ebook img

Embracing Scientific Realism (Synthese Library, 445) PDF

249 Pages·2021·3.112 MB·English
Save to my drive
Quick download
Download
Most books are stored in the elastic cloud where traffic is expensive. For this reason, we have a limit on daily download.

Preview Embracing Scientific Realism (Synthese Library, 445)

Synthese Library 445 Studies in Epistemology, Logic, Methodology, and Philosophy of Science Seungbae Park Embracing Scientific Realism Synthese Library Studies in Epistemology, Logic, Methodology, and Philosophy of Science Volume 445 Editor-in-Chief Otávio Bueno, Department of Philosophy, University of Miami, USA Editorial Board Members Berit Brogaard, University of Miami, USA Anjan Chakravartty, University of Notre Dame, USA Steven French, University of Leeds, UK Catarina Dutilh Novaes, VU Amsterdam, The Netherlands Darrell P. Rowbottom, Lingnan University, Hong Kong Emma Ruttkamp, University of South Africa, South Africa Kristie Miller, University of Sydney, Australia The aim of Synthese Library is to provide a forum for the best current work in the methodology and philosophy of science and in epistemology. A wide variety of different approaches have traditionally been represented in the Library, and every effort is made to maintain this variety, not for its own sake, but because we believe that there are many fruitful and illuminating approaches to the philosophy of science and related disciplines. Special attention is paid to methodological studies which illustrate the interplay of empirical and philosophical viewpoints and to contributions to the formal (logical, set-theoretical, mathematical, information-theoretical, decision-theoretical, etc.) methodology of empirical sciences. Likewise, the applications of logical methods to epistemology as well as philosophically and methodologically relevant studies in logic are strongly encouraged. The emphasis on logic will be tempered by interest in the psychological, historical, and sociological aspects of science. Besides monographs Synthese Library publishes thematically unified anthologies and edited volumes with a well-defined topical focus inside the aim and scope of the book series. The contributions in the volumes are expected to be focused and structurally organized in accordance with the central theme(s), and should be tied together by an extensive editorial introduction or set of introductions if the volume is divided into parts. An extensive bibliography and index are mandatory. More information about this series at https://link.springer.com/bookseries/6607 Seungbae Park Embracing Scientific Realism Seungbae Park School of Liberal Arts Ulsan National Institute of Science and Technology Ulsan, Korea (Republic of) ISSN 0166-6991 ISSN 2542-8292 (electronic) Synthese Library ISBN 978-3-030-87812-2 ISBN 978-3-030-87813-9 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-87813-9 © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors, and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. This Springer imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Switzerland AG The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland Preface Arthur Fine declared that “the realist programme has degenerated by now to the point where it is quite beyond salvage” (Fine, 1986, p. 149). This declaration was natural in the 1980s. In 1962 and 1980, respectively, Thomas Kuhn and Bas van Fraassen published The Structure of Scientific Revolutions and The Scientific Image in which they mounted formidable objections to scientific realism. Over the past several decades, however, scientific realists have tackled the forceful objections, criticized scientific antirealism, and advanced new arguments for scientific realism. As a result, scientific realism, in my view, looks better than before. This does not mean, however, that the debate between scientific realists and antirealists has ended. It only means that scientific antirealists have the chance to sharpen their old objec- tions, to develop new objections, to diffuse the criticisms against scientific antireal- ism, and to refute the new arguments for scientific realism. In my view, the realism debate is as exciting as ever. It is a fruitful research program which constantly pro- vides researchers with enticing new topics. This book summarizes and develops the ideas that I have already put forward in journals including Axiomathes, Foundations of Science, Inquiry, Journal of General Philosophy of Science, Social Epistemology, and Studies in History and Philosophy of Science. The task of each chapter is as follows. Chapter 1 undermines several standard objections to the no-miracles argument. Chapter 2 criticizes various ver- sions of the pessimistic induction leveled against scientists, realists, and scientific theories. Chapter 3 displays epistemic and pragmatic disadvantages of scientific antirealism. Chapter 4 introduces six new arguments for scientific realism which are distinct from the no-miracles argument. Chapter 5 critically responds to five vari- ants of putative realism. Chapter 6 explores the issue of how to formulate scientific realism and antirealism. Chapter 7 argues that scientific understanding is a boon for scientific realists, but not for scientific antirealists. Chapter 8 develops a new account of scientific progress, and then explores how five rival accounts of scientific prog- ress relate to scientific realism and antirealism. Chapter 9 criticizes mathematical realism and defends mathematical antirealism. Chapter 10 attempts to establish that scientific realism is a better philosophical framework for scientific practice than is v vi Preface scientific antirealism. Chapter 11 presents several new topics for future debates between scientific realists and antirealists. My deepest intellectual debt goes to my graduate advisor, Richard Healey of the University of Arizona. This book would not exist without the graduate courses that I took from him and the undergraduate courses that I TA-ed for him. The epistemol- ogy and philosophy of mind courses that I took from Alvin Goldman also pro- foundly influenced this book. I also owe an intellectual debt to other great thinkers around the world whose papers and/or books have been inspirational to me. They include Mario Alai, Jamin Asay, Alexander Bird, Benjamin Callard, Finnur Dellsén, Simon Fitzpatrick, Philip Kitcher, Larry Laudan, Peter Lipton, Timothy Lyons, Moti Mizrahi, Alan Musgrave, Thomas Nickles, Hilary Putnam, Stathis Psillos, Samuel Ruhmkorff, Jamie Shaw, Kyle Stanford, Bas van Fraassen, and Brad Wray. My gratitude also goes to anonymous referees of Synthese Library and the journals to which I submitted my papers. Their sharp and insightful comments have been the driving force to improve my thoughts. I am also grateful to my wife (Hyegyoung Gong) and three daughters (Jihye Park, Jeongae Park, and Suzie Park) for the delight that they offered while I was writing this book. I am also thankful to Dave Truncellito and Jill Flohil for helping me on editorial matters. Last but not least, I thank Otávio Bueno, Editor-in-Chief, for inviting me to contribute to Synthese Library. Ulsan, Korea (Republic of) Seungbae Park Contents 1 In Defense of the No-Miracles Argument . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 1.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 1.2 The NMA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 1.3 Laudan’s Objection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 1.4 The Rejection of the Demand . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 1.5 IBE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 1.6 Evolutionary Theory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 1.7 The End of History Illusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 1.8 Ad Hoc . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 1.9 Empiricism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 1.10 Surrealism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 1.11 Predictive Similarity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 1.12 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 2 Critiques of the Pessimistic Induction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 2.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 2.2 The Pessimistic Induction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 2.3 Problematic Positions. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26 2.3.1 The Classic PI and IBE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26 2.3.2 The Classic PI and Evolutionary Theory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27 2.4 The Grand PI . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28 2.4.1 Four Intrinsic Problems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28 2.4.2 The PUA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29 2.4.3 The Relative PI . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32 2.4.4 The PI over Realists . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33 2.4.5 The Epistemic PI . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34 2.4.6 The Problem of Misleading Evidence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35 2.4.7 Proportional Pessimism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40 2.5 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41 References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42 vii viii Contents 3 Critiques of Scientific Antirealism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45 3.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45 3.2 The PI Over Antirealist Explanations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46 3.3 The PI Over Pessimists . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47 3.4 The PI Over Antirealists . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48 3.5 Explanation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50 3.6 Prediction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53 3.7 Two Epistemic Disadvantages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54 3.8 Epistemic Reciprocalism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56 3.9 Empiricism and the Problem of Unobserved Anomalies . . . . . . . . . 59 3.10 Constructive Empiricism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60 3.11 Gap Antirealists . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62 3.12 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63 References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64 4 Six New Arguments for Scientific Realism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67 4.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67 4.2 The Optimistic Induction Over Realists . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68 4.3 The Argument from Undiscovered Evidence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69 4.4 The Argument from Neighboring Theories . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74 4.5 The Counter-Induction for Realism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76 4.6 The English Notion of Rationality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79 4.7 The Grand Optimistic Induction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83 4.8 Tu Quoque . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84 4.9 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85 References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86 5 Critiques of Five Variants of Putative Realism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89 5.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89 5.2 Entity Realism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90 5.3 Minimal Realism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93 5.4 Axiological Realism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96 5.5 Van Fraassen’s Definition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98 5.6 Selective Realism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101 5.6.1 An Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101 5.6.2 Common Problems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102 5.6.3 Distinctive Problems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105 5.6.4 The PIs against Selective Realism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107 5.6.5 The Six New Arguments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 108 5.7 The Argument from a Bad Lot . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109 5.8 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111 References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112 6 Formulating Scientific Realism and Antirealism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115 6.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115 6.2 Formulational vs. Epistemological . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 116 6.3 Wide and Narrow Formulations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 120 Contents ix 6.4 Epistemic, Attributive, and Conditional Formulations. . . . . . . . . . . 122 6.5 A Pragmatic Advantage of the Epistemic Formulation . . . . . . . . . . 126 6.6 Conceptual and Empirical Objections . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 127 6.7 Doxastic Conditionalism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 128 6.8 Acceptance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 131 6.9 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 132 References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 133 7 Scientific Realism and Scientific Understanding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 135 7.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 135 7.2 No Belief? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 136 7.2.1 Belief and Understanding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 136 7.2.2 Acceptance and Understanding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 137 7.2.3 Empiricism and Understanding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 140 7.3 No Justification? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 142 7.3.1 The Episode of Einstein . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 142 7.3.2 Explanation or Prediction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 145 7.4 No Truth? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 146 7.4.1 Models . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 146 7.4.2 Past Theories . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 148 7.4.3 Anti-epistemism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 150 7.5 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 151 References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 152 8 Scientific Realism and Scientific Progress . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 155 8.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 155 8.2 The Historical Episode of Semmelweis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 156 8.3 The Problem-Solving Account . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 158 8.4 The Semantic Account . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 159 8.5 The Noetic Account . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 161 8.6 The Epistemic Account . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 161 8.7 The Evidential Account . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 163 8.7.1 Content . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 163 8.7.2 A Comparison with the Problem-Solving Account . . . . . . . 166 8.7.3 A Comparison with the Semantic Account . . . . . . . . . . . . . 167 8.7.4 A Comparison with the Noetic Account . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 168 8.7.5 A Comparison with the Epistemic Account . . . . . . . . . . . . . 169 8.7.6 Objections and Replies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 170 8.8 Relationships to Realism and Empiricism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 171 8.9 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 174 References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 175 9 Scientific Realism and Mathematical Realism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 177 9.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 177 9.2 Mathematical Realism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 178 9.3 The Abstract World . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 179 9.3.1 The Argument from Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 179

See more

The list of books you might like

Most books are stored in the elastic cloud where traffic is expensive. For this reason, we have a limit on daily download.