Elements of a Critical Theory of Justice

252 Pages·2013·1.505 MB·English

by  Gustavo Pereira (auth.)

Elements of a Critical Theory of Justice
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Elements of a Critical
Theory of Justice
Gustavo Pereira
Universidad de la República, Uruguay
© Gustavo Pereira 2013
Softcover reprint of the hardcover 1st edition 2013 978-1-137-26337-7
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in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988.
First published 2013 by
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ISBN 978-1-349-44255-3 ISBN 978-1-137-26338-4 (eBook)
DOI10.1057/9781137263384
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Contents
Preface and Acknowledgements vii
Introduction 1
Part I Models of Justice and Recognition 9
I.1 Justice and Recognition: Two Models 11
I.1.1 Fraser’s approach 12
I.1.2 Honneth’s approach: struggle for recognition 17
I.2 Evaluation of Fraser’s and Honneth’s Normative
Approaches 23
I.2.1 Limitations of Fraser’s approach 25
I.2.2 Limitations of Honneth’s approach 32
I.2.3 Towards a critical theory of justice 37
Part II Foundations for a Critical Theory of Justice
and Reciprocal Recognition Autonomy 43
II.1 Foundation and Application 45
II.1.1 The renewal of critical theory 45
II.1.2 Recognition and foundation 50
II.1.3 Foundation and application 55
II.2 Reciprocal Recognition Autonomy as a Decentred
Autonomy 61
II.2.1 Reciprocal recognition autonomy as a decentred
autonomy 62
II.2.2 Autonomy and self-reflection 68
II.2.3 Differentiated autonomy and the requirements
of practical contexts 75
Part III Scope, Metrics and Principles of Justice 81
III.1 Conceptions of Justice and Reciprocal Recognition
Autonomy 83
III.1.1 Conceptions and metrics of justice 83
v
vi Contents
III.1.2 Capabilities and primary goods: the best
metric for a critical theory of justice 93
III.2 Principles and Scope of Justice 103
III.2.1 What a theory of social justice provides 104
III.2.2 Principles of justice 114
III.2.3 Choice and responsibility 123
III.3 The Background of Application 137
III.3.1 Reified concepts 138
III.3.2 Multidimensional concepts: common
understandings and poverty 144
III.3.3 Pathological instrumental reason 153
III.3.4 Egalitarian ethos 164
Part IV Democratic Ethical Life and Its Promotion 173
IV.1 Democratic Ethical Life and Public Reason 175
IV.1.1 Democratic ethical life 176
IV.1.2 Public reason and civic equality 178
IV.1.3 Public reason and deliberation 182
IV.1.4 Dissent as virtuous behaviour 186
IV.2 Narrative, Emotions and Democratic Ethical Life 194
IV.2.1 The social function of narratives 194
IV.2.2 Rational emotions 199
IV.2.3 Educable emotions 203
IV.2.4 Compassion and public reason 207
Notes 214
Index 241
Preface and Acknowledgements
Our contemporary world is experiencing a great paradox. As never
before in human history, there are now enough goods and resources to
ensure every human being’s basic needs to lead a decent life. However,
universal access to those goods and resources is far from achieved.
Continued inequality reinforces the priority of translating social justice
into political practice. Yet there is a wide gap between the intense
concern and debate of philosophers on social justice and their trans-
lation into the institutional design and policymaking of actual socie-
ties. This situation requires shifting the focus of social justice from the
formulation of ideal theories of justice to their application, though this
is only possible with the right guide, one that has a solid theoretical
foundation and justified normative criteria.
The fact that I live on the world’s most socio-economically unequal
continent is probably what drives my own feelings of urgency. Poverty,
marginalization, oppression and social exclusion are all too common
in many Latin American countries, and these unbearable and offen-
sive situations have led me in my attempts to contribute to counter-
acting them. That is the aim of this book, and in writing it I offer
English-speaking readers what I consider the main elements of a crit-
ical theory of justice. This is the result of the work I have developed on
social justice, beginning with my previous books, published in Spanish,
Condenados a la desigualdad extrema (‘Doomed to Extreme Inequality’,
2007) and Las voces de la igualdad (‘The Voices of Equality’, 2010). In
this process I have benefited and learnt from many discussions with
many scholars: their comments, questions and objections have led to
the current formulation of my approach. I would like to thank some of
them: Adela Cortina has a special place for influencing my thought in
the commitment to application and the real transformation of actual
societies. Together with Andrea Vigorito we have founded the inter-
disciplinary group Ethics, Justice and Economics at Universidad de
la República, in which economists, lawyers and philosophers pursue
research on topics of social justice. Many of the discussions we have
processed are part of this book, so the voices of Gianella Bardazano,
Ana Fascioli, Martín Fleitas, Ricardo Marquisio, Helena Modzelewski,
Agustín Reyes, Andrés Rius, Alejandra Umpiérrez and Gonzalo Salas
are present.
vii
viii Preface and Acknowledgements
Among the colleagues to whom I am very grateful and indebted
for their comments and helpful remarks are Sabine Alkire, Miguel
Andreoli, Kathya Araujo, Luiz Araújo, André Berten, Gerald A. Cohen,
Flavio Comin, Jesús Conill, David Crocker, Sevérine Deneulin, Paulette
Dieterlen, Rainer Forst, Andrés de Francisco, Domingo García-Marzá,
Roberto Gargarella, Stefan Gosepath, Axel Grosseries, Axel Honneth,
Hans-Christoph Merle, Nythamar de Oliveira, Carlos Pereda, Alessandro
Pinzani, Mozzafar Qizilbash, Henry Richardson, Faviola Rivera, Juan
Carlos Siurana, Frances Stewart, Carlos Thiebaut, Álvaro de Vita and
Philippe Van Parijs.
A special word of thanks goes to Linda Dorow, who copyedited the
initial manuscript, making it sound much more fluent in English than
my original formulation.
My family has supported all the work I devoted to the book, in partic-
ular my wife, Helena, who read and corrected the manuscript. After
many months of very intense work, I just look forward to sharing with
my sons and Helena our afternoons rowing in the sea at Playa Hermosa.
I dedicate this book to them and to my parents, in memory of my loving
mother.
Introduction
Our self-understanding as beings that must be equally treated and
considered is one of the legacies of Modernity – and the one that has
had greatest impact over time. This can be taken as an unsurpassable
normative ideal of contemporary societies. Our self-understanding as
equals is based on the intrinsic worth that we have as persons, so we
must always be considered an end and never only a means. This end,
with no relative worth but with intrinsic worth, is what Kant called
dignity.
Dignity is the base that sustains equality among people. If every
person is an end in himself or herself, rather than a means to someone
else’s ends, and all persons are entitled to equal dignity, then equality
must have a special place in the architecture of moral philosophy. In
addition, we can affirm that the idea of equality has enough normative
potential not only to explain the current demands for justice but also
to explain those that have historically emerged and, in particular, to
provide guidance in identifying which future transformations in social
institutions should be made in order to achieve that ideal.
It is due to the internal relationship between dignity and equality that
an egalitarian way of securing dignity has been necessary. This has been
provided, for instance, through the guarantees of a set of fundamental
rights, a set of fair means – the development of elementary capabilities,
or fair access to opportunities. The majority of these feasible answers
to the requirement of ensuring equal dignity generated, in the 1970s, a
theoretical reflexive field that interpreted the demand of guaranteeing
equal dignity as providing the best theory of justice.
In the 1990s, an important discussion arose in moral and political
philosophy. Its starting point, a critique of the approaches that had
been at the core of the debate about justice, was presented from the
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