DTIC ADA588621: Predicting Suicide Attacks: Characteristics of Bombings in Israel

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RESEARCH BRIEF
Predicting Suicide Attacks
Characteristics of Bombings in Israel
The threat of suicide bombings in the United States and
elsewhere prompted the Department of Homeland Key findings:
Security to commission the Naval Research Laboratory
• Geospatial features correlated with suicide bombings in
(NRL) to develop a method for predicting the determinants
Israel include bus routes, main traffic routes, and parking
of suicide bombing attacks. As a test case, NRL chose to
areas. Attackers tend to favor crowded areas, such as for
study bombings in Israel, where many such attacks have
shopping and entertainment, and they often return to pre-
already taken place and where the data describing them are
viously attacked sites.
particularly good. NRL focused on four Israeli cities—Jeru-
salem, Haifa, Tel Aviv, and Netanya—and on three terrorist • Sociocultural correlates of suicide bombings include
groups—Hamas, Al-Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigade, and the Pales- high concentrations of Jews or immigrants, as well as
tinian Islamic Jihad—from 1993 to 2006. occurrence of political negotiations or religious holidays.
The first part of the NRL study identified spatial prefer- Political support for right-wing candidates is negatively
correlated with suicide attacks.
ence patterns. It found that areas at high risk for attack included
those with bus routes, main traffic routes, and parking areas.
• Ultimately, with better data, such analyses could support
For the second part of the study, NRL turned to RAND
recommendations for heightened public awareness or
to enhance the predictive ability of the methodology by
preparedness drills. But care must be taken in generaliz-
incorporating socioeconomic, demographic, and political
ing these results from Israel to other countries.
aspects of suicide bomber attacks. RAND researchers tested
these variables both quantitatively and qualitatively. The
quantitative analysis focuses on Jerusalem, while the qualita-
tive analysis includes all four cities.
Qualitative Analysis and Results
Quantitative Analysis and Results For our qualitative analysis, we reviewed open-source articles
The quantitative analysis focused on statistical areas as about attacks and target sites in Jerusalem, Tel Aviv, Haifa,
defined by the Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics, areas com- and Netanya. We then identified themes common to suicide
parable to U.S. census tracts that we refer to as “neighbor- bombing sites in Israel. The themes reflected both types and
hoods.” Our analysis data included socioeconomic character- attributes of target locations. We found terrorists targeted
istics, demographic characteristics, electoral data, proximity accessible crowds. Such crowds did not have to be large. In
to terrorist safe houses, and sociocultural precipitants (e.g., general, suicide bombers were content to target groups of
religious holidays or political events). We found that these dozens or even smaller. Attackers were also very repetitive in
data not only have statistically significant relationships with target decisions: More than one in three attacks were repeat
the odds of attack within specific neighborhoods but also strikes on locations previously targeted.
explain unique variances in the risk of attack over and above Attackers often targeted places that were well known.
geographical predictors. Nearly 70 percent of targets were a principal shopping loca-
Demographically, both having a heavily Jewish popula- tion, a main street for shopping and entertainment, or an
tion and having a large number of immigrants (particularly iconic location (i.e., a site of symbolic or popular interest or
from Asia and Africa) were related to greater risk of attack. one that would be well known to local residents). Other attri-
Voting for right-wing or Orthodox parties in 1999 was related butes for targeted sites included having crowds of children
to lower risk of attack. Jewish religious holidays and political or youth, easy access, or a beachfront location; being places
negotiations also led to greater likelihood of attack within where Israelis and Arabs commingled; and being a disco or
specified time windows. The figure summarizes relationships club. We found that, over time, target selection migrated
among attack sites, sociocultural risks, and geospatial risks. from iconic and central locations to other sites, perhaps in
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Predicting Suicide Attacks: Characteristics of Bombings in Israel
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Combined Geospatial and Sociocultural Risk Map, Jerusalem Conclusions and Recommendations
Some of the relationships we found, such as the attractiveness
of neighborhoods with high-density Jewish populations, are
obvious. Others, such as the link between immigrant neigh-
borhoods and terrorist attacks, are less obvious and deserve
further exploration.
Our exploratory analyses were cross-sectional, but the
sociocultural and geospatial variables and even precipitant
events likely change over time. Future research using mul-
tiple years of data could determine how these changes affect
suicide bombings. Outcomes in one neighborhood are also
likely correlated with outcomes in nearby neighborhoods.
Future analyses could explore in more depth such spatial
influences.
This analysis is limited to preferences of Palestinian
suicide bombers. While there are some similarities between
attack sites in Israel and those elsewhere, we expect there are
significant differences as well. Suicide bombings in Israel
0 10 took place during open hostilities between Israel and Pal-
Kilometers estinians, and Palestinian terrorist organizations have long
glorified suicide operations. Neither condition is likely to
Suicide bombing attacks
Sociocultural risk > 50% apply to the United States or other Western countries. In the
Low geospatial risk (0–0.79)
United States, for example, there is no comparable conflict
Medium geospatial risk (0.80–1.55)
High geospatial risk (> 1.55) between the government and minority groups. The United
States and other countries have also had relatively few suicide
attacks (September 11, 2001, being the only U.S. example).
At the same time, there may well be similarities between
the types of places that terrorists attack in Israel and else-
response to increased security at preferred sites. Nevertheless, where. Suicide bombers in Israel appear to favor places
sites attacked multiple times included the following: with crowds or transportation nodes, a finding that may be
• in Jerusalem, the central bus station, the Jaffa Road and applicable elsewhere. The methods used to assess target pref-
King George Street intersection, the Mahane Yehuda erences in Israel could be transferred elsewhere. Qualitative
market, Ben Yehuda street (a pedestrian mall), and the data analysis can be applied directly to data from elsewhere.
French Hill bus junction Quantitative techniques would need to be restructured
• in Tel Aviv, the Neve Sha’ana market and shopping areas slightly, but underlying methods would still apply. Increasing
near the central bus station the amount of available data, such as including all sites that
• in Netanya, Hasharon Mall entrances and immediately were under surveillance, whether or not attacks succeeded,
surrounding areas, such as bus stops. could yield more insights into what terrorists consider to be
ideal targets. Ultimately, such research could help develop
Twenty-three attacks also occurred on transportation sys- recommendations for heightened public awareness or pre-
tems, including seven attacks on the system itself, 13 attacks paredness drills in certain areas.
on locations that indirectly involved transportation, and three
attacks that were premature detonations on bus lines.
This research brief describes work done for the RAND National Defense Research Institute, and RAND Justice, Infrastructure, and Environment,
documented in Predicting Suicide Attacks: Integrating Spatial, Temporal, and Social Features of Terrorist Attack Targets, by Walter L. Perry,
Claude Berrebi, Ryan Andrew Brown, John S. Hollywood, Amber Jaycocks, Parisa Roshan, Thomas Sullivan, and Lisa Miyashiro, MG-1246-NRL,
2013 (available at http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/MG1246.html). The RAND Corporation is a nonprofit research institution that
helps improve policy and decisionmaking through research and analysis. RAND’s publications do not necessarily reflect the opinions of its
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