Empirical Philosophy of Science: Introducing Qualitative Methods into Philosophy of Science

170 Pages·2015·1.76 MB·English

by  Susann Wagenknecht

Studies in Applied Philosophy,
Epistemology and Rational Ethics
Susann Wagenknecht
Nancy J. Nersessian
Hanne Andersen E ditors
Empirical
Philosophy
of Science
Introducing Qualitative Methods into
Philosophy of Science
Studies in Applied Philosophy, Epistemology
and Rational Ethics
Volume 21
Series editor
Lorenzo Magnani, University of Pavia, Pavia, Italy
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Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México (UNAM), Coyoacan, Mexico
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Centre Cavaillès, CNRS—Ecole Normale Supérieure, Paris, France
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Lund University, Lund, Sweden
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Waterloo University, Waterloo, ON, Canada
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University of British Columbia, Vancouver, BC, Canada
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Susann Wagenknecht Nancy J. Nersessian
(cid:129)
Hanne Andersen
Editors
Empirical Philosophy
of Science
Introducing Qualitative Methods into
Philosophy of Science
123
Editors
SusannWagenknecht Hanne Andersen
Centrefor Science Studies Department for ScienceEducation
Aarhus University University of Copenhagen
Aarhus Copenhagen
Denmark Denmark
Nancy J.Nersessian
Department ofPsychology
Harvard University
Cambridge, MA
USA
ISSN 2192-6255 ISSN 2192-6263 (electronic)
Studies in AppliedPhilosophy,Epistemology and Rational Ethics
ISBN978-3-319-18599-6 ISBN978-3-319-18600-9 (eBook)
DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-18600-9
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Contents
Empirical Philosophy of Science: Introducing Qualitative Methods
into Philosophy of Science . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Susann Wagenknecht, Nancy J. Nersessian and Hanne Andersen
Part I Foundations
Prolegomena to an Empirical Philosophy of Science . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Lisa M. Osbeck and Nancy J. Nersessian
Feeling with the Organism: A Blueprint for an Empirical
Philosophy of Science. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
Erika Mansnerus and Susann Wagenknecht
Part II Case Studies
Modeling as a Case for the Empirical Philosophy of Science . . . . . . . . 65
Ekaterina Svetlova
Reductionism as an Identity Marker in Popular Science . . . . . . . . . . . 83
Hauke Riesch
An Empirical Method for the Study of Exemplar Explanations. . . . . . 105
Mads Goddiksen
Longino’s Theory of Objectivity and Commercialized Research. . . . . . 127
Saana Jukola
v
vi Contents
Part III Empirical Philosophy of Science and HPS
History and Philosophy of Science as an Interdisciplinary Field
of Problem Transfers. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 147
Henrik Thorén
Context-Dependent Anomalies and Strategies for Resolving
Disagreement. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 161
Douglas Allchin
Empirical Philosophy of Science:
Introducing Qualitative Methods
into Philosophy of Science
Susann Wagenknecht, Nancy J. Nersessian and Hanne Andersen
Abstract A growing number of philosophers of science make use of qualitative
empirical data, a development that may reconfigure the relations between philos-
ophyandsociologyofscienceandthatisreminiscentofeffortstointegratehistory
and philosophy of science. Therefore, the first part of this introduction to the
volume Empirical Philosophy of Science outlines the history of relations between
philosophyandsociologyofscienceontheonehand,andphilosophyandhistoryof
scienceontheother.Thesecondpartofthisintroductionoffersanoverviewofthe
papersinthevolume,eachofwhichisgivingitsownanswertoquestionssuchas:
Why does the use of qualitative empirical methods benefit philosophical accounts
of science? And how should these methods be used by the philosopher?
(cid:1) (cid:1)
Keywords Empirical methods Qualitative research History and philosophy of
(cid:1)
science Naturalized philosophy
S.Wagenknecht(&)
CenterforScienceStudies,AarhusUniversity,NyMunkegade118,
8000AarhusC,Denmark
e-mail:[email protected]
N.J.Nersessian
DepartmentofPsychology,HarvardUniversity,1160WilliamJamesHall,
33KirklandSt.,Cambridge02138,MA,USA
e-mail:[email protected]
H.Andersen
DepartmentforScienceEducation,ØsterVoldgade3,
1350CopenhagenK,Denmark
e-mail:[email protected]
©SpringerInternationalPublishingSwitzerland2015 1
S.Wagenknechtetal.(eds.),EmpiricalPhilosophyofScience,
StudiesinAppliedPhilosophy,EpistemologyandRationalEthics21,
DOI10.1007/978-3-319-18600-9_1
2 S.Wagenknechtetal.
1 Introduction
When philosophers of science make use of qualitative methods, they draw upon a
long and rich research tradition that is rooted in the social sciences and has grad-
uallybeenadoptedinotherfields.1Theuseofqualitativemethodsinphilosophyof
science brings philosophers in close contact with philosophically inclined social
scientistsstudyingscience,andatthesametimeitbringsforthnewperspectiveson
the classical problem of the integration of history and philosophy of science. This
introductionwillgiveanoverviewofthenewrelationstosociologyofscienceand
history of science brought about by the use of qualitative methods, and it will
shortly present the papers in the volume—each of which gives its own answer to
two questions: Why does the use of qualitative empirical methods benefit philo-
sophical accounts of science? And how should these methods be used by the
philosopher?
1.1 History and Philosophy of Science
The role that empiricalinsight can play inthe philosophy of science isextensively
debated in discussions on the relevance of historical to philosophical accounts of
science (and vice versa). The relation between history and philosophy of science
has been an issue of contention for half a century.2 In the late 1950s and early
1960s, a new historiography of science developed that aimed at describing past
scienceinitshistorical integrity ratherthan throughthelensofthepresent,andby
doing so it provided an image of science that seemed to differ from the image
entailed by standard philosophical accounts at the time. Historically inclined phi-
losophers of science therefore began suggesting that philosophy of science should
beconcernedwiththehistoricalstructureofscienceratherthanwithanahistorical,
logical structure that they saw as having little relation to the actual scientific
enterprise. In addition, they advocated that philosophers should conduct their own
historical research directed towards specificallyphilosophical questions rather than
rely on accounts developed by historians.
1While qualitative methods have gradually been adopted by many fields outside sociology, the
methodsthemselveshavealsodeveloped(forhistoriesofhowqualitativemethodshavedeveloped
andbeenreceived,seeDenzinandLincoln(2000),VidichandLyman(1994),Brinkmannetal.
(2014)).Theideaofqualitativemethodsasitisusedtodaywasestablishedduringthe1960sand
1970swhenthefirsthandbooks,textbooksandspecializedjournalsfocusedonqualitativemethods
appeared(seee.g.GlaserandStrauss1967;Filstead1970;BogdanandTaylor1975).Duringthe
1980s,theywereincreasinglyadoptedwithinpsychology,educationalresearchandareassuchas
nursingscience,andadecadelaterinhealthcareresearchmoregenerally.
2WeareherereferringprimarilytotheAnglo-Saxontraditionofhistoryandphilosophyofscience.
Inthecontinentaltradition,thehistoryoftherelationhasbeendifferent,seee.g.Gutting(1989,
2005).ForoverviewsoftheAnglo-Saxonhistory,seee.g.MauskopfandSchmaltz(2012).
EmpiricalPhilosophyofScience:IntroducingQualitativeMethods… 3
In attending to science through history, this emerging historical philosophy of
science was faced with the question whether the accounts it provided were
descriptive or prescriptive. In addressing this question Kuhn, for example, argued
that his theses about the structure of scientific revolutions should be read in both
waysatonce:hisaccountofthedevelopmentofsciencewasaprescriptivetheory,
and the reasons for taking it seriously were that scientists do in fact behave as the
theorysaystheyshould.Thismightseemcircular,butaswithanyothertheory,the
successofatheoryofthedevelopmentofscienceshouldbedependentonitsability
to explain new data that had not been involved in its initial formulation.
Parallel to the growing institutionalization of history and philosophy of science
(HPS)asafield,thediscussioncontinuedwhethertherelationbetweenhistoryand
philosophy of science really was an intimate relationship, or if it was rather just a
marriageofconvenience(seee.g.Feigl1970;McMullin1970;Giere1973;Burian
1977).3 Whereas most philosophers of science agreed that philosophy of science
had to be informed by a close attention to science, there was less agreement on
whetherthehistoryofsciencewastoplayaprivilegedrole.Argumentsinfavorof
an integrated history and philosophy of science varied from the more pragmatic
argument that early science is often more accessible than contemporary science
tomoreprincipledarguments,assertingthattopicsofaparticulartype,suchashow
science develops over time, necessarily require a historical perspective.
Another topic of discussion was how historical cases could and should be
selected and what and how philosophers could generalize from them. On the one
hand,philosopherscriticalofthehistoricalturnarguedthatifcaseswereselectedto
illustrateaphilosophicalpositionalreadydeveloped,thenitcouldbequestionedas
to how far these cases would work as support. Conversely, if starting from the
historicalcases,itwasquestionablehowmuchcouldbegeneralizedfromjustafew
or sometimes even a single case (see e.g. Pitt 2001; Burian 2001). On the other
hand, historically inclined philosophers of science argued that history of science
neither generated facts from which philosophical generalization could be induced,
nor did it generate evidence by which philosophical theories could be directly
tested.Instead,historicalcasesandphilosophicalanalyzesneedtobeintegratedina
mutual, iterative process (Chang 2012).
1.2 Beyond History: A Broader Approach to Naturalized
Philosophy
Inthefollowingdecades,thehistoricallyinclinedphilosophyofsciencecametobe
seen as just one approach of a naturalized philosophy of science. Following on
Quine’s (1969) argument for “naturalizing” epistemology by using findings from
3SeealsoNickles(1995),Schickore(2011)andthecollectionofpapersinMauskopfandSchmaltz
(2012)forlatersurveysofthedebate.