Freedom and self-creation : Anselmian libertarianism PDF
Preview Freedom and self-creation : Anselmian libertarianism
OUPCORRECTEDPROOF–FINAL,29/7/2015,SPi Freedom and Self-Creation OUPCORRECTEDPROOF–FINAL,29/7/2015,SPi OUPCORRECTEDPROOF–FINAL,29/7/2015,SPi Freedom and Self-Creation Anselmian Libertarianism Katherin A. Rogers 1 OUPCORRECTEDPROOF–FINAL,29/7/2015,SPi 3 GreatClarendonStreet,Oxford,OX26DP, UnitedKingdom OxfordUniversityPressisadepartmentoftheUniversityofOxford. ItfurtherstheUniversity’sobjectiveofexcellenceinresearch,scholarship, andeducationbypublishingworldwide.Oxfordisaregisteredtrademarkof OxfordUniversityPressintheUKandincertainothercountries #KatherinA.Rogers2015 Themoralrightsoftheauthorhavebeenasserted FirstEditionpublishedin2015 Impression:1 Allrightsreserved.Nopartofthispublicationmaybereproduced,storedin aretrievalsystem,ortransmitted,inanyformorbyanymeans,withoutthe priorpermissioninwritingofOxfordUniversityPress,orasexpresslypermitted bylaw,bylicenceorundertermsagreedwiththeappropriatereprographics rightsorganization.Enquiriesconcerningreproductionoutsidethescopeofthe aboveshouldbesenttotheRightsDepartment,OxfordUniversityPress,atthe addressabove Youmustnotcirculatethisworkinanyotherform andyoumustimposethissameconditiononanyacquirer PublishedintheUnitedStatesofAmericabyOxfordUniversityPress 198MadisonAvenue,NewYork,NY10016,UnitedStatesofAmerica BritishLibraryCataloguinginPublicationData Dataavailable LibraryofCongressControlNumber:2015934140 ISBN 978–0–19–874397–2 Printedandboundby CPIGroup(UK)Ltd,Croydon,CR04YY LinkstothirdpartywebsitesareprovidedbyOxfordingoodfaithand forinformationonly.Oxforddisclaimsanyresponsibilityforthematerials containedinanythirdpartywebsitereferencedinthiswork. OUPCORRECTEDPROOF–FINAL,29/7/2015,SPi Contents Introduction:AnselmianLibertarianism 1 1. WhynotCompatibilism?TheDivineControllerArgument andaWager 41 2. AnselmianLibertarianism:Backgroundand Voluntates 65 3. AnselmianLibertarianism:AParsimoniousAgent-causation 81 4. ThreeEntailments 101 5. DefendingAnselmianInternalism 127 6. AnselmianAlternativesandFrankfurt-styleCounterexamples 150 7. TheLuckProblem:PartI.ProbabilitiesandPossibleWorlds 174 8. TheLuckProblem:PartII.TheLocusofResponsibility 202 9. TheTracingProblem 216 Bibliography 239 Index 245 OUPCORRECTEDPROOF–FINAL,29/7/2015,SPi OUPCORRECTEDPROOF–FINAL,29/7/2015,SPi Introduction: Anselmian Libertarianism [Thegood]angelsarenottobepraisedfortheirjusticeduetothefactthat they wereabletosin,butratherdue tothefactthat,inaway,they haveit fromthemselvesthattheyare[now]unabletosin;inthistheyare,tosome extent,similartoGod,whohaswhateverHehasfromHimself(ase). Curdeushomo2.101 Part I: Why Do We Want Free Will? Introduction AnselmofCanterburyisprobablythefirstphilosopherontheplanettoattempta well-worked-out theory of libertarian free will.2 He is motivated to pioneer this positionbythethoughtthatifwehumanbeings(andanyothercreatedrational andfreeagentstheremaybe)aretobearanyresponsibilityforwhatwedoand, more importantly, for the kind of people we are, then we must be able to make choices which truly come from ourselves. He believes, as an entailment of his Christianfaith,thatGodmadeusinHisimage.Andhetakesthattoincludethe pointthat we are remarkablereflections in that we areable to participate in the creationofourowncharacters.Thepurposeoffreedomisthatweshouldbeable to imitate God, not just by being good creatures—any creature is a good creature—but by being good from ourselves. We exist in absolute dependence onGod,butHehasopenedforusasmallspaceforindependentactionandself- creation.Thelocusofthatsmallspaceisfreechoice. The core of Anselm’s theory is that the created free agent must be able to choose between open options and that choice must come in some ultimate way 1 TranslationsthroughoutaremyownfromthestandardLatintext,AnselmiOperaOmnia,ed. F.S.Schmitt,6vols.(RomeandEdinburgh:FriedrichFrommannVerlag,1938–68). 2 SeemyAnselmonFreedom(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,2008). OUPCORRECTEDPROOF–FINAL,29/7/2015,SPi INTRODUCTION fromhimself.3Heiswhatwe,today,wouldrefertoasanagent-causalist,butwith thedifferencethatheinsiststhatwemustnotattributetothecreatedfreeagent any new and unique causal powers. This proposal of a parsimonious agent- causationconstitutesanovelandexcitingcontributiontothefreewilldiscussion, butitseemstohavebeenlosttointellectualhistory.4Myaiminthepresentwork istorecapturethetheoryasaviableapproachwithinthecurrentfreewilldebate. Ibegin(ChapterOne)withadefenseofAnselm’sbasicmotivation;ifGodcauses absolutelyeverything,including thechoicesofcreatedagents, thenthoseagents are not free, are not responsible, and cannot be the imagines dei that Anselm takes human beings to be. I attempt to cast the discussion in the contemporary idiom and within the contemporary literature, and so a new character, the Anselmian, has to be introduced. The Anselmian embraces the basic outline initiallyproposedbyAnselm,andthenattemptstofillitinandbuilduponit. “Anselm”and“Anselm’s”indicatethatitisindeedthehistoricalfigurewhose thought is expressed. As ChapterOne exemplifies, Anselm’s theory translates well into the present debate. In ChapterOne Anselm’s insistence that we cannotbefreeifallourchoicesarecausedbyGodprovidesastrongerversion of contemporary “controller” arguments for incompatibilism. In Chapters Two through Four I spell out Anselm’s parsimonious agent-causation and its entailments with an eye to how his theory connects with the contem- porary debate. Anselm’stheoryis,ofcourse,apropertargetfortheusualcriticismsthatcan be leveled against libertarianism in general, and agent-causal libertarianism in particular.Sometimeselementsinhistheory—likehisrefusaltohypothesizesui generiscausationuniquetofreechoice—allowittoescape,oratleastsignificantly mitigate,someofthestandardproblems.Butsometimeselementsinhistheory— suchashisdenialthatchoicesarerobust“things”withontologicalstatus—make someofthestandardproblemsseem,primafacie,moreobviousormoredamn- ing.ChaptersFivethroughEightdefendAnselmianlibertarianismbyproposing 3 AnselmiswhatKevinTimpewouldlabela“widesourceincompatibilist”:thecoreoffreewillis thattheagentbetheultimatesourceofhischoices,andthatentails—forthecreatedagent,atleast— that he confront alternative possibilities; Free Will: Sourcehood and Its Alternatives (London: Continuum,2008). 4 To my knowledge, Anselm’s theory of free will was not adopted in toto by any subsequent thinkers.DunsScotusisalibertarianandwasinfluencedbyAnselm,buthisoveralltheorydoesnot seemtobethesame(thoughmyknowledgeofScotusislimited,andperhapsheisclosertoAnselm than I take him to be). Among the historical reasons for this “forgetfulness” we might list the WesternEuropeanreceptionofAristotletowardstheendofthetwelfthcentury.Anselm’sProslo- gionargumentandhisCurdeushomowerewellknowntothirteenth-centurythinkers,asshownby Aquinas’criticismsofboth,butperhapsthedetailsofAnselm’stheoryoffreedomgotlostinthe excitementoverAristotle. OUPCORRECTEDPROOF–FINAL,29/7/2015,SPi INTRODUCTION Anselmian answers (answers drawn from, or inspired by, Anselm’s theory) to threeofthemostsignificantandstandardproblemsraisedagainstlibertarianism. (Ioffer four chaptersin response to three problemsbecausethe“luck” problem requirestwochaptersofAnselmianresponse.)ChapterNineraises,andattempts to answer, a question that has not seen a great deal of play in the current literature, but which is especially acute for the Anselmian theory: The point of freedom is self-creation, but if agents are not aware of this, can they be held responsible for the selves they create? ChapterNine ends with a brief recapitu- lationof,andconclusionto,thebookasawhole. BeforewecanmovetoAnselm’stheoryandits’motivationssomeintroductory material is in order. This introductory chapter is divided into two parts. The secondpartprovidesaroadmaptothebookasawhole.InthisfirstpartIbegin by setting out an important methodological principle that will be in play throughout the book: Anselm’s theory is to be explained and defended with an eye to Anselm’s own theist perspective. This is a constructive way to go about things for two reasons: First, showing how Anselm’s (and the Anselmian’s) position on free will arises within his theism illustrates a way in which back- ground beliefs may play a significant role in generating intuitions concerning various steps in the free will debate. And second, it is helpful, in a number of arguments, to invoke an ideal knower and/or an omnipotent controller. In Anselm’suniverse,Godisalreadytheretofilltheseroles. IcontinuePartIoftheintroductorymaterialbyexplaininghowIwillbeusing the terms relevant to the discussion. Especially important will be two sorts of responsibility-denying necessity: causal necessity and “external, non-causal” necessity,asdistinguishedfrom“consequent”necessitywhichisentirelyinnocu- ousvis-à-visfreedomandresponsibility.NextInotethatscienceandexperience leaveopenthequestionofwhatsortoffreechoiceswemake,ifany.Theabsence of any conclusive evidence one way or the other leaves the philosopher free to pondertheissueofwhywewantfreewill.Anselm,andthoseofalikemind,want free will—a very robust, libertarian free will—because it is required (or so I will argue)ifwearetobethemetaphysicallyvaluablethingsthatAnselm,andmuch of Western thought, has traditionally held us to be. Part I of the Introduction concludes with setting out still more methodological principles. First, it is choices, and not overt deeds that will be the focus of consideration. Second, in thattheAnselmianconnectsfreedomwiththevalueofthefreeagent,criteriathat are inclusive are, ceteris paribus, preferable to criteria that are exclusive in describing what is required for free choice. And finally, it needs to be noted up front that the concern is less with individual choices and acts than with the character that is built through those choices and acts. As I noted above, in
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