DTIC ADA552684: Learning from Experience, Volume 2: Lessons from the U.S. Navy's Ohio, Seawolf, and Virginia Submarine Programs

0.67 MB·English

by  Defense Technical Information Center

CHILDREN AND FAMILIES The RAND Corporation is a nonprofit institution that
EDUCATION AND THE ARTS helps improve policy and decisionmaking through
research and analysis.
ENERGY AND ENVIRONMENT
HEALTH AND HEALTH CARE This electronic document was made available from
INFRASTRUCTURE AND www.rand.org as a public service of the RAND
TRANSPORTATION
Corporation.
INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS
LAW AND BUSINESS
Skip all front matter: Jump to Page 16
NATIONAL SECURITY
POPULATION AND AGING
PUBLIC SAFETY
Support RAND
SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY
Purchase this document
TERRORISM AND
HOMELAND SECURITY Browse Reports & Bookstore
Make a charitable contribution
For More Information
Visit RAND at www.rand.org
Explore the RAND National Defense
Research Institute
View document details
Limited Electronic Distribution Rights
This document and trademark(s) contained herein are protected by law as indicated
in a notice appearing later in this work. This electronic representation of RAND
intellectual property is provided for non-commercial use only. Unauthorized posting
of RAND electronic documents to a non-RAND website is prohibited. RAND
electronic documents are protected under copyright law. Permission is required
from RAND to reproduce, or reuse in another form, any of our research documents
for commercial use. For information on reprint and linking permissions, please see
RAND Permissions.
Report Documentation Page Form Approved
OMB No. 0704-0188
Public reporting burden for the collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and
maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information,
including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington
VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to a penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it

does not display a currently valid OMB control number.
1. REPORT DATE 3. DATES COVERED
2011 2. REPORT TYPE 00-00-2011 to 00-00-2011
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE 5a. CONTRACT NUMBER
Learning from Experience. Volume 2. Lessons from the U.S. Navy’s Ohio,
5b. GRANT NUMBER
Seawolf, and Virginia Submarine Programs
5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER
6. AUTHOR(S) 5d. PROJECT NUMBER
5e. TASK NUMBER
5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION
RAND Corporation,National Defense Research Institute,1776 Main REPORT NUMBER
Street, P.O. Box 2138,Santa Monica,CA,90407-2138
9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 10. SPONSOR/MONITOR’S ACRONYM(S)
11. SPONSOR/MONITOR’S REPORT
NUMBER(S)
12. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT
Approved for public release; distribution unlimited
13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES
14. ABSTRACT

15. SUBJECT TERMS
16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF: 17. LIMITATION OF 18. NUMBER 19a. NAME OF
ABSTRACT OF PAGES RESPONSIBLE PERSON
a. REPORT b. ABSTRACT c. THIS PAGE Same as 155
unclassified unclassified unclassified Report (SAR)
Standard Form 298 (Rev. 8-98)
Prescribed by ANSI Std Z39-18
This product is part of the RAND Corporation monograph series.
RAND monographs present major research findings that address the
challenges facing the public and private sectors. All RAND mono-
graphs undergo rigorous peer review to ensure high standards for
research quality and objectivity.
JOHN F. SCHANK CESSE IP FRANK W. LACROIX ROBERT E. MURPHY
• • •
MARK V. ARENA KRISTY N. KAMARCK GORDON T. LEE
• •
LEARNING
FROM
EXPERIENCE
VOLUME II
Lessons from the U.S. Navy’s
Ohio, Seawolf, and Virginia Submarine Programs
Prepared for the United States Navy
Approved for public release; distribution unlimited
NATIONAL DEFENSE RESEARCH INSTITUTE
The research described in this report was prepared for the United States
Navy. The research was conducted within the RAND National Defense
Research Institute, a federally funded research and development center
sponsored by the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff,
the Unified Combatant Commands, the Navy, the Marine Corps, the
defense agencies, and the defense Intelligence Community under Contract
W74V8H-06-C-0002.
Library of Congress Control Number: 2011939404
ISBN: 978-0-8330-5896-6
The RAND Corporation is a nonprofit institution that helps improve
policy and decisionmaking through research and analysis. RAND’s
publications do not necessarily reflect the opinions of its research clients
and sponsors.
R
® is a registered trademark.
© Copyright 2011 RAND Corporation
Permission is given to duplicate this document for personal use only, as
long as it is unaltered and complete. Copies may not be duplicated for
commercial purposes. Unauthorized posting of RAND documents to a
non-RAND website is prohibited. RAND documents are protected under
copyright law. For information on reprint and linking permissions, please
visit the RAND permissions page (http://www.rand.org/publications/
permissions.html).
Published 2011 by the RAND Corporation
1776 Main Street, P.O. Box 2138, Santa Monica, CA 90407-2138
1200 South Hayes Street, Arlington, VA 22202-5050
4570 Fifth Avenue, Suite 600, Pittsburgh, PA 15213-2665
RAND URL: http://www.rand.org
To order RAND documents or to obtain additional information, contact
Distribution Services: Telephone: [phone];
Fax: [phone]; Email: [email protected]
Preface
The successful conduct of large, complex design and construction pro-
grams requires personnel with unique skills and capabilities supple-
mented with practical experience in their areas of expertise. This is
especially true for the design and construction of new nuclear powered
submarines. Unique design and engineering skills must be nurtured
and sustained and program managers at all levels must be trained and
educated to create the pool of knowledge and experience to conduct a
successful program.1 In the past, the growth and sustainment of key
technical and management personnel in the submarine community
was facilitated through numerous sequential design and acquisition
programs. Personnel participated in one or more programs, gaining
experience to be the leaders in future programs.
Due to increases in the operational lives of submarines and the
constrained defense budgets faced by most nations, new submarine
programs are occurring less frequently. There are now substantial gaps
between new programs, providing fewer opportunities for personnel
to gain the experience needed to manage complex processes and make
informed decisions. Future managers of new programs may not have
the benefit of learning from the challenges faced and the issues solved
in past programs.
Recognizing the importance of past experience for successful
program management, the Program Executive Officer for Submarines
asked the RAND Corporation to develop a set of lessons learned from
previous submarine programs that could help inform future program
1 See Schank et al., 2005a; Schank et al., 2007.
iii
iv Learning from Experience, Volume II
managers. This volume describes the important lessons from the Ohio,
Seawolf, and Virginia programs. Separate volumes in the series provide
lessons from the United Kingdom and Australian submarine programs
and a summary of the lessons learned from all three programs:
• MG-1128/1-NAVY, Learning from Experience, Volume I: Lessons
from the Submarine Programs of the United States, United King-
dom, and Australia
• MG-1128/3-NAVY, Learning from Experience, Volume III: Lessons
from the United Kingdom’s Astute Submarine Program
• MG-1128/4-NAVY, Learning from Experience, Volume IV: Lessons
from Australia’s Collins Submarine Program.
This research was conducted within the Acquisition and Technol-
ogy Policy Center of the RAND National Defense Research Institute,
a federally funded research and development center sponsored by the
Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff, the Unified Com-
batant Commands, the Navy, the Marine Corps, the defense agencies,
and the defense Intelligence Community.
For more information on the Acquisition and Technology Policy
Center, see http://www.rand.org/nsrd/ndri/centers/atp.html or contact
the director (contact information is provided on the web page).
Contents
Preface ............................................................................. iii
Figures ............................................................................. ix
Tables .............................................................................. xi
Summary .........................................................................xiii
Acknowledgments ............................................................xxvii
Abbreviations ...................................................................xxix
CHAPTER ONE
Introduction ....................................................................... 1
Organization of This Document ................................................. 3
CHAPTER TWO
U.S. Nuclear Submarines Up to Ohio ......................................... 5
Historical Lessons in Submarine Acquisition ................................... 8
CHAPTER THREE
Ohio Case Study .................................................................11
Background ........................................................................11
Setting the Requirements ........................................................15
Acquisition Strategy ..............................................................18
Designing and Building the Ohio-Class Submarines .........................21
New Facilities................................................................... 23
Workforce Issues ................................................................25
Quality Control Issues ........................................................ 26
Government-Furnished Equipment ......................................... 27
Design Changes .................................................................29
v
vi Learning from Experience, Volume II
Areas of Schedule Delays and Cost Growth .................................. 30
Schedule Delays ................................................................ 30
Cost Growth .....................................................................32
Life-Cycle Issues .................................................................. 34
Conversions to SSGN ............................................................35
Lessons from the Ohio Program ................................................ 36
CHAPTER FOUR
Seawolf Case Study ............................................................. 43
Background ....................................................................... 43
Setting the Requirements ....................................................... 44
Acquisition Strategy ............................................................. 46
Designing and Building the Seawolf-Class Submarines ..................... 48
Facility and Workforce Issues .................................................51
Quality Control Issues .........................................................51
Government- and Contractor-Furnished Equipment .......................52
Design Changes .................................................................52
Areas of Schedule Delays and Cost Growth ..................................53
Life-Cycle Issues .................................................................. 56
Lessons from the Seawolf Program ............................................ 56
Moving to the First Post–Cold War Submarine Program....................58
CHAPTER FIVE
Virginia Case Study .............................................................61
Background ........................................................................61
Setting the Requirements ........................................................63
Acquisition Strategy ............................................................. 68
Designing and Building the Virginia-Class Submarines .....................70
Software Tools ...................................................................78
Modular Build ................................................................. 80
Metrics and Oversight ..........................................................82
Areas of Cost Growth and Schedule Delays .................................. 86
Life-Cycle Issues ...................................................................89
Lessons from the Virginia Program ........................................... 90
Contents vii
CHAPTER SIX
Lessons Identified ................................................................93
Top-Level Strategic Lessons ..................................................... 96
Supporting and Managing the Program ...................................... 98
Setting Operational Requirements ............................................ 100
Establishing a Contracting Environment .................................... 102
Designing and Building the Submarines ..................................... 106
Planning for Integrated Logistics Support ................................... 108
APPENDIX
Significant Events in the Three Programs ................................. 111
Bibliography .................................................................... 117