Feyerabend and Scientific Values: Tightrope-Walking Rationality

268 Pages·2003·28.9 MB·English

by  Robert P. Farrell (auth.)

Feyerabend and Scientific Values
BOSTON STUDIES IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE
Editors
ROBERT S. COHEN, Boston University
JÜRGEN RENN, Max-Planck-Institute for the History of Science
KOSTAS GAVROGLU, University of Athens
Editorial Advisory Board
THOMAS F. GLICK, Boston University
ADOLF GRÜNBAUM, University of Pittsburgh
SYLVAN S. SCHWEBER, Brandeis University
JOHN J. STACHEL, Boston University
MARX W. WARTOFSKY†, (Editor 1960–1997)
VOLUME 235
FEYERABEND AND
SCIENTIFIC VALUES
Tightrope-Walking Rationality
by
ROBERT P. FARRELL
School of Liberal Arts,
The University of Newcastle, Australia
SPRINGER-SCIENCE+BUSINESS MEDIA, B.V.
A C.I.P. Catalogue record for this book is available from the Library of Congress.
ISBN 978-90-481-6309-0 ISBN 978-94-017-1542-3 (eBook)
DOI 10.1007/978-94-017-1542-3
Printed on acid-free paper
All Rights Reserved
©2003 Springe r Science+ Business Media Dordrecht
Originally published by Kluwer Academic Publishers in 2003
No part of this work may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted
in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, microfilming, recording
or otherwise, without written permission from the Publisher, with the exception
of any material supplied specifically for the purpose of being entered
and executed on a computer system, for exclusive use by the purchaser of the work.
CONTENTS
preface ............................................................................................................ ix
Introduction ..................................................................................................... !
1 Feyerabend' s Reductio ad Absurdum of 'Rationalist' Philosophies ............ 5
1.1 Introduction ........................................................................................... 5
1.2 Feyerabend's Conception of 'Rationalist' Philosophy ........................... 7
1.3 Feyerabend's Reductio ........................................................................ 12
1.4 Feyerabend, Galileo and 'Rationalist' Philosophies ............................ 18
1.4.1 Introduction .................................................................................. 18
1.4.2 The Reductio ad Absurdum of Empiricism ................................. 18
1.4.3 The Reductio ad Absurdum of Popper's Falsificationism ........... 26
1.4.4 Galileo and Lakatos's Methodology of Scientific Research
Programmes .......................................................................................... 35
1.5 Feyerabend's Rhetoric: Propaganda, Irrationality and Subjective
Wishes ....................................................................................................... 39
2 Feyerabend, Lakatos and Anarchism ........................................................ .44
2.1 Introduction ......................................................................................... 44
2.2 Feyerabend's Reductio of Lakatos's MSRP ....................................... .46
2.2.1 Introduction .................................................................................. 46
2.2.2 Theory Appraisal: Intra-Research Programme ........................... .47
2.2.3 Theory Appraisal: Inter-Research Programme ............................ 51
2.2.4 Feyerabend's Reductio of MSRP ................................................. 55
2.2.5 Content Increase and the Circularity of MSRP ........................... 60
2.3 First Steps Towards a Positive Alternative Account of Rationality ... 64
2.4 Conclusion .......................................................................................... 69
3 Feyerabend's Incommensurability and the Pragmatic Theory
of Observation .............................................................................................. 71
3.1 Introduction ......................................................................................... 71
3.2 Feyerabend's Incommensurability as Formal Incommensurability .... 72
3.2.1 Universal Theories ....................................................................... 72
3.2.2 The Logical Empiricist Background ............................................ 75
3.2.3 The Pragmatic Theory of Observation ........................................ 78
3.2.4 Meaning Variance and the Failure ofFormalism ........................ 80
3.2.5 Popperian Incommensurability .................................................... 82
3.3 Responses to Feyerabend's Incommensurability ................................ 87
3.3.1 The Strategy of Misinterpretation ................................................ 87
3.3.2 The Irrelevance of Reference ....................................................... 92
3.4 Feyerabend's Commensurability ......................................................... 95
VI CONTENTS
3.5 Conclusion .......................................................................................... 99
4 Feyerabend's Relativism .......................................................................... 100
4.1 Introduction ....................................................................................... lOO
4.2 Realism and Relativism .................................................................... 101
4.3 Feyerabend's Changing Attitudes Towards Relativism .................... 106
4.3.1 Science in a Free Society ........................................................... 106
4.3.2 Farewell to Reason .................................................................... 112
4.4 Quantum Physics and Complementarity ........................................... 117
4.5 Quantum Physics and the Theoretical/Empirical Dichotomy of
Traditions ................................................................................................ 122
4.6 Conclusion ........................................................................................ 129
5 Feyerabend and Pluralism ........................................................................ 133
5.1 Introduction ....................................................................................... 133
5.2 Popper and Empirical Content.. ........................................................ 135
5.3 Relevant and Irrelevant Potential Falsifiers ...................................... 138
5.4 Basic Statements and Initial Conditions ........................................... 140
5.5 Rival Theories and the Duhem Thesis .............................................. l43
5.6 Conclusion ........................................................................................ 145
6 Popper, Methodological Pluralism and Epistemic Values ...................... 147
6.1 Introduction ....................................................................................... 147
6.2 Popper's Axiological Normativity .................................................... 148
6.3 Feyerabend's Axiological Normativity ............................................. 150
6.3.1 Introduction ................................................................................ 150
6.3.2 Feyerabend's Early Popperianism .............................................. 151
6.3.3 Problems With Feyerabend's Early Popperianism ..................... 151
6.3.4 Feyerabend's Gradual Awareness of the Problem ..................... 153
6.3 .5 The Principles of Proliferation and Tenacity ............................. 154
6.4 Feyerabend as a Comprehensively Critical Popperian ..................... 155
6.5 Feyerabend's Methodological Pluralism: Relativist or
'Rationalist'? ............................................................................................ 157
6.6 Conclusion ........................................................................................ 161
7 Kuhn on Paradigms, Rules and Values .................................................... 163
7.1 Introduction ....................................................................................... 163
7.2 Some Confusions in Kuhn's Philosophy ........................................... 164
7 .2.1 Scientific Rules .......................................................................... 164
7.2.2 Paradigms ................................................................................... 165
7 .2.3 The Wittgensteinian Analogy .................................................... 167
7 .2.4 'Crisis' and Paradigm Change .................................................... 169
7.3 The Importance of Scientific Values ................................................ 170
7.3.1 Kuhn's Introduction ofValues ................................................... l70
CONTENTS Vll
7.3.2 The Wittgensteinian Analogy and Scientific Values ................. 173
7.3.3 Scientific Rules and Scientific Values ...................................... 174
7.3.4 Scientific Values and Paradigms ............................................... 175
7.3.5 The 'Logic' of Values ................................................................. 178
7.3.6 Normal Science and Paradigm Change ...................................... 181
7.4 Conclusion ........................................................................................ 185
8 Tightrope-Walking Rationality: Feyerabend's Metanarrative ................ 188
8.1 Introduction ....................................................................................... 188
8.2 Consolations for the Specialist ......................................................... 190
8.2.1 Introduction ................................................................................ 190
8.2.2 The Critique of Kuhn ................................................................. 190
8.2.3 The Critique of Popper and Lakatos .......................................... 192
8.2.4 Philosophical Versus Practical Traditions ................................. 193
8.3 Feyerabend's Two Argumentative Chains ....................................... 194
8.3.1 Introduction ................................................................................ 194
8.3.2 Two Argumentative Chains ....................................................... 195
8.4 Theoretical/Abstract Versus Empirical Traditions ........................... 199
8.4.1 Introduction ................................................................................ 199
8.4.2 Empirical Traditions .................................................................. 199
8.4.3 Theoretical/A bstract Traditions ................................................. 200
8.4.4 Two Traditions and Two Principles .......................................... 200
8.5 Values-Based Rationality ................................................................. 202
8.5 .1 Introduction ................................................................................ 202
8.5.2 Why Values? .............................................................................. 203
8.5.3 The Dynamical/Tensional Nature ofFeyerabend's Values ....... 205
8.5.4 Normativity and Values-Based Rationality ............................... 207
8.6 Feyerabend: Postmodemist or Tightrope-Walking Rationalist.. ...... 209
8.7 Conclusion ........................................................................................ 212
9 Feyerabend and World-Views ................................................................. 214
9.1 Introduction ....................................................................................... 214
9.2 Non-Reductive Metaphysical World-Views ..................................... 217
9 .2.1 Introduction ................................................................................ 217
9 .2.2 Metaphysical, Non-Reductive, Naturalism ................................ 217
9.2.3 Reductive Versus Non-Reductive Naturalism ........................... 220
9.3 Feyerabend and World-Views .......................................................... 224
9.3.1 Introduction ................................................................................ 224
9.3.2 The Aristotelian World-view and the Scientific Revolutio ....... 225
9.3.3 Epistemological Anarchism and Forms of Life ......................... 227
9.3 .4 The Scientific World-View and Altemati ve World-Views ....... 229
9.4 Conclusion ........................................................................................ 233
vm CONTENTS
references .................................................................................................... 23 7
index ........................................................................................................... 245
PREFACE
When I first began my studies for my PhD I intended to produce a new,
positive account of scientific rationality. My supervisor, C. B. Christensen,
advised me that to produce a positive account of scientific rationality I must
first 'deal with' the critique of scientific rationality found in the writings of
Paul Feyerabend. Consequently, I embarked upon a study of Feyerabend,
intending to devote a chapter to 'refuting' Feyerabend' s critique of scientific
rationality. However, once I began to read Feyerabend I was struck by the
huge disparity in my reading of Feyerabend and the interpretations found in
the literature. In attempting to explain my interpretation of Feyerabend, the
planned introductory chapter blossomed into a full-fledged thesis.
One week after I submitted my thesis (Feyerabend's Epistemological
Anarchism and Values-Based Rationality, ANU, 1998) I had an intellectual
epiphany as to how I should have written my thesis. Subsequently, even
though my thesis was passed, I embarked on the process of rewriting my
thesis, the results of which are contained herein.
Even though I was distracted from my initial project, the original goal
was achieved: I believe that the idea of a values-based rationality is of great
importance and constitutes a valid alternative account of rationality. I
sincerely hope that the readers of this book concur with my assessment.
My thanks go to C. B. Christensen, for supervision, disagreements and
hospitality. F. Jackson stopped me from making some grievous mistakes and
offered invaluable editorial advice. G. Munevar, A. Musgrave, and H.
Sankey provided me with many comments and criticisms of my thesis.
Special thanks to G. Munevar for consistent encouragement of my efforts to
get this book into print. I would also like to thank J. Wright, L. Tambolo and
S. Gattei for comments and discussion of previously published parts of this
book. Thank you also to the people who attended two departmental seminars
at the University of Newcastle where chapter's 7 and 8 were first presented.
Special thanks to C. Erkelens and J. Voogd for their editorial assistance.
Part of chapter 4 previously appeared as "Feyerabend's Metaphysics:
Process-Realism, or Voluntarist-Idealism?", Journal for General Philosophy
of Science, 32, 2001, pp. 351-369 (Kluwer Academic Publishers). Most of
chapter 5 originally appeared as "Rival Theories and Empirical Content
Revisited", Studies in History and Philosophy of Science, 31,2000, pp. 137-
49 (Elsevier Science). And part of chapter 6 appeared as "Will the
Popperian Feyerabend Please step Forward: Pluralistic, Popperian Themes