FOREIGN POLICY DECISION-MAKING AND VIOLENT NON-STATE ACTORS David Ray ...

207 Pages·2004·0.57 MB·English

ABSTRACT
Title of Dissertation: FOREIGN POLICY DECISION-MAKING AND
VIOLENT NON-STATE ACTORS
David Ray Andersen, Doctor of Philosophy, 2004
Dissertation directed by: Professor Jonathan Wilkenfeld
Department of Government and Politics
A state’s foreign policy is directed toward a variety of external actors. Most
understanding of foreign policy behavior, however, is derived from observations of
states interacting with other states. This study examines how foreign policy decision-
making during crisis differs when it is directed toward violent non-state actors. A
crisis is defined as an event in which a state perceives a threat to one or more of its
basic values, along with an awareness of finite time for response, and a heightened
probability of engaging in military hostilities. Violent non-state actors are those non-
state groups that pursue their political goals through the use of or threat to use violence.
Additionally, the non-state actors of interest are those that threaten an external state’s
national interests in such a way that it represents a crisis for that country, necessitating
some form of foreign policy response.
This study argues that because non-state actors lack many of the structural
characteristics associated with a state, such as a recognized foreign ministry or the lack
of trust states have in a non-state leader’s ability to enforce agreements, states respond
to these crises more violently than they do when responding to crises triggered by
states. International Crisis Behavior (ICB) data confirms that the major response by
states toward crises triggered by violent non-state actors are more violent than
responses to crises triggered by states. Empirical results also show that non-state
groups with more pronounced political and military structures are less likely to be
responded to violently. Other factors, such as the nature of the value threatened and
type of violence used to trigger the crisis, do not have a significant impact on how
states respond.
This study argues that a set of international norms have emerged that help
mitigate the level of violence between states and that these norms do not apply as
strongly to these violent non-state groups. However, non-state groups that are able to
establish institutional structures similar to those of states are more likely to lessen the
level of violence directed toward them.
FOREIGN POLICY DECISION-MAKING AND VIOLENT NON-STATE ACTORS
by
David Ray Andersen
Dissertation submitted to the Faculty of the Graduate School of the
University of Maryland, College Park in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy
2004
Advisory Committee:
Professor Jonathan Wilkenfeld, Chair
Professor I.M. Destler
Professor Mark Irving Lichbach
Professor George Quester
Professor Shibley Telhami
©Copyright by
David Ray Andersen
2004
TABLE OF CONTENTS
List of Tables iv
List of Figures v
Chapter 1: Introduction: A Different Threat 1
Violent Non-State Actors in Historical Context 4
Non-State Actors in Today’s International System 9
Challenges to Sovereignty 11
Non-State Power 15
State versus Non-State 22
The Impact of Violent Non-State Actors 27
Beyond Intervention 34
Foreign Policy Decision-Making during Crisis 39
Obstacles and Challenges 42
Outline and Structure of Dissertation 45
Chapter 2: State Decision-Making and Crisis Bargaining
with Violent Non-State Actors 50
Foreign Policy Decision-Making 51
Action-Reaction and Sequential Games in Foreign
Policy Decision-Making 55
Sequential Decision-Making and Crisis Bargaining
Between States and Non-States 59
Values and Threats 71
Conclusion 75
Chapter 3: Violent Non-State Actors 77
Defining Violent Non-State Actors 83
Revolutionary/Ideological Movements 88
Ethnopolitical/Identity Movements 90
Fundamentalist/Religious Movements 93
Violent Tactics 99
Guerrilla Tactics 102
Terrorist Tactics 105
Conclusion 111
Chapter 4: Data, Hypotheses and Methodology 112
Case Selection 114
Classification of Violent Non-State Groups and Tactics 119
Hypotheses 124
Methods and Variables 133
Dependent Variables 134
ii
Independent Variables 135
Chapter 5: State Responses to Non-State Actors
during Foreign Policy Crises 141
Violence and State Responses to Non-State Actors 142
Why Violence? 149
States, Non-States and Values Threatened 152
International Organization Involvement 158
Violent Responses and Actor Type and Tactic 161
Conclusion 169
Chapter 6: Foreign Policy and Violent Non-State
Actors in a Transnational World 171
Bibliography 179
iii
LIST OF TABLES
Table 3.1. United States and Soviet Crisis Involvement, 1945-199 81
Table 4.1. Countries Experiencing Foreign Policy Crises 115
Table 4.2. Violent Non-State Groups 121
Table 4.3. Violent Non-State Actor Type and Violent Non-State Actor Tactic 130
Table 4.4. Violent Non-State Actor and Gravity of Value Threatened 132
Table 4.5. Value Non-State Actor and Issue Crisis 133
Table 4.6. List of Cases 140
Table 5.1. Frequencies of Crises Triggered and Major Response 142
Table 5.2. Frequencies of Crises Triggered and Principal Technique 143
Table 5.3. Major Response by Crisis Actor 144
Table 5.4. Primary Management Technique by Crisis Actor 145
Table 5.5. Major Response to Crisis Trigger and Triggering Entity 146
Table 5.6. Major Response to Crisis Trigger (More Powerful State) 147
Table 5.7. Principal Crisis Management Technique and Triggering Entity 148
Table 5.8. Principal Crisis Management Technique (More Powerful State) 148
Table 5.9. Content of Crisis Outcome and Triggering Entity 150
Table 5.10. Major Response to Crisis and Content of Crisis Outcome 151
Table 5.11. Extent of Satisfaction about Outcome and Triggering Entity 151
Table 5.12. Gravity of Value Threatened and Triggering Entity 154
Table 5.13. Gravity of Value Threatened and Major Response 155
Table 5.14. Gravity of Value Threatened from State and Major Response 156
Table 5.15. Gravity of Value Threatened from Violent State and Major Response 157
Table 5.16. Gravity of Value Threatened from Violent State and Major Response
from Stronger Crisis Actor 158
Table 5.17. Crisis Trigger and Content of Global Organization Involvement 160
Table 5.18. Crisis Trigger and Content of Global Organization Involvement 161
Table 5.19. Violent Non-State Actor Type and Major Response 162
Table 5.20. Violent Non-State Actor Type and Principal Technique 163
Table 5.21. Violent Non-State Actor Tactic and Major Response 164
Table 5.22. Group/Tactic and Major Response by Crisis Actor 165
Table 5.23. Violent Non-State Actor Tactic and Violence Associated 166
Table 5.24. Violent Non-State Actor Type and Violence Associated 166
Table 5.25. Violent Non-State Actor Tactic and Global Organization 167
Table 5.26. Violent Non-State Actor Type and Global Organization 168
Table 5.27. Breakdown of Global Organization Activity 169
iv
LIST OF FIGURES
Figure 1.1. State-State Interactions 10
Figure 1.2. State/Non-State Interaction 11
Figure 2.1. International Interaction Decision Tree 61
Figure 2.2. Crisis Subgame Decision Tree 62
Figure 4.1. Violent Non-State Actor Triggered Crises Per Decade 116
v
Chapter 1
Introduction: A Different Threat
When hijacked airplanes slammed into the World Trade Center and the
Pentagon on September 11th, 2001 there was a prevailing sense that the world was
facing an entirely new challenge. Instead of threats emanating from “rogue” states or a
competing superpower, the world now turned its attention toward non-state actors
seeking to advance their political agendas through violent means. This type of threat,
however, is not new. From pirates on the Barbary Coast to groups such as al-Qaeda
today, violent non-state actors have always posed serious obstacles to the interests of
states. However, in a shrinking and increasingly interdependent world with greater
access to lethal weaponry and advanced communications technologies, these groups
present an ever more complex challenge to contemporary foreign policy decision-
makers. How policymakers assess these threats and subsequently formulate policy
toward these groups constitutes an essential part of our understanding of how such
decisions are made in a transnational era.
This study examines the threats violent non-state actors pose to states and how
states respond to these groups. While sharing some characteristics, violent non-state
actors are fundamentally different from states and, therefore, pose a challenge for
international relations scholarship. The scope of this work is bounded substantively
and conceptually in that it focuses specifically on those cases in which a state actor
1
experiences a foreign policy crisis from the actions of a non-state actor. This
dissertation asks whether foreign policy responses to crises triggered by such groups
mirror or differ from those that are made toward states that pose similar threats.1 Either
outcome presents an interesting puzzle. If policy outcomes are similar, then why is it
that states develop similar responses to non-similar units? If the policies are different,
then how are they different and how does the structure of these asymmetric
relationships determine those differences?
The study of international relations has devoted most of its attention to the
behavior of states acting within a constrictive international system. The state, which is
generally understood to hold a monopoly on the legitimate use of organized violence
(Weber 1964: 154), has been the primary arbiter of how change occurs within that
system (Carnoy 1984; Jessop 1990; Poggi 1990). It is considered the principal unit of
analysis in international relations theory and, as a result, most theorizing has been
directed toward state-state interactions (see Waltz 1979; Keohane 1986; Wendt 1999).
While a state-centric research agenda has produced key insights into the power
relations and mechanisms that exist between states, it tends to ignore another level of
interactions that takes place between states and non-state actors.
Non-state actors, both violent and non-violent, have proliferated throughout the
globe and their impact can be seen on numerous levels. In fact, one could argue that
two of the most significant historical markers of the last fifteen years—the fall of

1 A foreign policy crisis is defined by Brecher and Wilkenfeld (2000: 3) as “a threat to
one or more basic values, along with an awareness of finite time for response to the
value threat, and a heightened probability of involvement in military hostilities.” A
trigger is the “catalyst to a foreign policy crisis” (pg. 9).
2