Fact And Meaning: Quine And Wittgenstein On Philosophy Of Language

257 Pages·1989·7.088 MB·

by  Jane Heal

Fact and Meaning
PHILOSOPHICAL THEORY
SERIES EDITORS
John McDowell, Philip Pettit and Crispin Wright
For Truth in Semantics
Anthony Appiah
The Dynamics of Belief: A Normative Logic
Peter Forrest
Abstract Objects
Bob Hate
Fact and Meaning
Jane Heal
Conditionals
Frank Jackson
Reality and Representation
David Papineau
Facts and the Function of Truth
Huw Price
Moral Dilemmas
Walter Sinnott-Armstrong
Fact and Meaning
Quine and Wittgenstein on
Philosophy of Language
JANE HEAL
Basil Blackwell
Copyright ©Jane Heal 1989
First published 1989
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British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data
A CIl’ catalogue record for this book is available
from the British Library.
Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data
Heal, Jane.
Fact and meaning: Quine and Wittgenstein on. philosophy of
language / Jane Heal.
p. cm. — (Philosophical theory)
Bibliography: p.
Includes index.
ISBN 0-631-14591-5
1. Languages—Philosophy. 2. Quine, W. V. (Willard Van Orman)-
-Gontributions in philosophy of language. 3. Wittgenstein, Ludwig,
1889-1951—Contributions in philosophy of language. I. Title.
II. Scries.
PI06.H355 1989
!49'.94—del 9 88-7890
CIP
Typeset in 11 on 13 pt Baskerville
by Vera-Reyes, Inc.
Primed in Great Britain at
The Camclot Press Ltd, Southampton
Contents
Preface vii
1 Introduction I
2 Varieties of Realism 11
2.1 Minimal Realism 11
2.2 Reflecting on Minimal Realism 21
2.3 Realism, Idealism and Empiricism 25
2.4 Realism, Relativism and Intcrsubjectivity 28
3 Instrumentalism and Meaning Scepticism 35
3.1 Quine’s Arguments for the Indeterminacy of
Translation 35
3.2 Setting up a Predictive Sentence Machine 40
3.3 Indeterminacy of Function and Meaning 45
3.4 Instrumentalism and the Revisability of Logic 55
4 Quine’s Naturalized Empiricism 60
4.1 Quine’s Epistemology 60
4.2 Ontological Relativity and Disquotation 70
4.3 Quine’s Version of Realism 75
4.4 Should Empiricism be Naturalized? 82
5 The Mona Lisa Mosaic 86
5.1 Semantic Holism 86
5.2 Holism and Indeterminacy: the Mosaic Analogy 92
5.3 Holism, Indeterminacy and Language 98
5.4 Can We Restore Dctcrminacy? 102
vi Contents
6 The Slide into the Abyss 112
6.1 The Incompatibility of Realism and Meaning
Scepticism 112
6.2 Thoroughgoing Pragmatism 121
6.3 Wittgenstein and Pragmatism 129
6.4 Empiricism and Platonism 134
7 The Dissolving Mirror 143
7.1 Wittgenstein’s Hostility to Mirroring Realism 143
7.2 Explanation and the Absolute Conception 149
7.3 Kripkc and Norms 160
8 Interpretations and Misinterpretations 167
8.1 Speech Acts and Language Games 167
8.2 Wittgenstein and Anti-Realism 178
9 Interests, Activities and Meanings 192
9.1 Proof and New Concepts 192
9.2 Conceptual Change and Determinacy of Sense 196
9.3 Other Forms of Life? 206
9.4 Modal Realism 210
9.5 Facts about Meaning . . . 216
Notes 229
Bibliography 240
Index 245
Preface
The aim of this hook is to formulate a view of some very wide-
ranging themes about which an enormous amount has been writ­
ten, and it would be absurd to claim any kind of comprehensiveness
or finality for this treatment of them. Philosophical discussion
forms a kaleidoscopically changing scene. New, or seemingly new,
pieces are constantly emerging into view and new juxtapositions of
old pieces reveal themselves. 1 hope that T have detected and
described the salient features of some recurrent and significant
patterns - but it may be that I have only provided a muddled
account of some temporary configuration. In any case it is certain
that other interesting arrangements are possible, other connections
can be made and other themes justifiably brought to prominence. I
hope that this does not provide an excuse for sloppiness or for
failing to notice matters which need discussion. But it goes some
way to explain why a great amount of excellent work goes undis­
cussed here.
I have tried to acknowledge the main sources of and influences
on my views; but I am far from sure that 1 have identified and
remembered all of them, since philosophical views develop in such
devious ways and over such a length of time. I have several times
had the disconcerting experience of writing down some thought I
took to be new and then discovering the very same idea on looking
through old notes of my own. If in this way I can mislay and
seemingly re-invent my own ideas, it is surely possible to do it to
those of others as well and I am certain that many cases of such
borrowing exist in the following pages. To all those whose ideas I
have thus appropriated without acknowledgement, I apologize.
vi Contents
6 The Slide into the Abyss 112
6.1 The Incompatibility of Realism and Meaning
Scepticism 112
6.2 Thoroughgoing Pragmatism 121
6.3 Wittgenstein and Pragmatism 129
6.4 Empiricism and Platonism 134
7 The Dissolving Mirror 143
7.1 Wittgenstein’s Hostility to Mirroring Realism 143
7.2 Explanation and the Absolute Conception 149
7.3 Kripke and Norms 160
8 Interpretations and Misinterpretations 167
8.1 Speech Acts and Language Games 167
8.2 Wittgenstein and Anti-Realism 178
9 Interests, Activities and Meanings 192
9.1 Proof and New Concepts 192
9.2 Conceptual Change and Determinacy of Sense 196
9.3 Other Forms of Life? 206
9.4 Modal Realism 210
9.5 Facts about Meaning 216
Notes 229
Bibliography 240
Index 245
Preface
The aim of this book is to formulate a view of some very wide-
ranging themes about which an enormous amount has been writ­
ten, and it would be absurd to claim any kind of comprehensiveness
or finality for this treatment of them. Philosophical discussion
forms a kaleidoscopically changing scene. New, or seemingly new,
pieces are constantly emerging into view and new juxtapositions of
old pieces reveal themselves. I hope that I have detected and
described the salient features of some recurrent and significant
patterns - but it may be that I have only provided a muddled
account of some temporary configuration. In any case it is certain
that other interesting arrangements arc possible, other connections
can be made and other themes justifiably brought to prominence. I
hope that this does not provide an excuse for sloppiness or for
failing to notice matters which need discussion. But it goes some
way to explain why a great amount of excellent work goes undis-
cusscd here.
I have tried to acknowledge the main sources of and influences
on my views; but I am far from sure that I have identified and
remembered all of them, since philosophical views develop in such
devious ways and over such a length of time. I have several times
had the disconcerting experience of writing down some thought 1
took to be new and then discovering the very same idea on looking
through old notes of my own. If in this way I can mislay and
seemingly re-invent my own ideas, it is surely possible to do it to
those of others as well and I am certain that many cases of such
borrowing exist in the following pages. To all those whose ideas I
have thus appropriated without acknowledgement, I apologize.
The references in the Notes section are given in an abbreviated
and informal fashion. In connection with Wittgenstein’s works,
numbers refer to sections, except for Philosophical Investigations Part
11, where numbers refer to pages. Full details of the works cited are
to be found in the bibliography.
1 am conscious of a debt to many friends and colleagues who are
not explicitly mentioned in the book and with whom I have
discussed these matters. I would like to record in particular my
gratitude to Geoffrey Midgley, conversations with whom over
many years have much enlivened and enriched my understanding
of Wittgenstein. I would also like to thank Crispin Wright who
encouraged me to undertake this project in the first place and
whose acute comments on an earlier draft saved me from many
blunders.
St John’s College
Cambridge