DTIC ADA597085: Conquering the Elements: Thoughts on Joint Force (Re)Organization

16 Pages·0.12 MB·English

by  Defense Technical Information Center

Conquering the Elements:
Thoughts on
Joint Force (Re)Organization
MICHAEL P. NOONAN and MARK R. LEWIS
©2003MichaelP.NoonanandMarkR.Lewis
O
peration Iraqi Freedom demonstrated, or should have demonstrated, that
jointwarfighting—thatis,thesynergisticapplicationoftheuniquecapabili-
tiesofeachservicesothatthenetresultisacapabilitythatisgreaterthanthesum
oftheparts—isnotjustthemantraoftheDepartmentofDefense,butis,infact,a
reality. Nevertheless, as successful as Operation Iraqi Freedom was, the depart-
mentmighttaketheconceptofjointoperationstostillanotherlevel.IfOperation
IraqiFreedomprovidedtheobserverwithglimpsesofinnovative,task-organized
unitssuchastheArmy’seliteDeltaForcespecialmissionsunitworkingwithapla-
toonofM1Abramsmainbattletanksandcloseairsupport,westillseeasegmenta-
tionofthebattlespacethatcreatesunnaturalseams,inhibitingthefullpotentialofa
jointforce.Howdoesthissquarewithfuturejointoperationalconcepts?Canthe
current architecture of joint force command and control arrangements react re-
sponsively and effectively to the threat environment that exists today and will
likelyconfrontourforcesinthefuture?Isthereabetterway?Inthisarticle,wewill
explore those questions as we look at alternative joint force architectures that
mightbetterunleashthefullcapabilityoftheDepartmentofDefense.
The Paths to Military Innovation
Insimpleterms,statespreparetheirmilitariesforthefuturebyrework-
ing,reequipping,orredesigningtheirforcestobettermeettheirsecurityneeds,
todevelopdecisivemeans,ortoensuretheircompetitiveleadinmilitarycapabil-
ities. “Transformation” is the pursuit of such an increase in military capability,
andtheDOD’sTransformationPlanningGuidancetellsusthatitisa“strategic
imperative”fortheUSmilitarytotransform.
Autumn2003 31
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Standard Form 298 (Rev. 8-98)
Prescribed by ANSI Std Z39-18
The Transformation Planning Guidance defines transformation as “a
processthatshapesthechangingnatureofmilitarycompetitionandcooperation
through new combinations of concepts, capabilities, people, and organizations
thatexploitournation’sadvantagesandprotectagainstourasymmetricvulnera-
bilitiestosustainourstrategicposition.”1Eachofthefourcomponentsoftrans-
formation can be seen as a path or axis along which one might proceed toward
militaryinnovation,eitherseparatelyorinconjunctionwithajourneydownone
ormoreoftheotherpaths.Inordertoputourdiscussionwithinabroaderframe-
work,eachofthepathsbearscloserexaminationattheoutsetofthisarticle.
(cid:1) Concepts. New operational concepts seek to create synergies be-
tweentheaerospace,ground,andmaritimeforces.Thedevelopmentoftheblitz-
kriegdoctrineofrapidmechanizedwarfaresupportedbycloseairsupportisthe
oft-citedprimeexampleofanewoperationalconcept.
(cid:1) Capabilities. In a limited sense, new capabilities derive from new
technologies.Clearly,technologyplaysapivotalroleinmilitarytransformation.
The arrival of the tank and FM radio transformed the battlefield (which in turn
enabledthedevelopmentofthetransformationalblitzkriegconcept),andnuclear
weapons completely changed the face of warfare. Today, advances in precision
strike weapons and information technology have enabled the military to do
things never before contemplated. Indeed, the destruction of a regime no longer
requiresthedestructionofasociety.Technologyplaysakeyroleinmanyofthe
service transformation visions, from the Air Force’s super-stealthy F-22 fighter
totheArmy’sfuturecombatsystemandtheNavy’sefforttotransformballistic-
missilesubmarinesintoland-attackplatforms.
(cid:1) People.Oneaspectoftransformationislearningtousethecomplex
technologiesproperly.Itisnotenoughtopresentnewtechnologyandsimplyin-
structservicemembersinthetechnicaloperationofthenewsystems.Blending
the skill and experience of high-quality people with functional technology is
whatproducesagainincombatcapability,andthecontinualprocessofassess-
ing, recruiting, and retaining those people will require a transformation in the
waytheDefenseDepartmentapproachespersonnelchallenges.
(cid:1) OrganizationalChanges.Organizationalchangesseektogivecom-
mandersmoreoptionsbyoptimizingtheirassetsinwaysbestsuitedtocarryout
MichaelP.NoonanisDeputyDirectoroftheProgramonNationalSecurityStudies
andaResearchFellow(DefensePolicy)attheForeignPolicyResearchInstitute.ACap-
tainintheArmyReserve,heholdsaffiliationswiththeInstituteforDefenseAnalyses,
theInternationalInstituteforStrategicStudies,theInter-UniversitySeminaronArmed
ForcesandSociety,andTempleUniversity’sCenterfortheStudyofForceandDiplomacy.
MarkR.LewisisamemberoftheStrategy,Forces,andResourcesDivisionattheIn-
stituteforDefenseAnalyses.Hepreviouslyservedovertenyearsonactivedutywiththe
USArmy,inspecialoperationsandinfantryassignments.
32 Parameters
tasks. At its heart, it is about assigning the right resources (human or materiel)
to a command and control architecture properly structured to achieve mission
accomplishment. The development of the Greek phalanx or the Napoleonic
division—both of which provided a clear battlefield advantage over similarly
equippedenemies—canbeseenasexemplarsoforganizationalchange.
Militaryforcesarecomplexadaptivesystemsthataresensitivetoper-
turbations that can produce unintended consequences throughout the system.
Adjustmentsinanyofthefourcomponentsoftransformationcannotbefullyun-
derstood without experimentation. Joint force experimentation brings together
eachofthefourpathsdiscussedabove.2Thechallenge,however,asBarryPosen
notes,isthatinnovationisgenerallyunsuccessfulabsentamajorwartimedefeat
ortheconcertedeffortsofcivilianpolicymakers.3Thisissimplybecausethecul-
turesandbureaucraticinterestsoftheservicesmakethoseorganizationsdifficult
tochange.4AsThomasMahnkenhaspointedout,“Becauserevolutionsinmili-
tary affairs disrupt long-standing norms and structures, it is not surprising that
organizationalresistancetochangeisoneofthemostformidablebarrierstoin-
novation.”5Clearly,waitingforamajorwartimedefeatisundesirable.Likewise,
theserviceshaveshowntheabilitytostalwartlyresistconcertedeffortstomake
themchange.Withthisinmind,wenextturntoanexaminationofjointnessand
theindividualservices.
The Evolution of Jointness
Thespecificclimatesinwhichtheservicescarryouttheiroperational
assignmentsdirectlyshapeboththeiroutlookonwarandpeaceandthosetools
with which they equip themselves.6 Throughout most of its history, the United
Stateshaspracticedwarfarethatwasmoreeasilycompartmentalizedbythena-
ture of its dimension or medium. Each service had a distinct role and operated
nearlyindependently:theNavylaidclaimtoblue-wateroperations,theMarine
Corps developed itself into an expeditionary force, and the Army focused on
large-scalegroundwarfare.WiththerelativelylatearrivaloftheAirForce,that
service built its doctrine around the belief that bombers could collapse the en-
emy’s will as they collapsed his cities, and thus strategic airpower trumped the
other services, relegating them to operations on the periphery. As recently as
WorldWarII,many,ifnotmost,ofthebattleswereeitherprimarilyland(theEu-
ropean campaign), primarily maritime (the Pacific campaign), or primarily air
(theBattleofBritainorthestrategicbombingofGermany’sindustrialcenters).
Historically,therefore,militarycampaignsconductedalongthelinesofthesepa-
rate services are understandable. The separateness of military operations into
differentmediumsisanassumptionbornfromhistory.
Even as changes in the strategic context began to drive the need for
morepreciseapplicationsofcombatpower,bureaucraticstrugglesoverbudget-
arydivisions,contradictoryadvice,andoperationalinefficiencieswithintheDe-
partment of Defense brought about calls for “jointness.” The passage of the
Autumn2003 33
Goldwater-Nicholslegislationof1986(andsubsequentlegislationdealingwith
specialoperationsforces)soughttochangethewaythedepartmentdidbusiness.
This legislation came about largely because interservice rivalry had hindered
military effectiveness in operations such as the Iranian hostage rescue attempt
(1980)andtheinvasionofGrenada(1983).7
Atitscore,thelegislationempoweredregionalCombatantCommand-
erswithcommandandcontrolresponsibilityfortheirgeographicarea,8strength-
ened the role of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and made joint
assignments a prerequisite for selection to general or flag rank. The logic was
simpleenough:astrengthenedwarfightingchainofcommandstaffedbyofficers
experiencedinworkingwiththeircounterpartsfromtheotherserviceswouldin-
creasetheoperationaleffectivenessoftheUSmilitarywritlarge.Reality,how-
ever,oftentrumpslogic.
The invasion of Panama (1989) and the Persian Gulf War (1990-91)
werelargelydescribedasexemplarsofjointoperationsfollowingthepassageof
the Goldwater-Nichols legislation. In reality, these conflicts were fought along
servicelines.TheMarinesoperatedintheirsectors,theArmyinotherareas,and
specialoperationsforcesinyetotherareas.Similarly,aviationfromallfourser-
vicesgenerallyhadtheirownareasofresponsibility,withtheAirForceusually
preferring to “go downtown” to attack strategic targets in pursuit of air-war-
specificobjectives.
IftheUnitedStateshandilywonthoseconflicts,thenwhyistruejoint
warfightingimportant?Principally,theanswerisbecauseinmostcircumstances
thecoordinated,complementaryuseofcross-servicecapabilitiesallowsforthe
mostefficientuseofforce.TwochangeshaveaffectedthewayUSforcesfight.
First,technologynowallowstheservicestocommunicateandshareinformation
quickly,enablingthemtoworkmorecloselytogether.This,combinedwithad-
vancesinmunitions,hasthepotentialtocreateasynergyamongtheservicesand
yieldgreatercombatpowerinsmallerforcepackagesthaneverbefore.Second,
ashasbeenpointedout,mostofourconflictshaveproventoberelativelysmall
(but operationally complex) wars—with or without strategic consequences.9
More and more frequently, we are seeing the nature of warfare transition from
an endeavor aimed at whole nations or societies to conflicts that require the
UnitedStatestoemploymilitarypowerwithexactingprecisionagainstportions
ofasociety,muchlikeasurgeonwhocutsoutacanceroustumorfromotherwise
healthytissue.
Technologies, organizations, and operational concepts have evolved
over time, and the assumptions that drove the separation of conflicts into land,
maritime, and air dimensions are no longer valid. The continued acceptance of
theseassumptions,however,iscreatingaconflictwithinthejointoperationalar-
chitecture.ThelocalizedandintensenatureofUSmilitaryengagementoverthe
pastdecade,combinedwiththesmallerbaseoftroopsandequipmentfromwhich
todrawcapabilities,meansthattheservicesmustworkmorecloselytogetherto
34 Parameters
produce a synergistic effect. The challenge is that organizational barriers hinder
the optimal use of our forces, even after 16 years of the jointness Goldwater-
Nicholswasdesignedtopromote.Thisisbecauseweareseeingtheemergenceof
new,“transformational”operationalconcepts.AsGeneralTommyFranks,com-
manderofUSforcesinbothAfghanistanandIraqnoted,inthoseconflicts,“For
thefirsttime,wehadreliantoperations,whereoneserviceisreliantontheperfor-
mance of another service. I believe that is transformational.”10 As effective as
thoseforceswere,tomaximizetheirpotential,theseconceptsrequireaconcurrent
changeinorganizationalstructures.AirForceChiefofStaffGeneralJohnJumper
describedsomeoftheexistingstructuralbarrierscolorfully,whenhesaid:
Yougointoan[AerospaceOperationsCenter]today,andwhatwillyousee?Tribal
representativessittingdowninfrontoftribalworkstations,interpretingtribalhi-
eroglyphicstotherestofuswhoareonwatch.Andthenwhathappens?Theystand
upandwalkovertoanothertribalrepresentative,andrevealtheirhieroglyphics,
whicharetranslatedbytheothertribeintoitsownhieroglyphicsandenteredinto
its own workstation. What if machines talked to one another? That would break
downthestovepipe.11
Joint Forces Today
Tounderstandwherethoseorganizationalbarrierslieandhowtheycon-
strainforcesinmodernoperations,itisnecessarytofirstlookathowCombatant
Commandersorganizethejointforcenow.Today,whenadirectmilitaryresponse
is required, a Combatant Commander has the option of delegating the authority
necessarytoasubordinatecommander.Thesesubordinateorganizationsare“Joint
TaskForces,”andtheircommandersare“JointForceCommanders.”Eachservice
thenformsacomponentcommandthroughwhichitfulfillsitsresponsibilitiesun-
der US Code Title 10 by providing trained and ready forces to the joint force.
SometimestheJointTaskForcehasservice-basedcomponentforcesasthesubor-
dinatecommands,butoftentheJTFCommanderchoosestoorganizeunderfunc-
tionalsubordinatecommanders.Functionalcomponentsarecreatedwhentwoor
more services operate within the same “dimension or medium.” For instance, a
JointForceLandComponentCommanderisresponsiblefor“theproperemploy-
mentof...landforces;planningandcoordinatinglandoperations;oraccomplish-
ingsuchoperationalmissions.”12Asaresult,bothArmyandMarinegroundforces
areusuallyassignedtohiscommand.Similarly,bothAirForceandNavyaircraft
areusuallymembersoftheJointForceAirComponentCommand.Inthesecases,
the Joint Force Commander generally draws the functional component com-
manderfromthecomponentthatprovidesthebulkoftheassetstothecommand.
ThisorganizationisdepictedinFigure1,onthefollowingpage.
Thisconcepthasledtoajointforceorganizedtoachieveunityofcom-
mand—oneofthePrinciplesofWar13—inland,maritime,andaerospacestove-
pipes.Operationsdonotbecome“joint”untilthecomponentcommand,orthree-
Autumn2003 35
President
Military
SecretaryofDefense
Departments
Chairman,JCS
CombatantCommander
JointTaskForceCommander
JointLandForces JointAirForces JointMaritimeForces JointSpecial
Component Component Component OperationsTask
Commander Commander Commander Force
TrainedandReadyForces
Deptofthe Deptofthe Deptofthe
Army AirForce Navy
Figure1.Jointcomponentcommandstoday.
starflagofficer,level.Thiscreatessituationssuchasthefourseparatewarsalong
component or service lines in Desert Storm, for instance; and the example of
Mogadishu,wherespecialoperationsforcesandmainforceunitsworkedinde-
pendently; and how Operation Anaconda in Afghanistan appears to have been
hamperedbyaseriousdisconnectbetweenlandandairforces.14
Therefore,atleasttwochallengesarisefromthisjointarchitecture.The
firstisthatitcreatesanartificialwedgeorseambetweencomponentsintoday’s
multi-dimensionaloperations.Thesecondisthatjointnesskeptatthethree-star
level does not support emerging operational concepts using smaller, dispersed
forces,bothonthegroundandintheair.
Challenge#1:ModernOperationsAreMulti-Dimensional
Modern operations no longer occur in a single dimension or medium.
Segmentationbymediumordimensionwasalogicalapproachwhenservicesop-
eratedseparately(largelybycircumstance),butitnolongerfacilitatesmilitary
effectiveness. Now one must consider the changes in information technology,
precisionweapons,andtheneedforthepreciseapplicationofforceintheevolv-
ing nature of joint operations across the spectrum of conflict. Are Army forces
launchedfromaNavyshipsupportedbyAirForcebombersdroppingprecision-
strikemunitionsengagedinaland,maritime,orairoperation?Thattheansweris
notsoclearisnosurprise,norisitasurprisethatsuchuncertaintycandriveorga-
nizationalconfusion.
Theresultcanbeorganizationalstovepipeswhereagroundcommand-
er may have to send his request for air support up the ground forces chain of
command several echelons to the “terra-based” component commander level.
36 Parameters
There,therequestcanmovehorizontallytotheaircomponentcommanderand
back down the air component command structure to the operational level air
commander,whowillactuallyplanandflythemission.Moreover,whilemany
officerscantalk“joint,”theystillthink“service.”Whatisjointdoctrineinname
actually reinforces the service-centric nature of our operations. At the most
basic level, planning procedures and operational concepts fundamentally con-
strainregionalCombatantCommanderstothinkintermsofland(Army),air(Air
Force), and maritime (Navy) terms, even though warfare is no longer so easily
compartmentalized.
Inaddition,asthenatureofwarfarechanges,labelsofwhatisthought
oftodayas“conventional”and“unconventional”mayblendinthefuturetosuch
apointwhereitismoreusefultoconceiveofmilitaryoperationsaseitherautono-
mous or centralized. Autonomous operations are generally handled by small,
hand-selected, and extremely well-trained and well-equipped forces. Special
OperationsForcesprovideagoodexampleofunitsfittingtheautonomousopera-
tionsprofile.SpecialOperationsForcesarenotperfectlysuitedforallmannerof
missions, but they are able to accomplish results disproportionate to their size
preciselybecauseofthehighperformancestandardssetandmetbytheirmem-
bers,thecollectiveexperiencetheybringtobear,andthelatitudetheyaregiven
to perform their duties. Centralized operations, conversely, accomplish their
goalsbymassingforcesunderstrictercommandandcontrolarrangementstooff-
setthelowerexperiencelevelsfoundinthemajorityofpersonnelinmainforce
units.Thisautonomous/centralizeddichotomydoesnotcompartmentalizewell
alongtraditionalland,air,andmaritimelines.15
Furthermore, as security operations evolve in the modern era, “multi-
dimensional”nolongerrefersonlytothemediumsofland,sea,andairinwhich
the forces operate. Today, the term “multiple dimensions” encompasses all ele-
mentsofnationalpowerfocusingsimultaneouslyonasecurityproblem.TheState
Departmentisofteninvolved,forinstance,asistheJusticeDepartmentandeven
the Treasury Department. So too are many quasi-governmental or nongovern-
mentalagencies.Yet,theDepartmentofDefenseoftenmustcoordinatethoseef-
fortsintoonecomprehensivecampaignplan.Tothatend,DODhasrecognizedthe
needforinputandactionfromothernational,international,andnongovernment
agenciesinajointinteragencyprocess,andittestedaninteragencygroupduring
the “Millennium Challenge ’02” experiment. These organizations and agencies
arenoteasilymeldedintoland,sea,oraircommandstructures,however,andtotry
todosoimpedestheirabilitytocontributetothemission.16
Challenge#2:AtWhatLevelDoForcesBecome“Joint”?
The second conflict comes from the underlying assumption that the
three-starlevelistheappropriateechelonwherethecomponentforcesshould
“join”tomakejointforces.Advancesintechnologyallowtheelementsofeach
service to communicate and share information quickly with each other, en-
Autumn2003 37
abling them to work more closely together. This, combined with advances in
munitions, has the potential to create a synergy among the services and yield
greatercombatpowerinsmallerforcepackagesthaneverbefore.AsAmerican
forcestransform,theynolongerneedtobringtobeargreatnumbersofforcesto
engage the enemy in a climactic battle of attrition. Today one small team of
ground operators working in conjunction with just a few airplanes often can
do what once would have required much larger ground and air forces.17 The
combat power that once was deliverable only by divisions and wings has
nowdevolveddowntolowerandlowerlevelsoforganization.Once,massive
formations grew out of the amalgamation of many separate entities, as forces
layeredthemyriadcombat,combatsupport,andcombatservicesupportorga-
nizationsontopofoneanothertobuildaforceofadequatemassandfirepower.
Thus,theforcegrewtobesolargethatitmadesensetomergeitintothejoint
world at the component command level.
Thattheseheavyforceshavebeenhugelysuccessfulinthepastisindis-
putable. Nevertheless, they are also hugely dependant on gigantic logistical
trains that stretch for hundreds of miles. These trains, in turn, require combat
powertosafeguardthem.Buttransformationalvisionsofafuturebattlefieldsee
it unconstrained by traditional lines or designations such as “front” and “rear.”
Forceswillbesupportedby“justintime”or“reachback”logisticalconceptsthat
supplytheforcewithmaterielandinformationwithoutsignificantlyexpanding
itsfootprintintheareaofoperations.Thebattlespacewillnolongerbethelinear,
one-dimensionalbattlefieldoftheindustrialage,butamuchmorefluidsituation
drivenbyinformation-agetechnologiesandoperationalconceptsthatcreatedis-
continuousbattlelinesacrossallthreedimensions.18
These changes enable the development of emerging operational con-
ceptscenteringaroundthepreceptofmassingeffectswithoutmassingphysical
presence. Non-organic platforms deliver those effects from beyond traditional
battlespaceboundaries,andtheywillextendbeyondtheuseoftraditionalkinetic
andexplosivelethalforcestoencompassbothnon-lethalweaponsandinforma-
tionoperations.Jointforcesattacktheenemynotonlyinhisphysicaldomainbut
in the realm of human psychology as well, in campaigns designed to disorient
anddemoralizetheenemy.Theideaisthatifonehitscertainpressurepoints,the
enemyleadershipwillcrumblefromwithin,evenwhileretainingthemilitaryca-
pabilitytocontinuethefight.
Figure2,onthefollowingpage,depictstoday’sdoctrinalcommandand
controllinkagesbetweengroundandaerospaceforces,19butwhatthepreceding
discussionindicatesisthattheinteractionbetweenforcesoperatingindifferent
mediums is going to have to happen at levels well below where the interaction
happenstoday.Layersofcommanddiffusetheintentofthecommandersactually
engagedinthebattleandaddcomplexitytodecisionmakingcycles,whichthen
erodestheresponsivenessbetweencomponentsnecessarytomaketheseemerg-
ingconceptssuccessful.Thus,theassumptionthatthecomponentcommanderor
38 Parameters
JFC
AWACS JOC
ABCCC
CRC JFACC
FAC(A)
JFLCC JAOC
CRE BCE
Corps
Division FSE
A2C2
FSE
Brigade TACP TACP ASOC
GLO
Battalion
FSE WOC
FSE TACP
TACP
FlyingWings/Groups/
Squadrons
Figure2.Doctrinalcommandandcontrolarchitecturefor
jointaerospace/groundoperations.
three-star level is the appropriate echelon to bring together the separate forces
intoajointforceiscreatingaconflictbetweenthenatureoftoday’soperations
andthewaythejointoperationalarchitectureisorganized.
Withthisdisjointedarchitectureinmind,itshouldbereadilyapparent
why problems such as the reported difficulties coordinating close air support
with ground operations in Afghanistan occur. In an interview for the Army’s
Field Artillery journal, Army Major General Franklin L. Hagenbeck, com-
manderofthe10thMountainDivisionandtheon-scenecommanderforOpera-
tionAnacondainAfghanistan,hintedthatoperationaleffectivenesswaslimited
because close air support (particularly from the Air Force) was hindered by
overreliance on precision-guided munitions, difficulty in hitting non-fixed tar-
gets, and strict targeting procedures.20 Understandably, some in the Air Force
counteredthattheArmy’slast-minuteattemptatcoordinationandunrealisticre-
quirements for close air support assets effectively hamstrung the Air Force be-
forethemissionevenbegan.
Becausethecomponentsaresplitbythemediuminwhichtheyoperate
(andservicestowhichtheybelong),commandersinonejointcomponentrarely
interactwiththeircounterpartsinpeacetime.Furthermore,sincethemilitaryha-
bituallywaitsuntilacrisisemergesbeforeitformsadhocjointorganizationsto
fight the developing battle, tactical- and operational-level commanders rarely
havetheopportunitytodevelopthedeepexpertiseinjointoperationsthatmod-
erncontingenciesrequire.InthecaseofOperationAnaconda,itisnotclearthat
Autumn2003 39