Duns Scotus on Time and Existence: The Questions on Aristotle's 'De interpretatione' PDF
Preview Duns Scotus on Time and Existence: The Questions on Aristotle's 'De interpretatione'
duns scotus on Tıme & Exıstence DUNS SCOTUS ON TIME & EX ISTENCE The Questions on Aristotle’s “De interpretatione” R Translated with introduction and commentary by Edward Buckner and Jack Zupko The Catholic University of America Press Washington, D.C. Copyright © 2014 The Catholic University of America Press All rights reserved The paper used in this publication meets the minimum requirements of American National Standards for Information Science—Permanence of Paper for Printed Library Materials, ANSI Z39.48-1984. ∞ Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Duns Scotus, John, approximately 1266–1308. [Quaestiones in Aristotelis libros I-II Perihermenias. English] Duns Scotus on time and existence : the questions on Aristotle’s On interpretation / translated with introduction and commentary by Edward Buckner and Jack Zupko. pages cm Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 978-0-8132-2603-3 (cloth : alk. paper) 1. Aristotle. De interpretatione. 2. Logic—Early works to 1800. 3. Language and languages—Philosophy—Early works to 1800. I. Buckner, Edward, 1955– translator. II. Title. B439.D8613 2014 160—dc23 2014016451 Contents Acknowledgments ix Abbreviations xi Introduction 1 Translation Opus I 25 Question 1. What Is the Subject of On Interpretation? 25 Question 2. Do Names Signify Things, or Species in the Mind? 28 Question 3. Does a Change Occur in the Signification of an Utterance Given That a Change Has Occurred in the Thing Signified? 39 Question 4. Does Aristotle Designate an Appropriate Difference between Inscriptions and Utterances, and Affections and Things? 43 Questions 5. Is a Common Term Said Univocally of Existing Things and Non-Existing Things? 45 Question 6. Are There Any Supposita Belonging Simpliciter to a Common Term Signifying a True Nature, apart from Things That Exist? 47 Question 7. Are the Propositions ‘Caesar is a man’ and ‘Caesar is an animal’ True When Caesar Does Not Exist? 49 Question 8. Are the Propositions ‘A man is a man’ and ‘Caesar is Caesar’ True When Neither of Them Exists? 52 Question 9. Does a Common Term Suppositing with a Present- Tense Verb Supposit Only for Presently Existing Things? 67 Question 10. In a Past-Tense Proposition, Does the Subject Stand Only for Things That Were, and in a Future-Tense Proposition, Only for Things That Will Be? 70 Question 11. Is a Common Term Distributed for Any of Its Supposita Simpliciter in Every Proposition in Which Some Immediate Contracting Term Is Not Added to It? 71 Question 12. Is ‘Caesar is a man’ True When Caesar Does Not Exist? 83 Question 13. Can a Common Term Be Restricted? 87 vi Contents Opus II. Questions on the Two Books of Perihermenias: On Book I 96 Prologue 96 Question 1. Does a Name Signify a Thing or an Affection? 98 Question 2. Does a Name Signify a Thing Univocally When the Thing Is Existing and When It Is Not? 106 Question 3. Do Truth and Falsity Only Concern Composition and Division? 110 Question 4. Does an Indefinite Name Posit Something, Such That the Predication of the Being of That Thing Is Required? 113 Questions 5. Is the Verb ‘Is’ Only a Copula of the Predicate with the Subject? 119 Question 6. Is a Present-Tense Verb a Copula for the Present ‘Now’ or Indifferently for Anything Present? 121 Question 7. Is a Proposition about the Future Determinately True or False? 131 Question 8. Is ‘a will be’ Now Determinately True? 132 Question 9. Is It Possible That Neither Part of a Contradiction Is True? 133 Opus II. Questions on the Two Books of Perihermenias: On Book II 142 Question 1. Does an Indefinite Verb Remain Indefinite in a Sentence? 142 Question 2. Does ‘This is not just; therefore, this is non-just’ Follow? 147 Question 3. Does a Consequence of This Sort Hold for Relational Terms? 149 Question 4. [Does a Consequence of This Sort] Hold with Past-Tense Verbs: First, Would ‘It was non-white; therefore, it was not white’ Follow? 149 Question 5. Conversely, [Does a Consequence of This Sort] Follow, Assuming the Constant Existence of the Subject? 150 Questions 6. Is ‘A white man runs’ One? 153 Question 7. Is ‘A white thing is musical’ One? 155 Question 8. Is ‘A white man is a musical man’ One? 156 Question 9. Is ‘A man, who is white, runs’ One? 157 commentary Opus I 169 Question 1. What Is the Subject of On Interpretation? 169 Question 2. Do Names Signify Things, or Species in the Mind? 172 Question 3. Does a Change Occur in the Signification of an Utterance Given That a Change Has Occurred in the Thing Signified? 187 Contents vii Question 4. Does Aristotle Designate a Proper Difference between Inscriptions and Utterances, and Affections and Things? 194 Questions 5–8. Summary Outline 197 Question 5. Is a Common Term Said Univocally of Existing Things and Non-Existing Things? 197 Question 6. Are There Any Supposita Belonging Simpliciter to a Common Term Signifying a True Nature, apart from Things That Exist? 202 Question 7. Are the Propositions ‘Caesar is a man’ and ‘Caesar is an animal’ True When Caesar Does Not Exist? 206 Question 8. Are the Propositions ‘A man is a man’ and ‘Caesar is Caesar’ True When Neither of Them Exists? 213 Questions 9–11. Summary Outline 230 Question 9. Does a Common Term Suppositing with a Present-Tense Verb Supposit Only for Presently Existing Things? 231 Question 10. In a Past-Tense Proposition, Does the Subject Stand Only for Things That Were, and in a Future-Tense Proposition, Only for Things That Will Be? 238 Question 11. Is a Common Term Distributed for Any of Its Supposita without Qualification in Every Proposition in Which Some Immediate Contracting Term Is Not Added to It? 241 Question 12. Is ‘Caesar is a man’ True When Caesar Does Not Exist? 254 Question 13. Can a Common Term Be Restricted? 260 Opus II. Questions on the Two Books of Perihermenias: On Book I 274 Prologue 274 Question 1. Does a Name Signify a Thing or an Affection? 276 Question 2. Does a Name Signify a Thing Univocally When the Thing Is Existing and When It Is Not? 283 Question 3. Do Truth and Falsity Only Concern Composition and Division? 288 Question 4. Does an Indefinite Name Posit Something, Such That the Predication of the Being of That Thing Is Required? 292 Question 5. Is the Verb ‘Is’ Only a Copula of the Predicate with the Subject? 299 Question 6. Is a Present-Tense Verb a Copula for the Present ‘Now,’ or Indifferently, for Anything Present? 302 Questions 7–9: Future Propositions and Truth 317 Question 7. Is a Proposition about the Future Determinately True or False? 320 Question 8. Is ‘A will be’ Now Determinately True? 321 Question 9. Is It Possible That Neither Part of a Contradiction Is True? 323 viii Contents Opus II. Questions on the Two Books of Perihermenias: On Book II 331 Question 1. Does an Indefinite Verb Remain Indefinite in a Sentence? 331 Questions 2–5: On Inferential Relations between Propositions Containing Definite versus Indefinite Terms 335 Question 2. Does ‘This is not just; therefore, this is non-just’ Follow? 340 Question 3. Does a Consequence of This Sort Hold for Relational Terms? 343 Question 4. [Does a Consequence of This Sort] Hold with Past-Tense Verbs: First, Would ‘It was non-white; therefore, it was not white’ Follow? 344 Question 5. Conversely, [Does a Consequence of This Sort] Follow, Assuming the Constant Existence of the Subject? 345 Questions 6–9. The Unity and Complexity of Propositions 349 Question 6. Is ‘A white man runs’ One? 350 Question 7. Is ‘A white thing is musical’ One? 352 Question 8. Is ‘A white man is a musical man’ One? 353 Question 9. Is ‘A man, who is white, runs’ One? 354 Bibliography 365 Index of Names 377 General Index 381 Acknowledgments The present translation was made possible by the appearance in 2004 of the critical edition of Scotus’s Quaestiones in Libros Perihermenias Aristotelis—edited by Robert Andrews, Girard Etzkorn, the late Fr. Gedeon Gál, OFM, Romuald Green, OFM, Timothy Noone, Roberto Plevano, Andrew Traver, and Rega Wood—in volume II of the Opera Philosophica of Blessed John Duns Scotus, jointly published by the Franciscan Institute of St. Bonaventure University and the Catholic University of America. Along with the entire scholarly community, we owe a debt of gratitude to the editorial team for making available to present and future Scotus scholars a reliable, modern edition of the Perihermenias along with other important writings. We are also grateful to the publishers for permit- ting us to use the critical edition as the basis for our translation. We began translating Scotus’s commentaries on De interpretatione separate- ly, but were alerted to each other’s efforts early on thanks to the intervention of Tim Noone. The difficulty of the text made it advisable to work together, which is what we did, to the point where it is now no longer easy to identify who wrote what. Our procedure was for one of us to translate and the other to revise the translation, alternating our roles for each question. But the revisions inevitably prompted discussion, which led to further revisions and further discussion until we were confident we had the text right, or at least that we had provided our best rendition of what we took Scotus to be saying. Any remaining uncertainties are flagged and discussed in the translation. During the five years that we worked on the translation, we encountered many passages that were challenging not only linguistically, but also in terms of their underlying historical and doctrinal context. Here we freely availed ourselves of the scholarship of others, especially concerning the Oxford logic scene in the ix
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