imposed on the world and themselves certain meanings and values which transformed morally inert mechanism and an exploration of wheels within wheels into a differ- ent kind of enterprise—a moral science. The present work lies within the alternative strand of thought that originates with Aristotle. It traces human growth, development, and adaptation in a way parallel to that of a natural organism and is therefore broadly naturalistic. It ties that understanding to an evolutionary neurology that acknowledges our co-construction of the world; within that account, it looks at neurocognitive disruptions in what we make of ourselves. It locates value in that complex moral project and espouses an account of human freedom that avoids the metaphysical extravagance of dualism. Within such an Aristotelian enterprise one can argue for the reality of the moral community and even for a robust and natural conception of human spirituality. Aristotle notes that human beings develop, in part, through education and argument and create in themselves a second nature based on the attri- butes they are born with. Sherlock Holmes is a case in point. Inference and causal reasoning, broadly human characteristics elaborated from our animal cognitive equipment through practice and argument, exploit a body of knowledge that is dynamic and in perceptuo-motor engagement with the world informed by shared learning and communication about a domain of interest. Being the world’s greatest detective requires extensive self-formation using both types of experience.
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