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ETHICS AND VALUES IN APPLIED SOCIAL RESEARCH Allan J. Kimmel Applied Social Research Methods Series Volume 12 SAGE PUBLICATIONS The Publishers of Professional Social Science Newbury Park Beverly Hills London New Delhi tapyright © 1988 by Sage Publications, Inc. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced or utilized in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or by any information storage and retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publisher. For information address: SAGE Publications, Inc. 2111 West Hillcrest Drive Newbury Park, California 91320 SAGE Publications Inc. SAGE Publications Ltd. 275 South Beverly Drive 28 Banner Street Beverly Hills London EC1Y 8QE California 90212 England SAGE PUBLICATIONS India Pvt. Ltd. M-32 Market Greater Kailash I New Delhi 110 048 India Printed in the United States of America Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Kimmel, Allan J. Ethics and values in applied social research / Allan J. Kimmel. p. cm. — (Applied social research methods series; v. 12) Bibliography: p. Includes indexes. ISBN 0-8039-2631-6 ISBN 0-8039-2632-4 (pbk.) 1. Social sciences—Research—Moral and ethical aspects. I. Title. II. Series. H62.K495 1988 87-25166 300'.72—del 9 FIRST PRINTING 1988 CONTENTS Preface 7 1. Introduction 9 The Goals of Basic and Applied Science 10 Preventive Intervention: An Illustrative Example of Applied Social Research 13 Case Studies in Social Research Ethics 15 Summary 23 Recommended Readings 24 Chapter Exercises 24 2. An Overview of Ethical Problems in Social Research 26 On Being Ethical and Moral: Is There a Difference? 26 Characteristics of Ethical Problems in Social Research 30 Typology of Ethical Problems in Applied Social Research 36 Summary 40 Recommended Readings 41 Chapter Exercises 41 3. Ethical Standards and Guidelines for Social Research 42 Ethical Theories and Moral Reasoning 42 Governmental and Professional Standards 50 Summary 64 Recommended Readings 64 Chapter Exercises 64 4. Methodological Issues and Dilemmas 66 Informed Consent and Social Research 67 Ethical Issues in the Selection and Assignment of Research Participants 77 Summary 83 Recommended Readings 84 Chapter Exercises 84 5. Confidentiality and the Right to Privacy 85 The Nature and Goals of Privacy 86 The Need to Protect Individual Privacy and Confidentiality of Data 90 Strategies for Protecting Privacy and Confidentiality 97 Summary 102 Recommended Readings 103 Chapter Exercises 103 6. Special Problems in Applied Settings 104 Ethical Issues in Organizational Research 104 Ethics and Evaluation: Some Illustrative Problems 110 Unanticipated Consequences: The “Dark Side” of Prevention Research 114 Ethical Responsibilities When the Research Is Completed 117 Summary 122 Recommended Readings 123 Chapter Exercises 123 7. Attitudes and Value Commitments 124 The Role of Values in Social Research 124 Implications for Peer Review 132 Summary 136 Recommended Readings 137 Chapter Exercises 137 8. Conclusion and Recommendations 138 Summary 144 References 145 Subject Index 158 About the Author 160 P R E F A C E My first introduction to research ethics came when I was a student enrolled in an undergraduate experimental social psychology course at the University of Maryland. The American Psychological Association had just approved its current ethical guidelines for human subject research. We discussed those guidelines and their implications in class, but only after I had already begun work with a fellow student on an original experiment for which we would be graded. Consistent with most social psychological research at that time, our study was conducted in the laboratory and it involved an elaborate deception. Our newly acquired insights into the ethical imperatives of laboratory research, however, quickly caused us concern about our use of deception. We realized that it was too late in the course to redesign our experiment so that our subjects would not have to be deceived; instead, we resolved to take the subject debriefing that followed the collection of data a lot more seriously than we had done previously. Although I have never felt entirely comfortable with our decision to continue deceiving the very persons we relied on to donate their valuable time as participants in our study, I realize, in retrospect, that our pragmatic decision probably was not an atypical compromise. This book is intended to provide a discussion of and insights into ethical problems and dilemmas faced by social scientists engaged in applied social research. It was written in large part so that social researchers will be better able to anticipate ethical problems in their applied studies before they occur, in order to avoid them entirely or else become more skillful in coping with them. All too often, it seems, researchers do not fully appreciate the complexities of ethical issues and dilemmas until they are caught up in them while in the midst of conducting research. By that time, it is likely to be too late to cope effectively with the problems in a reasoned and objective manner, and less than satisfactory compromises between ethical and methodological considerations are likely to result. The book is intended primarily for advanced undergraduates, graduate students, and researchers in the social and behavioral sciences. It includes case studies and offers suggestions for resolving ethical conflicts and developing research alternatives. Throughout the book, 7 8 ETHICS AND VALUES IN APPLIED SOCIAL RESEARCH the potential conflicts between ethical and professional values are addressed so as to assess the ethical objections that have been leveled against applied social research tactics and goals. It is hoped that this discussion will contribute to a fuller understanding of the methods of social research and the organization of scientific activity. There are a number of people to thank for their assistance during the preparation of this volume. I am especially grateful to Debra Rog and Leonard Bickman, editors of the series, for giving me the opportunity to write it. They, as well as two reviewers, Thomas Murray and Greg Andranovich, commented on an earlier draft and offered a number of useful suggestions that I have tried to incorporate in the chapters that follow. I believe their suggestions have made for a fuller and richer book. Donald Campbell furnished helpful background materials, including some of the working papers he prepared for the National Commission for the Protection of Human Subjects of Biomedical and Behavioral Research. He also provided a number of enviable insights into the subtle ethical problems likely to be encountered in the conduct of preventive intervention research. Finally, I am particularly indebted to Ralph Rosnow, who served not unlike a “silent partner” in this enterprise. His many comments and repeated feedback on earlier drafts of the chapters were invaluable and he is in large part responsible for inspiring me to write the book. Allan J. Kimmel Fitchburg, Massachusetts 1 Introduction Since World War II, ethical issues in the social sciences have become a topic of growing concern as researchers try to ensure that their studies are directed toward worthwhile goals and that the welfare of their subjects and their research colleagues is protected. In recent decades, scientific and societal mechanisms and collective guidelines have evolved to provide assurance both to investigators within social science disciplines (anthropology, political science, psychology, and sociology) and to the general public that the resolution of research dilemmas will be morally acceptable. But ethical decision making depends largely on the individual researcher’s awareness and interpretation of these mechan isms and guidelines and, in many cases, the issues lack the clarity required for resolution. The ethical issues encountered in applied social research are subtle and complex, raising difficult moral dilemmas that, at least on a superficial level, appear unresolvable. These dilemmas often require the researcher to strike a delicate balance between the scientific require ments of methodology and the human rights and values potentially threatened by the research. As such, the underlying guiding research principle is to proceed both ethically and without threatening the validity of the research endeavor insofar as possible. It thus is essential that investigators continually ask how they can conduct themselves ethically and still make progress through sound and generalizable research. In subsequent chapters, current ethical standards and regula tions will be reviewed, and their implications as guiding mechanisms will be discussed in the context of dilemmas encountered in actual research cases. The intent in this first chapter is to highlight the importance of questions of ethics and values in social research. Toward that end, the goals of applied social research are described and contrasted with those of basic research endeavors, and some illustrative case studies of ethically controversial investigations in the research literature are reviewed to sensitize the reader to the importance of ethical considera tions at all stages of the research process. 9 10 ETHICS AND VALUES IN APPLIED SOCIAL RESEARCH THE GOALS OF BASIC AND APPLIED SCIENCE While sharing certain fundamental principles of research, social scientists may choose to direct their scientific activity from a “pure” or “applied” orientation. The basic distinction—albeit an oversimplified one—underlying this dichotomy is that “pure” science remains un challenged by practical, concrete social problems and issues while “applied” research is essentially atheoretical in nature (Pepitone, 1981). Individuals who limit their scientific activity to purely theoretical work unrelated in any apparent way to real-world problems are typically referred to as “basic”researchers. Basic researchers hold that the proper course of science is the objective study and ultimate solution of basic scientific questions, regardless of whether their solutions have practical applications. Around the turn of the twentieth century, social science research first became largely guided by a mechanistic paradigm or conceptual scheme borrowed—not by accident—from the experimental approach of the natural sciences. Since that time, basic researchers typically have viewed themselves as value-free “technicians,” maintaining an active role in the discovery of truth but a passive role in determining the societal use of their findings (Rosnow, 1981). The assumption underlying this position of scientific nonresponsibility was (and still is, to a large extent) that although research findings can be used for good or bad ends, knowledge is ethically neutral. Working from this value-free tradition, basic researchers generally agree that their work is objective and morally neutral (as implied by the labels “pure” and “basic”), since their goal is the disinterested and impersonal pursuit of scientific knowledge for its own sake. Some critics of the basic science tradition maintain that pure research is not value free since, in their view, it is immoral not to use the knowledge we have from theoretical research to attempt to reduce real-life social problems (e.g., Baumrin, 1970; Weber, 1949). But other critics of the supposed moral neutrality of basic science (e.g., Giddens, 1976,1979; Smith, 1978) have argued the reverse point by claiming that, in fact, there have been past abuses in applications of “pure knowledge” (such as splitting the atom and Hiroshima, in vitro fertilization and test tube babies, and the like). Further, critics contend that basic research often entails the use of unethical procedures for obtaining knowledge (as when human subjects are harmed during a theoretical study), and they INTRODUCTION 11 point out the potential destructiveness of some knowledge for personal and social life, such as the undermining of character and social customs (Luria, 1976; Smith, 1978). Thus when one considers the basic scientist’s “right to know” within a larger social perspective, it is apparent that such a right—which is an implicit assumption within the pure science framework—can conflict with the obligation to do no harm (Steininger, Newell, & Garcia, 1984). Perhaps in reaction to the apparent constraints and limited utility of a purely theoretical approach, some social scientists have made serious attempts to introduce and firmly establish social relevance into their work. In psychology, for example, a shift away from a purely theoretical approach has occurred at various stages in the development of the profession. Until World War I, psychology avoided any shift toward application in order to maintain its stature as a pure and objective science. Any tendency toward application was criticized adamantly by the more traditional basic researchers, such as E. B. Titchener, a staunch experimentalist. Titchener vigorously criticized the establishment of the behaviorism school during the 1920s for asking psychologists to trade a science for a technology that was not firmly rooted in theory (O’Donnell, 1979). Years later, William McGuire (1965, p. 139), another leading experimentalist, proclaimed that a research approach that emphasized application rather than theory was one “as inelegant and inefficient as trying to push a piece of cooked spaghetti across the table from the back end.” Since World War I, apparently in reaction to social and professional forces, the pendulum has at times swung away from pure research and toward application as opportunities emerged for an action- oriented science in psychology. However, each attempt at relevance brought with it a set of subtle, complex ethical issues that seriously threatened the ideals of scientific objectivity and moral neutrality (Rosnow, 1981). It may be that in their impatience to find relevance in their work psychologists failed to consider the ethical implications of using many of their established laboratory procedures in applied settings. Argyris (1975) has suggested, for example, that because so much scientific social psychology has been based on the manipulation and control of variables in laboratory experiments, psychologists who attempt to solve social problems do so by trying to manipulate and control variables in the natural world, perhaps inappropriately. If this assessment is valid, it is not difficult to understand why many of the ethical dilemmas en countered in theoretical laboratory research (such as those involving 12 ETHICS AND VALUES IN APPLIED SOCIAL RESEARCH informed consent, debriefing, and confidentiality) have appeared in applied settings as well. Only recently have psychologists begun to consider alternative strategies for conducting research and for producing social change, such as enlisting individuals as collaborators, rather than “subjects.” Advocates of this so-called “role play” approach maintain that the enterprise of collecting data or producing change can thus better serve the mutual interests of both psychologist and co worker participant. Other social science disciplines, such as political science, have undergone similar shifts in orientation during their development. In political science, a focus on methodology and objective inquiry gradually gave way during the 1940s to an emphasis on problems that arise in the adjustment of individuals to their society. This policy-science approach stressed that the political scientist should choose problems for study that have a bearing on the major policy issues of the time, and that are consistent with his or her values and the goals and objectives of democratic society (Lasswell, 1951). See Lerner and Lasswell(1951) and Rein (1976) for in-depth considerations of the policy approach in political science. Many individuals within the scientific community would argue that research ethics become increasingly important as the results of investiga tions acquire policy, professional, and personal implications outside the social science professions. However, this is not meant to imply that one can avoid responsibility for knowledge produced by restricting his or her scientific activity to a basic science approach. Conversely, the view that only applied research is ethical because of its assumed potential for social benefits is a short-sighted one, since some of the greatest breakthroughs in science have come about through basic theoretical research. For example, chemistry did not advance as a science until chemists shifted away from an applied end (the creation of gold) to a concern for understanding chemistry at a theoretical level (Diener & Crandall, 1978). When the dichotomy between pure and applied science is more closely evaluated, moral distinctions tend to blur. There are those who currently maintain that the “pure” versus “applied” distinction is a misconception and should be rejected (Georgoudi & Rosnow, 1985; Pepitone, 1981). According to this argument, because applied research often leads to theoretical understanding, and theoretical advances permit practical applications, the two types of research may not be as different as they initially appear. Theory does not arise in a social vacuum apart from concrete events that gave impetus to it (Sarason,