Table Of Content

ACTA PHILOSOPHICA FENNICA VOL. 74 2004 FROM A METAPHILOSOPHICAL POINT OF VIEW A Study of W. V. Quine’s Naturalism HEIKKI J. KOSKINEN SOCIETAS PHILOSOPHICA FENNICA ACTA PHILOSOPHICA FENNICA Editor: Ilkka Niiniluoto Editorial Board: Timo Airaksinen Leila Haaparanta Olli Koistinen Simo Knuuttila [ngmar Pérn Gabriel Sandu Acta Philosophica Fennica is published by the Philosophical Society of Finland. Since the inception of the series in 1935 it has been the forum for much of the best philosophical work in Finland. In 1968- 1981 it was distributed by the North- Holland Publishing Company (Amsterdam), and since 1981 by the Academic Book- store (Helstnk1). Information for Authors The Acta series publishes shorter and longer monographs as well as collections of articles in all parts of philosophy. Authors should send their contributions to Acta Philosophica Fennica, Department of Philosophy, P.O. Box 9 (Siltavuorenpenger 20 A), 00014 University of Helsinki, Finland. All philosophical traditions and all types of philosophy fail within the intended scope of the Acta Philosophica Fennica. It follows from its traditional character, however, that special consideration is given to the work of Finnish philosophers and to papers and monographs inspired by their contributions to philosophy. Subscription Information Permanent subscriptions can be placed directly with Bookstore Tiedekirja, Kirkko- katu 14, 00170 Helsinki, Finland, Fax +358-9-635 017. Other orders can be placed with Bookstore Tiedekirja or with The Academic Bookstore, P.O. Box 128 (Keskus- katu 1), 00101 Helsinki, Finland, Fax +358-9-121 4441. ACTA PHILOSOPHICA FENNICA Vol. 74 FROM A METAPHILOSOPHICAL POINT OF VIEW A Study of W. V. Quine’s Naturalism HEIKKI J. KOSKINEN HELSINKI 2004 Copyright © 2004 The Philosophical Society of Finland [SBN 951-9264-51-5 ISSN 0355-1792 Hakapaino Oy Helsinki 2004 “There is a science which investigates being as being and the attributes which belong to this in virtue of its own nature. Now this is not the same as any of the so-called special sciences; for none of these others treats universally of being as being.” (Aristotle, Metaphysics, 1V, 1, 20-25) Preface A preface seems like an appropriate place for tracing some of the ways in which the intellectual themes of the study at hand are intertwined with its author’s personal history. This study is a long-term research project that has been based on my earlier interests, but it has also markedly shaped my own philosophical orientation in turn, as the work has proceeded. One of the things that have happened during the research process is that my conception of philosophy has developed and changed quite radically. This might perhaps be expected upon undertaking a metaphilosophical study, but the surprising thing is that it was reading W. V. Quine’s work that made me feel much closer to what might be called a traditional conception of the nature and role of philosophy. What makes this turn of events surprising (for myself at least) is that Quine is a central figure of twentieth century naturalism - a school of thought that has been criticized for excessive scientism, as well as for undermining or even destroying philosophy as an independent and worth- while discipline. Against my initial expectations, then, through studying Quine’s thought I have become much more acutely aware of the central areas of theoretical philosophy; their value, nature, and various inter- relations. I am glad of this development and the felt deepening of vision associated with it. The personal motivation for this study has arisen from an idiosyncratic journey through the discipline. My original interests in academic philosophy were related with issues in the philosophy of mind, and together with my major (theoretical philosophy), I eagerly studied cognitive science at the University of Helsinki. These two subjects seemed like a perfect match foran MA degree. However, specializing towards philosophy of mind conducted in a naturalistic spirit made me feel a little uneasy and perplexed with traditional philosophy. It seemed that the influential naturalistic trend was very strongly oriented to empirical results and the special sciences, while at the same time, it expressed suspicion or even outright hostility towards traditional philosophical approaches related with both metaphysics and conceptual analysis. 6 Preface The situation was a powerful metaphilosophical motivator. I started wondering about the nature of philosophy and the role of a philosopher in the midst of all this. With a philosopher’s training, one could hardly become the neuroscientist, the cognitive psychologist, or the artificial intelligence programmer celebrated by the naturalists. But the stronger the endorsement of naturalism, the further behind traditional philosophy also appeared to be left. One had the feeling of falling between two chairs: philosophy seemed to be pushed further and further away, while empirical research kept escaping from the philosopher’s reach at the other end. So what was a naturalistically minded philosopher to do - what was [ to do? This personal bafflement was combined with a more objective scholarly motivation as it seemed obvious that naturalism as a philosophical move- ment had many varieties, and was not always very clear about the dis- tinctive role of philosophy in relation to the various special sciences. The rational - and typically philosophical - thing to do in a conceptually con- fusing situation like this is to go for the foundations. And that is how [ came to Quine. My pro gradu (MA) thesis, Is There a Place for the Mind in the Mind-Body Problem? Philosophical Naturalism and the Challenge of Subjectivity (1998), already contained quite a lot of metaphilosophical material relying mainly on Quine, and to a lesser extent on Carnap. In their evaluation of my thesis, [lkka Niiniluoto and Sami Pihlstrém pointed out some problematic features in the relations between naturalism, philosophy, and science, suggesting that I could study the metaphilosophical implications of naturalism further in my projected doctoral dissertation. They also suggested that a more systematic dealing with ontology would have made my thesis sharper. I have tried to achieve both of these aims in the present study by con- centrating on the metaphilosophical and ontological aspects of Quinean naturalism. Some of the themes dealt with in this work have already been discussed in my Finnish publications, although they are much more fully examined and consistently developed in the present volume. I have studied Quinean naturalism from a metaphilosophical point of view in my Finnish articles “Filosofisen tiedon luonne ja W. V. Quinen holistinen empirismi” [Ajatus 57, 2000], “Quine, Wienin piirin perintd ja filosofian kohtalo” [in Niiniluoto & Koskinen (eds.), Wienin piiri, Gaudeamus, Helsinki, 2002], “Naturalismi ja teoreettisen filosofian kdytdnnot” [in Pihlstrém & Rolin & Ruokonen (eds.), Kaiytanto, Yliopistopaino, Helsinki, 2002], “Quine, naturalismi ja filosofian puhtaus” [in Rédsanen & Tuohimaa (eds.), Filosofinen tieto ja filosofin taito, Preface 7 Acta Philosophica Tamperensia Vol. 2, 2003], “Naturalismi ja filosofian metafyysinen kdanne” [Ajatus 60, 2003], and “Kieltojen filosofiasta filosofian kieltoon?” [forthcoming in Gylling & Kivinen & Vilkko (eds.), Kielto, Yli- opistopaino, Helsinki]. I have also co-authored a larger paper “Philosophical and Empirical Knowledge in the Program of Naturalism” with Sami Pihlstrém [in Kiikeri & Ylikoski (eds.), Explanatory Connections: Electronic Essays Dedicated to Matti Sintonen, http://www.valt.helsinki fi/kfil/ matti/ koskinen.pdf]. Another Quine-related activity has been the construction of a Quinology Site |at http:/ / www kolumbusfi / heij.k kokskiine n|, which also hosts a “Quinology Network”. In addition to these printed and electronically maintained publications, I have read versions of my papers and other presentations in various symposia of Leila Haaparanta’'s project The Nature of Philosophical Knowledge at the University of Tampere, and in the one-word colloquia KAYTANTO and KIELTO of The Philosophical Society of Finland at Helsinki. “Quine and the Nature of Philosophical Knowledge” was a paper presented in the Fourth European Congress for Analytic Philosophy at Lund University, Sweden, June 2002. “Quinean Naturalism and the Metaphysical Turn” was presented in the 12" International Congress of Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science at Oviedo, Spain, August 2003. During my journey through philosophy, I have developed many personal debts of gratitude, of which I can only mention a few. First of all, I am grateful to my wife Pirjo Koskinen, who provided me with initial encouragement and sustained support, which truly were a sine gua non. Juha Savolainen was my first philosophy teacher, who gave generously of his time, transmitted his enthusiasm for the subject, and convinced me that naturalism was a good thing. S. Albert Kivinen acted as an unforgettable gentlemanly gatekeeper of the academe at my entrance examination, and later enriched the intellectual atmosphere of the department with his eccentric and fascinating presence. Ilkka Niiniluoto’s writings on the philosophy of science, his various lectures, and co-operation in different connections have been a great inspiration throughout my formal studies. During a time in which I was engaged with naturalistic philosophy of mind, Esa Saarinen provided me with valued opportunities to meet “The Ace”, Colin McGinn, for private discussions at Café Ekberg. Markus Lammen- ranta’s proseminars, our shared room at Metsdtalo, and numerous other occasions have provided me with many chances to discuss aspects of naturalism with him. Sami Pihlstré6m has been a constant guide and companion ever since | attended his first lectures on philosophy of science. 8 Preface Since then, there have been various intellectually stimulating lectures, discussions, forms of co-operation, and finally employment in his project. Pihlstrom has also supervised and read my whole work section by section, giving many valuable feedback notes. Naturally, all the remaining faults and obscurities are my own. Through Leila Haaparanta’'s seminar on the nature of philosophical knowledge at the University of Helsinki, I was able to thematize my own metaphilosophical interests much more clearly in the beginning of my graduate studies. Since then, I have also had the honour and privilege to work in co-operation with her project at the University of Tampere, participating in meetings, colloquiums, and book projects. At Tampere, I have especially enjoyed conversations with Timo Vuorio. With Panu Raatikainen, | have gained illumination and discussed Quine’s philosophy on many occasions along the way. Auli Kaipainen - who has now been affiliated with the Department of Philosophy for a full quarter of a century - has always provided important assistance and practical help. Jaroslav Peregrin of the Czech Academy of Sciences and Panu Raatikainen of the Helsinki Collegium for Advanced Studies acted as the examiners of my dissertation. To them, I am grateful for their comments. It was a pleasure to have my work read by two such able philosophers. During the years 1999-2002, my research was financially supported by the Finnish Cultural Foundation, to which I express my sincere gratitude. The work was finally completed with a grant from the Rector of the University of Helsinki, and while working as a researcher in Sami Pihl- strédm’s project The Limits of Naturalism, funded by the Academy of Finland. I am grateful to both for their support. [ am deeply grateful to my mother Inkeri Koskinen for all the moral and material support she has offered throughout my studies. I also wish to thank my parents-in-law, Nelly Joutsenlahti and the late Yrj6 Kankare for the help and kindness they have given. And finally, closest to home, my deepest gratitude goes to my wife Pirjo and our wonderful daughter Kazuko, who have seen me through it all. With love, I dedicate this work to them. Helsinki, March 5, 2004 Heikk: |. Koskinen