Ethics Without Intention

281 Pages·2014·0.852 MB·English

by  Ezio Di Nucci

Ethics Without
Intention
BLOOMSBURY ETHICS SERIES
Bloomsbury Ethics is a series of books written to help students
explore, engage with and master key topics in contemporary ethics
and moral philosophy.
Intuitionism, David Kaspar
Moral Realism, Kevin DeLapp
Reasons, Eric Wiland
Virtue Ethics, Nafsika Athanassoulis
Forthcoming in the series:
Climate Ethics, Sarah Kenehan
Moral Principles, Maike Albertzart
Moral Skepticism, Basil Smith
Moral Psychology, Jay R. Elliott
Trust, Ethics and Human Reason, Olli Lagerspetz
Value Theory, Francesco Orsi
Series Editors:
Thom Brooks is Reader in Law at Durham Law School. He is the
founding editor of the Journal of Moral Philosophy and runs a popular
Political Philosophy blog called The Brooks Blog.
Simon Kirchin is Senior Lecturer in Philosophy at the University of
Kent, UK. He is President of the British Society for Ethical Theory and
co-editor of Arguing About Metaethics (Routledge, 2006).
Ethics Without
Intention
EzIO DI NUCCI
LONDON • NEW DELHI • NEW YORK • SYDNEY
Bloomsbury Academic
An imprint of Bloomsbury Publishing Plc
50 Bedford Square 1385 Broadway
London New York
WC1B 3DP NY 10018
UK USA
www.bloomsbury.com
Bloomsbury is a registered trade mark of Bloomsbury Publishing Plc
First published 2014
© Ezio Di Nucci, 2014
Ezio Di Nucci has asserted his right under the Copyright, Designs and
Patents Act, 1988, to be identified as Author of this work.
All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or
transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical,
including photocopying, recording, or any information storage or retrieval
system, without prior permission in writing from the publishers.
No responsibility for loss caused to any individual or organization acting on
or refraining from action as a result of the material in this publication can
be accepted by Bloomsbury Academic or the author.
British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data
A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library.
ISBN: HB: 978-1-4725-2300-6
PB: 978-1-4725-3296-1
ePDF: 978-1-4725-2322-8
ePub: 978-1-4725-2579-6
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
A catalog record for this book is available from the Library of Congress.
Typeset by Deanta Global Publishing Services, Chennai, India
ai miei figli, Eleonore e Francesco Paolo

CONTENTS
Preface ix
Acknowledgements x
1 Introductory remarks: We never do just one thing 1
PART ONE The Doctrine of Double Effect
13
2 Definitions first: Classic formulations of
the Doctrine 15
3 Back to the beginning: Aristotle, Aquinas and the
origins of double effect 36
PART TWO Double Effect in Theory
63
4 The Trolley Problem 65
5 An experimental approach to the permissibility
of killing one to save five 90
6 A theoretical problem with double effect:
Closeness 103
7 Kamm, Kant and double effect 132
PART THREE Double Effect in Practice
155
8 The classic application of double effect:
Collateral damages 157
viii CONTENTS
9 An experimental approach to the
distinction between intending and merely
foreseeing 177
10 Bioethical applications: The example of embryo
loss and stem cell research 188
11 What shall i do? The Doctrine cannot tell us
how we may permissibly act 198
12 Concluding remarks: Responsibility, character
and Mends 208
Notes 233
Bibliography 259
Index 265
PREFACE
This book is a critical analysis of the Doctrine of Double Effect, a
normative principle according to which sometimes an effect or conse-
quence which is not morally permissible as an intended means or end
is morally permissible as a merely foreseen side effect. Here I present
the Doctrine and offer eight arguments against it. First argument:
I show that the counterfactual test of intention fails to distinguish
between intended means and merely foreseen side effects (Chapter 2).
Second argument: I present the argument from marginally bad means,
according to which the Doctrine implausibly rules against cases where
the intended means are morally negligible (Chapter 3). Third argu-
ment: I dispute, both theoretically and empirically, the moral intui-
tions that are supposed to motivate the Doctrine, as, for example,
killing one to save five in trolley cases (Chapters 4 and 5). Fourth
argument: I show that the problem of closeness makes the Doc-
trine unworkable because we can always argue that the agent did
not intend the bad means (Chapter 6). Fifth argument: I defend a
counterexample to the Doctrine – the Loop Variant – from Frances
Kamm’s recent attempt to deal with it by arguing that means are
not necessarily intended (Chapter 7). Sixth argument: I show that
influential thought-experiments in the double effect literature, such
as Terror Bomber & Strategic Bomber, face a dilemma: either there is
no moral difference between the two consequentialistically identical
cases – so that the Doctrine draws a moral distinction without a dif-
ference – or the moral difference is explained by more fundamental
normative considerations rather than the distinction between intended
means and merely foreseen side effects (Chapters 8 and 9). Seventh
argument: I argue that the Doctrine provides no moral guidance
because it cannot tell us what to do; it is therefore a useless normative
principle (Chapter 11). Eighth argument: I argue that the Doctrine
fails even if we water it down to a responsibility- attribution principle
(Chapter 12). Summing up, this book argues that the Doctrine of
Double Effect should be abandoned.