DTIC ADA564988: Acknowledging Limits: Police Advisors and Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan

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W I L L I A M R O S E N A U
ACKNOWLEDGING LIMITS
P O L I C E A D V I S O R S A N D C O U N T E R I N S U R G E N C Y I N
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2011 2. REPORT TYPE 00-00-2011 to 00-00-2011
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Acknowledging Limits: Police Advisors and Counterinsurgency in
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Afghanistan
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ACKNOWLEDGING LIMITS
Police Advisors and Counterinsurgency in
A F G H A N I S T A N
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Acknowledging Limits: Police Advisors and Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan.
© 2011 by CNA Corporation. All rights reserved.
PCN 10600004400
Published by Marine Corps University Press, Quantico, VA.
Contents
v
AcronymsandAbbreviations
vii
PrefaceandAcknowledgments
viii
MapofVignetteLocations
1
Introduction
13
Vignette1: PoliceMentoringTeam,QalatDistrict,2008
21
Vignette2: PoliceTrainingMission,Khost-GardezPass,2007–2008
29
Vignette3: BritishPoliceMentors,HelmandProvince,2008–2009
35
Vignette4: AfghanNationalCivilOrderPoliceAdvisor,2007–2008
41
Vignette5: PoliceMentoring,GhazniandPaktikaProvinces,2008–2009
53
Vignette6: U.S.MarineCorpsPoliceMentoringTeamCommander,
GarmsirDistrict,2009
61
Vignette7: BritishPoliceMentor,HelmandProvince,2009
71
Vignette8: RegionalPoliceMentoringTeamCommander,Northern
Afghanistan,2007–2008
81
Vignette9: U.S.MarineCorpsPoliceMentoringTeamCommander,
Nawa-I-BarakzayiDistrict,2009
89
Vignette10: U.S.MarineCorpsPoliceMentor,NowZadDistrict,2009
95
Conclusion
iii
Acronyms
and Abbreviations
ABP AfghanBorderPolice
ALP AfghanLocalPolice
ANA AfghanNationalArmy
ANCOP AfghanNationalCivilOrderPolice
ANP AfghanNationalPolice
BDD BorderDistrictDevelopment
CDI CivilianDefenseInitiative
CJTF-Phoenix CombinedJointTaskForce–Phoenix
CSTC-A CombinedSecurityTransitionCommand–Afghanistan
DOD U.S.DepartmentofDefense
EUPOL EuropeanUnionPoliceMission
FDD FocusedDistrictDevelopment
FOB ForwardOperatingBase
GAO U.S.GovernmentAccountabilityOffice
v
IED Improvisedexplosivedevice
ISAF InternationalSecurityAssistanceForce
ISCI InterimSecurityforCriticalInfrastructure
MoI MinistryofInterior
MP MilitaryPolice
NATO/ISAF NorthAtlanticTreatyOrganization/
InternationalSecurityAssistanceForce
NTM-A NATOTrainingMission–Afghanistan
OPTEMPO Operationaltempo
PMT PoliceMentoringTeam
PRT ProvincialReconstructionTeam
QRF Quick-ReactionForce
RGR RoyalGurkhaRifles
RTC RegionalTrainingCenter
SWAT SpecialWeaponsandTactics
vi
Preface and
Acknowledgments
ThismonographexplorespolicementoringinAfghanistanbyU.S.andUKmilitaryforces
duringthe2007–2009period.Inaseriesof10vignettes,thisstudyexaminesefforts
toadvise,train,andsupportelementsoftheAfghanNationalPolice(ANP)innorthern,
eastern,andsouthernAfghanistan.ThesevignettesexplorethementoringofANPunits,
aswellastheadvisingofindividualchiefsofpoliceatthedistrictandprovincelevels.
ThisstudywouldnothavebeenpossiblewithoutthegenerousassistanceofAmerican
andBritishsoldiersandMarineswhogavemanyhoursoftheirtimeininterviewsand
follow-oncommunicationswiththeauthor.Theauthorwouldalsoliketoacknowledge
LieutenantColonelTroyWright,USMC,oftheJointCenterforInternationalSecurityForce
Assistance,whofacilitatedkeyinterviews,andtheIrregularWarfareCommunityofIn-
terest,whosemembershelpedidentifyandlocateinterviewsubjects.
TheauthorwouldalsoliketothankCNA’sConnieCuster,KarinDuggan,MeganKatt,
Jerry Meyerle, Rebecca Martin, Eric Thompson, and Lee Woodard. Finally, the author
thanks the Marine Corps University Press, in particular Jim Caiella, Andrea Connell,
SteveEvans,RobertKocher,ShawnVreeland, andKenWilliams.
vii
TAJIKISTAN
UZBEKISTAN DUSHANBE CHINA
TURKMENISTAN
SJhOebWerZgJhAanN 8 MShaazrairfi KUNDUZ Fayzabad
Kunduz Taluqan BADAKHSHAN
BALKH TAKHAR
Aibak
SariPul
Maimanah
SAMANGAN PuliKhumri
FARYAB SARIPUL BAGHLAN PANJSHIR Parun
Bazarak
BADGHIS NURISTAN
Qala-l-Naw BAMYAN Charikar MKaAhPmIuSdARaqi Asadabad
Bamyan PARWAN 4 LAGHMAN KUNAR
Herat Chaghcharan MaidanShahr KABKUALBUL MehtarlaNmANGARHAR
HERAT GHOR WARDAK PuliAlam Jalalabad
ISLAMABAD
DAYKUNDI LOGAR PAKTIA INDIA
IRAN Gardez
Nili Ghazni KHOST
GHAZNI 5 2 Khost
Sharan
URUZGAN
FARAH TarinKot
Farah PAKTIKA
ZABUL
1
10 Qalat 5 PAKISTAN
Lashkar Kandahar
Gah
3
7 6 9
NIMROZ
Zaranj KANDAHAR INTERNATIONALBOUNDARY
HELMAND
N
NATIONALCAPITAL
PROVINCE(WELAYAT)CAPITAL
Afghanistanhas34provinces(welayats)
0 50 100 150 Kilometers
0 50 100 150 Miles
Map of
Vignette Locations
1. PoliceMentoringTeam,QalatDistrict,2008
2. PoliceTrainingMission,Khost-GardezPass,2007–2008
3. BritishPoliceMentors,HelmandProvince,2008–2009
4. AfghanNationalCivilOrderPoliceAdvisor,2007–2008
5. PoliceMentoring,GhazniandPaktikaProvinces,2008–2009
6. U.S.MarineCorpsPoliceMentoringTeamCommander,GarmsirDistrict,2009
7. BritishPoliceMentor,HelmandProvince,2009
8. RegionalPoliceMentoringTeamCommander,NorthernAfghanistan,2007–2008
9. U.S.MarineCorpsPoliceMentoringTeamCommander,Nawa-I-BarakzayiDistrict,2009
10. U.S.MarineCorpsPoliceMentor,NowZadDistrict,2009
Introduction
The role of the police is an important but largely overlooked aspect of contemporary
counterinsurgency and stability operations. Although academic and policy specialists
haveexaminedtheroleofpoliceinpostconflictenvironments,thequestionofhowpo-
liceshouldbeorganized,trained,andequippedforcounterinsurgencycampaignshas
receivedlittlesystematicattention.1Similarly,U.S.militarydoctrineandtheprofessional
militaryliterature,whilenotignoringthesubjectentirely,donotconsideritinanysys-
tematicway.2Thisgapisparticularlyironic,giventheprominentrolethatsoldiersand
Marines have played in training indigenous police and other security forces in coun-
terinsurgencycampaignsfromVietnamtoAfghanistan.
Ifthebroadertopicofpoliceandcounterinsurgencyisunderexamined,thesubjectof
mentoring—thatis,advising,training,andpartneringwith—foreignpoliceforcesiseven
moreneglected.AmericanMarines,soldiers,andothermilitarypersonnelpreparingto
deploytoAfghanistanforthepolicementoringmissionhavefewsourcesofinformation
andanalysisavailabletothem.Thismonographaddressesthatgap.Usingaseriesof
10vignettes,thisreportexaminesindepththeexperiencesofindividualAmericanand
BritishsoldiersandMarineswhoservedasmentorsinAfghanistanduringthe2007–
2009period.
Approach
ItshouldbenotedthatthisstudyisnotanassessmentoftheAfghanpolice.Norisit
anevaluationoftheU.S.andNorthAtlanticTreatyOrganization/InternationalSecurity
1AnimportantrecentexceptionisDavidH.BayleyandRobertM.Perito,ThePoliceinWar:Fighting
Insurgency,Terrorism,andViolentCrime(Boulder,CO:LynneRiennerPublishers,2010).
2JamesS.Corum,“TrainingIndigenousForcesinCounterinsurgency:ATaleofTwoInsurgencies,”
U.S.ArmyStrategicStudiesInstitute,March2006,www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.
mil/pubs/summary.cfm?q=648,accessed15June2010.U.S.ArmyFieldManual3-24,
Counterinsurgency,widelyconsideredthemilitary’smostimportantdoctrinalstatementon
counterinsurgency,devotesfewerthansevenpagestothesubjectofpoliceandcounterinsurgency.
“Networkanalysisandotheranalyticaltools,”ontheotherhand,receives28pages.