Empiricism and Experience PDF
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Empiricism and Experience Anil Gupta OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS empiricism and experience This page intentionally left blank Empiricism and Experience Anil Gupta 1 2006 1 OxfordUniversityPress,Inc.,publishesworksthatfurther OxfordUniversity’sobjectiveofexcellence inresearch,scholarship,andeducation. Oxford NewYork Auckland CapeTown DaresSalaam HongKong Karachi KualaLumpur Madrid Melbourne MexicoCity Nairobi NewDelhi Shanghai Taipei Toronto Withofficesin Argentina Austria Brazil Chile CzechRepublic France Greece Guatemala Hungary Italy Japan Poland Portugal Singapore SouthKorea Switzerland Thailand Turkey Ukraine Vietnam Copyright (cid:1)2006 byAnil Gupta PublishedbyOxfordUniversityPress,Inc. 198MadisonAvenue,NewYork,NewYork10016 www.oup.com OxfordisaregisteredtrademarkofOxfordUniversityPress Allrightsreserved.Nopartofthispublicationmaybereproduced, storedinaretrievalsystem,ortransmitted,inanyformorbyanymeans, electronic,mechanical,photocopying,recording,orotherwise, withoutthepriorpermissionofOxfordUniversityPress. LibraryofCongressCataloging-in-PublicationData Gupta,Anil Empiricismandexperience/AnilGupta. p. cm. Includesbibliographicalreferences(p.)andindex. ISBN-13978-0-19-518958-2 ISBN0-19-518958-2 1. Experience. 2. Knowledge,Theoryof. 3. Empiricism. I. Title. B105.E9G87 2006 146'.44—dc22 2005055485 1 3 5 7 9 8 6 4 2 PrintedintheUnitedStatesofAmerica onacid-freepaper To Mukta Beloved Friend This page intentionally left blank preface My principal concern in this book is to understand the logical rela- tionshipofexperiencetoknowledge.Experience,itappears,makes some contribution to our knowledge of the world. What is this contribution? Say that I look out of my window and see that it is raining.AsIlookout,Ihaveavisualexperienceandcomethereby to believe that it is raining. My belief is reasonable, and it would appear, it is so in part because of my visual experience. But how does my visual experience contribute to the reasonableness of my belief?Thisquestionhasnoeasyanswer,andIdevotechapter1to bringing into clear view the principal obstacle that must be over- comeifwearetofindasatisfactoryanswer.Itisimportanttofindan answer, for without it, we cannot assess the claims of empiricism. My approach to the problem of experience and knowledge is shaped by three convictions. The first conviction is that the classicalempiricistresponsetotheproblemdeservesrespect.Igrant that classical empiricism is unacceptable. However, in the process ofthrowingawayitsdetaileddoctrines,weshouldtakecarenotto throwawaythedisciplinewithinwhichitworksandtheproblems that it addresses. Classical empiricism, as I see it, is founded on genuine constraints and a natural idea. It is not a product of some silly little argument from illusion, or of some pathological preoc- cupation with skepticism. I argue in chapter 2 that classical em- piricism is a powerful—and inevitable—development of a natural idea.Hence,agenuinealternativetoclassicalempiricismcannotbe viii Preface obtainedcheaply.Itwillnotbefound,forexample,byreturningto the comfort of common sense, or by browsing the racks of natu- ralized psychology, or through a refuge in some sort of mythical behaviorism. I argue for all this in chapters 2 and 5. (Especially relevantarexx2Eand5B,whereIdiscussWillardV.O.Quine’sand Wilfrid Sellars’s responses to classical empiricism.) My second conviction is that the problem requires us to take seriously certain interdependencies. In chapter 4, I highlight the relevant interdependencies and go on to develop a proposal about the logical relationship of experience to knowledge. My entire approach here is guided by the work I have done on the logical theoryofinterdependentdefinitions.(Iprovideinchapter3abrief introduction to this theory.) This work has made me realize that logicalinterdependencyisnotsomethingtobeavoidedandfeared but something to be accepted and exploited. It is a common prej- udicethatlogicalinterdependencyisasourceofproblems;actually, itisoftentheroutetoasolution.Thefundamentalerrorinclassical empiricism—indeed,inalltraditionalthinkingaboutknowledge— issues, it seems to me, from its flight from interdependence. The essence of this book can be summed up thus: it is an attempt to address the concerns of the classical empiricists, within the con- straintstheywouldinsiston,butwithatooltheydidnotpossess— the logic of interdependence. It is not a new thought that classical empiricism has elements that deserve to be preserved. And, in contemporary philosophy, logical interdependence is increasingly recognizedaslegitimateandpowerful.ThewayinwhichIhaveput these two ideas together may, I hope, hold some interest. My third conviction is that this change in logical perspective yieldsapromisingempiricism,anempiricismthatdoesnotneedto bebuttressedbyidealismoranotherformofantirealism.Inchapters 5and7,Iarguethatthechangeofperspectiveyieldsanempiricism thatisviable.Thechangeprovidesempiricismwithanewtoolfor dealing with troublesome challenges. In chapters 6 and 8, I argue thattheempiricismweobtainisanattractiveone.Itdoesnotneed to make claims that earn it enemies and that embarrass its friends. Thesearetheconvictionsthatunderliethisbook.Ihaveargued forthem,butIamacutelyawarethatitisnoteasytodefendthese convictions,muchlesstoprovethem.Thisbookismerelyafirststep towardthedefense.Ihavenotclutteredthebookwithaprofusionof ‘perhaps’,‘maybe’,and‘seemstome’.Butitshouldbeunderstood that it is with great tentativeness that I put forward the theory Preface ix sketchedbelow.Theissuesaredifficultandcomplex,andindealing withthem,itisparticularlyeasytomistakeillusionforinsight.Our subject has known many an arduous program that seemed to its proponents to be insightful—indeed, to provide the only feasible approach—but that was deeply flawed in its very first steps; the entireprogramlooks,inretrospect,quixotic.Hence,itisessentialin thissubjecttoscrutinizewiththegreatestcarethefirststepsbefore onelaunchesintolongandelaborateinvestigations.Ihaveaimedto provideinthisbookonlysuchdetailsasaresufficienttodetermine thestructuralsoundnessofthepictureIpresent.Iamwellawarethat anumberofelementsinthepicture—includingthenotionsofview andadmissibility—needgreaterelaboration.Thecentralquestionis whether these elements deserve further elaboration, whether the basicplanofthetheorysurvivesacarefulfirstscrutiny.Ifthetheory is deemed quixotic, I wish to have the comfort of knowing that I sparedthereaderuselessandboringcomplexity. The book ends with a ‘‘Supplement on ‘Experience’.’’ Here, I gather together earlier remarks that clarify the concept of experi- encein play in thebook, andIhave addedsomefurther clarifying comments. Since the supplement presupposes the preceding chapters, I have placed it at the end. But it may be consulted any timethepressure ofthe question,‘‘What on earth doesthe author mean by ‘experience’?’’ becomes too great for the reader to bear. i have been thinking about the problems of experience andknowledgefromtheverybeginningofmyphilosophicalcareer. These problems were on my mind when I worked in the early months of 1980 on ideas that evolved into the revision theory of truth; my first, inchoate thoughts about the present proposal date from this period. I did not begin to develop these thoughts, however,untiltheearly1990s.Idevotedapartofmystay,in1998– 1999, at the Center for Advanced Studies in the Behavioral Sci- ences, Stanford, to working out the present proposal. I thank the Center for providing an ideal research environment, and I thank Indiana University and the Andrew W. Mellon Foundation for supportingmystaythere.Ibeganseriousworkonwritingthisbook inearly2001,andbeforetheunsettlingeventsofthefallinterrupted mywork,Ihadgooddraftsofchapters1,3,and4.(Iwroteadraftof apartofchapter2alsobutdiscardedalmostallofit.)Iwrotemuch oftherestofthebookintheacademicyear2003–2004,whenIwas on a sabbatical leave from the University of Pittsburgh. The leave
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